Empee Distilleries Limited Vs. State of Tamil Nadu - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
in the high court of judicature at madras dated:28. 10.2013 coram: the honourable mr. justice s.manikumar w.p.no.28819 of 2013 m.p.nos.1 and 2 of 2013 m/s.empee distilleries limited (power division) no.261/3, koothadivayal village, aranthangi taluk, pudukottai district, rep. by its vice president (power division) .. petitioner vs. 1.the state of tamil nadu, rep.by the secretary to government, energy department, secretariat, fort st.george, chennai  600 009. 2.the director of electricity tax, o/o the chief electrical inspector to government, thiru.vi.ka.industrial estate, chennai  600 032. 3.the electrical inspector & electricity tax, inspecting officer, 13, nh bungalow road, tvs toll gate, trichy  620 020. .. respondents writ petition filed under article 226 of the constitution of.....

Judgment:

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:

28. 10.2013 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.MANIKUMAR W.P.No.28819 of 2013 M.P.Nos.1 and 2 of 2013 M/s.Empee Distilleries Limited (Power Division) No.261/3, Koothadivayal Village, Aranthangi Taluk, Pudukottai District, rep. by its Vice President (Power Division) .. Petitioner vs. 1.The State of Tamil Nadu, rep.by the Secretary to Government, Energy Department, Secretariat, Fort St.George, Chennai  600 009. 2.The Director of Electricity Tax, O/o the Chief Electrical Inspector to Government, Thiru.vi.ka.Industrial Estate, Chennai  600 032. 3.The Electrical Inspector & Electricity Tax, Inspecting Officer, 13, NH Bungalow Road, TVS Toll Gate, Trichy  620 020. .. Respondents Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to issue a Writ of Certiorari calling for the records of the impugned demand notice of the third respondent in Lr.No.147/E1/TRY/TA/2013 dated 18.7.2013 and quash the same as being violative of the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Tax on Consumption or Sale of Electricity Act, 2003 and the exemption Notifications in G.O.Ms.No.25 dated 24.3.2008, G.O.Ms.No.106 dated 04.09.2008, G.O.Ms.No.79 dated 14.09.2009, G.O.Ms.No.43 dated 30.4.2010 and G.O.Ms.No.85 dated 9.9.2010 for the period from 1.3.2008 to 1.5.2008 and for the period from 4.9.2008 till 31.3.2011. For petitioner : Mr.AR.L.Sundaresan, Senior Counsel, for M/s.AL.Ganthimathi For respondents : Mr.R.Vijaya Kumar, Addl.Govt.Pleader

ORDER

M/s.Empee Distilleries Limited (Power Division), represented by its Vice President, Aranthangi Taluk, Pudukottai District, has challenged the Letter No.147/E1/TRY/TAX/2013 dated 18.07.2013 of the Electrical Inspector and Electricity Tax Inspecting Officer, Trichy / third respondent herein, by which the third respondent has demanded a sum of Rs.9,79,35,000/-, for the sale of electricity units to third parties and through PTC, based on the best available sources and such type of available other plants or units for the total value of units sold, within 15 days, along with penal interest with required forms.

2. Perusal of the impugned order of the Electrical Inspector and Electricity Tax Inspecting Officer, Trichy / third respondent, shows that Turbo Generator and other Diesel Generator erected in the premises was inspected on 17.02.2008 under Rule 63(3) of the Indian Electricity Rules 1956. Earlier, the Unit has been permitted by the Chief Electrical Inspector to the Government, Chennai, vide their Lr.No.PDK/790/CEIG /D3/2008-2, dated 28.02.2008, TANGEDCO Pudukkottai HT SC No.125, with a sanctioned demand of 975 KVA. The Turbo Generator rating 10000 KW/12500/KVA11KV has been registered with the department on 19.02.2008 and re-registered on 23.02.2011. As per the Tamil Nadu Tax on Consumption of Electricity Act, 2003, a registered person should pay the tax regularly and the relevant forms C2 or C3 applicable, have to be sent for every calendar month. Alleging that the writ petitioner has not paid any tax, notice in FORM  E1 (Energy Department) dated 24.5.2011, has been sent to the petitioner, by the Director of Electricity Tax, Chennai / second respondent. Notice in Form  E1, issued to the petitioner, is extracted hereunder. FORM  E1See rule 16(1) To M/s.Empee Distilleries Limited (Power Division), SF No.261/3, Koothadivayal Hamlet, Pattukottai Road, Mukudi Village, Aranthangi, Pudukottai Dt. - 614 606. Whereas - You being a person liable to pay tax under sub section (1) of Section 3 have not submitted the return(s) under section 8 of the Act in respect of the period(s) from Feb 2008 to March, 2011. And whereas it appears to me that it is necessary to make an assessment under section 9 of the Act in respect of the above mentioned period (s) from Feb 2008 to March, 2011. You are hereby directed to attend at the office of the Electrical Inspector / Trichy on 8.6.2011 at 11.00 a.m., and to produce there the books of account (list of which is given below) together with any objection which you may wish to prefer and any evidence you may wish to adduce in support thereof. In the event of your failure to comply with this notice, I shall assess the amount of tax under section 9 of the Act to the best of my judgment without further reference to you. Director Dated Office List of books of Account and document required to be produced detail as per the annexure......................................................................................................................................................................... Annexure FORMAT Name of the Plant Total Electri-city produced unit Captive Consum-ption if any ** Tax Paid @ 10 paise per unit Electri-city Sold to TNEB Electri-city Sold to others $ Net Charge of Sale of Electri-city Tax paid if any @ 5% on net charge If not the Tax paid reason for ## Month-wise details from Feb 2008 March 2011 Kwhr Kwhr Rs. Kwhr Kwhr Rs. Rs. Note:- 1)** Captive consumption-within the factory or sent outside the factory and to whom 2)$$ Name of plant, Total Number of units and sale value should be given. 3) If covered by Court Stay-Stay order details.

3. In response to the above said notice, the petitioner has sent a reply and that the same has been acknowledged on 6.7.2011. Thereafter, the The Electrical Inspector & Electricity Tax Inspecting Officer, Trichy / third respondent herein, has sent a Letter No.147/kpd;thp/kpM/jp 2012 ehs; 08.10.2012, directing the petitioner to send the monthly statements of production of electricity units, consumption of units and the sale of units, for the period from 02/08 to 09/12 in the prescribed format. The said Letter is extracted hereunder. jkpH;ehL muR kpd; Ma;t[j; Jiw mdg;g[eh; kpd; Ma;thsh;. 13V/vd/vk/g';fsh rhiy. o/tp/v!;/ nlhy;nfl;. jpUr;rp 620 020. bgWeh; M/s.Empee Distilleries Limited (Power Division) No.261/3, Koothadivayal Village, Aranthangi Taluk, Pudukottai District. foj vz;/147-kpd;thp-kp/M-jp-2012 ehs; 08/10/2012 Iah. bghUs; kpd;thp ?. jkpH;ehL kpd;Dfh;t[ my;yJ tpw;gid kPjhd thpr;rl;lk; 2003 ?. jpU/ Empee Distilleries Limited (Power Division) No.261/3, Koothadivayal Village, Aranthangi Taluk, Pudukottai District, kpd;dhf;fp K:yk; cw;gj;jp bra;j a{dpl; tpguk; kw;Wk; tpw;gid bra;j a{dpl; tpguk; nfhUjy; ?. Fwpj;J/ ghh;it 1/gjptpr;rhd;W vz;/TRY/GEN, 147/2011 ehs; 23/02/2011/ 2/,t;tYtyff; foj vz;/147/kp/M-jp-kpd;thp-2011. Ehs; 30/06/2011;/ ghh;it (2); fz;l ,t;tYtyf;f foj;jpy; j';fsJ epWtdj;jpYs;s kpd;dhf;fpfs; K:yk; cw;gj;jp bra;J kpd;rhu a{epl; tptu';fis mspf;FkhW nfl;Lf; bfhs;sg;gl;lJ/ ,jw;F ,d;iwaehs; tiu j';fsplkpUe;J gjpnyJk; bgwg;gltpy;iy. vdnt. j';fsJ epWtdj;jpYs;s kpd;dhf;fpfspypUe;J cw;gj;jp bra;J.

brhe;j cgnahfj;jpw;F gad;gLj;jpa kpd;rhu a{dpl; kw;Wk; tpw;gid bra;j a{dpl; tpguk; Mfpatw;iw (2-08 Kjy; 9-12 Koa) khjthhpahf fPH;f;fz;l gotj;jpy; cld; mspf;FkhW nfl;Lf;bfhs;sg;gLfpwJ/ khjk; kpd;dhf;fpfs; bkhj;j kpd;cw;gj;jp (G1+G2+G3) a{dpl;Lfs; brhe;j gad;gLj;jy; a{dpl;Lfs; JkpH;ehL kpd; thhpaj;jpw;F tpw;gid bra;j a{dpl;Lfs; PTC K:yk; tpw;gid bra;j a{dpl; jdpahUf;F. third party tpw;gid bra;j a{dpl; 2/08 - - 9/12 ,f;fojk; bgwg;gl;likf;F Vw;gspg;g[ tH';FkhW nfl;Lf;bfhs;sg;gLfpwJ/ xk;/-?. kpd; Ma;thsh; (bgh). jpUr;rp Translated version of the above letter is extracted hereunder: Government of Tamil Nadu Electricity Inspection Department From To The Electricity Inspector (General), M/s.Empee Distilleries Limited 13 A.N.M. Bungalow Road, (Power Division) T.V.S. Tollgate, No.261/3, Koothadivayal Village, Trichy - 620 020. Aranthangi Taluk, Pudukkottai District. Letter No.147, Electricity Tax/Mi.A.Thi 2012, dated 08.10.2012 Respected Sir, Sub:Electricity Tax - Tamil Nadu Tax on consumption or sale of Electricity Act 2003 - Thiru.Empee Distilleries Ltd. (Power Division) No.261/3, Koothadivayal Village, Aranthangi T.K., Pudukkottai District - Details of units of electricity generated through the power generating plant and the details of units sold - called for - regarding. Ref:1. Registration Certificate No.TRY/GEN, 147/2011, dated 23.02.2011.

2. Letter No.147/Mi.A.Thi. Electricity Tax 2011, dated 30.06.2011 of this office. ----- You were requested in the letter of this office, 2nd cited under the reference, to furnish the details of the units of electricity, generated through the power generating plants in your management. No reply has been received from you till date for the aforesaid letter. Therefore, you are requested to furnish the details, monthwise (2/2008 to 9/2012) in the following form, immediately, with regard to the units of electricity generated through the power generating plants, the units which were utilized for your personal use and the units which were sold. Month Power generated plants Total generation of power Units used for personal use Units sold to T.N.E.B. Units sold through P.T.C. Units sold to private and third parties 2/2008 - - 9/2012 It is requested to acknowledge the receipt of this letter. Sd/- Electricity Inspector, I/C Trichy.

4. Reminder dated 28.12.2012 has also been sent, which is extracted hereunder: gjpt[m".;ry; Xg;g[ifld; jkpH;ehL muR kpd; Ma;t[j; Jiw mDg;g[eh; kpd; Ma;thsh;. (bghJ) 13V/vd;;/vk;/g';fsh rhiy. o/tp/v!;/ nlhy;nfl;. jpUr;rp 620 020/ bgWeh; M/s.Empee Distilleries Limited (Power Division) No.261/3, Koothadivayal Village, Aranthangi Taluk, Pudukottai District. foj vz;/147-kpM-jp-kpd;thp-2012 ehs; 28.12/2012 Iah. bghUs; kpd;thp ?. jkpH;ehL kpd;rhu Efh;t[ thp kw;Wk; tpw;gidr; rl;lk; 2003  jpU/ Empee Distilleries Limited (Power Division) No.261/3, Koothadivayal Village, Aranthangi Taluk, Pudukottai District, kpddhf;fp a{dpl; nfhUjy; ?. Fwpj;J/ ghh;it 1/gjptpr;rhd;W vz;/TRY/GEN, 147/2011 ehs; 23/02/2011/ 2/,t;tYtyff; foj vz;/147/kp/M-jp-kpd;thp-2011. ehs; 30/06/2011 kw;Wk; 08/10/2012 ghh;it (2)y; fz;l ,t;tYtyf;f foj;jpy; j';fsJ epWtdj;jpYs;s kpd;dhf;fpfs; K:yk; cw;gj;jp bra;J gad;gLj;jpa kpd;rhu a{dpl;. PTC kw;Wk; K:d;whk; egUf;F tpw;gid bra;j a{dpl; tptu';fis mspf;FkhW nfl;Lf;bfhs;sg;gl;lJ/ ,jw;F gjpnyJk; ,d;Wtiu j';fsplkpUe;J bgwg;gltpy;iy/ ,dpa[k; fhyjhkjk; bra;ahJ.

,e;j ,t;tptu';fis ,f;fojk; fz;l gj;J jpd';fSf;Fs; ,t;tYtyfj;jpw;Ff; fpilf;FkhW mDg;gp itf;f mwpt[Wj;jg;gLfpwJ/ jkpH;ehL kpd;rhu Efh;t[ thp kw;Wk; tpw;gid rl;lk; 2003 gphpt[ 13(1) (2) d; go nkw;fz;l tptu';fs; jh';fs; mtrpak; mspf;f ntz;Lk; vd mwpt[Wj;jg;gLfpwJ.

nkYk; ,d;iwa njjp tiu j';fs; kpd;dhf;fpfspypUe;J cw;gj;jp bra;ag;gl;l kpd;rhu a{dpl; tptu';as; mj;Jld; gad;gLj;jpa kpd;rhu a{dpl; tptu';fs;spf;fg;gl ntz;Lk;/ nkw;fz;l fhyj;jpy; TANGEDCOw;F tH';fg;gl;l kpd;rhu a{dpl; tptuk; khjthhpahf mspf;fg;glntz;Lk; vd mwpt[Wj;jg;gLfpwJ/ nkw;fz;l fhyj;jpy; K:d;whk; egh; my;yJ PTC K:Yk; tpw;fg;gl;l kpd;rhu a{dpl; tptu';fs; mspf;fg;gl ntz;Lk; vd mwpt[Wj;jg;gLfpwJ/ 02-08 Kjy; 12-12 Koa cs;s fhyj;jpw; cw;gj;jp bra;agl;L. gad;gLj;jg;g;l;l kpd;rhu a{dpl;LfSf;F cldlahf thpa[k; nkw;fz;l thpapid fhyjhkjkhf brYj;Jtjw;F tl;oa[k; brYj;jg;gl ntz;Lk;/ murhy; mspf;fg;gl;l thptpyf;Ffs; VJk; j';fSf;Fg; bghUe;jhJ/ vdnt. midj;J fhyj;jpw;Fk; thp kw;Wk; fhyjhkjkhf brYj;Jtjw;F tl;oa[k; brYj;jg;glntz;Lk; vd mwpt[Wj;g;gLfpwJ/ PTC kw;Wk; K:d;whk; egUf;F kpd;rhuk; tpw;gid bra;ag;gl;l bjhiff;F5 thpa[k; brYj;jg;gl ntz;Lk;/ ,e;j thpapid fhyjhkjkhf brYj;Jtjw;F tl;oa[k; brYj;jg;gl ntz;Lk;/ nkw;fz;l thp kw;Wk; tl;ofis cld; (15 jpd';fSf;Fs;) brYj;jp brYj;Jr;rPl;L tptu';fs; mspf;f mwpt[Wj;jg;gLfpwJ/ xk;/-?. kpd; Ma;thsUf;fhf. jpUr;rp Translated version of the above reminder is as follows:- Registered post with acknowledgment Government of Tamil Nadu Electricity Inspection Department From To The Electricity Inspector (General), M/s.Empee Distilleries Limited 13 A.N.M. Bungalow Road, (Power Division) T.V.S. Tollgate, No.261/3, Koothadivayal Village, Trichy - 620 020. Aranthangi Taluk, Pudukkottai District. Letter No.147/Mi.A.Thi/Electricity Tax/2012, dated 28.12.2012 Sir, Sub:Electricity Tax - Tamil Nadu Tax on consumption or sale of Electricity Act 2003 - Thiru.Empee Distilleries Limited (Power Division), No.261/3, Koothadivayal Village, Aranthangi Taluk, Pudukkottai District - requesting for power generating units - reg. Ref:1. Registration Certificate No.TRY/GEN,147/2011, dated 23.02.2011.

2. Letter No.147.P.G.P./T/Electricity Tax/2011, dated 30.06.2011 and 08.10.2012. ----- In the letter from this office cited under reference 2, it has been asked to furnish the details of units of electricity, that were used after generating through power generating plants in your company and also the units sold through PTC and to the third parties. No reply has been given by you in this regard till this day. Your are instructed not to cause any further delay and to furnish the said details to this office within ten days from the receipt of this letter. As per the section 13(1)(2) of the Tamil Nadu Tax on consumption or Sale of Electricity Act 2003, it is mandatory that you should furnish the aforesaid details. Further, you should furnish the units of electricity generated by you through your power generating plants and the units of electricity consumed. You are instructed to furnish the details of the units of electricity supplied to the TANGEDCO during the aforesaid period. You are instructed to furnish the details of the units of electricity sold to the third party or through PTC during the aforesaid period. The tax for the units of electricity generated and consumed during the period 2/8 to 12/12 shall immediately be paid and the interest also shall be paid for the delayed remittance of the aforesaid tax. The exemption whatsoever, given by the government shall not be applicable to you. Therefore, you are instructed to pay the tax for all the period and the interest for the delayed remittance. 5% tax shall be paid for the amount for which the electricity was sold to PTC and 3rd parties. Interest shall also be paid for the delayed remittance of this tax. You are hereby instructed to remit the aforesaid tax and interest within 15 days and to furnish the details of challan therefor. Sd/- For Electricity Inspector, Trichy.

5. By the above said letter, the petitioner has also been intimated that for non-payment of the electricity tax, interest at the rate of 5%, has to be paid on the quantum of electricity units sold to third parties and through PTC. By Letter No.491/E1/TRY/TAX/2013, dated 25.02.2013, the Electrical Inspector, Trichy has sought for the details, which are extracted hereunder: GOVERNMENT OF TAMILNADU ELECTRICAL INSPECTORATE From The Electrical Inspector, 13, N.M.Bungalow Road, TVS Tollgate, TRICHY620020 To Thiru Empee Distilleries Ltd., Power Division, 261/3, Koothadivayal Village, Aranthangi  614 616, Pudukkottai District. Letter NO.491/E1/TRY/TAX/2013, Dated 25.02.2013 Sub: Tax  Tamil Nadu Tax on Consumption or Sale of Electricity Act 2003  Details required  Reg. Your attention is invited to the above cited Tamil Nadu Tax on Consumption or Sale of Electricity Act & Rules, 2003 & relevant letters. In this regard, the following details are urgently required.

1. Capacity of the plant & date of commissioning 2. Monthwise gross generation from the date of commissioning 3.Auxiliary Consumption (in units) 4.Own Consumption (in units) 5.Energy consumed through interstate open access (in units) 6.Sale to TANGEDCO7Sale through PTC8Sale to others 9.Price of Energy per unit 10.Electriciy Tax on own consumption 11.Electricity Tax on sale of electricity 12.Penal interest 13.Total sale of energy within the State 14.Total sale of energy sold through interstate open access. You are requested to send the following details as enclosed with this letter urgently. The above details can also be sent to this office by e-mail (as below) [email protected]. All these details should be sent as per the provision of the Act 13(1) & (2) of Tamil Nadu Tax on Consumption or Sale of Electricity Act & Rules 2003. You are required to acknowledge the receipt of this letter. Electrical Inspector Trichy.

6. Statement showing the details of the Power Plants and the Electricity Tax details of remission, which have to be filled up by the petitioner, has also been annexed to the said letter. The Letter No.25.4.2013 reads as follows:- By Registered Post with Ad. GOVERNMENT OF TAMILNADU ELECTRICAL INSPECTORATE From The Electrical Inspector, 13, N.M.Bungalow Road, TVS Tollgate, TRICHY620020 To Thiru Empee Distellaries Ltd., Power Division, 261/3, Koothadivayal Village, Aranthangi  614 616, Pudukkottai District. Letter No.491/E1/TRY/TAX/2013, Dated 25.04.2013 Sir, Sub: Tax  Tamil Nadu Tax on Consumption or Sale of Electricity Act 2003  Details required  Reg. Ref: This office Lr.No.491/E1/TRY/TAX2013, Dated 25.02.2013 Your attention is invited to the above cited reference wherein you have been requested to send some details regarding the production, consumption and sale of Electricity of the Gensets installed at your premises. Though it has been mentioned that these details should be sent as per the provision of the Act 13(1) & (2) of the Tamil Nadu Tax on Consumption or Sale of Electricity Act & Rules 2003, the details have not yet been received from your end. Hence, you are advised to send the above particulars within 10 days from the date of receipt of this letter, failing which necessary further action will be taken as per provisions of the above Act. The above details can also be sent to this office by email.(as below) [email protected] You are required to acknowledge the receipt of this letter. Electrical Inspector Trichy.

7. Though the petitioner has challenged the demand on several grounds, the main challenge is to the competency of the Electrical Inspector and Electricity Tax Inspecting Officer, Trichy / the third respondent herein, to make the best of judgment, in determining the electricity tax payable.

8. From the impugned order, it could be deduced that though various reminders have been sent directing the petitioner to produce the Books of Accounts, registers, etc., which were required for the purpose of verification, such Books of Accounts and other details, were not sent. According to the third respondent, tax was not paid. As per the version of the Electrical Inspector and Electricity Tax Inspecting Officer, Trichy / third respondent, returns were not sent. At this juncture, it is relevant to consider the consequence of not filing the returns or payment of tax.

9. Section 9 of the Tamil Nadu Tax on Consumption or Sale of Electricity Act, 2003, deals with the consequences when returns are not submitted, and the said Section is extracted hereunder. 9.(1) If no return in respect of any period is submitted by a licensee or a person required to submit return under section 8 or if the return submitted by such licensee or person appears to the Director to be incorrect or incomplete the Director shall, after giving such licensee or person as the case may be, a reasonable opportunity of being heard, proceed in such manner as may be prescribed to assess to the best of his judgment the amount of electricity tax payable under this Act by such licensee or person. (2) The amount of electricity tax assessed under sub-section (1) for a period less the sum, if any, already paid in respect of the said period, shall be paid by the licensee or the person by such date as may be specified in a notice issued by the Director in this behalf and the date to be specified shall be ordinarily not less than 30 days from the date of service of such notice. (3) No assessment under this section shall be made after the expiry of four years. Explanation.- For the purpose of this section, ".year". means the year commencing on the first day of April and ending on the last day of March.

10. Section 10 provides for an appeal as against the order of assessment of electricity tax and the said Section is extracted hereunder:

10. (1) Any person may in the prescribed manner appeal to the Government against any order of assessment of Electricity Tax within sixty days or such further period as may be allowed by the Government for reasons shown to their satisfaction from the date of receipt of a notice of demand issued after such order of assessment. Provided that no appeal against an assessment of electricity tax shall be entertained by the Government unless they are satisfied that such amount of electricity tax as the appellant may admit to be due from him has been paid. (2) The Government in disposing of any appeal under sub-section (1) may - (a) confirm, modify or annul the assessment of electricity tax; or (b) set aside the assessment of electricity tax and direct the Director to make a fresh assessment after such further inquiry as may be directed.

11. The procedure to be followed by the Director for assessment of tax under Section 9 is prescribed in rule 16 of the Tamil Nadu Tax on Consumption or Sale of Electricity Rules, 2003, framed in exercise of powers conferred by Section 15 of the Tamil Nadu Tax on Consumption or Sale of Electricity Rules, 2003, (Tamil Nadu Act 12 of 2003), which is extracted hereunder:- 16. PROCEDURE FOR ASSESSMENT OF TAX UNDER SECTION9- (1) Where it appears necessary to the Director to make an assessment under section 9 in respect of the tax payable by any licensee, he shall serve a notice in Form E-1 upon him - (a) stating the return period or periods of a year in respect of which the assessment is proposed. (b) requiring him to produce the books of account and other documents which the authority wishes to examine together with any objection if any which the licensee may wish to prefer, any evidence which he may wish to produce in support thereof (2) After examining the books of accounts, considering the objection preferred and evidence produced in support thereof, the Director shall assess under section 9, the amount of tax payable by the assessee, and he shall briefly but clearly record the reasons on which his order is based. (3) If, after adjusting the amount of tax paid by the assessee for the period in question, any such tax is found to be due from a licensee or a person, assessed under section 9, the Director shall serve a notice in Form E-2 on the assessee specifying the date within which payment shall be made and he shall further specify the date on which and the authority to whom the evidence in support of such payment shall be produced and he shall also send a copy of the assessment order to the assessee along with the said notice. (4) For the purpose of procedure for payment of tax found due on assessment, the provisions of rule 4 to 7 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

12. Form E1 under Rule 16(1) of the Tamil Nadu Tax on Consumption or Sale of Electricity Rules, 2003 is extracted hereunder: FORM E-1 {See rule 16(1)} Notice of assesment under section 9 of the Tamil Nadu Tax on Consumption or Sale of Electricity Act, 2003. To * *(Name of the licensee/person liable to pay electricity tax under section 3.) . . .(address) Whereas -- *(a) You being a licensee have not submitted the return(s) under section 8 of the Act in respect of the period(s) from..to  *(b) You being a person liable to pay tax under clause ( c) of sub section (1) of section 3 have not submitted the return(s) under section 8 of the Act in respect of the period(s) from.. to.. *( c) The return(s) under section 8 of the Act for the period(s) from.. to.. Submitted by you appears/appear to be incorrect or incomplete; And whereas it appears to me that it is necessary to make an assessment under section 9 of the Act in respect of the above mentioned period(s) from.to.. You are hereby directed to attend at..(place) on(date) at..(item) and to produce there the books of account (list of which is given below) together with any objection which you may wish to prefer and any evidence you may wish to adduce in support thereof. In the event of your failure to comply with this notice, I shall assess the amount of tax under section 9 of the Act to the best of my judgement without further reference to you. Dated Director Office Seal: List of books of Account and document required to be produced.  . (*) Strike out which is not applicable.

13. Reading of the provisions indicate that the Director of Electricity Tax, Chennai / second respondent alone is empowered, to cause notice under Form  E-I, and thereafter, provide an opportunity of hearing to the licensee or assessee or the person specified under Section 9 of the Tamil Nadu Tax on Consumption or Sale of Electricity Act, 2003, and upon considering the Books of Accounts, Objections and evidence, as per rule 16 of the Tamil Nadu Tax on Consumption or Sale of Electricity Rules, 2003, proceed to determine the tax to be paid by the licensee or assesee. In the event of failure of the licensee to comply with the notice, issued under Section 9 r/w rule 16 of the rules, the Director to the best of his judgment shall assess unit tax under Section 9 of the Act. The power conferred on the Director of Electricity Tax has not been delegated to the Electrical Inspector & Electricity Tax Inspecting Officer, Trichy.

14. However, Mr.R.Vijayakumar, learned Additional Government Pleader, placing reliance on Sections 12 and 13 of the Tamil Nadu Tax on Consumption or Sale of Electricity Act, 2003, and on the basis of the notification issued in G.O.Ms.No.52 Energy (B1) Department Dated.13.06.2003 submitted that the Electrical Inspector and Electricity Tax Inspecting Officer, Trichy / third respondent herein has got powers in the capacity of an Inspecting Officer to levy tax effectively and also to enforce the provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder. He further submitted that for the purpose of effective enforcement and raising a demand on the consumers, on day-to-day basis, it would not be possible for the Director of Electricity Tax, to make the best of his judgment and in such circumstances, the assessment made by the Electrical Inspector and Electricity Tax Inspecting Officer / third respondent has to be sustained.

15. In order to consider the submissions of the learned Additional Government Pleader, this Court deems it fit to extract Sections 12 and 13 of the Tamil Nadu Tax on Consumption or Sale of Electricity Act, 2003. 12. Electricity Tax Inspecting Officer: - (1) The Government may, by notification, appoint the Electricity Tax Inspecting Officers to inspect the prescribed books of account kept under section 8. (2) Every Inspecting Officer appointed under this section shall be deemed to be a public servant within the meaning of section 21 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860).

13. Powers of Electricity Tax Inspecting Officer: - (1) Subject to the provisions of any rules made by the State Government in this behalf, an Inspector may - (i) require production for inspection of such books and records as may be necessary for ascertaining or verifying the amount of electricity tax leviable under the Act. (ii) enter and search any premises where electricity is, or is believed to be supplied, for the purpose of - (a) verifying the statements made in the books of account kept, and returns submitted, under section 5, (b) testing the reading of meters, (c) verifying the particulars required in connection with the levy of electricity tax. (iii) exercise such powers and perform such other functions as may be necessary for carrying out the purposes of this Act or the rules made there under. (2) All searches made under sub-section (1) shall be made in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

16. It is also worthwhile to extract the Government Order G.O.Ms.No.52, Energy Department, dated 13.06.2003, which reads as follows:- ABSTRACT The Tamil Nadu Tax on Consumption or Sale of Electricity Rules, 2003  Issued. G.O.Ms.No.52, Energy (B1) Department, Dated.13.06.2003 Read: From the Chief Electrical Inspector to Government Letter No.14101/A1/2002-8 dated.26.05.2003 * * *

ORDER

: The appended Notification will be published in an Extra-Ordinary issue of the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette dated the 16th June 2003. (By Order of the Governor) R.Rathinasamy Secretary to Government To The Works Manager, Government Central Press, Chennai-79. (for publication of the Notification in Tamil Nadu Government Extra-ordinary Gazette) The Chief Electrical Inspector to Government, Chennai-32. The Chairman, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, Chennai-2 All Electrical Inspectors / Assistant Electrical Inspectors / Junior Electrical Inspectors, through Chief Electrical Inspector to Government, Guindy, Chennai-32. The Accountant General  I, Chennai-18 The Accountant General  I, Chennai-18 (By name) Copy to: The Finance Department, Law Department, Chennai-9.

17. Powers conferred under Rules 18 and 19 of the Rules are extracted hereunder.

18. POWER OF ENTRY OF INSPECTING OFFICER - An inspecting Officer may enter any premises where electricity is, or believed to be, generated for own consumption, or sale of surplus electricity to others, for the purpose of- (a) verifying the statements made in the books of account kept and return submitted by the licensee; (b) checking the readings of the meters; and (c) verifying the particulars required in connection with the levy of tax.

19. INSPECTION OF BOOKS OF ACCOUNT AND CHECKING OF RETURNS  An Inspecting Officer may, at any time during the working hours of the office of the licensee or non licensee, as the case may be require him to produce for inspection at the registered or other office such books and records in his possession or control as may be deemed necessary by the Inspecting Officer for ascertaining or verifying the amount of tax payable under the Act.

18. On the aspect of delegated legislation, this Court deems it fit to consider few decisions. (i) In Pradvat Kumar Bose v. The Hon'ble The Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court reported in AIR1956SC285 the Supreme Court observed as follows: ".It is well-recognised that a statutory functionary exercising such a power cannot be said to have, delegated his functions merely by deputing a responsible and competent official to enquire and report. That is the ordinary mode of exercise of any administrative power. What cannot be delegated except where the law specifically so. Provides is the ultimate responsibility for the exercise of such power.". (ii) In Union of India v. P.K.Roy, reported in AIR1968SC850 the Supreme Court, held as follows: ".The maxim 'delegatus non protest delegare' deals with the extent to which a statutory authority may permit another to exercise a discretion entrusted by a statute to itself. It is true that delegation in its general sense does not imply a parting with statutory powers by the authority which grants the delegation, but points rather to the conferring of an authority to do things which otherwise that administrative authority would have to do for itself. If, however, the administrative authority named in the statute has and retains in its hands general control over the activities of the person to whom it has entrusted in part the exercise of its statutory power and the control exercised by the administrative authority is of a substantial degree, there is in the eye of law no ".delegation". at all and the maxim ".delegatus non potest delegare". does not apply [See Fowler (John) & Co. (Leeds) v. Duncan (1941 Ch. 450, Foll].. In other words, if a statutory authority empowers a delegate to undertake preparatory work and to take an initial decision in matters entrusted to it but retains in its own hands the power to approve or disapprove the decision after it has been taken, the decision will be held to have been validly made if the degree of control maintained by the authority is close enough for the decision to be regarded as the authority's own.". (iii) Craies on Statute Law, 6th edn., p. 263, it has been said as follows: ".If the requirements of a statute which prescribe the manner in which something is to be done are expressed in negative language, that is to say, if the statute enacts that it shall be done in such a manner and in no other manner, it has been laid down that those requirements are in all cases absolute, and that neglect to attend to them will invalidate the whole proceeding.". Where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other modes of performance are necessarily forbidden. The intention of the Legislature in enacting s. 20(1) was to confer a power on the authorities specified therein which power had to be exercised in the manner provided and not otherwise. (iv) In A.K.Roy v. State of Punjab reported in AIR1986SC2160 the Supreme Court, on the construction of the first part of Section 20(1) of the Act, observed that, ".12. In the case of statutory powers the important question is whether on a true construction of the Act, it is intended that a power conferred upon A may be exercised on A's authority by B. The maxim delegatus non potest delegare merely indicates that this is not normally allowable but the Legislature can always provide for sub-delegation of powers. The provision contained in ss.24(2)(e) enables the State Government to frame a rule for delegation of powers and functions under the Act but it clearly does not envisage any sub-delegation....... It is well-settled that rules framed pursuant to a power conferred by a statute cannot proceed or go against the specific provisions of the statute.". (v) In Marathwada University v. Seshrao Balwant Rao Chavan reported in 1989 (3) SCC132 the Supreme Court observed as follows: ".20. ........It is a settled principle that when the Act pre- scribes a particular body to exercise a power, it must be exercised only by that body. It cannot be exercised by others unless it is delegated. The law must also provide for such delegation. Halsbury's Laws of England (Vol.14th Ed. para 32) summarises these principles as follows: ".32. Sub-delegation of powers. In accordance with the maxim delegatius non potest delegare, a statutory power must be exercised only by the body or officer in whom it has been confided, unless sub-delegation of the power is authorised by express words or necessary implication. There is a strong presumption against construing a grant of legislative, judicial or disciplinary power as impliedly authorising sub-delegation; and the same may be said of any power to the exercise of which the designated body should address its own mind.".

25. ....Ratification is generally an act of principal with regard to a contract or an act done by his agent. In Friedman's Law of Agency (Fifth Edition) chapter 5 at p. 73, the/principle of ratification has been explained: ".What the 'agent' does on behalf of the 'principal' is done at a time when the relation of principal and agent does not exist: (hence the use in this sentence, but not in subsequent ones, of inverted commas). The agent, in fact, has no authority to do what he does at the time he does it. Subsequently, however, the principal, on whose behalf, though without whose authority, the agent has acted, accepts the agent's act, and adopts it, just as if there had been a prior authorisation by the principal to do exactly what the agent has done. The interesting point, which has given rise to considerable difficulty and dispute, is that ratification by the principal does not merely give validity to the agent's unauthorised act as from the date of the ratification: it is antedated so as to take effect from the time of the agent's act. Hence the agent is treated as having been authorised from the outset to act as he did. Ratification is 'equivalent to an antecedent authority'.".

26. In Bowstead on Agency (14th Ed.) at p. 39) it is stated: ".Every act whether lawful or unlawful, which is capable of being done by means of an agent (except an act which is in its inception void) is capable of ratification by the person in whose name or on whose behalf it is done ..... The words ".lawful or unlawful"., however, are included primarily to indicate that the doctrine can apply to torts. From them it would follow that a principal by ratification may retrospectively turn what was previously an act wrongful against the principle, e.g. an unauthorised sale, or against a third party, e.g. a wrongful distress, into a legitimate one; or become liable for the tort of another by ratifying.".

27. These principles of ratification, apparently do not have any application with regard to exercise of powers conferred under statutory provisions. The statutory authority cannot travel beyond the power conferred and any action without power has no legal validity. It is ab initio void and cannot be ratified.". (vi) In Sahni Silk Mills (P) Ltd., v. Employees' State Insurance Corporation reported in 1994 (5) SCC346 the Supreme Court, at Paragraphs 5 to 7 and 9, observed as follows: ".5. The courts are normally rigorous in requiring the power to be exercised by the persons or the bodies authorised by the statutes. It is essential that the delegated power should be exercised by the authority upon whom it is conferred and by no one else. At the same time, in the present administrative set-up extreme judicial aversion to delegation cannot be carried to an extreme. A public authority is at liberty to employ agents to exercise its powers. That is why in many statutes, delegation is authorised either expressly or impliedly. Due to the enormous rise in the nature of the activities to be handled by statutory authorities, the maxim delegatus non potest delegare is not being applied specially when there is question of exercise of administrative discretionary power.

6. By now it is almost settled that the legislature can permit any statutory authority to delegate its power to any other authority, of course, after the policy has been indicated in the statute itself within the framework of which such delegatee is to exercise the power. The real problem or the controversy arises when there is a sub- delegation. It is said that when Parliament has specifically appointed authority to discharge a function, it cannot be readily presumed that it had intended that its delegate should be free to empower another person or body to act in its place. In Barium Chemicals Ltd., v. Company Law Board [AIR1967SC295. this Court said in respect of sub-delegation: ".Bearing in mind that the maxim delegatus non protest delegate sets out what is merely a rule of construction, sub-delegation can be sustained if permitted by express provision or by necessary implication.".

7. Again in Mangulal Chunilal v. Manilal Maganlal [AIR1968SC822, while considering the scope of Section 481(1)(a) of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act (59 of 1949) this Court said that Commissioner of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation had delegated his power and function under the aforesaid section to a Municipal Officer to launch proceedings against a person charged with offences under the Act or the rules and that officer to whom such functions were delegated could not further delegate the same to another.

8. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 1, in respect of sub-delegation of powers it has been said: ".In accordance with the maxim delegatus non protest delegate, a statutory power must be exercised only by the body or officer in whom it has been confided, (H. Lavender & Son Ltd. v. Minister of Housing and Local Government [1970 (3) All.ER. 871].) unless sub-delegation of the power is authorised by express words or necessary implication (Customs and Excise Comrs. v. Cure and Deeley Ltd. [(1962) 1 QB340 and Mungoni v. Attorney General of Northern Rhodesia [1960 (1) ALL.ER446). There is a strong presumption against construing a grant of legislative, judicial, or disciplinary power as impliedly authorising sub-delegation; and the same may be said of any power to the exercise of which the designated body should address its own mind. Allam & Co. v. Europa Poster Services Ltd. [1968 (1) All.ER826... ".

9. In the case of Harishankar Bagla v. State of M.P. [AIR1954SC465, while examining the scope of Section 4 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 it was said: Section 4 of the Act was attacked on the ground that it empowers the Central Government to delegate its own power to make orders under Section 3 to any officer or authority subordinate to it or the Provincial Government or to any officer or authority subordinate to the Provincial Government as specified in the direction given by the Central Government. In other words, the delegate has been authorized to further delegate its power in respect of the exercise of the powers of Section 3. Mr Umrigar contended that it was for the Legislature itself to specify the particular authorities or officers who could exercise power under Section 3 and it was not open to the Legislature to empower the Central Government to say what officer or authority could exercise the power. Reference in this connection was made to two decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States of America Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan (1934) 293 us 388 and Schechter v. United States (1934) 295 us 495. In both these cases it was held that so long as the policy is laid down and a standard established by a statute, no unconstitutional delegation of legislative power is involved in leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the policy as declared by the legislature is to apply. These decisions in our judgment do not help the contention of Mr Umrigar as we think that Section 4 enumerates the classes of persons to whom the power could be delegated or sub-delegated by the Central Government and it is not correct to say that the instrumentalities have not been selected by the Legislature itself.".

12. ......The maxim delegatus non protest delegate was originally invoked in the context of delegation of judicial powers saying that in the entire process of adjudication a judge must act personally except insofar as he is expressly absolved from his duty by a statute. The basic h principle behind the aforesaid maxim is that ".a discretion conferred by statute is prima facie intended to be exercised by the authority on which the statute has conferred it and by no other authority, but this intention may be negatived by any contrary indications found in the language, scope or object of the statute".. (Vide John Willis, ".Delegatus non protest delegate, (1943) 21 Can. Bar Rev. 257, 259)".. 19. A conjoint reading of Sections 12 and 13 of the Tamil Nadu Tax on Consumption or Sale of Electricity Act, 2003, read with rules 18 and 19 of the Tamil Nadu Tax on Consumption or Sale of Electricity Rules, 2003, indicates that the Electricity Tax Inspecting Officer has ample powers to inspect the prescribed Books of Accounts kept under Section 8 of the Act and that he may also require them for inspection for ascertaining or verifying the amount of tax payable under the Act. He is also empowered to enter upon and search in premises where electricity is supplied and for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Act (a) verify the statements made in the books of account kept and return submitted by the licensee; (b) check the readings of the meters; and (c) verify the particulars required in connection with the levy of tax.

20. The notice dated 24.5.2011 reads that the assessee has been directed to attend the office of the Electrical Inspector/Trichy, on 08.06.2011 at 11.00 A.M., and produce the books of account (list enclosed), together with any objection, which the assessee may wish to prefer and any evidence that the assessee may wish to adduce in support thereof.

21. A mere direction to the assessee to produce the books of accounts, objections and any evidence, in support of his case, does not indicate that the assessment would be done by the Electrical Inspector, when the Director, in his Form E1 Notice [Rule 16(1)]. asserts that, he would assess the amount of tax under Section 9 of the Act to the best of his judgment, without further reference to the assessee, in the event of failure to comply with the notice. On the basis of the contents of the notice, an argument could be advanced that only in the event of failure to comply with the notice, the Director has to personally assess, and if the assessee produces the books of account, with objections and any evidence, then the Electrical Inspector, may assess the tax, to the best of his judgment. But that argument cannot be countenanced, in view of Section 9 of the Act, which states that, (1) if no return in respect of any period is submitted by a licensee or a person required to submit return under section 8 or if the return submitted by such licensee or person appears to the Director to be incorrect or incomplete, the Director shall, after giving such licensee or person, as the case may be, a reasonable opportunity of being heard, proceed in such manner, as may be prescribed to assess to the best of his judgment, the amount of electricity tax payable under this Act, by such licensee or person; and (2) The amount of electricity tax assessed under sub-section (1) for a period less the sum, if any, already paid in respect of the said period, shall be paid by the licensee or the person by such date as may be specified, in a notice issued by the Director, in this behalf and the date to be specified shall be ordinarily not less than 30 days from the date of service of such notice. Moreover, as per Rule 16(2) of the Tamil Nadu Tax on Consumption or Sale of Electricity Rules, 2003, after examining the books of accounts, and after considering the objection preferred and evidence produced in support thereof, the Director shall assess under section 9, the amount of tax payable by the assessee, and he shall also briefly, but clearly record the reasons, on which his order is based. Therefore, even in the case of production of books of accounts, whatever is available with the licencee, and after considering the objections and evidence produced in support thereof, the Director alone shall assess under Section 9 of the Act.

22. A combined reading of Section 9, rule 16 and Form E1 makes it clear that if the returns are not submitted, or the returns submitted by the licencee, under Section 8 of the Act appears to be incorrect or incomplete, the Director, after giving the licensee a reasonable opportunity of being heard, shall proceed in the manner, as may be prescribed, to assess the best of judgment, the amount of electricity tax payable under the Tamil Nadu Tax on Consumption or Sale of Electricity Act, 2003. By applying the principle, ".best of judgment"., the Director has to make an assessment and shall serve a notice in Form-E2 on the assessee, specifying the date, within which the payment shall be made, and he shall further specify the date on which and the authority to whom the evidence in support of such payment shall be produced and he shall also send a copy of the assessment order to the assessee along with the said notice.

23. Reading of the statutory provisions extracted supra also makes it clear that except the Director for Electricity Tax, Chennai / second respondent, no other person has been empowered to make the best of judgment for the purpose of assessment of electricity tax payable, under the Tamil Nadu Tax on Consumption or Sale of Electricity Act, 2003. At this juncture, this Court deems it fit to reproduce the operative portion of the notice, prescribed in the statute and contained in Form E1, issued by the Director, where the legislature has specifically conferred the power of assessment, only on the Director and not on any other person. ".I shall assess the amount of tax under Section 9 of the Act to the best of my judgment, without reference to you.". The words, ".I shall". and ".my judgment"., manifestly indicate that the act of assessment in the case of assessees, covered under Section 8 and 9 of the Act, r/w. Rule 16 of the Tamil Nadu Tax on Consumption or Sale of Electricity Rules, 2003, has to be performed, only by the Director and not by any other person. Usage of the above words, in the statute, casts the duty to be discharged only by the Director. Jurisdiction and authority is conferred only on the Director. The language employed does not indicate delegation of his statutory duty to any other person. At this juncture, this Court deems it fit to extract few judgments, which interpreted the word, ".shall"., in the enactments: (i) The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Hidayatullah, in M/s.Sainik Motors v. State of Rajasthan reported in AIR1961SC1480 observed that ordinarily, though the word shall is mandatory, it can be interpreted as directory, if the context and intention otherwise demands. (ii) In P.T.Rajan v. T.P.M.Sahir reported in 2003 (8) SCC498 the following conclusions are relevant, 45. A statute as is well known must be read in the text and context thereof. Whether a statute is directory or mandatory would not be dependant on the user of the words shall or may. Such a question must be posed and answered having regard to the purpose and object it seeks to achieve.

46. ..

47. The construction of a statute will depend on the purport and object for which the same had been used. ...

48. ..

49. Furthermore, a provision in a statute which is procedural in nature although employs the word shall may not be held to be mandatory if thereby no prejudice is caused. (iii) In Ashok Lanka v. Rishi Dixit reported in 2005 (5) SCC598 para No.53 is relevant, which reads as under:- 53. The question as to whether a statute is mandatory or directory would depend upon the statutory scheme. It is now well known that use of the expression shall or may by itself is not decisive. The court while construing a statute must consider all relevant factors including the purpose and object the statute seeks to achieve. (see P.T.Rajan v. T.P.M.Sahir and U.P.SEB v. Shiv Mohan Singh reported in 2003 (8) SCC498.  (iv) In Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd., v. State of U.P., reported in 2011 (9) SCC354 one of the substantial questions of law framed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, was whether the provisions of Section 17(3-A) of the Land Acquisition Act, is mandatory or directory and whether non-compliance of the same, would vitiate the entire land acquisition proceedings, even when the land had already vested in the State, in terms of Section 17(1) of the Act. Due to the divergent views expressed by the Hon'ble Judges, the matter has been referred to a larger Bench. However, the decisions considered by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Swatanter Kumar, are worth consideration, 117. In `Principles of Statutory Interpretation', 12th Edition, 2010, Justice G.P. Singh, at page 389 states as follows: As approved by the Supreme Court: ".The question as to whether a statute is mandatory of directory depends upon the intent of the Legislature and not upon the language in which the intent is clothed. The meaning and intention of the legislation must govern, and these are to be ascertained not only from the phraseology of the provision, but also by considering its nature, its design and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other". ".For ascertaining the real intention of the Legislature"., points out Subbarao, J, ".the court may consider inter alia, the nature and design of the statute, and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other; the impact of the other provisions whereby the necessity of complying with the provisions in question is avoided; the circumstances, namely, that the statute provides for a contingency of the non- compliance with the provisions; the fact that the non-compliance with the provisions is or is not visited by some penalty; the serious or the trivial consequences, that flow therefrom; and above all, whether the object of the legislation will be defeated or furthered".. If object of the enactment will be defeated by holding the same directory, it will be construed as mandatory, whereas if by holding it mandatory, serious general inconvenience will be created to innocent persons without very much furthering the object of enactment, the same will be construed as directory. But all this does not mean that the language used is to be ignored, but only that the prima facie inference of the intention of the Legislature arising from the words used may be displaced by considering the nature of the enactment, its design and the consequences flowing from alternative construction. Thus, the use of the words `as nearly as may be' in contrast to the words `at least' will prima facie indicate a directory requirement, negative words a mandatory requirement `may' a directory requirement and `shall' a mandatory requirement.".

118. Maxwell, in Chapter 13 of his 12th Edition of `The Interpretation of Statutes', used the word `imperative' as synonymous with `mandatory' and drew a distinction between imperative and directory enactments, at pages 314-315, as follows: ".Passing from the interpretation of the language of statutes, it remains to consider what intentions are to be attributed to the legislature on questions necessarily arising out of its enactments and on which it has remained silent.". The first such question is: when a statute requires that something shall be done, or done in a particular manner or form, without expressly declaring what shall be the consequence of non-compliance, is the requirement to be regarded as imperative (or mandatory) or forms prescribed by the statute have been regarded as essential to the act or thing regulated by it, and their omission has been held fatal to its validity. In others, such prescriptions have been considered as merely directory, the neglect of them involving nothing more than liability to a penalty, if any were imposed, for breach of the enactment. ".An absolute enactment must be obeyed or fulfilled exactly, but it is sufficient if a directory enactment be obeyed or fulfilled substantially".. It is impossible to lay down any general rule for determining whether a provision is imperative or directory. ".No universal rule,". said Lord Campbell L.C., ".can be laid down for the construction of statutes, as to whether mandatory enactments shall be considered directory only or obligatory with an implied nullification for disobedience. It is the duty of Courts of Justice to try to get at the real intention of the Legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be construed.". And Lord Penzance said: ".I believe, as far as any rule is concerned, you cannot safely go further than that in each case you must look to the subject matter; consider the importance of the provision that has been disregarded, and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured by the Act; and upon a review of the case in that aspect decide whether the matter is what is called imperative or only directory.".

119. In a recent judgment of this Court, May George v. Tahsildar [(2010) 13 SCC98, the Court stated the precepts, which can be summed up and usefully applied by this Court, as follows: (a) While determining whether a provision is mandatory or directory, somewhat on similar lines as afore-noticed, the Court has to examine the context in which the provision is used and the purpose it seeks to achieve; (b) To find out the intent of the legislature, it may also be necessary to examine serious general inconveniences or injustices which may be caused to persons affected by the application of such provision; (c) Whether the provisions are enabling the State to do some things and/or whether they prescribe the methodology or formalities for doing certain things; (d) As a factor to determine legislative intent, the court may also consider, inter alia, the nature and design of the statute and the consequences which would flow from construing it, one way or the other; (e) It is also permissible to examine the impact of other provisions in the same statute and the consequences of non-compliance of such provisions; (f) Physiology of the provisions is not by itself a determinative factor. The use of the words `shall' or `may', respectively would ordinarily indicate imperative or directory character, but not always. (g) The test to be applied is whether non-compliance with the provision would render the entire proceedings invalid or not. (h) The Court has to give due weightage to whether the interpretation intended to be given by the Court would further the purpose of law or if this purpose could be defeated by terming it mandatory or otherwise.

120. Reference can be made to the following paragraphs of May George (supra) : ".16. In Dattatraya Moreshwar v. The State of Bombay and Ors. [AIR1952SC181, this Court observed that law which creates public duties is directory but if it confers private rights it is mandatory. Relevant passage from this judgment is quoted below: `7........It is well settled that generally speaking the provisions of the statute creating public duties are directory and those conferring private rights are imperative. When the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of this duty would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty and at the same time would not promote the main object of legislature, it has been the practice of the Courts to hold such provisions to be directory only, the neglect of them not affecting the validity of the acts done.' 17. A Constitution Bench of this Court in State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhya [AIR1961SC751 decided the issue observing: `29.....For ascertaining the real intention of the Legislature, the Court may consider, inter alia, the nature and the design of the statute, and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other, the impact of other provisions whereby the necessity of complying with the provisions in question is avoided, the circumstance, namely, that the statute provides for a contingency of the non-compliance with the provisions, the fact that the non-compliance with the provisions is or is not visited by some penalty, the serious or trivial consequences that flow therefrom, and, above all, whether the object of the legislation will be defeated or furthered.' 22. In B.S.Khuna and Ors. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Ors. [(2000) 7 SCC679, this Court considered the provisions of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, particularly those dealing with transfer of immovable property owned by the Municipal Corporation. After considering the scheme of the Act for the purpose of transferring the property belonging to the Corporation, the Court held that the Commissioner could alienate the property only on obtaining the prior sanction of the Corporation and this condition was held to be mandatory for the reason that the effect of non-observance of the statutory prescription would vitiate the transfer though no specific power had been conferred upon the Corporation to transfer the property.

23. In State of Haryana and Anr. v. Raghubir Dayal [(1995) 1 SCC133, this Court has observed as under: `5. The use of the word `shall' is ordinarily mandatory but it is sometimes not so interpreted if the scope of the enactment, or consequences to flow from such construction would not so demand. Normally, the word `shall' prima facie ought to be considered mandatory but it is the function of the Court to ascertain the real intention of the legislature by a careful examination of the whole scope of the statute, the purpose it seeks to serve and the consequences that would flow from the construction to be placed thereon. The word `shall', therefore, ought to be construed not according to the language with which it is clothed but in the context in which it is used and the purpose it seeks to serve. The meaning has to be described to the word `shall; as mandatory or as directory accordingly. Equally, it is settled law that when a statute is passed for the purpose of enabling the doing of something and prescribes the formalities which are to be attended for the purpose, those prescribed formalities which are essential to the validity of such thing, would be mandatory. However, if by holding them to be mandatory, serious general inconvenience is caused to innocent persons or general public, without very much furthering the object of the Act, the same would be construed as directory.' ".

121. The Legislature in Sections 11A and 17(3A) of the Act has used the word `shall' in contradistinction to the word `may' used in some other provisions of the Act. This also is a relevant consideration to bear in mind while interpreting a provision.

122. The distinction between mandatory and directory provisions is a well accepted norm of interpretation. The general rule of interpretation would require the word to be given its own meaning and the word `shall' would be read as `must' unless it was essential to read it as `may' to achieve the ends of legislative intent and understand the language of the provisions. It is difficult to lay down any universal rule, but wherever the word `shall' is used in a substantive statute, it normally would indicate mandatory intent of the legislature.

123. Crawford on `Statutory Construction' has specifically stated that language of the provision is not the sole criteria; but the Courts should consider its nature, design and the consequences which could flow from construing it one way or the other.

124. Thus, the word `shall' would normally be mandatory while the word `may' would be directory. Consequences of non- compliance would also be a relevant consideration. The word `shall' raises a presumption that the particular provision is imperative but this prima facie inference may be rebutted by other considerations such as object and scope of the enactment and the consequences flowing from such construction.

125. Where a statute imposes a public duty and proceeds to lay down the manner and timeframe within which the duty shall be performed, the injustice or inconvenience resulting from a rigid adherence to the statutory prescriptions may not be a relevant factor in holding such prescription to be only directory. For example, when dealing with the provisions relating to criminal law, legislative purpose is to be borne in mind for its proper interpretation. It is said that the purpose of criminal law is to permit everyone to go about their daily lives without fear of harm to person or property and it is in the interests of everyone that serious crime be effectively investigated and prosecuted. There must be fairness to all sides. (Attorney General's Reference (No.3 of 1999) (2001) 1 All ER577Reference : Justice G.P. Singh on `Principles of Statutory Interpretation', 11th Edition 2008). In a criminal case, the court is required to consider the triangulation of interests taking into consideration the position of the accused, the victim and his or her family and the public.

126. The basic purpose of interpretation of statutes is further to aid in determining either the general object of the legislation or the meaning of the language in any particular provision. It is obvious that the intention which appears to be most in accordance with convenience, reason, justice and legal principles should, in all cases of doubtful interpretation, be presumed to be the true one. The intention to produce an unreasonable result is not to be imputed to a statute. On the other hand, it is not impermissible, but rather is acceptable, to adopt a more reasonable construction and avoid anomalous or unreasonable construction. A sense of the possible injustice of an interpretation ought not to induce Judges to do violence to the well settled rules of construction, but it may properly lead to the selection of one, rather than the other, of the two reasonable interpretations. In earlier times, statutes imposing criminal or other penalties were required to be construed narrowly in favour of the person proceeded against and were more rigorously applied. The Courts were to see whether there appeared any reasonable doubt or ambiguity in construing the relevant provisions. Right from the case of R. v. Jones, ex p. Daunton [1963(1) WLR270, the basic principles state that even statutes dealing with jurisdiction and procedural law are, if they relate to infliction of penalties, to be strictly construed; compliance with the procedures will be stringently exacted from those proceedings against the person liable to be penalized and if there is any ambiguity or doubt, it will be resolved in favour of the accused/such person. These principles have been applied with approval by different courts even in India. Enactments relating to procedure in courts are usually construed as imperative. A kind of duty is imposed on court or a public officer when no general inconvenience or injustice is caused from different construction. A provision of a statute may impose an absolute or qualified duty upon a public officer which itself may be a relevant consideration while understanding the provision itself. (See `Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes', 12th Edition by P. St. J.

Langan and R. v. Bullock, [(1964)1 QB481) 127. One school of thought has accepted that the word `shall' raises a presumption that the particular provision is imperative, while the other school of thought believes that such presumption is merely prima facie, subject to rebuttal by the other considerations mentioned above. For example, in M/s. Sainik Motors, Jodhpur & Others v. The State of Rajasthan [AIR1961SC1480, the word `shall' has been held to be merely directory.

128. G.P. Singh in the same edition of the above-mentioned book, at page 409, stated that the use of the word `shall' with respect to one matter and use of word `may' with respect to another matter in the same section of a statute will normally lead to the conclusion that the word `shall' imposes an obligation, whereas the word `may' confers a discretionary power. But that by itself is not decisive and the Court may, having regard to the context and consequences, come to the conclusion that the part of the statute using `shall' is also directory. It is primarily the context in which the words are used which will be of significance and relevance for deciding this issue.

129. Statutes which encroach upon rights, whether as regards person or property, are subject to strict construction in the same way as penal Acts. It is a recognized rule that they should be interpreted, if possible, so as to respect such rights and if there is any ambiguity, the construction which is in favour of the freedom of the individual should be adopted. (See `Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes', 12th Edition by P. St. J.

Langan) 130. This Court in the case of Devinder Singh (supra) held that the Land Acquisition Act is an expropriatory legislation and followed the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation v. Darius Shapur Chennai and Ors. [(2005) 7 SCC627. Therefore, it should be construed strictly. The Court has also taken the view that even in cases of directory requirements, substantial compliance with such provision would be necessary.

131. If I analyze the above principles and the various judgments of this Court, it is clear that it may not be possible to lay down any straitjacket formula, which could unanimously be applied to all cases, irrespective of considering the facts, legislation in question, object of such legislation, intendment of the legislature and substance of the enactment. In my view, it will always depend upon all these factors as stated by me above. Still, these precepts are not exhaustive and are merely negative. There could be cases where the word `shall' has been used to indicate the legislative intent that the provisions should be mandatory, but when examined in light of the scheme of the Act, language of the provisions, legislative intendment and the objects sought to be achieved, such an interpretation may defeat the very purpose of the Act and, thus, such interpretation may not be acceptable in law and in public interest.

132. Keeping in mind the language of the provision, the Court has to examine whether the provision is intended to regulate certain procedure or whether it vests private individuals with certain rights and levies a corresponding duty on the officers concerned. The Court will still have to examine another aspect, even after holding that a particular provision is mandatory or directory, as the case may be, i.e., whether the effect or impact of such non-compliance would invalidate or render the proceedings void ab initio or it would result in imposition of smaller penalties or in issuance of directions to further protect and safeguard the interests of the individual against the power of the State. The language of the statute, intention of the legislature and other factors stated above decide the results and impacts of non-compliance in the facts and circumstances of a given case, before the Court can declare a provision capable of such strict construction, to term it as absolutely mandatory or directory. 24. The maxim, ".expressio unius est exclusio alterius"., may be applied to the case on hand, ie., Express enactments shuts the door to further implication. The words, appears to me, I shall, my judgment and best of his judgment used in the affirmative language, at many places, in the statutory provisions and the relevant forms, should be read and interpreted to mean that exclusive jurisdiction has been conferred only on the Director to assess, and not to others. Thus the statue limits the exercise of power of best of judgment, by others. Impossibility of performance of a statutory and specific duty, due to practical difficulties, cannot be a reason, for abdication of such power or statutory duty. The duty to be performed is attached to the holder of the office. Tamil Nadu Tax on Consumption or Sale of Electricity Act, 2003 and the Rules, do not indicate any contrary intention that the said statutory duty can be performed by others. It is understandable that in each and every case, the Director, himself cannot make the best of his judgment, in all the cases, falling under Sections 8 and 9 of the Act, and some latitude has to be given, for workability of the statute, but there should be a specific provision in the statute for delegating this function to any other authority, to make the provisions, relating to assessment, workable. The limits of the power to be delegated, should be clearly defined in the Act, which in my humble view, is conspicuously absent. An enabling provision has to be made in the statute by the legislature, conferring power, on any other authority, the extent and subject to any restriction, as it may deem fit, and that the powers may be delegated to any specified persons or class of persons. The power to sub-delegate should be expressly or impliedly authorised in the Act, otherwise, the principle, ".delegatus not potest delegate". will come into operation.

25. Yet another aspect to be considered is that, as per Section 10 of the Act, if any person is aggrieved over an order of assessment of electricity tax, he can file appeal, against such assessment, only to the Government and not to any other authority. Normally, in taxing statutes, the initial assessment of tax, would be done only by an officer, below the Head of the Department and an appeal remedy would be provided to a superior authority.

26. The principle of ".Causus Omissus"., is applied, when there is a case of omission in a statute. The expression, Causus Omissus, as explained in various decisions, means (1) Omitted case, (2) What a statute or an instrument of writing undertakes to foresee and to provide for certain contingencies, and through mistake, or some other cause, a case remains to be provided for, it is said to be a Causus Omissus. In a given case, the words Causes Omissus could also be extended, a legal issue or situation not governed by the statutory or administrative law or by terms of contract.

27. After careful consideration of the statutory provisions, this Court is of the view that there is ".causus omissus". in the statute. In my humble opinion, even harmonious construction of the statutory provisions, would not by implication confer power on the electrical inspector, to make the best of judgment and Court cannot stretch the words, ".I shall". and ".my judgment"., attached to the holder of the office of ".Director"., to any other authority, to fill in the gaps of the omission in the statute. The word ".Director". as defined in Section 2(3) of the Tamil Nadu Tax on Consumption or Sale of Electricity Act, 2003, is as follows: ".Director". means the Director of Electricity Tax appointed by the State Government.".

28. Though the Courts while interpreting statutory provisions normally allow the intention of the statute to override the defects or difficulties, but it is subject to limitations. On the facts and circumstances of this case, this Court cannot add any authority or substitute, the ".Director with that of Electrical Inspector, to perform the functions of the Director. Few decisions on the aspect, whether the Court can add or delete words, from a statute, are extracted. and Courts cannot add or delete words from the statute. Reference can be made to few decisions, (i) In Mohan v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2007) 9 SCC431 the Supreme Court held that, 9. .... We will be adding words to the statute if we put such interpretation to Section 11-A, and it is well settled that the court should not add or delete words in a statute.". (ii) In Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Essar Power Ltd., reported in (2008) 4 SCC755 the Supreme Court, at Paragraphs 52, 54, 55 and 56, held as follows: 52. No doubt ordinarily the literal rule of interpretation should be followed, and hence the court should neither add nor delete words in a statute. However, in exceptional cases this can be done where not doing so would deprive certain existing words in a statute of all meaning, or some part of the statute may become absurd.

54. Thus, in Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of India, this Court has observed that sometimes courts can supply words which have been accidentally omitted.

55. In G.P. Singhs Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 9th Edn., 2004 at pp. 71-74 several decisions of this Court and foreign courts have been referred to where the court has added words to a statute (though cautioning that normally this should not be done).

56. Hence we have to add the aforementioned words at the end of Section 175 otherwise there will be an irreconcilable conflict between Section 174 and Section 175. (iii) In Ansal Properties & Industries Ltd. v. State of Haryana, reported in (2009) 3 SCC553 the Supreme Court held that, 39. ....It is a well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. The language employed in a statute is determinative factor of legislative intent. If the language of the enactment is clear and unambiguous, it would not be proper for the courts to add any words thereto and evolve some legislative intent, not found in the statute.

40. In Ganga Prasad Verma (Dr.) v. State of Bihar [1995 Supp (1) SCC192, it has been held that: (SCC p. 195, para 5) 5. Where the language of the Act is clear and explicit, the court must give effect to it, whatever may be the consequences, for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the legislature. (iv) In Phool Patti v. Ram Singh reported in (2009) 13 SCC22 the Supreme Court held that, 9. It is a well-settled principle of interpretation that the court cannot add words to the statute or change its language, particularly when on a plain reading the meaning seems to be clear. Since there is no mention of any pre-existing right in the exception in clause (vi), we have found it difficult to accept the views in Bhoop Singh case [1995 (5) SCC709. It seems that there is inconsistency in the decisions of this Court in Bhoop Singh case and K.Raghunandan case [2008 (13) SCC102, and since we are finding it difficult to agree with the decision of this Court in Bhoop Singh case, the matter should be considered by a larger Bench of this Court. (v) In Mohd. Shahabuddin v. State of Bihar, reported in (2010) 4 SCC653 the Supreme Court held that, 179. Even otherwise, it is a well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. The language employed in a statute is a determinative factor of the legislative intent. If the language of the enactment is clear and unambiguous, it would not be proper for the courts to add any words thereto and evolve some legislative intent, not found in the statute. Reference in this regard may be made to a recent decision of this Court in Ansal Properties & Industries Ltd. v. State of Haryana [2009 (3) SCC553 180. Further, it is a well-established principle of statutory interpretation that the legislature is specially precise and careful in its choice of language. Thus, if a statutory provision is enacted by the legislature, which prescribes a condition at one place but not at some other place in the same provision, the only reasonable interpretation which can be resorted to by the courts is that such was the intention of the legislature and that the provision was consciously enacted in that manner. In such cases, it will be wrong to presume that such omission was inadvertent or that by incorporating the condition at one place in the provision the legislature also intended the condition to be applied at some other place in that provision. (vi) In Satheedevi v. Prasanna reported in (2010) 5 SCC622 the Supreme Court held as follows: 12. Before proceeding further, we may notice two well-recognised rules of interpretation of statutes. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislature must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. If the words used are capable of one construction, only then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. The words used in the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can legitimately ariseKanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan [AIR1957SC907 13. The other important rule of interpretation is that the court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe the legislation because it has no power to do so. The court cannot add words to a statute or read words which are not there in it. Even if there is a defect or an omission in the statute, the court cannot correct the defect or supply the omissionUnion of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal [1992 Supp (1) SCC323 and Shyam Kishori Devi v. Patna Municipal Corpn. [AIR1966SC1678 29. When the statute contemplates a thing to be done in a prescribed manner, the same has to be done in the manner as provided for and not otherwise. Useful reference can be made to the following decisions. (i) In T.Ramamoorthy v. The Secretary, Sri Ramakrishna Vidyalaya High School, etc. & Others reported in 1998 Writ. LR641 at Paragraph 6, held as follows: ".If the statutory provision enacted by the Legislature prescribed a particular mode for terminating the service or dismissing the teaching or a non-teaching staff of a school, it can and has to be done not only in that manner alone, but it cannot be done in any manner too. This principle that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, things must be done in that way and not otherwise and that the other method of performance is necessarily precluded, is not only well settled, but squarely applies to this case also in construing the scope of the power as also its exercise by the management under Section 22 of the Act.". (ii) In U.P. State Bridge Corpn. Ltd. v. U.P. Rajya Setu Nigam S. Karamchari Sangh, [(2004) 4 SCC268, the Supreme Court, at Paragraph 12, held as follows: 12. Although these observations were made in the context of the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain the proceedings relating to an industrial dispute and may not be read as a limitation on the Courts powers under Article 226, nevertheless it would need a very strong case indeed for the High Court to deviate from the principle that where a specific remedy is given by the statute, the person who insists upon such remedy can avail of the process as provided in that statute and in no other manner. (iii) In Captain Sube Singh v. Lt. Governor of Delhi [(2004) 6 SCC440, the Supreme Court, at Paragraph 29, held as follows: 29. In Anjum M.H. Ghaswala, a Constitution Bench of this Court reaffirmed the general rule that when a statute vests certain power in an authority to be exercised in a particular manner then the said authority has to exercise it only in the manner provided in the statute itself. (See also in this connection Dhanajaya Reddy v. State of Karnataka.) The statute in question requires the authority to act in accordance with the rules for variation of the conditions attached to the permit. In our view, it is not permissible to the State Government to purport to alter these conditions by issuing a notification under Section 67(1)(d) read with sub-clause (i) thereof. (iv) The Supreme Court in State of Jharkhand v. Ambay Cements reported in 2005 (1) CTC223 at Paragraph 27, held as follows: ".27. Whenever the statute prescribes that a particular act is to be done in a particular manner and also lays down that failure to comply with the said requirement leads to severe consequences, such requirement would be mandatory. It is the cardinal rule of the interpretation that where a statute provides that a particular thing should be done, it should be done in the manner prescribed and not in any other way. It is also settled rule of interpretation and where a statute is penal in character, it must be strictly construed and followed. Since the requirement, in the instant case of obtaining prior permission is mandatory, therefore, non-compliance of the same must result in cancelling the concession made in favour of the grantee-the respondent herein.". (v) In Pandit D Aher v. State of Maharashtra reported in 2007 (1) SCC437 the Supreme Court, at Paragraph 19, held as follows: ".When an employee, by reason of an alleged act of misconduct, is sought to be deprived of his livelihood, the procedure laid down under the sub rules are required to be strictly followed. It is now well settled that a judicial review would lie even if there is an error of law apparent on the face of the record. If statutory authority uses its power in a manner not provided for in the statute or passes an order without application of mind, judicial review would be maintainable. Even an error of fact for sufficient reasons may attract the principles of judicial review.".

30. There cannot be any quarrel over the exercise of independent powers by the Electricity Tax Inspecting Officer, to inspect and verify the statements made in the Books of Accounts and returns submitted by the assessee and to verify the meters etc., but the Tamil Nadu Tax on Consumption of Electricity Act, 2003, and the Rules framed thereunder do not empower the Electricity Tax Inspecting Officer to make the best of his judgment, and determine the tax payable by the licensee or the assessee, as the case may be. The contention of the learned Additional Government Pleader that in the matter of raising a demand on the consumers, throughout the State, on day-to-day basis, the Director of Electricity Tax, may not be in a position to make the best of his judgment in every case and that therefore, the impugned order has to be sustained, is not acceptable to this Court for the reason, the power to make the best of judgment is not conferred on the Electrical Inspector and Electricity Tax Inspecting Officer, in cases falling under Section 9 of the Act. When statute confers powers on the Director of Electricity Tax to issue a notice under Form  EI, and also provide an opportunity of being heard, and to pass orders, in terms of Section 9 r/w rule 16 of the Tamil Nadu Tax on Consumption or Sale of Electricity Rules, 2003, the same has to be exercised only by the Director of Electricity Tax and not by others.

31. Notification No.II (EG.4/5/(b)/6) 2003, published in the Gazettee, dated 16.06.2003, also does not confer any power on the Electrical Inspector and Electricity Tax Inspecting Officer to make the best of judgment, in the event of non-submission of returns, in respect of the period, which the assessee, is required to file.

32. As rightly contended by Mr.AR.L.Sundaresan, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, the impugned proceedings dated 18.7.2013 is without jurisdiction, more particularly, when Form-E1 notice has been issued by the Director. Hence, the impugned notice is set aside. Considering the practical difficulty that in every case, the Director may not be in a position to make the best of judgment, this Court suggests that steps may be taken to make necessary provisions in the statute.

33. As the impugned notice is set aside solely on the question of competence, the matter is remitted back to the second respondent to proceed on the basis of the notice issued in Form E1 dated 24.5.2011 (Energy Department), from the Stage, where the defect has crept in and pass orders, as per section 9 r/w rule 16 of the rules, within one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is allowed. The connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed. No costs. Index : Yes 28.10.2013 Internet: yes asvm/skm To 1.The Secretary to Government, The State of Tamil Nadu, Energy Department, Secretariat, Fort St.George, Chennai  600 009. 2.The Director of Electricity Tax, O/o the Chief Electrical Inspector to Government, Thiru.vi.ka.Industrial Estate, Chennai  600 032. 3.The Electrical Inspector & Electricity Tax, Inspecting Officer, 13, NH Bungalow Road, TVS Toll Gate, Trichy  620 020. S.MANIKUMAR, J.

asvm/skm W.P.No.28819 of 2013 and M.P.Nos.1 and 2 of 2013 28.10.2013