Sudhir Kumar, Member (A).
1. This Review Application has been filed seeking for a review of the order pronounced on 30.01.2014 in TA No. 1086/2009. The operative portion of the order in TA was as follows:-
"22. It is, therefore, clear and apparent that the applicant does not have any substantive grievance which requires a judicial intervention or determination from this Tribunal, and actually his grievances could have been settled if the issue concerning his seniority, in respect of which he had given numerous representations, had been settled, after which he would have perhaps automatically become eligible for being counted among the 30% segment of NFSG on the basis of his seniority. Therefore, this TA is disposed of, with liberty being granted to the applicant to consolidate his grievance as raised by him with the respondents through his representations dated 07.02.2005, 31.03.2005, 15.04.2005, 30.06.2005, 06.08.2005 and 09.12.2005 into a single representation, and the Respondent North MCD is directed to consider his case of seniority, and resolve it, so that the issue of grant of NFSG or DACP financial upgradations to him can be settled, and if after such consideration of his representation, the applicant falls within 30% of the cadre of NFSG, or can be covered under the DACP Scheme for grant of financial benefits from a retrospective date, his claim would be considered and he would be granted those benefits accordingly."
(Emphasis supplied).
2. Still, the applicant has filed this review. The grounds taken by the applicant while filing this Review Application are as follows:-
That all the facts and documents raised by the applicant in his OA have not been taken in true spirit and have not been appreciated in real spirit.
That the seniority of the applicant is not in dispute for the purpose of grant of NFSG grade.
That what was in dispute was that the respondent had in their order dated 05.01.2005 shown the name of the applicant to be below his juniors and the prayer was to correct the serial number of the applicants seniority in the orders dated 05.01.2005.
That the applicant be given the NFSG grade w.e.f. 06.06.2000, as he was entitled to be included in 30% of the total strength, which the Respondent had not granted.
That the Respondent had filed a false reply that the review applicant did not work under the JAG grade, and, therefore, he was not entitled for the CMO (NFSG) Grade.
That the Respondent did not raise any objection about the seniority position of the petitioner, and had never held that he does not fall within 30% of the strength of the cadre.
That the judgment has failed to notice the details about the applicants initial appointment and promotion, length of service and seniority.
That the order for grant of DACP was passed on 05.01.2005, which was not in accordance with the seniority list drawn in 1983 enclosed with the Rejoinder in the TA.
That the applicant had made representation for correction in seniority list on 12.04.2005, 30.06.2005, 06.08.2005 and 09.12.2005 but the respondent had failed to place him in the order as per seniority list.
That while the Tribunal had correctly appreciated the facts in para 6, and also the procedure, terms and conditions for grant of NFSG to doctors, but some contents of the petition contained in Annexure P-1 to P-4 have been over looked while passing the order.
That since the case of the applicant in his representations was only that his name may be placed at correct place in the order dated 05.01.2005, and he is entitled for being considered for grant him benefits for CMO (NFSG) w.e.f. 06.06.2000 and not from the date 05.04.2002, therefore, he had confined his prayer only for the financial benefits.
That while para 21 of the judgment this Tribunal had correctly observed that DACP has delinked the cases of Doctors from the concept of NSFG but the order as passed has totally ignored that the Respondent has deliberately not implemented the package deal extended for grant of NFSG to the Medical Officers dated 06.06.2000 which was adopted by the respondent vide Resolution No. 93.
That two schemes were introduced one by one, NFSG w.e.f. 06.06.2000 in pursuance of the recommendations of the IV Pay Commission, and DACP w.e.f. 05.04.2002 in pursuance of the recommendations of the V Pay Commission, and both were adopted by the Corporation, but the Respondent had not constituted the DPC for grant of benefit of NFSG to the applicant in spite of his having worked for total length of service of 20 years, and being covered for the said scheme since 1994.
3. It has, therefore, been prayed that the order dated 30.01.2014 passed by this Tribunal may be reviewed and the TA be allowed with costs in the interest of justice.
4. As per the operative portion of the order already reproduced above, it is clear that all the contentions of the review applicant have been dealt with in sufficient length in the 20 pages order, and it has further been appreciated that the Respondent has not actually settled his grievance concerning his seniority, after which the applicant would perhaps have automatically become eligible for being counted among the 30% segment of NFSG on the basis of his seniority. As a result only, the TA was disposed of, giving liberty to the applicant to consolidate his grievances voiced through his numerous representations dated 07.02.2005, 31.03.2005, 15.04.2005, 30.06.2005, 06.08.2005 and 09.12.2005 into a single representation, and directions have been issued to the Respondent North MCD to consider the applicants case of seniority, and resolve it. No directions adverse to the applicant have been issued, and the Review Application itself has admitted that the facts of the applicants case have also been correctly appreciated and recorded in the order sought to be reviewed.
5. It is, therefore, apparent that the order as passed by this Tribunal on 30.01.2014 does not require to be reviewed or recalled, as has been prayed for through this Review Application.
6. The powers of review of this Tribunal are quite limited, and a review applicant cannot be allowed to file an appeal in the guise of a review application. In our considered opinion, the Review Applicant is only trying to once again reargue the matter through this RA, which is not permissible in view of the ratio as laid down by the Honble Apex Court in State of West Bengal vs. Kamal Sen Gupta 2008 (8) SCC 612.
7. In Union of India v. Tarit Ranjan Das, 2004 SCC (LandS) 160 and in Subhash vs. State of Maharashtra and Another, AIR 2002 SC 2537, it was categorically held by the Honble Apex Court that in the garb of Review Application, the Tribunal cannot re-examine the issue, and a review is allowable only if an error is pointed out, and the error pointed out is plain and apparent, on the face of the record itself. We do not find that the review applicant before us has been able to point out any error whatsoever, or any error apparent on the face of the record, which is plain and apparent. We are bound by the Honble Apex Courts judgments cited above.
8. In Parsion Devi and Others vs. Sumitri Devi and Others [1997 (8) SCC 715], the Honble Apex Court has held as under:-
"Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court to exercise its power of review under Order 47, Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47, Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected". There is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision and an error apparent on the face of the record. While the first can be corrected by the higher forum, the latter only can be corrected by exercise of the review jurisdiction. A review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise"."
(Emphasis Supplied)
9. Further, in Ajit Kumar Rath Vs. State of Orissa (1999 (9) SCC 596), the Honble Apex Court reiterated that the power of review vested in the Tribunal is similar to the one conferred upon a Civil Court, and held as follows:-
The provisions extracted above indicate that the power of review available to the Tribunal is the same as has been given to a court under Section 114 read with Order 47 CPC. The power is not absolute and is hedged in by the restrictions indicated in Order 47. The power can be exercised on the application of a person on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made. The power can also be exercised on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason. A review cannot be claimed or asked for merely for a fresh hearing or arguments or correction of an erroneous view taken earlier, that is to say, the power of review can be exercised only for correction of a patent error of law or fact which stares in the face without any elaborate argument being needed for establishing it. It may be pointed out that the expression "any other sufficient reason" used in Order 47 Rule 1 means a reason sufficiently analogous to those specified in the rule. Any other attempt, except an attempt to correct an apparent error or an attempt not based on any ground set out in Order 47, would amount to an abuse of the liberty given to the Tribunal under the Act to review its judgment.
(Emphasis Supplied)
10. In view of the above position, the Review Application No. 65/2014 is, therefore, rejected. There shall be no order as to costs.