Judgment:
1. Three appellants were put on trial by the learned 5th Additional Sessions Judge, Samastipur after being indicted of committing offences under Sections 304B and 498A of the IPC and for being tried in Sessions Trial No.296 of 1999. By judgment dated the 29th June of 2002, the three appellants were held guilty of committing the two offences, i.e., 304B and 498A IPC. After being heard on sentence on the same day, each of the appellants was directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for ten years on each of the two counts. The appellants have come up before this Court through the present appeal to question the correctness of the findings as regards their guilt and the appropriateness of the order of sentence.
2. The occurrence was dated on 26th of July, 1996 and as per allegation it had taken place at 6 A.M. The informant Md. Shakil who was examined as P.W.5 alleged that while he was passing through the house of the appellants, while going to purchase some tea, he heard the sound of gagging emanating from the courtyard of his sister Haseena Khatoon. He out of curiosity entered inside the Angan to find that 13 persons named in the fardbeyan (Ext-1) including the three appellants had put the deceased down on the ground and were strangulating her to death. Some persons were pressing her neck, while others were catching different organs of the deceased Haseena Khatoon. P.W.5 stated that his sister was killed by strangulation by the accused persons and he raised hulla which attracted persons who saw the occurrence.
3. As regards the reason for commission of the murder of deceased Haseena Khatoon, the informant stated that after being married on 07.06.1996 to appellant Md. Khairul, the deceased was being asked to bring Rs.15,000/- from the informant which had been refused by her and, as such, she was murdered.
4. As may appear from the facts of the case, it could initially have been registered for the offence under Section 302 IPC, but the police registered the case under Section 304B/34 IPC and took up the investigation. The investigating officer has not been examined, but the record indicates that the dead body was sent for postmortem examination which was held by Dr. Navin Kumar Verma (P.W.6) on 26.07.1996 and he could not find any ante-mortem injury on the dead body either externally or internally, as such, he preserved the viscera and opined that the cause of death could not be ascertained. It appears from the record that the viscera report was also not received till the conclusion of the trial and delivery of the judgment, but the police finding material sufficient through the statements of witnesses, sent up the present set of three appellants up for trial.
5. The defence of the appellants was that of their innocence and false implication.
6. Altogether seven witnesses were examined by the prosecution in support of the charges. P.W.1 Md. Akhtar and P.W.2 Harkhu Das did not support the prosecution case and gave one line evidence that they had no knowledge about the occurrence. They were, as such, declared hostile and cross-examined by the prosecution. P.W.3 Jogi Das corroborated the charges by stating that the appellant Md. Khairul with Taiyab, Sabir and Haroon had surrounded the deceased and after having put a loop of her sari had strangulated her. P.W.4 Rasheed was not an eye witness to the occurrence and he claimed having heard from Md. Shakil, the informant of the case, that his sister had been murdered by the appellants. However, while considering the evidence of P.W.5, I could not isolate a single fact which could point out that P.W.5 Md. Shakil had stated anything about the occurrence to P.W.4. In that view, the evidence of P.W.4 appears inadmissible on account of being incorporated hearsay. P.W.5 the informant was supporting his case and was stating that it were the accused persons including the present appellants who had committed the murder of his sister and while so doing the accused Haroon had gagged the lady while appellant Md. Khairul with one Taiyab had pressed the neck at the orders of appellant Md. Abdul Sakur. The reason for commission of the offence was the demand of Rs.15,000/- from the lady after she had been married to appellant Md. Khairul and non-fulfillment of the demand. In cross-examination P.W.5 stated that the deceased was married thrice, her marriage to appellant Md. Khairul was the last and the third marriage of her earlier two marriages, one with Lalbabu of village-Mau, had witnessed some rough weathers and the lady was firstly married some eight years ago but that had also ended in divorce.
7. As regards the manner of occurrence, the informant was cross-examined in paragraph18 of his evidence and was suggested that he had never stated the fact that his sister was strangulated by appellant Md. Khairul and one Taiyab while she had been gagged by Firoj and the act had been committed at the orders of appellant Md. Abdul Sakur. Thus, what appears is that the investigating officer was not examined and, as such, this important fact on the manner of occurrence was not proved by cross-examining the investigating officer. The defence appears prejudiced on account of non-examination of the investigating officer.
8. At any rate, what appears from the evidence of P.W.5 is that it was a case of direct evidence as P.W.5 claimed to have seen his sister being killed by being strangulated to death. The doctor did not find any external or internal injury. In cross-examination the witness stated that her neck was pressed to suffocate her to death, but P.W.6, the doctor, who held postmortem examination on the dead body did not find any injury. Not only on any part of the dead body but also on either of the sides of the neck and thus, the absence of injury on the dead body was ruling out the manner of occurrence completely. The doctor had preserved the viscera and as I have noted earlier, there was no report submitted after the chemical analysis of the preserved viscera.
9. The defence had examined Dr. Dinesh a compounder who was contacted by the family members of the deceased and was requested that he should go and attend on the deceased who was suffering from diarrhoea. P.W.2 stated that he went and administered saline drippings to the deceased. But the deceased who was suffering from diarrhoea and vomiting did not survive and died. Considering the evidence of D.W.2 and other defence witnesses who were examined in support of the above fact, the probability becomes stronger that the manner of occurrence which was alleged for causing the death of the deceased was doubtful.
10. In addition to what I have stated and recorded above, the offence of dowry death is constituted by many ingredients, like, that the death of a married lady should have occurred within seven years of her marriage, that the lady should have died under circumstances not normal and that it should reasonably be shown that just prior to her death, the lady had been subjected either to cruelty or had been harassed either for dowry or in connection therewith. The ingredient that the lady had been treated with cruelty or harassed just before her death for or in connection with a demand of dowry appears not established. The informant P.W.5 did state that an amount of Rs.15,000/- was asked from the deceased which amount was refused to be given, but there is no evidence of any witnesses that for not bringing that particular amount, the lady was ever illtreated or tortured either by her husband or by any of the relatives of the husband. A plain reading of the provision of Section 304B IPC may point out that in case, the ingredients are established by admissible or acceptable evidence, then it has to be deemed, i.e., to say that it has to be presumed that the accused person had committed dowry death. It is true that the Evidence Act also contains a provision under Section 113B of the Evidence Act requiring the raising of a presumption as to dowry death when it is shown that soon before her death, the women, whose death was the subject matter of an enquiry as dowry death, had been subjected by the accused person to cruelty or harassment for in connection with any demand of dowry, then the accused had committed the offence. In my personal view, the provision of Section 113B of the Evidence Act might be there, but when the very provision of Section 304B IPC was directing that the ingredients of an offence under Section 304B established, could itself be sufficient to presume that the accused had committed the dowry death, then there was no need for the legislature to legislate a separate provision under Section 113B of the Evidence Act. The very basic provision of Section 304B IPC requires the Courts to draw statutory presumption of commission of dowry death by the accused persons, in case, the ingredients had been established. I have recorded these opinions of mine only to point out the scope and ambit of Section 304B IPC and, as such, these discussions are only academic in nature. As regards the factual aspect of the case, I have already noted that on account of a complete lack of evidence including that the lady had ever been subjected to ill-treatment or torture just prior to her death on account any demand in connection with dowry, the offence under section 304B IPC was not constituted. As regards the conviction of the appellants for the offence under Section 498A IPC, I want to record the same reasons, based on the lack of evidence showing that the lady had never been ill-treated or tortured in any connection. The evidence is completely blank raising no presumption or inference that the lady had never been tortured or ill-treated in any connection and for any reason.
11. Having regard to the above findings recorded by me, in the light of the evidence available on the trial court record, the appeal succeeds and the same is allowed. The appellants are acquitted of the charges, they had been convicted of by setting aside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence. The three appellants are on bail. They shall stand discharged from their respective bonds.
12. Smt. Uma Kumari has assisted the Court as Amicus Curiae and the Court desires that she be paid one fee of hearing by the Patna High Court Legal Services Committee and for that purpose let copies of the first and last pages of this judgment be made over to her for appearing in this matter as Amicus Curiae.