1. Petitioner/informant has challenged the judgment dated 28.01.2003 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, FTC-1, Samastipur in Sessions Trial No. 347/1997/190/2000 whereby and whereunder the O.Ps No. 2 to 8 have been acquitted.
2. It has been submitted on behalf of petitioner that the judgment of acquittal recorded by the learned lower court happens to be based upon wrong and flimsy grounds. It has also been submitted that altogether eight PWs have been examined out of whom PW-7 is the doctor who had conducted postmortem over the dead body of Sunil (deceased). From his evidence as well as from the postmortem report, it is evident that deceased Sunil had sustained ante-mortem fire arm injury and that was found the cause of death. Therefore, the version of the prosecution with regard to murder of Sunil by means of fire-arm is fully proved. However, the learned lower court wrongly and illegally took the aforesaid evidence contrary to the prosecution case in the background of presence of semi digested food in the stomach of deceased as well as having the location of fire-arm injury towards downward direction which the doctor had deposed on cross-examination.
3. PW-8 is the another doctor who had examined the informant Dev Narain Mahto on 21.03.1996 at about 8.30 a.m. and found injuries over his person caused by hard and blunt substance which sufficiently proved the nature of assault made by one of the O.P.s Shiv Shankar Mahto by butt of rifle over head of informant. There happens to be no adverse evidence brought through by way of cross-examination. However, did not find consideration by the learned lower court. Now coming to the evidence of material witnesses, two fold arguments have been made. The first one that from the FIR itself, it is evident that Nawal Kishore Mahto, PW-2, Thakur Prasad Singh, PW-4 and Anil Kumar son of informant examined as PW-1 are the FIR named witnesses. They have supported the prosecution case in its entirety. Therefore, taking into account their status being FIR named witnesses as well as on account of having absence of contradiction, development, embellishment in their evidence is suggestive of the fact that they are truthful, creditworthy witnesses and on account thereof, their evidence should not have been brushed aside on superficial grounds. It has also been submitted that even discarding their evidence for a moment PW-5, Dev Narain Mahto (informant) had deposed and supported the prosecution case in toto without having any sort of exaggeration. Therefore, the prosecution case is found fully supported thereof.
4. The learned lower court while dealing with the evidence of the prosecution witnesses failed to consider that they were consistent with regard to genesis as well as manner of occurrence and they have also shown themselves conclusively being an eyewitness to the occurrence. The defence during cross-examination of each and every individual witness had failed to demolish their evidence and as such, the learned lower court should have accepted their evidence in their entirety. Being interested witness is not a ground to discredit their evidence. Whatever caution has been prescribed is to the extent of minute observation of the evidence. Apart from this œfalsus in uno falsus in omnibus? is not at all a sound principle so recognized and as such even discarding the irrelevant portion of the evidence of each of the PWs, the learned lower court should have held that prosecution witnesses remained firm and intact over genesis as well as manner of occurrence. From the judgment of the learned lower court, it is apparent that evidence of all the witnesses have not been considered and dealt with under the garb of aforesaid settled principle. It has further been submitted that the case of the prosecution has been disbelieved mainly on the ground that there is over-writing on the relevant parts in the Fardbeyan which suggests that there is interpolation in the timing of recording of Fardbeyan as well as timing of occurrence. In this connection, it has been submitted that when the evidence is taken together with the evidence of PW-7, it is apparent that there is no discrepancy. Moreover, the witnesses are consistent over the time. While examining PW-6, the I.O. he has also disowned the same. Therefore, there was no cogent and sufficient reason before the learned trial court which could have discredited the evidence of the PWs on that very score. In sum and substance, it has been submitted that the judgment of acquittal rendered by the learned lower court is contrary to the evidence available on the record as well as learned lower court had committed grave error during course of consideration of the evidence. As such, the same is fit to be set aside.
5. Counter meeting with the submissions raised on behalf of the petitioner, it has been submitted on behalf of O.P. No.2 to 8 that there is presumption of innocence of accused as per criminal jurisprudence till he is convicted by the competent court. Also, it is further found fortified when there is judgment of acquittal. Therefore, unless and until there is perversity while deciding the issue, the judgment of acquittal should not be interfered with during course of revisional jurisdiction moreso, at the instance of private party. It has also been submitted that when two views are possible one leaning in favour of accused then that view is to be honoured. The learned lower court had accepted and honoured the view leaning in favour of O.P.No.2 to 8 by way of acquitting them, as such, the aforesaid finding under the score of revisional jurisdiction should not be interfered with.
6. It has further been submitted that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction at the instance of an individual/private party against the judgment of acquittal has been deprecated, moreover, when the State had not chosen to challenge the judgment of acquittal by way of filing an appeal. The caution so prescribed while considering the revision petition at the instance of private party has been led by the Honble Apex Court times without number and the basic feature of the aforesaid conclusive finding happens to be that in normal phenomena, in routine manner such exercise should not be taken up. Certain criteria have been prescribed whereunder interference is found to be permissible. The aforesaid criteria are found centralized with basic point that in case there is gross error, procedural lapses at the part of learned lower court while recording judgment of acquittal, then only such adventure is permissible.
7. Now coming to the facts of the case, it has been submitted that presence of over-writing in the Fardbeyan at all relevant places has got a bearing. The prosecution has come up with a definite case that occurrence had taken place at 6.30 a.m. so that the prosecution witnesses including the informant would claim themselves as an eyewitness to occurrence but that is not the fact. The informant as well as the deceased might have been assaulted in the preceding night itself at some difference place in different manner for which there was no eyewitness nor the informant was able to identify the assailant. The informant had already put his presence at the police station at early hour. From the Fardbeyan, it is evident that the occurrence so alleged happens to be of 2.30 a.m. and then thereafter interpolation has been made by way of over-writing to suggest that it had taken place at 6.30 a.m. In likewise manner, there is over-writing at the timing at which hour the Fardbeyan was recorded. That means to say the timing of occurrence as well as timing of recording of Fardbeyan both have been shifted and changed with an ulterior motive to implicate the O.P. No.2 to 8 in the background of the fact that both the parties are on constrained relationship in the background of land dispute.
8. It has also been submitted that the Doctor, PW-7 had conducted postmortem over the dead body of Sunil on 22.03.1996 at about 11:00 a.m and had opined the time elapsed since death as 36 hours which covers the original timing of 2.30 a.m. so disclosed by the informant himself.
9. Then it has been submitted that PW-6, the I.O. had not found a drop of blood at the place where dead body of deceased was found. After going through the evidence of PWs, more particularly, PW-1 it is evident that after sustaining gun shot injury, the deceased fell down and copious blood came out from the injury which must have been found by the I.O. while inspecting place of occurrence had there been the place of occurrence same as suggested by prosecution. Non presence of blood is another circumstance which falsifies the case of the prosecution as suggested during course of trial.
10. It has also been submitted that presence of semi digested food is of no consequence in ordinary course of nature but it has got relevancy so far present case is concerned. Although neither the prosecution has deposed the time of meal nor the O.P. Nos. 2 to 8 extracted during course of cross-examination, the time of meal, kind of food taken by deceased but the fact remains that had the deceased died at 6.30 a.m., semi digested food would not have found its presence instead thereof complete digested food would have been found. Therefore, presence of semi digested food is suggestive of the fact that the deceased might have been murdered near about 2.30 a.m. which happens to be earlier prosecution version and so happens to be the cause for disbelieving the prosecution version by the learned lower court.
11. It has also been submitted that from the evidence of the PWs it is crystal clear that they have got bondage of relationship so much so that they are also involved in a murder case jointly. Not only this, from the evidence of PW-5, the informant, apart from visualizing dubious character, being an accused in so many kinds of heinous offences are also admitted. That means to say, the criminal background of the family of prosecution party is another circumstance which suggest as well as probabilizes the manner of death of deceased at different place in different manner.
12. The aforesaid factual aspect is found further strengthened after considering the evidence of the prosecution witnesses that at the time of death the deceased was fully dressed which usually the persons in the countryside are not often. Therefore, the cumulative effect of the aforesaid event does suggest that the prosecution has not come with the clean hand relating to the genesis as well as manner of occurrence rather taking an advantageous position got the O.P. No.2 to 8 involved in this case after having murder of the deceased at some different location in some different manner. It has further been submitted that when the evidence of PWs are taken up conjointly, each of them are found inconsistent with each other and on account thereof, demolishes the veracity of the evidence of the PWs. Therefore, the judgment impugned does not require interference.
13. The learned APP fairly submitted that having the judgment of acquittal, virtually, blurred the interest of the prosecution even having revision at the instance of private party.
14. On several occasion, the court faced with issue and illuminated it by laying down definite proposition of law. In Venkatesan v. Rani and others reported in AIR 2013 SC 3320, the Honble Apex Court has laid down guidelines for adjudicating upon revision against acquittal. The relevant para is quoted below:-
œ6. To answer the questions that have arisen in the present case, as noticed at the very outset, the extent and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, particularly in the context of exercise thereof in respect of a judgment of acquittal, may be briefly noticed. The law in this regard is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court. Illustratively, as also chronologically, the decisions rendered in Pakalapati Narayana Gajapathi Raju vs. Bonapalli Peda Appadu[1], Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram[2], Mahendra Pratap Singh v. Sarju Singh[3], K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of A.P.[4] and Logendranath Jha v. Polai Lal Biswas[5] may be referred to. Specifically and for the purpose of a detailed illumination on the subject the contents of paras 8 and 10 of the judgment in the case of Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram (supra) may be usefully extracted below.
œ8. This Court, however, by way of illustration, indicated the following categories of cases which would justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision:
(i) Where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case, but has still acquitted the accused;
(ii) Where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce;
(iii) Where the appellate court has wrongly held the evidence which was admitted by the trial court to be inadmissible;
(iv) Where the material evidence has been overlooked only (either) by the trial court or by the appellate court; and
(v) Where the acquittal is based on the compounding of the offence which is invalid under the law.
These categories were, however, merely illustrative and it was clarified that other cases of similar nature can also be properly held to be of exceptional nature where the High Court can justifiably interfere with the order of acquittal.?
œ10. No doubt, the appraisal of evidence by the trial Judge in the case in hand is not perfect or free from flaw and a Court of appeal may well have felt justified in disagreeing with its conclusion, but from this it does not follow that on revision by a private complainant, the High Court is entitled to re-appraise the evidence for itself as if it is acting as a Court of appeal and then order a re-trial. It is unfortunate that a serious offence inspired by rivalry and jealousy in the matter of election to the office of village Mukhia, should go unpunished. But that can scarcely be a valid ground for ignoring or for not strictly following the law as enunciated by this Court.
The observations in para 9 in the case of Vimal Singh v. Khuman Singh[6] would also be apt for recapitulation and, therefore, are being extracted below.
œ9. Coming to the ambit of power of the High Court under Section 401 of the Code, the High Court in its revisional power does not ordinarily interfere with judgments of acquittal passed by the trial court unless there has been manifest error of law or procedure. The interference with the order of acquittal passed by the trial court is limited only to exceptional cases when it is found that the order under revision suffers from glaring illegality or has caused miscarriage of justice or when it is found that the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case or where the trial court has illegally shut out the evidence which otherwise ought to have been considered or where the material evidence which clinches the issue has been overlooked. These are the instances where the High Court would be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal. Sub-section (3) of Section 401 mandates that the High Court shall not convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. Thus, the High Court would not be justified in substituting an order of acquittal into one of conviction even if it is convinced that the accused deserves conviction. No doubt, the High Court in exercise of its revisional power can set aside an order of acquittal if it comes within the ambit of exceptional cases enumerated above, but it cannot convert an order of acquittal into an order of conviction. The only course left to the High Court in such exceptional cases is to order retrial.?
7. The above consideration would go to show that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Courts while examining an order of acquittal is extremely narrow and ought to be exercised only in cases where the Trial Court had committed a manifest error of law or procedure or had overlooked and ignored relevant and material evidence thereby causing miscarriage of justice. Re-appreciation of evidence is an exercise that the High Court must refrain from while examining an order of acquittal in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the Code. Needless to say, if within the limited parameters, interference of the High Court is justified the only course of action that can be adopted is to order a re-trial after setting aside the acquittal. As the language of Section 401 of the Code makes it amply clear there is no power vested in the High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction.?
15. That means to say, unless and until the court below had committed a manifest error of law or procedure or had overlooked and ignored the relevant, crucial evidence already available on the records leading to miscarriage of justice, in casual and routine manner exercise of revisional jurisdiction has been forbidden. That means to say, there should be proper scrutiny on that very score whether serious lapses did exist in consonance with the materials available on the record. Then and then only, the interference is found permissible otherwise the opportunity is found completely shunned.
16. As per Ext-3, Fardbeyan of PW-5 Deo Narain Mahto recorded on 21.03.1996 at about 8.15 hours (over-writing) at Bithan P.S. by PW-6 alleging inter alia that on the same day at about 6.30 a.m. (over-writing) he along with is son Sunil Kumar were at his Darwaza. At that very time, Raj Kishore @ Mantun, Shiv Shankar Mahto, Dilip Kumar Mahto, Rajiv Mahto, Bindeshwari Mahto, Ramchandar Mahto, Uchit Mahto armed with country made pistol, rifle respectively came at his Darwaza. Out of whom Bindeshwari Mahto, Ramchandar Mahto, Uchit Mahto caught hold his son Sunil and directed to assault as he was not ready to relinquish the land. On the instigation of Uchit Mahto, Raj Kishore Mahto shot at by his country made pistol on the left chest of Sunil on account thereof, he sustained injury and fell down. Thereafter, Dilip Mahto pounced upon his chest and pressed causing instantaneous death. During intervening period, he tried to save his son during course of which Shiv Shankar Mahto gave a butt blow on his head causing severe injury. After hearing sound of firing the villagers began to assemble seeing whom all the accused persons escaped towards western direction who were chased but gone out of grip. Nawal Kishore, Thakur Prasad and Anil Kumar along with others were named who witnessed the occurrence. He had further disclosed that there is cases pending in between them relating to land dispute and so he had alleged commission of murder in the aforesaid background.
17. From Bithan outpost, the Fardbeyan was forwared to Hasanpur P.S. for registration of the case on the basis thereof, Hasanpur (Bithan) P.S. Case No. 39/1996 was registered although, till then the investigation was already taken up by the PW-6 who had recorded the Fardbeyan. After completing the investigation charge-sheet was submitted whereupon trial commenced. During course of trial altogether eight PWs were examined along with exhibit of so many documents. After analyzing the same by the judgment impugned the accused were acquitted, hence this revision at the instance of informant/petitioner.
18. After going through the judgment impugned, it is evident that the learned lower court have not disbelieved the place of occurrence as is evident from para-29 of the judgment, also explained the event whereunder blood was not found by the I/O at P.O. with certain finding in the background of observation of the court order from para-28 thereof, with regard to discrepancy over timing of recording of Fardbeyan as well as timing of occurrence inconsonance with the evidence of PW-6 has been taken note of. It is also evident from para-32 thereof, that the learned lower court had not considered the status of other witnesses to be an eyewitness to occurrence in the background of disclosure made in the Fardbeyan thought admitted the status of PW-5 as sole eyewitness to occurrence. It is also evident from para-30 thereof, that the learned lower court had taken into account the apparel having worn by the deceased and the cumulative effect ultimately debilitated the prosecution version as is evident from para-34 of the judgment.
19. In the case of Gangabhavani v. Rayapati Venkat Reddy as reported in 2013 (4) PLJR (SC) 345 the Honble Apex Court has an occasion to deal with the situation whereunder the witnesses have not been cross-examined on particular point. For better appreciation the relevant paragraphs are quoted below:-
œ17. This Court in Laxmibai (Dead) Thr. L.Rs. and Anr. v. Bhagwanthuva (Dead) Thr. L.Rs. and Ors., AIR 2013 SC 1204 examined the effect of non- cross examination of witness on a particular fact/circumstance and held as under:
œ31. Furthermore, there cannot be any dispute with respect to the settled legal proposition, that if a party wishes to raise any doubt as regards the correctness of the statement of a witness, the said witness must be given an opportunity to explain his statement by drawing his attention to that part of it, which has been objected to by the other party, as being untrue. Without this, it is not possible to impeach his credibility. Such a law has been advanced in view of the statutory provisions enshrined in Section 138 of the Evidence Act, 1872, which enable the opposite party to cross-examine a witness as regards information tendered in evidence by him during his initial examination in chief, and the scope of this provision stands enlarged by Section 146 of the Evidence Act, which permits a witness to be questioned, inter-alia, in order to test his veracity. Thereafter, the unchallenged part of his evidence is to be relied upon, for the reason that it is impossible for the witness to explain or elaborate upon any doubts as regards the same, in the absence of questions put to him with respect to the circumstances which indicate that the version of events provided by him, is not fit to be believed, and the witness himself, is unworthy of credit. Thus, if a party intends to impeach a witness, he must provide adequate opportunity to the witness in the witness box, to give a full and proper explanation. The same is essential to ensure fair play and fairness in dealing with witnesses.? (Emphasis supplied)
(See also: Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, JT 2013 (8) SC 181; and Gian Chand and Ors. v. State of Haryana, JT 2013 (10) SC 515).
18. Thus, it becomes crystal clear that the defence cannot rely on nor can the court base its finding on a particular fact or issue on which the witness has not made any statement in his examination-in-chief and the defence has not cross examined him on the said aspect of the matter.
20. PW-5 Dev Narain Mahto being an informant is the maker of the document (Fardbeyan) while PW-6 being the person who had recorded the Fardbeyan (scribe) as well as who happens to be the I.O. From Ext-2, Fardbeyan itself, it is evident that apart from having the signature of informant, PW-5 exhibited as Ext-1, the signature of FIR attesting witness happens to be Ext-1/A as well as Ext-1/B. The FIR attesting witnesses have been examined as PW-2 as well as PW-4. After going through the evidence of PW-2, PW-4 and PW-5 it is apparent that defence had not cross-examined these three PWs on the score of timing/interpolation when there is consistent version of the witnesses, PW-1 in examination-in-chief œthen Ramdas Mahto and Thakur Prasad carried his father to police station on bicycle?. PW-2 in examination-in-chief œthen thereafter he along with Thakur Prasad and Shibu Mahto carried Dev Narain Mahto to police station.? PW-4 had not deposed on that very score while PW-5 had stated that he had given his Fardbeyan at Bithan police station whereupon he had put his signature. Ramdas Mahto and Thakur Prasad had also put their signature. In that background at least the FIR attesting witnesses by their presence have shown that the Farbeyan was given by PW-5 in their presence at Bithani police station in continuity, therefore, they should have been cross-examined on that very score coupled with the evidence of informant (PW-5) who had also reiterated the earlier version. Had there been a cross-examination on that very score, they should have an opportunity to explain whether there was interpolation at their behest or at the behest of Investigating Authority oral the end of accused to get the prosecution case completely smashed. Moreover, it is evident that the learned lower court had wrongly interpreted the evidence of PW-6 during cross-examination so recorded under para-9 in Para-28 of the judgment and which has been taken as sheet anchor to disbelieve the case of the prosecution. For better appreciation, the aforesaid paragraph (PW-6, para-9) is quoted below in its verbatim:-
21.03.96 ko Bithan Thana Prabhari, Yogendra Das The. Fardbeyan Mein Ghatna Ka Samay 2 ½ baje Subah Likha Hai. Jise 6.30- 2.30 ko interpolate kar banaya hai aisi Baat Nahin Hai. Double pen chala hai. 9.15 hrs ko 8.15 kiya hua hai Aisi Baat Nahin Hai. Teen Line ke baad 9.15 ko ghata kar 8.15 kiya gaya Hai Aisi Baat Nahin Hai. Ki 9 per double chalakar 8 Banaya Gaya Hai. 2.30 ko 6.30 Banaya Gaya Hai Aisi Baat Nahi Hai.
21. It appears from para-28 of the judgment that the learned lower court had not properly considered the evidence in its right perspective whereunder the denial of the witnesses by way of suggestion has acknowledged by twisting it.
22. Now coming to the postmortem report, again the learned lower court made a mistake. Direction of cartridge towards downward may affect on account of various reasons including deflection on account of striking over a bone. Modi in his medical jurisprudence had observed:-
œOn the other hand, a bullet of low velocity causes contusion and laceration of the margins of the wound of entrance. It is easily deflected and deformed by striking some hard object and often lodges in the body. The track made by a bullet widens as it goes deeper. This is reference of a penetrated wound. If a bullet creases a bone, it may produce a gutter with or without fracturing it and may or may not give the direction or deflection of the bullet.?
PW-7 had found following ante-mortem injury on the dead body:-
(A) Abrasion 2?x1? on right leg lower part.
(B) Lacerated wound 2 ½? x 1? on right ankle laterally.
(C) One circular lacerated wound with inverted margin, blackening and charring around the wound, size ¼? in diameter x cavity deep on left upper chest. Blow left clavicle.
(2) On deep dissection of chest and abdomen,
(i) There were fractures of 2nd and 3rd ribs, left side interiorly. On further dissection, plura and lungs on left side was lacerated blood and blood clots were found in chest cavity. The abdomen cavity was full of blood and blood clots and laceration of liver was pumped.
23. It is evident from the evidence of PW-7 that during his cross-examination at para-8 had narrated that the injury was caused from above to downward so lungs, plura and liver were affected. From the consistent oral evidence including the evidence of PW-7, it is evident that deceased had sustained single fire-arm injury over his left chest and in the aforesaid background presence of injury projecting downward could not be seen as adverse to the prosecution case. However, PW-5 has not been cross-examined on this score, at least the distance from which firing was made.
24. In likewise manner, presence of semi digested food in the stomach is of no relevance as none of the witnesses including PW-7, the doctor was cross-examined on that very score as well as the time of intake and the quality of food so taken.
25. Absence of blood at the place of occurrence has itself been explained under para-29 of the judgment and on account thereof needs no further explanation. The issue has further been taken into account in the case of Ganga Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh as reported in (2013) 7 SCC 278 under paras-12, 13 and 14 which are as follows:-
œ12. According to Mr. Mehrotra, however, PW-5 is not a reliable witness as she has made a significant omission in her evidence by not stating anything about the seizure of the blouse, dhoti and broken bangles which were made in her presence. But we find that no question has been put to PW-5 in cross-examination with regard to seizure of the blouse, dhoti and broken bangles in her presence. If the appellants case was that PW-5 cannot be believed because she made this significant omission in her evidence, a question in this regard should have been put to her during her cross- examination. To quote Lord Herschell, LC in Browne vs. Dunn [(1894) 6 R 67 (HL)
œ¦¦it seems to me to be absolutely essential to the proper conduct of a cause, where it is intended to suggest that a witness is not speaking the truth on a particular point, to direct his attention to the fact by some questions put in cross examination showing that the imputation is intended to be made, and not to take his evidence and pass it by as a matter altogether unchallenged, and then, when it is impossible for him to explain, as perhaps he might have been able to do if such questions had been put to him, the circumstances which it is suggested indicate that the story he tells ought not to be believed, to argue that he is a witness unworthy of credit.?
13. Section 146 of the Indian Evidence Act also provides that when a witness is cross-examined, he may be asked any question which tend to test his veracity. Yet no question was put to PW-5 in cross-examination on the articles seized in her presence. In the absence of any question with regard to the seizure of the blouse, dhoti and broken bangles in presence of PW-5, omission of this fact from her evidence is no ground to doubt the veracity of her evidence.
14. The evidence of PW-5, in this case, is also corroborated by other evidence. Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act provides that in order to corroborate the testimony of a witness, any former statement made by such witness relating to the same fact at or about the time when the fact took place, or before any authority legally competent to investigate the fact may be proved. The evidence of PW-5 is corroborated by the evidence of her mother-in-law (PW-2) before whom she stated about the commission of the rape by the appellant soon after the incident the very same evening. The evidence of PW-5 is also corroborated by the FIR (Ex.9) before the Investigating Officer, PW-10, before whom she lodged the complaint one day after the incident.?
26. Now coming to the oral evidence not only all the PWs namely, PWs-1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 have supported the prosecution case in its entirety but during cross-examination also it is found that they have not made any embellishment, material development. Furthermore, it is evident that PW-1 had not been cross-examined on the factum of occurrence though some sort of cross-examination is visualizing from paras-4 as well as 7, PW-2 (para-9), PW-3 (para-2) PW-4 (para-3) and PW-5 (para-9, 10 and 11). The assault over PW-5, apart from ocular evidence has been supported by Doctor so examined as PW-8 who had found following injuries on his person as well as the PW-5 in para-9 of his cross-examination supported the same:-
1. Lacerated wound in the mid line of head 3 cm x ½ cm x 6 cm above the hair line.
2. Abrasion on right leg 6 cm below right knee 1 cm x 1 cm. All injuries were caused by hard and blunt substance, such as lathi. Nature of injury no01 after getting x-ray report simple in nature. Injury no.2 was simple in nature.
Age of injury- within six hours.
Nature of Identification:- Scar mark on middle of upper forearm posterior aspect.
27. It is evident from the evidence of witnesses that they are inter-related and so are delirious. Being inter-related is no ground for rejection of their evidence save and except having caution during course of scrutinizing the evidence that the same be scrutinized meticulously. The aforesaid issue has been taken into consideration in the case of Kanhaiya Lal v. State of Rajasthan as reported in 2013 (5) SCC 655 under paragraphs- 23, 24, and 25 which are as follows:-
23. The next limb of argument of Mr. Jain, learned counsel for the appellants, is that all the alleged eye witnesses are closely related to the deceased Purshottam and the prosecution has chosen not to examine any independent witness despite number of houses situate in the close vicinity of the house of Purshottam and that itself creates a dent in the version of the prosecution. When relatives, who are alleged to be interested witnesses, are cited by the prosecution, it is the obligation of the court to scrutinize their evidence with care, caution and circumspection. In the case at hand, the entire occurrence took place in and around the house of Purshottam. Five people had been done to death. In such a circumstance, it is totally unexpected that other villagers would come forward to give their statements and depose in the court. It is to be borne in mind that Ram Narayan, Sarpanch of the village, solely on the basis of suspicion, had seen to it that five persons meet their end. Such a situation compels one not to get oneself involved and common sense give consent to such an attitude. Thus, no exception can be taken to the fact that no independent witness was examined. As far as the relatives are concerned, Radhey Shyam, PW-1, is the brother of the deceased, Ram Lal, PW-2, is the brother of Radhey Shyam, Panna Bai, PW- 3, is the mother of Purshottam and Nirmala Bai, PW-5, is his wife, and Anita, PW-5, Badribai, PW-8, Manisha, PW-9 and Kaushalya, PW-10, are also close relatives and these witnesses have been cited as eye witnesses.
24. In Hari Obula Reddy and others v. The State of Andhra Pradesh[(1981) 3 SCC 675], a three-Judge Bench has opined that it cannot be laid down as an invariable rule that interested evidence can never form the basis of conviction unless corroborated to a material extent in material particulars by independent evidence. All that is necessary is that the evidence of the interested witnesses should be subjected to careful scrutiny and accepted with caution. If on such scrutiny, the interested testimony is found to be intrinsically reliable or inherently probable, it may, by itself, be sufficient, in the circumstances of the particular case, to base a conviction thereon.
25. In Kartik Malhar v. State of Bihar [(1996) 1 SCC 614], this Court has stated that a close relative who is a natural witness cannot be regarded as an interested witness, for the term œinterested? postulates that the witness must have some interest in having the accused, somehow or the other, convicted for some animus or for some other reason.
28. The learned lower court had only shown suspicion against their conduct forming a ground to reject their evidence in the background of being inter-related is not a sound principle of law. In likewise manner the learned lower court in para-35 had taken into account the propriety of the document so exhibited as Ext-8, 8/A, 8/B, 8/C inconsonance with Ext-A and B. The propriety of document whether on account of non probate of a will is admissible to the extent of devolvement of the property but failed to construe that on account thereof, the parties are on strained relationship. Enmity is a double edged sword. It may be a motive for false implication while it may be a motive for commission of offence and that has to be adjudged on the basis of the evidence so produced during trial.
29. Now coming to ocular evidence, it is apparent from the judgment impugned that the learned lower court had not dealt with in proper way. The learned lower court failed to assign any cogent reason to discard the evidence of other PWs. Apart from it, the learned lower court also failed to acknowledge Section 134 of the Evidence Act whereunder it is quality and not quantity, which matters. Why the evidence of PW-5 the informant as well as injured is to be disbelieved, the judgment impugned did not justify. In Mano Dutt and Anr v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2012) 4 SCC 79 it has been held under para-30,31 which are as follows:-
œ30. Salik Ram was examined as PW2 and his statement is cogent, coherent, reliable and fully supports the case of the prosecution. However, the other injured witness, Nankoo, was not examined. In our view, non-examination of Nankoo, to which the accused raised the objection, would not materially affect the case of the prosecution. Normally, an injured witness would enjoy greater credibility because he is the sufferer himself and thus, there will be no occasion for such a person to state an incorrect version of the occurrence, or to involve anybody falsely and in the bargain, protect the real culprit. We need not discuss more elaborately the weightage that should be attached by the Court to the testimony of an injured witness. In fact, this aspect of criminal jurisprudence is no more res integra, as has been consistently stated by this Court in uniform language.
31. We may merely refer to the case of Abdul Sayeed v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(2010) 10 SCC 259], where this Court held as under:
"28. The question of the weight to be attached to the evidence of a witness that was himself injured in the course of the occurrence has been extensively discussed by this Court. Where a witness to the occurrence has himself been injured in the incident, the testimony of such a witness is generally considered to be very reliable, as he is a witness that comes with a built-in guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and is unlikely to spare his actual assailant(s) in order to falsely implicate someone. "Convincing evidence is required to discredit an injured witness." [Vide Ramlagan Singh v. State of Bihar,[ (1973) 3 SCC 881 Malkhan Singh v. State of U.P. [(1975) 3 SCC 311, Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab [(1983) 3 SCC 470, Appabhai v. State of Gujarat, [(1988) supp SCC 241, Bonkya v. State of Maharashtra, [(1995) 6 SCC 447 Bhag Singh [(1997) 7 SCC 712 Mohar v. State of U.P. [(2002 7 SCC 606 (SCC p. 606b-c), Dinesh Kumar v. State of Rajasthan, [(2008) 8 SCC 270 Vishnu v. State of Rajasthan, [(2009) 10 SCC 477 Annareddy Sambasiva Reddy v. State of A.P. [(2009) 12 SCC 546 and Balraje v. State of Maharashtra. [(2010) 6 SCC 673]
29. While deciding this issue, a similar view was taken in Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, [(2009) 9 SCC 719 where this Court reiterated the special evidentiary status accorded to the testimony of an injured accused and relying on its earlier judgments held as under: (SCC pp. 726-27, paras 28-29)
"28. Darshan Singh (PW 4) was an injured witness. He had been examined by the doctor. His testimony could not be brushed aside lightly. He had given full details of the incident as he was present at the time when the assailants reached the tubewell. In Shivalingappa Kallayanappa v. State of Karnataka [1994 supp (3) SCC 235] this Court has held that the deposition of the injured witness should be relied upon unless there are strong grounds for rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies, for the reason that his presence on the scene stands established in case it is proved that he suffered the injury during the said incident.
29. In State of U.P. v. Kishan Chand [(2004) 7 SCC 629 a similar view has been reiterated observing that the testimony of a stamped witness has its own relevance and efficacy. The fact that the witness sustained injuries at the time and place of occurrence, lends support to his testimony that he was present during the occurrence. In case the injured witness is subjected to lengthy cross-examination and nothing can be elicited to discard his testimony, it should be relied upon (vide Krishan v. State of Haryana). Thus, we are of the considered opinion that evidence of Darshan Singh (PW 4) has rightly been relied upon by the courts below."
30. The law on the point can be summarized to the effect that the testimony of the injured witness is accorded a special status in law. This is as a consequence of the fact that the injury to the witness is an inbuilt guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and because the witness will not want to let his actual assailant go unpunished merely to falsely implicate a third party for the commission of the offence. Thus, the deposition of the injured witness should be relied upon unless there are strong grounds for rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies therein."
To the similar effect is the judgment of this Court in the case of Balraje.?
30. Consequent thereupon, the judgment impugned is set aside. Petition is allowed. The matter is remitted to the learned lower court to hear both the parties and will pass judgment in accordance with law and for that Opposite Parties No. 2 to 8 are directed to surrender before the learned lower court within four weeks failing which the court below will be at liberty to procure attendance of O.P. Nos. 2 to 8 in accordance with law.