Judgment:
1. The present appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 06.08.2002 and 08.08.2002 respectively passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Katihar in Sessions Trial No.224 of 2001 by which the solitary appellant Jahangir Alam was held guilty of committing offence under Section 376 IPC and was directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for ten years.
2. The appellant was put on trial with his father Nawab Arfeen after being charged under Section 376 IPC and as regards his father he was indicted U/S 376/109 I.P.C. His father was acquitted and the appellant was convicted as above.
3. Petition of complaint dated 22.04.1997 filed by P.W.1;the prosecutrix of the case, was the basis upon which the trial had proceeded. As per the petition of complaint, the occurrence had taken place some six months prior to the filing of the same and it appears from the allegation that the prosecutrix was subjected to sexual intercourse for a continuous period of more than six months, as a result of which, she conceived from the appellant. The prosecutrix proposed to the appellant to marry her but he refused. Ultimately, she had to narrate the facts to her parents and her father went to the father of the appellant, namely, Nawab Arfeen who rejected the proposal and threatened the father of the complainant (P.W.2) to be killed. It was alleged that a lot of pressure was exerted upon the appellant whereafter he left his village and went away to some other places. Ultimately, the prosecutrix was left with no other option but to file the complaint petition.
4. It appears that after examination of the complainant on solemn affirmation, some witnesses were produced during enquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C. and the appellant and his father were summoned to stand the trial and ultimately, were charged with commission of offences as indicated above.
5. While making the submission, it was contended by Sri N. Hoda, learned counsel appearing for the appellant that the case was a simple case of sexual intercourse with consent of the girl and it did not constitute any offence. Submission also was that there was no resistance or accusation of solicitating sex by the appellant Jahangir Alam and it appears that the lady was more willing than the appellant to indulge into the act. It was contended next that she was quite a prudent and grown up lady so much so that she was understanding the implications of the act and was making enquiry, as may appear from her evidence, from the appellant about indulging into the act and consequences thereof.
6. Sri Sujit Kumar Singh, learned Additional Public Prosecutor was submitting that the prosecutrix was aged less than 16 years of age and she had not reached the age of the discretion so as to consenting to the act of being sexual exploiting and it was a case of rape. Sri Singh has also drawn the attention of the Court to Section 90 of the IPC to submit that consent was obtained under some misconception of fact which may not constitute the consent legally and as such, it was an offence under Section 376 IPC.
7. The definition of rape may refer to the constitution of the offence in reference to the age of the victim as may appear from clause sixthly of Section 375 IPC which states that sexual intercourse by a man with a female, if the female is below 16 years of age, was rape even if it was committed with consent of that lady. Consideration of definition of rape may further indicate that the age is in fact no factor as regards the commission of sexual intercourse with alady by a man, if it is without consent. The line of distinction as regards the age of the victim, i.e., of 16 years is only to be considered when the Court was considering the defence of the act having been committed with consent of the lady. As such, the Court in the case of the present nature has to, first, embark upon the enquiry about the age of the victim on the date on which she appears undisputedly subjected to sexual intercourse by the appellant.
8. On perusal of the evidence of the three witnesses, which include the parents of the prosecutrix also it does not appear that there was truthful statement placed before the Court as regards age of the victim lady. It is true that the victim had stated that she was 14 years of age in the complaint petition but when she came to give evidence, she was not stating as to what her age was. The learned counsel for the appellant was pointing out to this Court that the heading of deposition containing the record of evidence of P.W.1 points out that she could be aged, in the estimate of the Court 22 years and as per her own statement 18 years. But what I find is that the details of the witness as regards her age or her name or her parentage besides the place of her residence or other details, which appear in the heading of a deposition of a witness are not the part of her evidence, for the reason that the definition of evidence excludes those details which appear in the heading of deposition sheets form being the evidence in the case. Evidence has been defined in procedural terms to mean the statement of a witness recorded in a judicial proceeding under oath by an authority competent to record it. It is well known that the details of a witness which are filled up in the vacant spaces in the deposition sheets, as appears in the present case also are informations in respect of the witnesses and those informations are obtained by the Court only to identify him or her as the person who had come to depose before the Court. Those details are never recorded after administering oath in the Court proceeding and oath is administered only after those details are obtained by the Court for being duly put down in the vacant spaces and, as such, that part of the deposition sheet is never the evidence in the case. The learned counsel for the defence was also appealing to me to consider the age as assessed by the Presiding Officer, i.e., 22 years of P.W.1 to reach the conclusion that she could be about 16 years of age, but I have just noted that assessment by the Court was never the evidence. It could be a personal opinion of the Presiding Officer which was put down under the requirements of practice to indicate the estimated age of the person who was deposing in the case. Likewise, the age of the victim which was stated by her may not also be acceptable for the same reason as I have just indicated. Thus, what appears is that is a void-like-situation appears from the evidence as regards the age of the victim. In her examination P.W.2, was pointed out that his daughter was about 13-14 years of age on the day of occurrence, but he was confronted with his previous statement which was made by him under Section 202 Cr.P.C. before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Katihar during enquiry and he was confronted to the fact that he had never stated before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Katihar in the enquiry that his daughter was aged 13 or 14 years. The witness P.W.2, the father of the prosecutrix, appears not thereafter pointing out any factual basis upon which it could be said that the lady was aged below 16 years on or around the date of occurrence. Similarly, P.W.3, the mother of the prosecutrix was also not giving any age of the victim and was simply stating the facts of the case that her daughter complained to her about being subjected to sexual intercourse by the appellant on the allurement of the appellant of getting married to her and she had conceived from the appellant and had given birth of a child and the appellant had refused to marry her. The mother could have been the best witness to state as to when she had given birth to P.W.1. She was an illiterate lady. She may not have the actual knowledge of the date on which P.W.1 was born, but she could have given some estimated age of her daughter. She was very plainly speaking as may appear from paragraph-7 of her evidence that she did not know the exact date on which her daughter was borne. It appears that she was suggested that her daughter was aged 20-25 years at the time when the occurrence had taken place. Fairly speaking, as appears from the evidence, it is very difficult for the Court to reach the conclusion as to what was the age of the victim.
9. I do not want to traverse into uncertainty and hazardous conjectures so as to noting down that a particular number of years could be the age of the victim, but what I could find from her evidence is that she was a person who was quite conscious of things around her and she appears further a person who had definitely achieved maturity and some age of discretion. For deriving the above conclusion, I could refer to some part of the evidence of P.W.1. During her examination-in-chief itself the lady was stating that the appellant had indulged into sexual intercourse with her and she had questioned to him as to why he was doing the act, upon which the appellant stated that he would marry the lady. In cross-examination, the lady was pursued on the above fact and it appears from paragraphs-9,10 and 11 that the lady was quite conscious of the act in which she had indulged into with the appellant so much so that initially the act was done under some cover of confidentiality by choosing the place which has been described by the prosecutrix in paragraph-9, but just in the next paragraph she stated that it was her free will and when the appellant called her she never hesitated on being called into the house in which the appellant was residing and she always responded to the call. Not only that on some occasion, the lady was caught by the appellant and was dragged into the house for fulfilling amorous desire of the appellant. While the lady was being dragged inside the house, the lady was not raising any alarm. This was the reply to the very question in the cross-examination and the last line of paragraph-11 discloses the complete mind set of the lady that she was not only consensuous as regards the act, but she was very much playing the equal part with the appellant and she used to enjoy the coitus together. She probably was teasing the appellant when the appellant was either asking her to come along to perform the act and after the act had been performed, she would put some questions as to why he was doing that thing. These are some of the factual data which indicate that the lady was quite matured and she had reached a level of maturity and that she had not only reached level of maturity rather she had reached the state of discretion and that she was feeling free and independent in choosing the course of her act to indulge into. The age of discretion has been fixed as 16 years, but if in absence of the age, it appears abundantly clear from the evidence that the lady was quite grown up so as to be independent in applying her discretion and if I come to this conclusion, which I definitely do after considering the evidence of the prosecutrix itself, then in my opinion, it could not be an offence under Section 376 IPC. The act was the result of joint planning of couple who were probably performing the act out of their own free will so as to enjoying the coitus.
9. The element of obtaining consent on account of mis-representation of the fact as injected into by the learned Public Prosecutor in his argument by virtue of Section 90 of the Act has to be noticed. Section 90 IPC reads as under:-
œ90. Consent known to be given under fear or misconception.”A consent is not such a consent as it intended by any section of this Code, if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconceptions; or
Consent of insane person.”if the consent is given by a person who, from unsoundness of mind, or intoxication, is unable to understand the nature and consequence of that to which he gives his consent; or
Consent of child.”unless the contrary appears from the context, if the consent is given by a person who is under twelve years of age.?
10. On a bare perusal of the provision, what appears is that the consent, if obtained under fear of injury or under a mis-conception of fact is no consent. Mis-conception of fact in the present case was that the lady had indulged into the act with the appellant only because he had allured her to a promise to marry her. What appears from the reading of the provision is that the consent must have been obtained before the act indeed had been performed. If the consent appears obtained or being granted after the act has been committed, then in my considered view Section 90 of the IPC is not applicable. Obtaining consent under some mis-conception or by putting the victim into some mis-conception of fact by the accused prior to indulging into the act complained of is the sine qua non of applying the provision. Here in the present case, it is very clear that the lady had entered into the sexual act with the appellant quite before and she had put a question as to why the appellant was indulging into the act with her upon which the appellant had simply stated that he wished to marry her. The act was never committed as appears from the facts of the case, after mis-leading the lady to a particular belief and then exploiting her sexually. In fact, the sexual act preceded long back the lady had enquired something from the appellant. In this fact situation, I am of the opinion that Section 90 IPC do not have any application and, as such, that argument does not appear available to the prosecution.
11. After having recorded what I have just done, the learned trial Judge, in my view, missed all important aspects of the case and convicted the appellant Jahangir Alam wrongly and illegally, as a result of which, the appeal succeeds. The appellant is acquitted after setting aside the judgment of conviction and the order of sentence passed upon him. The appellant is on bail. He shall stand discharged from the liabilities of his bail bonds.