Judgment:
1. The issue which has been referred to the Larger Bench, vide separate Bench Orders is whether, for the purpose of refund claims invoking Notifications granting exemption based upon total value /quantity of clearances during a financial year, the relevant date for the purpose of a claim for refund under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 would be the date of payment of duty or the close of that financial year.
The respondents who are manufacturers of electric wires and cables which fell under T.I. 33B of the Central Excise Tariff at the material time filed a refund claim for an amount of Rs. 26,250/- (received in the AC's office on 11-4-1979) paid on first clearances of the value not exceeding Rs. 5 lakhs effected during the year 1978-79 on the ground that they were entitled to exemption on the basis of Notification No: 71/78-C.E., dated 1-3-1978 as amended by Notification 91/78-C.E., dated 16-3-1978. Notification 71/78 provided exemption from payment of duty on the first clearances of the value not exceeding Rs. 5 lakhs effected during the financial year, provided that the value of the specified goods cleared from the Unit during the preceding financial year had not exceeded Rs. 15 lakhs. Notification 71/78 laid down that in the case of a manufacturer who had not cleared any specified goods in the preceding financial year or had cleared any such goods for the first time on or after the first day of August in the preceding financial year, the exemption shall be applicable to such manufacturer subject to his filing a declaration with the Assistant Collector that the aggregate value of such goods cleared during the financial year is not likely to exceed Rs. 15 lakhs. The respondents filed declarations to the effect that the value of clearances during the financial year 1978-79 was likely to exceed Rs.15 lakhs and thus paid duty on the clearances effected during the financial year 1978-79; however, at the end of the financial year 1978-79, it was found that the total value of clearances effected during that year had not exceeded Rs. 15 lakhs and, therefore, a refund claim was filed. The refund claim was rejected by the Assistant Collector vide his order dated 30-1-1980 without going into the merits on the ground that since the manufacturer had declared that the clearances were likely to exceed Rs. 15 lakhs, they were not entitled to the exemption. The appeal to the Appellate Collector of Central Excise, New Delhi was allowed and the claim was directed to be entertained on merits. It was found that the assessees had cleared goods worth Rs. 5,18,065.23 during 1978-79 and were, therefore, entitled to exemption from payment of duty only on first clearances of value not exceeding Rs. 5 lakhs; however, the claim for refund of duty paid on or before 11-10-1978 was rejected on the ground that it had been filed beyond a period of six months from the date of payment of duty and the claim of Rs. 15,710.63 was sanctioned for the period found to be within time. On appeal against the partial rejection of the refund claim, the lower appellate authority held that the time limit should be reckoned from the date of the close of the relevant financial year and allowed the appeal which in turn gave rise to E/2490/85 before the Tribunal. When this appeal was heard, the Bench noted conflicting decisions of various High Courts and of the Tribunal and hence placed the matter before the Hon'ble President for constitution of a Larger Bench to resolve the issue.
In this case, the respondents filed a refund claim for Rs. 1,47,717.33 on 5-9-1985 for duty paid during the period from 1-4-1984 to 31-3-1985 on specified goods falling under T.I. 51A of the Schedule to the erstwhile Central Excise Tariff (tools) on the ground that they were entitled to slab exemption under Notification 83/83-C.E., dated 1-3-1983 as amended, more so when the aggregate value of clearances of all excisable goods for home consumption did not exceed Rs. 25 lakhs during the preceding financial year i.e. 1983-84. The claim was rejected both on the ground that the assessee had not applied for the exemption in terms of the Notification in the classification list filed by them and that the claim for the period prior to 5-3-1985 was barred by limitation according to the provisions of Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944. The Collector (Appeals) held that the assessment during the financial year is to be deemed as provisional assessment, accepting the assessee's contention that it is only at the close of the financial year that they would come to know for certain whether they exceeded or not exceeded the ceiling on clearance value for the current financial year and he, therefore, held that the claim for refund should be taken as having been filed within time and ordered sanctioning the refund claim if otherwise found to be due and admissible. The Revenue filed the above appeal in the Tribunal which noted the conflicting decisions of the various High Courts and of the Tribunal and referred the matter for constitution of a Larger Bench.
4. In both the appeals, we have heard Shri A.K. Agarwal, learned SDR and perused the records; no one appeared for the respondents in spite of notice. Shri V. Sridharan, learned Counsel ably assisted the Bench by placing all relevant case law.
5. At the outset, it is to be noted that there is no dispute that in both the cases, the respondents were entitled to refund on merits and both the claims were rejected by the adjudicating authorities only on the ground of limitation.
6. We find that the Collector (Appeals) in both the cases has accepted the plea of the assessees that limitation would start only from the close of the financial year. This question has been the subject matter of a number of conflicting decisions of the Tribunal and of the High Courts. The first decision is the judgment of a Single Judge of the Kerala High Court in the case reported in 1978 (2) E.L.T. Q 705) (Kerala) - T.T. Pylunny Royal Smiths, Kunnakulam v. Union of India and Ors. s. In this case the assessees were enganged in the manufacture of steel furniture. During the financial year 1969-70, they had cleared goods worth Rs. 1,44,241.50. By virtue of Notification dated 30-4-1971, the assessee was entitled for exemption from payment of duty on the goods worth not exceeding Rs. 50,000/-. Excise duty was paid by the assessee during the year between 2-4-1969 to 24-9-1969 who filed the refund claim on 29-3-1971, which was well within the period of 1 year from 31-3-1970. During that period, Rule 11 of the Central Excise Rules governed the refund of excise duties and it provided 1 year time limit for claiming refund. The refund was rejected by the excise authorities on the ground that the refund claim was barred by time in terms of the provisions of Rule 11. Notification dated 30-4-1971 exempted steel furniture falling under Item 40, upto a value not exceeding Rs. 50,000/- cleared on or after the first day of April in any financial year from the whole of the duty of excise. The proviso to the Notification stipulated that the exemption was not applicable to a manufacturer whose value of clearances of steel furniture during such financial year exceeded Rs. 2 lakhs. The High Court took the view that it is only at the end of the financial year that one can know whether he is entitled for exemption from payment of excise duty as per the Notification. The High Court held that one cannot refuse -to pay excise duty when sales are effected, because one cannot be sure at that time whether his total turnover will or will not exceed Rs. 2 lakhs by the end of the financial year. Thus the High Court held that the period of limitation will commence from the last date of the year and allowed the refund claim.
6.1 On appeal by the Revenue, the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in the judgment reported in 1983 (14) E.L.T. 2156 reversed the judgment of the Single Judge and held that: "there can be little doubt that the Rules which we have quoted place the period of a limitation of an application for refund in this case at a period of one year. The same is to start from the date of payment or adjustment of duty. Being a Rule or a provision providing for limitation in respect of claims for refund, considerations of hardship seem to be out of place although, if it is possible to give the rule a construction which would avoid hardship, we should gladly adopt the same. What is contended before us by Counsel for the respondent is that unless the view taken by the learned Judge is endorsed, the practical working of the Rule would cause hardship and result in injustice. It was pointed out that an application for refund of excise duty, can having regard to the terms of Ext. PI. Notification, be preferred only in respect of steel furniture whose total value does not exceed Rs . 50,000/- and that too, only if the total value of the furniture removed in the course of the year does not exceed Rs. 2 lakhs. It was argued that whether the limit of two lakhs had been exceeded or not, would be known only at the close of the year in question; and, therefore, to insist on an application for refund or exemption being made with reference to the earlier point of time in the year on the mere ground that the duty had been paid during that period, would be inequitable and unjust; and would oblige the writ petitioner to make an application for refund irrespective of whether he was or was not hoping to fall within the limit for obtaining exemption for refund of duty. At the first blush, the argument did cause us some concern. But we are satisfied that there is no ground or scope for apprehension or uneasiness.
Although the realisation that the goods cleared do not exceed the two lakh limit which alone would qualify for exemption may come only at the end of the assessment year, the claim for refund has to be limited to goods worth not more than Rs. 50,000/-. There is nothing in Rule 173-J or Rule 11 which obliges a person to confine his claim for refund to the articles removed in the earlier part of the year rather than to the later portions thereof; so that, the hardship and the inequity of having to prefer a claim or application for refund with respect to the earlier purchases and removals of steel furniture are more imaginary than real, in the case of dealers regularly buying and clearing throughout the year. And, as for exceptional case of heavy concentration of clearance and removal in the early part of the year, with a rule of the type here involved, there is no reason why an application for refund should not be made each time clearances is made, upto the limit of Rs. 50,000/- leaving the authorities to reject the same, if the ceiling of Rs. 2 lakhs for obtaining refund had been exceeded." 6.2 The next decision is that of the Hon'ble A.P. High Court in the case of Auric Engineering P. Ltd. v. Assistant Collector of Central Excise reported in 1980 (6) E.L.T. 620 wherein the High Court was concerned with Notification 86/74, dated 1-5-1974 which exempted stampings and laminations falling under Item 28A of the erstwhile Central Excise Tariff to a quantity not exceeding 20 MTs cleared for home consumption on or after first day of April in any financial year from the whole of duty of excise leviable thereon subject to the condition that the stampings and laminations cleared by the manufacturer during such financial year did not exceed 40 MTs. In that case, two financial years were involved i.e. 1974-75 and 1975-76. For the financial year 1974-75, the assessee had filed a refund claim for the first 18 MTs as during that year, production was 36 MTs. For the financial year 1975-76, as the assessees had produced less than 40 MTs of stampings and laminations, a refund claim for 20 MTs was filed. The refund claim in respect of the financial year 1974-75 was filed on 3-4-1975 and the claim in respect of the financial year 1975-76 was filed on 31-3-1976. Both the claims were rejected by the Central Excise authorities as barred by time under the provisions of Rule 11 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944. The High Court held as under: Para 3.... On a fair reading of the Notification, I am inclined to agree with the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner.
Whether the production during a financial year would exceed 40 Metric Tonnes or not would be known only at the end of the financial year. It is only at the end of the financial year that the petitioner company could properly claim refund on the basis of the Notification. In the present case, the Central Excise Officials did collect duty from the petitioner-company even on the first 20 MTs contrary to the view which they are now putting forward. I am also unable to see any moral justification for the attitude of the Department. The petitioner company is clearly entitled to the exemption under the Notification. No purpose seems to be served by unnecessarily denying the benefit to which the petitioner's company is entitled." 6.3 The next decision to be considered is the decision of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court (Single Judge) reported in 1989 (41) E.L.T. 377 in the case of BTX Chemicals v. Collector of Central Excise. In this case the assessee was manufacturing drugs, drug intermediates and pharmaceuticals. Notification No. 55/75-C.E. granted total exemption from payment of duty to all drugs, medicines, pharmaceuticals and drug intermediates not elsewhere specified. By Notification No. 89/79-C.E., exemption was granted to goods falling under Item 68 on clearance for home consumption on or after the first day of April, upto the aggregate value not exceeding Rs. 15 lakhs. It was the case of the assessee that he was unaware of the aforesaid Notifications and paid the duty on their total turnover of Rs. 38,18,443/- for the financial year 1979-80.. According to the assessee, under the first Notification, he was entitled to exemption in respect of goods of the value of Rs. 24,24,188/-. In regard to the balance of Rs. 13,94,255/- exemption was claimed by him under the second Notification. Refund claim was filed by him on 19-7-1980. The refund claim was rejected by the excise authorities on the ground of time bar in terms of the provisions of Rule 11 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944. Rejecting the contention of the assessee and rejecting the reliance on the decision of the learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court, the Bombay High Court held as under : "5. In my judgment, there is no merit in the aforesaid contention as the Notification which was under consideration provides - "In exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-rule (1) of Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, the Central Government hereby exempts steel furniture falling under Item No. 40 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (1 of 1944) upto a value not exceeding rupees fifty thousand, cleared on or after the first day of April in any financial year by or on behalf of the manufacturer from one or more factories for home consumption from the whole of the duty of excise leviable thereon : (1) this exemption shall not be applicable to such manufacturer whose value of steel furniture so cleared during such financial year exceeds Rs. two lakhs." The proviso contained in the aforesaid Notification makes it clear that in order to avail of the exemption contained in the said Notification the manufacturer should not have cleared the steel furniture exceeding Rs. 2,00,000/- during the financial year. The entitlement for the exemption in that case can only be determined at the end of the financial year. Hence, if the application for refund is made within a period of six months from the end of the financial year, the same would be well within the period of limitation. The Exemption Notifications in the instant case are, however, distinct.
They give exemption in the case of first clearance of goods upto the aggregate value of Rs. 15,00,000/-. If the duty was paid at the time of clearance in respect of goods within the limit of Rs. 15,00,000/-, the period of limitation would begin from the date of the payment of the duty. This part of the contention of Shri Shah is, therefore, liable to be negatived." 6.4 In the case of Weikfield Products Co. (India) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India reported in 1991 (51) E.L.T. 323, the Division Bench of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court took the view in favour of the assessee. In that case, the High Court was concerned with Notification dated 30-4-1968 which exempted drinking chocolate powder from whole of excise duty for the first 20 MTs clearance, provided the total clearance during the financial year did not exceed 40 MTs. The assessee had in the financial year 1974-75 cleared goods on payment of duty at full rate. The assessee filed refund claim on 30-11-1974 contending that it was entitled to the Notification dated 30-4-1968. The Assistant Collector granted the refund partly and the balance claim was rejected on the ground of time bar. Allowing the writ petition, the High Court held as under : "As mentioned herein above, the exemption is available to the manufacturer provided the clearance of the goods during the financial year did not exceed 40 MTs. The manufacturer can avail of the exemption only at the end of the financial year on realisation that the clearance has not exceeded 40 MTs. In other words, the right to claim exemption accrues only at the end of the financial year and in the present case on April 1,1974. It is not in dispute that the refund application was filed on November 30, 1974 and, therefore, the application could not have been partly rejected on the ground of limitation. Mr. Desai, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, submitted that the petitioner should have paid the duty during the financial year under protest. It is impossible to accede to the submission. The question of payment of duty under protest did not arise because the manufacturer was not disputing the rate of duty or liability to pay. The manufacturer could claim exemption only at the end of the financial year and, therefore, there was no question of paying duty under protest." 7. Coming to the decisions of the Tribunal, on the point in issue, we find that in the case of Asian Bearing Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise reported in 1991 (51) E.L.T. 532, by 2:1 majority it has been held that the time limit for refund claim should be counted from the date of payment of duty as provided in Rule 11, following the judgment of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court (supra). In the subsequent decision of the Tribunal in the case of Collector of Central Excise, Kanpur v. Tin Can Manufacturers reported in 1995 (6) RLT 769, the majority view of the Tribunal is that the time limit for refund claim in such cases where the benefit of an exemption is available subject to a ceiling on value of clearances during a particular financial year is the close of the financial year.
8. We are concerned with the interpretation of Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 which is the relevant provision governing refunds. We find that while the expression "relevant date" has been defined differently for different situations, there is no specific definition of the said term to regulate refund claims filed invoking exemption Notifications granting exemption subject to the condition that the value of clearances of goods does not exceed specified value ceilings in a financial year. It has not been laid down that in such cases, "relevant date" will be the close of the financial year. The term relevant date has been defined in Explanation B under Section 11B as follows : "(a) In the case of goods exported out of India where a refund of excise duty paid is available in respect of the goods themselves or as the case may be, the excisable materials used in the manufacture of such goods :- (i) If the goods are exported by sea or air, the date on which the ship or the aircraft in which such goods are loaded, leaves India, or (ii) If the goods are exported by land, the date on which such goods pass the frontier, or (iii) If the goods are exported by post, the date of despatch of goods by the post office concerned to a place outside.
(b) In the case of goods returned for being remade, refined, reconditioned or subjected to any other similar process, in any factory, the date of entry into the factory for the purposes aforesaid; (c) In the case of goods to which banderols are required to be affixed if removed for home consumption but not so required when exported outside India, if returned to a factory after having been removed from such factory for export out of India, the date of entry into the factory; (d) In a case where a manufacturer is required to pay a sum, for a certain period, on the basis of the rate fixed by the Central Government by Notification in the Official Gazette in full discharge of his liability for the duty leviable on his production of certain goods, if after the manufacturer has made the payment on the basis of such rate for any period but before the expiry of that period such rate is reduced, the date of such reduction; (e) In a case where duty of excise is paid provisionally under this Act or the Rules made thereunder, the date of adjustment of duty after the final assessment thereof; The rule of construction to be applied in such cases has been laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Simj-ul-Haq Khan and Ors. s v. The Sunni Central Board of Waqf reported in AIR 1959 SC198 wherein the Apex Court held that there would be no justification for extending the application of Section 15 of the Limitation Act, 1908 which provides for exclusion of time during which proceedings are suspended on the ground that the Institution of the subsequent suit would be inconsistent with the spirit or substance of the order passed in the previous litigation. The Apex Court held that "it is true that rules of limitation are to some extent arbitrary and may frequently lead to hardship; but there can be no doubt that, in construing provisions of limitation, equitable consideration are immaterial and irrelevant, and in applying them effect must be given to the strict grammatical meaning of the words used by them." 8.1 Reference may also be made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills v. Union of India reported in 1987 (32) E.L.T. 234 S.C. In that case, Notification 20/82-C.E., dated 20-2-1982 had amended Rules 9 and 49 of the Central Excise Rules by way of addition of explanation. Section 51 (1) of the Finance Act, 1982 provided that the amendments made to Rules 9 and 49 by the aforesaid Notification shall be deemed to have and to have always had effect on and from the date on which the Central Excise Rules, 1944 came into force. Sub-section (2) of Section 51 of the Finance Act provided that any action or thing taken or done or purporting to have been taken or done before the 20th day of February, 1982 under the Central Excise Act and the Central Excise Rules, 1944 shall be deemed to be and to have always been, for all purposes, as validly and effectively taken or done as if the amendments referred to in Sub-section (1) had been in force at all material times and accordingly, notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any Court, Tribunal or other authority :- (d) recovery shall be made of all such duties which have not been collected or, as the case may be, which have been refunded but which would have been collected or, as the case may be, would not have been refunded, if the amendments referred to in Sub-section (1) had been in force at all material times." Interpreting the above provision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held in para 33 pf its judgment that there is no provision in the Central Excise Act or Rules to enable the Central Excise authorities to make any demand beyond the periods mentioned in Section 11A of the Act on the ground of accrual of cause of action. The Court held that Section 51 of the Finance Act does not in any manner affect the provisions of Section 11A and in the absence of any specific provision overriding Section 11 A, it would be consistent with Rules of harmonious construction to hold that Section 51 insofar as it gives retrospective effect to the amendments made to Rules 9 and 49 of the Central Excise Rules is subject to the provision of Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944. On the same analogy, we hold that for the purpose of computing time limit under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, the date of accrual of cause of action is irrelevant. The time limit for computing limitation for the purpose of refund is governed by Section 11B and according to explanation (f) thereto, a refund claim must be preferred within six months from the date of payment of duty. The Section no where provides that the refund claim can be filed within six months from the date of accrual of cause of action and therefore, it must be held that the refund claim filed within six months from the close of the financial year is barred by limitation.
9. The argument of the assessees that they may not know at the beginning of the year about their entitlement to the benefit of Notifications contingent upon the value of clearances being below the specified limits cannot be a ground for upholding their claim. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Ranchhoddas Karsondas reported in AIR 1959 SC 1154, all laws of limitation lead to some inconvenience and hard cases. The Court has held that the remedy for the legislature is to amend the law suitably and Courts can administer the laws as they find them and they are seldom required to be astute to defeat the law of limitation. As observed by the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in the Pylunny case (supra) a manufacturer is under no disability to file a refund claim in respect of payment of duty for goods within the exempted limit where he cleared the goods on payment of duty. In the event of the value of goods cleared exceeding the overall maximum laid down in the Notification, it would be open to the Department to disallow such a refund claim. It is only the decision to allow or reject a claim that will require the correct position about the aggregate value of clearances being within the overall ceiling to be known and this will not be essential for filing the refund claim itself. Therefore, the argument against the interpretation that limitation will begin to run from the date of payment of duty does not hold good since an assessee has other means to protect his interests.
10. The question as to how the Tribunal should proceed in the face of conflicting decisions of High Courts has been considered in M/s. Atma Steels P. Ltd. and Ors. s v. Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh reported in 1984 (17) E.L.T. 331 wherein the Larger Bench consisting of five Members held that, in view of its All India jurisdiction and peculiar features, the Tribunal cannot be held bound to the view of any one of the High Courts, but has the judicial freedom, to consider the conflicting views, reflected by different High Courts, and adopt the one considered more appropriate to the facts of a given case before the Tribunal. The Tribunal also indicated that this should be so, irrespective, of the fact whether one particular assessee was within the jurisdiction of a specified High Court or the original adjudicating authority was located there. The judgment of the Apex Court in the case of M/s. East India Commercial Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Calcutta reported in 1983 (13) E.L.T. 1342 (S.C.) was brought to the notice of the Larger Bench, but, was not adverted to sufficiently in the course of discussion. In the East India Commercial Co. case, one of the questions for consideration was whether the interpretation given by the Calcutta High Court to Section 167 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 would be binding on authorities functioning within the jurisdiction of the High Court and the Supreme Court held that "it is implicit in the power of supervision conferred on a superior Tribunal that all the Tribunals subject to its supervision should conform to the law laid down by it.... We, therefore, hold that the law declared by the highest Court in the State is binding on authorities or Tribunals under its superintendence.... ". This decision has been followed by the Bombay High Court in CIT v. Godavaridevi Saraf reported in 1978 (2) E.L.T.0624).U.P. Laminations v. Collector of Central Excise, Kanpur reported in 1988 (35) E.L.T. 398 (T), the Tribunal has followed the Supreme Court judgment in the case of East India Commercial Co.
case and set aside the show cause notice issued against the appellants therein as it was in direct violation of the law laid down by the Allahabad High Court within whose jurisdiction both the manufacturer and the Collector of Central Excise were situated.
10.2 In a recent decision of the Tribunal in the case of Madura Coats v. CCE, Bangalore reported in 1996 (82) E.L.T. 512, it has been held that the decision of a particular High Court should certainly be followed by all authorities within the territorial jurisdiction of that High Court and that the authorities in another State are not bound to follow the views taken by a particular High Court in the absence of a decision by the jurisdictional High Court with regard to constitutionality of a provisions. The Tribunal has held that since the adjudication of vires of a provision of a statute or Notification is outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and the jurisdictional High Court i.e., the High Court having jurisdiction over the authority and the assessee, has not struck down the provision or Notification as ultra vires, the Tribunal has to follow the same and the assessee is entitled to take the stand that he is entitled to the benefit of the particular provision or Notification since the jurisdictional High Court has not struck it down, even though some other High Court may have done so. In case the conflict of decisions among High Courts does not relate to vires of any provision or Notification, it has been held that the Tribunal has to proceed in accordance with the decision in Atma Steels P. Ltd. In the light of the decision of Supreme Court in the East India Commercial Company case i.e. where the jurisdictional High Court has taken a particular view on interpretation or proposition of law, that view has to be followed in cases within such jurisdiction.
If the jurisdictional High Court has not expressed any view in regard to the subject matter and there is conflict of views among other High Courts, then the Tribunal will be free to formulate its own view in the light of Atma Steels P. Ltd. case; however, there is a decision of only one High Court in regard to disputed interpretation or proposition of law, the Tribunal is bound to follow that order since it is not at liberty to disregard the solitary High Court decision.
11. In the present case, the decisions of the High Courts of Andhra Pradesh and Bombay in regard to reckoning of relevant date in cases where refund claims are filed invoking Notifications granting exemption based upon total value/quantity of clearances during a financial year have to be implemented by the authorities within their jurisdiction with reference to assessees within such jurisdiction. The respondents/assessees in the two appeals viz. M/s. Kashmir Conductor and M/s. Laldee (P) Ltd. are not situated in the jurisdiction of either of the above two High Courts and, therefore, will be bound by this Larger Bench order.
12. In the light of the above discussion, we hold that the time limit for refund claims filed on the basis of the Notifications granting exemption based upon the value of clearances during a particular financial year will commence from the date of payment of duty and that such refund claims are covered by Explanation (f) to Section 11B of the CESA, 1944.
13. Accordingly, the impugned orders of the lower appellate authority are set aside and the appeals of the Revenue are allowed.