BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCHOF THE MADRAS HIGH COURT DATED: 17.07.2014 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.NAGAMUTHU Writ Petition (MD)No.17990 of 2013 and Writ Petition (MD)No.18550 of 2013 and M.P.(MD)Nos.1 & 2 of 2013 in W.P.(MD)No.17990 of 2013 and 2 and 3 of 2013 in W.P.(MD)No.18550 of 2013 and 1 of 2014 in W.P.(MD)Nos.17990 and 18550 of 2013 I.Shahul Hameed ..Petitioner in WP179902013 V.Ganesan ..Petitioner in WP185502013 versus 1.The Chairman, Pandyan Grama Bank, Administrative OfficeCivil Appeal No.3081 of 2006, 2/70/1, Collector Office Complex, Virudhunagar, Virudhunagar District.
2.The Board of DirectORS.Appellate Authority, Administrative Office, 2/70/1, Collector Office Complex, Virudhunagar, Virudhunagar District..Respondents in both the WPs W.P.(MD)No.17990/2013 Writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying for issuance of a writ of certiorarified mandamus, calling for the records pertaining to the impugned proceedings issued by the 1st respondent, dated 12.09.2011, in his letter No.AIVD/V/309/11-12, quashing the same and consequently directing the respondents to reinstate the petitioner as Office, Scale-I, in the respondent Bank within a stipulated time, along with all monetary and service benefits.
W.P.(MD)No.18550/2013 Writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying for issuance of a writ of certiorarified mandamus, calling for the records pertaining to the impugned proceedings issued by the 1st respondent/The Chairman, Disciplinary Authority of Pandyan Grama Bank, in his letter dated 12.09.2011 in AIVD/V/310/11-12 and also letter dated 26.09.2013 in No.AIVD/763/2013-14, quashing the same and consequently directing the respondents to reinstate the petitioner as Office Assistant (Multipurpose) in the respondent Pandyan Grama Bank, within the stipulated time as may be fixed by this Court, along with all monetary and service benefits.
!For Petitioner : Mr.F.Deepak in WP179902013 For Petitioner : Mr.C.Masilamani in WP185502013 For Respondents : Mr.N.G.R.Prasad for in both the WPs Mr.M.P.Senthil :COMMON
ORDERThe petitioner in W.P.(MD)No.17990 of 2013 was formerly working as the Manager of Illuppaiyur Branch, Pandyan Grama Bank in Virudhunagar District.
The petitioner in W.P.(MD)No.18550 of 2013 was working as the Cashier in the said branch of the Bank.
Admittedly, one Mr.B.Muthupandi approached the said Branch for jewel loan.
The jewel produced by Mr.Muthupandi was appraised by the Appraiser and certified to be worth for a loan of Rs.800/- only.
However, these two petitioneRs.in collusion with each other, prepared and passed a debit voucher for Rs.7000/- to make it appear as though Rs.7000/- was paid to Mr.Muthupandi.
But, in fact, they paid only Rs.800/- to Muthupandi, as the proceeds of his jewel loan and these two petitioners allegedly misappropriated Rs.6200/-.
It is further alleged that in order to conceal the act of misappropriation, these two petitioners had asked the introducer of the jewel loan borrower to pay the misappropriated amount with interest on 05.03.2002.
2.With these allegations, independent charge memos were issued to the petitioneRs.on 20.05.2003, The petitioners denied the charges.
Having not been satisfied with the same, enquiry officers were appointed by the Bank to hold an enquiry into the charges against each petitioner.
The petitioners also participated before the respective enquiry officeRs.Finally, the enquiry officer concerned held the respective petitioner guilty of the charges.
Based on the same, by means of separate ordeRs.dated 12.09.2011 in AIVD/V/309/2011-2012 (in respect of the petitioner in W.P.(MD)No.17990/2013) and in AIVD/V/310/2011-12 (in respect of the petitioner in W.P.(MD)No.18550 of 2013).the disciplinary authority imposed a punishment of dismissal from service, in terms of Regulation 38(II)(b)(vi) of the Pandyan Grama Bank (Officers and Employees) Service Regulations, 2001.
As against the same, the petitioner in W.P.(MD)No.17990 of 2013 preferred an appeal on 25.10.2011 and on the same day, the petitioner in W.P.(MD)No.18550 of 2013, filed a separate appeal.
The appellate authority, namely the 2nd respondent/appellate authority, by order dated 26.09.2013 in AIVD/764/2013-14, dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner in W.P.(MD)No.17990 of 2013 and similarly, by order in AIVD/763/2013-14, dated 26.09.2013, dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner in W.P.(MD)No.18550 of 2013.
Aggrieved over these two ordeRs.the petitioners have come up with these two writ petitions.
3.I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned counsel appearing for the respondents and I have also perused the records, available.
4.Since common issues are involved in both the writ petitions, they were heard together and they are disposed of by this common order.
5.Admittedly, the appellate authority is the Board of DirectORS.consisting of as many as 8 membeRs.including the Chairman.
In order to consider the appeals filed by the petitioneRs.a meeting of the Board of Directors/Appellate Authority was held on 28.02.2012.
In the said meeting, the facts and evidence involved in the case and the nature of the allegations were threadbare deliberated upon among the Board of Directors and finally the Board decided to set aside the punishments of dismissal from service and instead decided to reduce the punishment into any one of the other major punishments other than dismissal/ removal/ compulsory retirement in terms of the Service Regulations of the Bank.
6.According to the respondent bank, as per the Central Vigilance Commission Guidelines, any modification of stiff major punishments like dismissal/ removal/compulsory retirement by the appellate authority, for which advice was already tendered by the Chief Vigilance Officer, to lesser punishment, requires the concurrence of the Chief Vigilance Officer.
Therefore, seeking the advice of the Chief Vigilance Officer of the Bank, the General Manager of the respondent Bank sent a letter dated 06.03.2012, vide No.AIVD/1450/211, enclosing the minutes of the deliberations of the appellate authority.
In response to the said letter, the Chief Vigilance Officer gave an advice, dated 19.03.2012, advising that the appeals by the petitioners herein were liable to be rejected, without interfering with the orders of the disciplinary authority, in view of the gravity of charges which had been held proved against them.
7.Again, along with Chief Vigilance Officer's advice, the matter was placed before the appellate authority in its meeting held on 31.08.2012.
Once again, the entire matter, as against the petitioneRs.was threadbare discussed and deliberated upon and finally the Board decided to reduce the punishment to a lesser punishment for both the delinquents in terms of Pandyan Grama Bank (Officers and Employees) Service Regulations, 2001, instead of major penalty as advised by the Chief Vigilance Officer.
The second decision reaffirming the earlier decision of the Appellate Authority was again forwarded to the Chief Vigilance Officer for further advice, by means of letter dated 04.09.2012.
This time again, the advice to proceed further in the matter was sought for from the Chief Vigilance Officer.
8.Having considered the same, the Chief Vigilance Officer by letter in C/208/Vig/45/2013-14, dated 31.05.2013, made the following advice.
No new fact have been brought by the AA (Appellate Authority).Hence I do not concur with their views. With the above report, the matter was again placed before the appellate authority, in its meeting held on 21.08.2013.
In the said meeting, the appellate authority took a decision to dismiss the appeals of the petitioneRs.This was conveyed by the Chairman of the Bank by means of the impugned ordeRs.The operative portion of the ordeRs.which is more or less similar in both the cases, reads as follows: It is seen that on 24-10-2012 while granting a Jewel Loan of Rs.800/- under Jewel Loan account AJL6122002 to one Shri B.Muthupandy, the Manager Mr.I.Shahul Hameed of Illuppaiyur branch prepared and passed for payment a debit cash voucher for Rs.7,000/- even though the Jewel pledged by Mr.B.Muthupandy was certified to be worthy only for a loan of Rs.800/- by the Jewel Appraiser of the branch.
Fully aware of these facts, the member paid only Rs.800/- to Mr.B.Muthupandy as the proceeds of his Jewel Loan and misappropriated the balance amount Rs.6,200/- in collusion with the Manager.
In order to conceal the act of misappropriation, the the member had arranged to have the introducer of the aforesaid Jewel Loan borrower remit the misappropriated amount into it with interest on 05-02-2003.
The member's contention and our detailed observations regarding their unacceptability are given in the Annexure.
The member has not brought out any new facts/ evidences/ grounds in the Appeals to reconsider the decision or modify the punishment of Dismissal imposed by the Disciplinary Authority.
The proved charges are serious in nature warranting deterrent punishment.
We find that the punishment is justified and warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case and the Appellate Authority does not find any reason to interfere with the same.
Therefore the Appellate Board confirms the punishment of Dismissal awarded by the Disciplinary Authority as to its quantum as well as on merits.
Hence the member's Appeal stands dismissed. It is these orders which are under challenge in these writ petitions.
9.The learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the appellate authority, on two occasions, took a firm decision, going by the facts of the case and the gravity of the allegations against the petitioneRs.that dismissal from service was unwarranted and therefore a lesser punishment other than dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement could be imposed.
The learned counsel would submit that the final decision of the Appellate Board, taken in the third meeting of the Board, was in tune with the dictate of the Chief Vigilance Officer, who gave advice on two occasions that the petitioners should be dismissed from service.
Thus, according to the learned counsel, the impugned final decisions taken by the appellate authority are not independent decisions taken, based on the objective analysis of the materials placed before them.
The learned counsel would further submit that the appellate authority, which was highly influenced by the two advices given by Chief Vigilance Officer, had failed to furnish copies of the reports of the Chief Vigilance Officer.
The learned counsel would also submit that the advices given by Chief Vigilance Officer are highly irrelevant and immaterial for the appellate authority to consider.
But, since the appellate authority had been influenced by the dictate of the Chief Vigilance Officer, the impugned orders are liable to be set aside, he contended.
In this regard, the learned counsel placed reliance upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Oriental Bank of Commerce and others versus S.S.Sheokand and Another http://indiankanoon.org/doc/177852614/ decided on 26.02.2014 in Civil Appeal No.3081 of 2006, wherein, in identical circumstances where the appellate authority was influenced by the advice from the Central Vigilance Commission, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the order was liable to be interfered with, since the same was in tune with the dictate of the Central Vigilance Commission.
10.Per contra, Mr.N.G.R.Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Bank, by referring to the counter, would contend that the impugned orders were not at all influenced by the advice given by Chief Vigilance Officer.
He would submit that as per the Vigilance Manual, which is applicable to the respondent bank, the bank is bound to obtain advice from the Chief Vigilance Officer when the outcome of the appellate authority's deliberation was to impose a lesser punishment thereby modifying the punishment of dismissal from service.
The learned counsel would further submit that in the instant case, only in compliance with the above guidelines of the Central Vigilance Commission, the advice was sought for from the Chief Vigilance Officer on two occasions, in which neither there is any illegality nor irregularity.
The learned counsel would further submit that obtaining such advice from Chief Vigilance Officer and placing the same in the meeting of the Appellate Board cannot ipso facto go to show that the ultimate decision of the appellate authority was influenced by the advice of the Chief Vigilance Officer.
He would further contend that in a case where it is found that the ultimate decision of the appellate authority has been influenced by the Chief Vigilance Officer's advice, of course, the final order passed by the appellate authority may be assailed but, in a case where the decision of the appellate authority is so independent, which had nothing to do with the advice given by the Chief Vigilance Officer, then the same cannot be assailed at any cost.
In the case on hand, the learned counsel would submit that though on two occasions Chief Vigilance Officer gave advice to reject the appeals of the petitioneRs.the final order passed by the appellate authority would clearly and clinchingly go to show that the final decision of the appellate authority was taken objectively and independently and not either on the dictate of the Chief Vigilance Officer or on the influence of the Chief Vigilance Officer's advice.
The learned counsel would further submit that the outcome of the deliberations in the fiRs.two meetings of the appellate authority were not communicated to the petitioners at all and therefore they cannot be considered as orders passed and it was only a process in the decision making and no decision had been taken and communicated to the petitioneRs.The only decision taken was the one which was taken in the third and the final meeting of the appellate authority, which was duly communicated to the petitioners also.
Therefore, the final decision of the appellate authority to confirm the dismissal order is independent, based on the gravity of the proved charges and all other attending circumstances and therefore the same does not require any interference at the hands of this Court.
11.In this regard, the learned counsel for the respondent bank has relied upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State Bank of India and others versus S.N.Goyal (2008) 8 SCC92 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that in the said case since there was no material to show that the order imposing the punishment was on the dictate of the Chief Vigilance Officer and since there was no mechanical acceptance of any suggestion or advice by the Chief Vigilance Officer and the ultimate order of dismissal from service cannot be found fault with.
12.I have considered the above submissions.
13.Admittedly, in the fiRs.meeting of the Board of Directors/appellate authority, the entire materials, including evidence, were placed and it was threadbare discussed and deliberated upon and finally, going by the gravity of the proved charges against the petitioneRs.the Board of Directors/Appellate Authority decided to set aside the order of punishment of dismissal from service.
Of course, that decisions was not communicated to the petitioneRs.But, the fact remains that it was a decision and the same was not a qualified decision.
The Bank ought to have acted upon the said decision.
14.Instead, the Bank forwarded the decision taken in the fiRs.meeting of the Appellate Authority to the Chief Vigilance Officer seeking his advice.
May be, the bank was right in seeking such an advice because it was warranted under the Vigilance Manual.
The Chief Vigilance Officer, as we have already seen, forwarded his advice suggesting that the appeals should be rejected and the orders of dismissal should be confirmed.
This advice was again considered by the Appellate Authority.
It is not as though the appellate authority consists of one or two membeRs.It consists of as many as eight responsible officeRs.The Appellate Board again deliberated and again took a decision that the punishment of dismissal from service was unwarranted and accordingly decided to reduce the punishment.
At least, the bank should have acted on that and imposed lesser punishment, other than the punishments like dismissal from service, removal from service or compulsory retirement.
The Bank did not do this also.
Instead, the bank again sought for advice from the Chief Vigilance Officer.
This time, the Chief Vigilance Officer, without assigning any reason, sent a simple advice stating that he stuck on to the earlier advice.
This came to the third and the final meeting of the Appellate Authority.
In that meeting, a decision was taken to confirm the punishment of dismissal, thereby dismissing the appeals.
15.Now, the question is whether the final decision taken in the third meeting was either due to the dictate of the Chief Vigilance Officer or atleast can it be said that it was influenced by the Chief Vigilance Officer's advice.
16.The Vigilance Manual, of course, states that such advice is to be sought for from the Chief Vigilance Officer.
But, the appellate authority should keep in mind that it is not bound by such advice.
It is only advisory in character which is to be considered while taking a decision.
In the second meeting, such advice was considered along with all other materials, including the gravity of the charges and once again the Appellate Authority decided to set aside the punishment of dismissal and decided to impose lesser punishment.
This decision taken in the second meeting was after due consideration of the advice given by the Chief Vigilance Officer.
Here, one can certainly say that this decision was not either influenced or as per the dictate of the Chief Vigilance Officer.
The very fact that the advice was considered and the Appellate Board decided to stick on to the earlier decision would go to show that the Appellate Board was not either influenced nor did it act according to the dictate of the Chief Vigilance Officer.
Therefore, so far as the decision taken in the second meeting of the Appellate Board is concerned, one cannot find fault with it at all because, certainly, it is an independent and objective decision taken by the Appellate Board.
17.In the third meeting held, no fresh material was placed before the Appellate Board for consideration, apart from the second advice given by the Chief Vigilance Officer.
In the second advice given by the Chief Vigilance Officer, as I have extracted herein above, the Chief Vigilance Officer did not rely on any fresh material.
Instead, it only said that the Chief Vigilance Officer had nothing new to offer by way of advice, except sticking on to the earlier advice.
When that be so, it is something strange that the Appellate Board took a diametrically opposite decision in the third meeting.
This would only go to show that the decision in the third meeting was taken certainly as per the dictate of the Chief Vigilance Officer or one can atleast say that it was influenced by the Chief Vigilance Officer's advice.
It is crystal clear that the appellate authority attempted to persuade the Chief Vigilance Officer to accept their proposal to reduce the punishment.
Since they failed, they surrendered to the advice of the Chief Vigilance Officer.
Thus, in my considered opinion, in simple terMs.it is nothing but surrendering of the authority of the appellate authority to the Chief Vigilance Officer so as to act simply according to the dictate of the Chief Vigilance Officer.
18.Let me now turn to the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners in Oriental Bank of Commerce case, cited supra.
In that case also, on facts, the decision was taken based on the Central Vigilance Commission's advice.
While considering the same, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that when the report of the Central Vigilance Commission was not made available to the delinquent, it is difficult to rule out the apprehension about the decision having been taken in pressure.
In paragraph 17 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows: 17.We have considered the submissions of both the counsel.
When we come to the question of imposition of punishment on the respondent, what we find is that undoubtedly, there was a serious allegation against him, and as it has been held in the case of Disciplinary Authority-Cum-Regional Manager (supra) such acts could not be condoned.
At the same time, we have also to note that the bank management itself had taken the view in the initial stage that the action did not require a major penalty.
It is also relevant to note that the High Court was also informed at the stage of review that the Bank was considering imposition of a minor penalty.
It is quite possible to say that the bank management did arrive at its decision to maintain a major penalty at a later stage on its own, and not because of the dictate of the CVC, but at the same time it has got to be noted that the CVC report had been sought by the management of the bank, and thereafter the punishment had been imposed.
As observed in the case of State Bank of India (supra).may be that the Disciplinary Authority had recorded its own findings, and had arrived at its own decision, but when this advise from CVC was sought, it could not be said that this additional material was not a part of the decision making process.
When this report was not made available to the respondent, it is difficult to rule out the apprehension about the decision having been taken under pressure.
Any material, which goes into the decision making process against an employee, cannot be denied to him.
In view of the judgment in the case of Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager (supra).the decision of the Bank could have been approved on merits, however, the two judgments in the cases of Nagaraj Shivaraj Karajgi (supra) and State Bank of India (supra) lay down the requisite procedure in such matteRs.and in the facts of this case, it will not be appropriate to depart from the dicta therein.
On this yardstick alone, a part of the judgment of the High Court interfering with the punishment will have to be sustained. 19.A cursory reading of the above judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court would make it very clear that the decision of the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority should not be influenced by the report of the Central Vigilance Commission.
In the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has referred to the earlier Supreme Court Judgment in Nagaraj Shivaraj Karajgi versus Syndicate Bank AIR1991SC1507 wherein the Supreme Court has held as follows: 19.The punishment to be imposed whether minor or major depends upon the nature of every case and the gravity of the misconduct proved.
The authorities have to exercise their judicial discretion having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case.
They cannot act under the dictation of the Central Vigilance Commission or of the Central Government.
No third party like the Central Vigilance Commission or the Central Government could dictate the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority as to how they should exercise their power and what punishment they should impose on the delinquent officer.
(See.
De Smitha's Judicial Review of Administrative Action, Fourth Edition.
p.309).The impugned directive of the Ministry of Finance is, therefore, wholly without jurisdiction and plainly contrary to the statutory Regulations governing disciplinary matters. Again in the State Bank of India versus D.C.Aggarwal, reported in AIR1993SC1197 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows: 5.May be that the Disciplinary Authority has recorded its own findings and it may be coincidental that reasoning and basis of returning the finding of guilt are same as in the CVC report but it being a material obtained behind back of the respondent without his knowledge or supplying of any copy to him the High Court in our opinion did not commit any error in quashing the order. 20.From these judgments, it is crystal clear that no third party like Central Vigilance Commission can dictate the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority as to how they should exercise their powers and what punishment should be imposed on the delinquent officeRs.In other words, if it is found that the final orders have been influenced by the Chief Vigilance Officer, certainly, the same require to be interfered with.
In the case on hand, as I have concluded, the decision taken in the third and the final meeting of the appellate authority was influenced by the advice of the Chief Vigilance Officer.
21.The judgment in State Bank of India versus S.N.Goyal case cited supra, relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents, in no way supports their case.
In that case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, on facts, found that there were no materials to show that the order imposing punishment was on the dictates of the Chief Vigilance Officer.
In paragraph 32 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows: 32.The reply dated 7-2-1995 from the Chief Vigilance Officer also makes it clear that he neither issued any direction to the appointing authority to impose a higher punishment nor altered the finding regarding guilt.
He merely gave his opinion that the gravity of the proved charge did not warrant leniency and, therefore, suggested that the quantum of penalty may be examined again.
The subsequent note put up by disciplinary authority on 2-5-1995 and the order passed thereon by the appointing authority on 3-5- 1995 imposing the penalty of removal, show that they were on independent consideration of the question.
Neither the note dated 2-5-1995 nor the order dated 3-5-1995 refers to the opinion or the view expressed by the Chief vigilance Officer of the Bank.
Nor is there any material to show that the order imposing punishment was on the dictates of the Chief Vigilance Officer.
There was no mechanical acceptance of any suggestion or advice by the Chief vigilance Officer nor consideration of any extraneous material as assumed by the courts below.
The appointing authority is required to inform the Vigilance Department in regard to cases involving vigilance angle.
The appointing authority did so.
But it did not seek any instruction, direction, suggestion or advice from the Vigilance Department.
There was also no direction or circular or instruction requiring the appointing authority to accept or act upon the suggestions or views of the Chief vigilance Officer.
The Vigilance Department merely gave its comment or view that it was not a fit case for showing leniency and left it to the authority concerned to take a decision on the punishment to be imposed.
So long as the decision was not on the dictates of the Vigilance Department or other outside authority, but on independent consideration, the order of removal cannot be faulted.
It cannot be said that either the at of intimating the Vigilance Department about the enquiry or independently reconsidering the issue of penalty after receiving the views of the Vigilance Department amounted to be acting on extraneous material, or acting on the advice or recommendation or direction of the Chief Vigilance Officer. 22.As seen above, in this judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, on facts, found that there was no influence by the Chief Vigilance Officer.
But, in this case, there are enormous materials to conclude that the final decision taken in the third meeting of the Appellate Authority was on account of the dictate of the Chief Vigilance Officer's advice.
23.As I have already stated, the very fact that in the second meeting the advice of the Chief vigilance Officer was considered and still the appellate authority decided to set aside the punishment of dismissal and the very fact that in the final meeting though there was no fresh material except the reiteration of the earlier advice by the Chief vigilance Officer still the appellate Authority took a decision to confirm the punishment of dismissal would go to show that the final decision was certainly due to the dictate or influence of the Chief vigilance Officer's advice.
In other words, in the absence of any fresh material before the Appellate Board other than the material which were already considered in the second meeting, a diametrically opposite decision was taken because of the reiteration by the Chief Vigilance Officer about his earlier advice.
In such view of the matter, on facts, I hold that the impugned orders are not at all sustainable and they are liable to be set aside.
24.The learned counsel for the respondent bank would submit that the petitioners had committed a grave misconduct in misappropriating a sum of Rs.6,200/- by fabricating the records and therefore the punishment of dismissal from service is very much appropriate.
In my considered opinion, regarding this the Court cannot express any opinion, because the Appellate Board has taken a decision to reduce the quantum of punishment.
25.In view of all the above, both the writ petitions are allowed and the impugned orders are set aside, with a direction to the disciplinary authority to impose any other lesser punishment other than dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement, as decided in the fiRs.two meetings of the Appellate Board.
The disciplinary authority shall issue consequential orders reinstating the petitioners in service within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
No order.
Connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.
Index:yes.
17.07.2013 Internet :Yes gb Note to Office: Issue on 21.07.2014.
B/o.
gb S.NAGAMUTHU,J gb Order in W.P.(MD)Nos.17990 and 18550 of 2013 and M.P.(MD)Nos.1 & 2 of 2013 in W.P.(MD)No.17990 of 2013 and 2 and 3 of 2013 in W.P.(MD)No.18550 of 2013 and 1 of 2014 in W.P.(MD)Nos.17990 and 18550 of 2013 Dated:17.07.2014