Judgment:
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI Date of Decision:
02. 07.2014 + RC.REV. 59/2014 SMT. SARASWTI DEVI Through: ..... Petitioner Mr. Ashutosh Bhattacharjee & Mr. J.P. Tripathi, Advs. Versus SMT. SANTOSH KUMARI. Through: ..... Respondent None. CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAJMI WAZIRI % MR. JUSTICE NAJMI WAZIRI1 This petition impugns an order dated 24.8.2013 whereby the respondent-landlady’s petition under Sections 14(1)(e) and 25 B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 was allowed. The petitioner’s application seeking leave to defend was dismissed and an eviction order has been passed against her with respect to the shop situated at the ground floor of property No.643 B-43, Jood Bagh, Tri Nagar, Delhi. The eviction was sought on the ground that the landlady had a bonafide need for it i.e. her husband who was otherwise carrying on a business with his son in manufacturing readymade garments required the premises, since due to old age he could not cope-up with the hectic schedule of manufacturing activities. He needed tenanted premises to start selling of readymade garments; for which he possessed sufficient experience so as to add to the profitability, along with the manufacturing facility of readymade garments being run by his son. The landlady contended that she had no alternate accommodation to fulfil the bonafide need. A leave to defend was sought by the present petitioner (tenant) on the ground that the husband was already engaged and settled in the business of manufacturing readymade garments with his son, hence he did not need the tenanted premises; that earlier attempts by the landlady to evict the tenant were unsuccessful; that on 7.8.1993, the husband of the petitioner in Suit No.445/1993 had stated that he would not want to evict the petitioner and that the Court needs to differentiate between need and desire of the landlord. The Trial Court however found that no triable issues were raised by the tenant. The Court reasoned that additional information sought to be brought through a rejoinder to the reply to leave to defend could not be taken into consideration since in proceedings under Section 25 B the application for leave to defend itself ought to contend all the grounds which would prima facie make out a case for disentitlement of the eviction petitioner through an order of eviction of the tenanted premises. The Court held that the “rejoinder is filed only for the purpose of replying to the averments made in the reply and any averment made beyond that is treated as a new stand”. The pleadings would be limited to the averments in the application for leave to defend and oral arguments are for the assistance of the Court, but arguments beyond the pleadings could not be taken into consideration. The Trial Court also reasoned that none of the new facts, sought to be brought on record, could be considered since it was not the case of the tenant that the said information was not in her knowledge or did not exist at the time of filing of the application for leave to defend. This Court is of the view that the said reasoning cannot be faulted. The Trial Court also reasoned that in her rejoinder the tenant had admitted that after the demise of her husband she was running the business from the tenanted premises. The landlady had placed on record photocopy of rent receipts and copy of the challans of the rent deposited in the Court which would show that they were issued in the name of the tenant/present petitioner. RCR59of 2014 petitioner/tenant was continuing the business in suit shop and hence this was not a triable issue. The contention that alternate accommodation was available with the landlady was found to be bald and vague since it was not supported by any particulars of such alternate accommodation. This too was found to be a non-triable issue. The Court relied upon the principle laid down in Shiv Sarup Gupta vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, 80 (1999) DLT731as well as Tagore Education Society Regd. vs. Kamla Tandon, 2009 (161) DLT232to conclude that bald and baseless averments and pleas by a tenant would not be sufficient to make out a triable issue or to doubt the need as not genuine or bonafide. The Court further relied upon the principle laid down in Sarla Ahuja vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR1999SC100which held that “when a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own occupation the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bonafide. When other conditions of the Clause are satisfied and when the landlord shows a prima facie case it is open to the Rent Controller to draw a presumption that the requirement of landlord is bonafide.”
The Court further held that “it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises.”
The Trial Court found reason in the landlady’s ground that due to old age and ailments her husband could not cope-up with the hectic schedule of manufacturing readymade garments. The less exhausting and physically less demanding business of retail of readymade garments was deemed to be more suitable. Medical documents regarding the husband were also taken into consideration by the Court in finding the need to be bonafide.
2. The learned counsel for the petitioner has reiterated the same arguments as before the Trial Court. In particular he contends that the need was not bonafide as the landlady’s husband was already engaged in a settled business with the son and the eviction proceeding was only a sham to evict the tenant from the premises in any way. This Court is not persuaded by the arguments of the learned counsel because the need for accommodation changes according to changed circumstances. In the present case, due to advanced age and deterioration of the health of the husband of the landlady, the tenanted premises were found to be more suitable for the husband starting a business of his own so as to augment his earnings. It cannot be a case that simply because he was engaged in a business with his son, he could not start his own business; and surely a landlady cannot be compelled to subject her husband to hardship at a sufferance of a tenant simply to further accommodate the tenant. The Trial Court was to see whether the need was bonafide. In the present case, the bonafide were established. Therefore, the tenant was rightly directed to be evicted. This Court is of the view that for the reasons mentioned in the impugned order, no fault can be found with the conclusion arrived at. There is no reason to interfere with the impugned order. The petition is without merit and is accordingly dismissed. NAJMI WAZIRI (JUDGE) JULY02 2014/ak