V.B. Gupta, Presiding Member
1. Petitioners/Opposite Parties have filed the present revision petition under Section 21(b) of Consumer Protection Act., 1986 (for short, Act) challenging the order dated 30.12.2013 passed by State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Odisha, Cuttack (for short, State Commission) in F.A. No. 375 of 2013.
2. Respondent/Complainant had filed a consumer complaint against the petitioners before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Cuttack (for short, District Forum) on the ground that deficiency in service had been committed by the petitioners, while asking for payment of differential premium amount at the time of payment of maturity value under Postal Life Insurance Policy (PLI) which was taken by the respondent. This amounts to unfair trade practice on the part of the petitioners.
3. The consumer complaint was contested by the petitioners stating that the maturity value as admissible was paid to the insured and there has not been any violation of the contract. However, there was some error in the calculation of the premium while conversion of WLA policy to Endowment policy.
4. The District Forum allowed the complaint and held the petitioners guilty of deficiency in service, negligence and unfair trade practice and directed;
œi) The Opp. Parties are liable to pay Rs.2,42,000/- as the maturity value including bonus plus terminal bonus to the complainant on the date of maturity of the policy No.OR-46893-CS instead of Rs.1,86,335/-.
ii) Since the Opp. Parties have already paid Rs.1,86,335/- on 15.9.2012, we direct them to pay the differential amount of Rs.56,265/- with interest @ 9% per annum from 6.12.2011 uptil the date of payment.
iii) We further direct the Opp. Parties to pay interest @ 9% on Rs.1,86,335/- from 6.12.11 to 15.9.12 i.e. for the delay in payment.
iv) The Opp. Parties are also directed to pay a compensation of Rs.5,000/- for harassment and mental agony to the complainant with cost of litigation of Rs.2,000/-.
v) The loss if any, sustained by the Govt. of India for the negligence of all the Opp. Parties shall be recovered from such officers proportionately from their salary, as a deterrent measure so as to improve the work culture.?
5. Aggrieved by the order of District Forum, petitioners filed first appeal before the State Commission. Since there was delay of 92 days in filing of the appeal, an affidavit seeking condonation of delay was filed before the State Commission.
6. The State Commission vide impugned order, declined to condone the delay holding that there is no sufficient cause to condone the delay and consequently dismissed the appeal.
7. Hence, the present petition.
8. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioners and have gone through the record.
9. It has been contended by learned counsel for the petitioners that though there was delay of 92 days in filing of the appeal before the State Commission, but the same has occurred due to the official procedure and there was no intention on the part of the petitioner to delay the matter.
10. In the grounds of revision, there is not an iota of any word, as to how there was delay of 92 days in filing of the first appeal before the State Commission and how State Commission has erred in not condoning the long delay of 92 days.
11. Relevant portions of the affidavit with regard to condonation of delay filed before the State Commission is reproduced as under;
œ2) That in the case even the order was passed on 17.04.2013, but it was received by the appellants on 29.04.2013 through the learned Central Government Counsel Sri R.C. Swain, C.G.C.
3) That, soon after receipt of the copy of the order dtd. 17.04.2013, it is necessary administrative approval of the competent authority i.e. the Chief Post Master General, Odisha Circle, Bhubaneswar was sought for by the undersigned for implementation of the order or otherwise vide letter No.CR/CD-04/2012 dt.03.05.2013.
4) That, thereafter the case was examined in detail by the competent authority and in course of examination the following records/information was sought for from different section/offices vide Circle Office letter No.LC/671-09/13 dtd. 15.05.2013 and L9/CD-82/13 dtd. 14.05.2013 is as follows:-
(i) Legal opinion from Ministry of Law and Justice, Department of Legal Matter, Kolkatta-1
(ii) Legal Opinion of Asstt. Solicitor General of India, O.H.C., Cuttack.
(iii) Copy of complaint case No.176/2012, copy of written version and related other documents, if any.
5) That, the legal opinion from the Ministry of Law and Justice, Kolkata and opinion of the ASGI, OHC, Cuttack were received at this end of 10.06.2013 and 16.06.2013 respectively. The required documents were sent to the appropriate authority.
Finally, it has been considered and decided by the competent authority to challenge the impugned order dtd. 17.04.2013 in the Hon'ble State Commission for which draft copy of First Appeal was prepared on consultation with the learned counsel for the Department and thereafter sent to Circle office for necessary vetting vide letter dtd. 01.07.2013. The vetted Appeal was received at this end 8.8.2013 and filed on 23.8.2013.
6. That, the Appellants most respectively submitted before this Hon'ble Commission with folded hand to condone the delay be its jurisdiction.?
12. As per petitioners own case, copy of the order passed by the District Forum was received by the Central Governments counsel on 29.4.2013. Thereafter the matter was examined in detail by the Competent Authority and after seeing the record and information from different sections, the appeal was filed before the State Commission only on 23..8.2013. Thus, it is manifestly clear that petitioners had taken about four months for filing the appeal before the State Commission. Thus, the only ground for the delay as per affidavit is œwith regard to the office procedure?. If petitioners department had taken about four months to file an appeal, then it has to blame itself for the careless and negligence on the part of its officials.
13. Admittedly, there are concurrent findings given by both the fora below in favour of the respondent. Thus, a valuable right has accrued in the favour of the respondent.
14. It is well settled that œsufficient cause? for condoning the delay in each case is a question of fact.
15. In Ram Lal and Ors. Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd.,
AIR Supreme Court 361, it has been observed;
œIt is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by S.5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant.?
16. In R.B. Ramlingam Vs. R.B. Bhavaneshwari, 2009 (2) Scale 108, it has been observed:
œWe hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the special appeal leave petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition.?
17. Honble Supreme Court after exhaustively considering the case law on the aspect of condonation of delay observed in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. Vs. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation reported in (2010) 5 SCC 459 as under;œWe have considered the respective submissions. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time.
The expression "sufficient cause" employed in Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 and similar other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub serves the ends of justice. Although, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in dealing with the applications for condonation of delay, this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of a liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate - Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji (1987)2 SCC 107, N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy (1998) 7 SCC 123 and 10 Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao Patil (2001) 9 SCC 106?.
18. Apex Courtin AnshulAggarwal Vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) has observed ;
œIt is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filingappeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the consumer foras?.19. Lastly, Honble Supreme Court in Post Master General and others vs. Living Media India Ltd. and another (2012) 3 Supreme Court Cases 563 has held;
œ24. After referring various earlier decisions, taking very lenient view in condoning the delay, particularly, on the part of the Government and Government Undertaking, this Court observed as under;
œ29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.
30. Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount consideration in exercising the courts' discretion wherever conferred upon it by the relevant statutes. Pursuing stale claims and multiplicity of proceedings in no manner subserves public interest. Prompt and timely payment of compensation to the landlosers facilitating their rehabilitation /resettlement is equally an integral part of public policy. Public interest demands that the State or the beneficiary of acquisition, as the case may be, should not be allowed to indulge in any act to unsettle the settled legal rights accrued in law by resorting to avoidable litigation unless the claimants are guilty of deriving benefit to which they are otherwise not entitled, in any fraudulent manner. One should not forget the basic fact that what is acquired is not the land but the livelihood of the landlosers. These public interest parameters ought to be kept in mind by the courts while exercising the discretion dealing with the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Dragging the landlosers to courts of law years after the termination of legal proceedings would not serve any public interest. Settled rights cannot be lightly interfered with by condoning inordinate delay without there being any proper explanation of such delay on the ground of involvement of public revenue. It serves no public interest.?
The Court further observed;
œ27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.
30. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay.
31. In view of our conclusion on Issue (a), there is no need to go into the merits of Issues (b) and (c). The question of law raised is left open to be decided in an appropriate case.
32.In the light of the above discussion, the appeals fail and are dismissed on the ground of delay. No order as to costs?.
20.Observations made by the Apex Court in the authoritative pronouncements discussed above are fully attracted to the facts and circumstances of the case.
21. Thus, in our view, the discretion exercised by the State Commission in declining the petitioners prayer for condonation of delay of 92 days, does not suffer from any legal infirmity and the possibility of this Commission forming a different opinion in the matter of condonation of delay cannot justify interference with the impugned order under Section 21(b) of the Act.
22. Thus, gross negligence, deliberate inaction and lack of bonafides is imputable to the petitioners. Consequently, the present revision petition filed by the petitioners is hereby dismissed in limini with cost of Rs.10,000/-(Rupees Ten Thousand only).
23. Petitioners are directed to deposit the cost by way of demand draft in the name of Consumer Legal Aid Account, within four weeks from today.
24. In case, petitioner fails to deposit the cost within the prescribed period, then they shall be liable to pay interest @ 9% p.a., till realization.
25. Pending application, if any stand disposed of.
26. List on 9.5.2014 for compliance.