1. The petitioner is one of the directors of respondent No.3 Company who has committed defaults in repaying loans / credit facilities to the tune of about Rs 25.25 Crores granted by respondent No.2 bank.
1.1 The petitioner is also one of the guarantors.
1.2 This petition is preferred against order dated 22.10.2013 in S.A. No. 77 of 2013 passed by the Learned Debts Recovery Tribunal II, Ahmedabad (hereinafter referred to as the œlearned Tribunal) whereby the learned Tribunal has rejected the said S.A. No. 77 of 2013 holding, inter alia, that the application is not maintainable before learned Tribunal at Ahmedabad. Learned Tribunal has observed and held, inter alia, that:-
5. On bare reading the above noted provisions of Section 19(1), I am of the opinion that, Ld. DRT-I Kolkata and Hon'ble Calcutta High Court have had only jurisdiction to try this SA.?
2. In the said order dated 22.10.2013 learned Tribunal has further observed and held that:-
œ6. Therefore with ought most respect to the decision of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court, I am of the opinion that in the prevailing situation, this Tribunal has had no jurisdiction to try this SA. The OA filed by the respondent bank is pending before the Ld. DRT-I Kolkata. This apart once having invoked the jurisdiction of the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court, the Applicant should not be allowed to restore to forum shopping and invoke jurisdiction of different Courts / Tribunals as per his whim and fancy. In view of the forgoing, to prevent conflicting decision being reached, to prevent abuse of its process, to secure the ends of justice and as the tribunal lacks jurisdiction, I pass the under noted order.
ORDER
1) The SA No. 77/2013 is dismissed.
2) For abusing the process of the Tribunal, an exemplary cost of Rs.25,000/- is imposed on the Applicant, payable to the respondent bank within 7 days from this order.?
3. The petitioner is aggrieved by the said order therefore, petitioner has preferred present petition and prayed, inter alia, that:-
œ31 (A) This Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a writ of or in the nature of mandamus or a writ of or in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside the orders dated 27.8.2013, 22.10.2013 and 23.10.2013 passed by the respondent no.1 in the Securitization Application No.77 of 2013 at Annexures Q, U and V respectively.
(B) This Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a writ of or in the nature of mandamus or a writ of or in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction:
i. holding and declaring that the action of the respondent no.2 of putting up the subject property for auction by way of the auction notice dated 24/25.7.2013 is unreasonable, inequitable, high-handed and illegal.
ii. quashing and setting aside the auction process of the subject property carried out by the respondent No.2 and the confirmation of sale of the subject property by the respondent no.2 in favour of the respondent no.4.
iii. Directing the respondent no.2 to conduct the auction sale of the subject property by fixing a proper and fair reserve price of the same in accordance with its correct market value as per the valuation report dated 25.1.2012 or a proper valuation report taken by the respondent No.2 and by giving widest possible publication of the proposed auction in leading newspapers in Gujarat in accordance with the requirements of law.
iv. directing the respondent no.2 to consider the request of the petitioner to enter into one time settlement with the respondent no.2 for settling the entire dues of the respondent no. 3 before again putting up the subject property for auction.
C. Pending the admission, hearing and final disposal of the present petition, this Hon'ble Court be pleased to stay and suspend the operation and implementation of the orders dated 27.8.2013, 22.10.2013 and 23.10.2013 passed by the respondent no.1 in the Securitization Application No.77 of 2013 at Annexure Q,U and V respectively.
D. pending the admission, hearing and final disposal of the present petition, this Hon'ble Court be pleased to restrain the respondent No.2 from taking any further steps / action in regard to confirming the sale or issuing the sale certificate or executing any conveyance deed or parting with possession or in nay manner dealing with or taking any other action in respect of the subject property.?
4. The relevant facts involved in and leading to presentation of this petition are that:
4.1 The petitioner is one of the directors of the respondent No.3 which is a company incorporated and registered under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the œAct?), engaged, inter alia, in the business of manufacturing and dealing in fabrics and allied products. The said respondent No.3 company has availed certain credit facility including term loan, letter of credit, cash credit etc. from the respondent No.2 Bank. Initially the said respondent No.3 availed credit facility to the tune of Rs. 17.50 Crores which was subsequently enhanced to Rs.25.25 crores.
4.2 It appears that the respondent No.3 initially made some payments towards repayment of the loan however, subsequently the said respondent committed defaults in repayment. Due to repeated and consistent defaults by the respondent No.3 in repayment of loan, the respondent No.2 bank declared the said account as N.P.A. Subsequently, on or around 2.11.2010 the respondent No.2 bank issued notice under Section 13 (2) “ followed by notice under Section 13(4) of Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as the œAct?). The respondent No.2 bank also informed respondent No.3 and the petitioner about the action taken and proposed to be taken by it.
4.3 Before proceeding further it is relevant to mention that for the purpose of availing loan / credit facility the respondent No.3 as the borrower and the petitioner (and other creditors) as the creditor offered certain properties towards security / collateral security. One of the properties so offered i.e. offered as security is, property being plot No. 5001/A. Sarigam Industrial Estage, Revenue Survey No. 511/P, 512/P and 513/P of Village Fanasa, Taluka Umargam, District Valsad and the various buildings, structures, plants and machinery situate thereon. The said property is thus, œsecured assets? for and in the hands of the respondent No.2 bank.
4.4 It appears that even after the said notices the respondent No.3 and / or the petitioner did not take any action for repayment of the outstanding payments of theloans / credit facilities availed from the respondent No.2 bank. Consequently, the respondent bank initiated further action under the Securities Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002.
4.5 Since the respondent No.3 and the petitioner failed to discharge their obligation of repayment of loan, respondent No.2 decided to auction the suit property / secured asset and notice dated 7.12.2012 proposing auction sale of the suit property / secured asset was issued.
4.6 Said notice dated 7.12.2012 was followed by few other notices (e.g. notice dated 12.3.2012, 23.6.2012, 26.9.2012, 23.4.2013 etc).
4.7 It appears that in pursuance of the said notices, attempts to auction sale the secured asset / suit property was undertaken however, for various reasons the said auction process did not yield any result. It appears that starting from the first auction and until the last auction (i.e. auction process during which present respondent No.4 made highest offer which came to be accepted by the respondent bank and the secured assets / suit property came to be sold to respondent No.4) the respondent No.2 bank had made about 4 attempts to auction sale the property however, said attempts did not materialize. The respondent bank, during the process, seems to have reduced the upset / reserved price from one stage / auction to another and in the last auction notice i.e. notice dated 25.7.2013 the upset / reserved price was quoted at Rs.1650.22 lacs.
4.8 It appears that at one stage when the respondent no. 3 and the petitioner felt aggrieved by the decision and auction of the respondent No.2 bank of reducing the upset / reserved price and also by other actions of the respondent bank, the petitioner had preferred a writ petition before Hon'ble Calcutta High Court wherein after hearing the petition being W.P. 14794 (W) of 2013 came to be disposed of vide order dated 21.5.2013. In the order Hon'ble High Court observed, inter alia, that:-
Upon noticing the said judgment this Court finds that the Apex Court has categorically held that the bank is permitted to recover the amount by adopting all legally permissible methods and not otherwise.
Rule 8 (5) of the Security Interest (Enforcement Rule, 2002) provides the authorised officer to obtain the valuation before effecting the sale, in consultation with the secured creditor. The same having not been done, the sale notice dated 24th April, 2013 cannot be said to be legally sustainable.
In view of the above, the impugned sale notice dated April 23, 2013 is hereby quashed and set aside.
The bank is permitted to proceed to effect the sale by adhering to the provisions contained in Rules 8 and 9 of the Security Interest (Enforcement Rules, 2002)?
4.9 It has emerged from the record that besides the above mentioned writ petition another proceedings were also instituted at Calcutta viz. OA NO. 218 of 2012 before learned tribunal at Calcutta. Thus, in connection with the transaction in question and the claim of respondent No.2 against the petitioner and respondent No.3 two proceedings have been instituted at Calcutta.
4.10 In this background, the respondent No.2 issued another notice dated 25.7.2013 for auction sale of the property.
4.11 Against the said notice the petitioner preferred above mentioned OA No. 77 of 2013 before learned tribunal at Ahmedabad (i.e. respondent No. 1). In this context the petitioner has claimed in the petition that learned tribunal heard the said SA No. 77 of 2013 on the issue of interim relief. It is claimed by the petitioner that during the said hearing before learned tribunal the petitioner challeged, inter alia, legality and maintainability of public notice for auction sale which was issued / published by the respondent No.2 bank.
From the submission by learned senior counsel for the contesting parties and from the record it has emerged that the the respondent No.3 availed the loans / credit facilities from respondent banks branch at Calcutta and the petitioner is one of the guarantor. Entire formalities and procedure including execution of relevant documents, mortgage deed etc. were completed and concluded at respondent banks Branch at Calcutta. The petitioner and respondent No.3 then failed to repay the loan. Hence the respondent bank issued notices dated 2.1.2011, 9.1.2012, 25.1.2012, 7.2.2012, 12.3.2012, 23.6.2012, 26.9.2012, 9.3.2013, 23.4.2013, 25.7.2013, 24.7.2013 and out of the said notices the notices dated 2.1.2011, 9.1.2012, 7.2.2012, 12.3.2012, 23.6.2012, 26.9.2012, 23.4.2013 and 24.7.2013 have been issued by the respondent banks branch at Calcutta. It appears that it is only the last notice i.e. the notice dated 25.7.2013 which came to be published in the local / vernacular newspaper published in Gujarat State / from Ahmedabad. It was pursuant to publication of the said notice / advertisement that the petitioner filed the above mentioned SA No.77 of 2013 in the learned tribunal at Ahmedabad. It appears that interim relief was prayed for, however, the learned Tribunal refused to grant interim relief prayed for by the petitioner and declined to stay the auction process. The learned tribunal, however, directed that sale certificate should not be issued without permission. On the other hand, the respondent bank opposed the maintainability of the said SA No.77 of 2013 on the ground that the learned Tribunal at Ahmedabad does not have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the said SA No.77 of 2013. The said objection seems to have been raised as preliminary objection against the maintainability of the application. Learned tribunal, therefore, heard and decided the said issue as preliminary issue and vide impugned order dated 22.10.2013 learned tribunal accepted the objection by respondent No.2 and held that the said SA No.77 of 2013 is not maintainable before learned tribunal at Ahmedabad. The learned tribunal accepted the said objection and disposed of the said SA No.77 of 2013 for want of territorial jurisdiction.
4.12 Thereafter, the respondent No.2 bank seems to have confirmed the sale in favour of respondent No.4 and sale certificate in favour of respondent No.4 is issued by respondent No.2 bank.
4.13 In this factual background present petition is preferred and the said order dated 22.10.2013 is challenged.
5. Mr. M.J. Thakore, learned Senior Counsel has appeared with Ms. A.M. Thakore, learned advocate for the petitioner, Mr. Mihir Joshi, learned Senior Counsel has appeared with Ms. Lodha, learned advocate for respondent and Mr. Shalin Mehta, learned Senior Counsel has appeared with Mr. M.I Hawa, learned advocate for the respondent No.4 auction purchaser.
6. At the outset, Mr. Joshi, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent No. bank raised objection against maintainability of the petition on the ground that statutory remedy by way of appeal before the learned Appellate Tribunal is available to the petitioner and that therefore petition may not be entertained.
7. Mr. Thakore, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner contended that the impugned order is apparently, patently and palpably wrong and incorrect and there are serious infirmities and error of law. Mr. Thakore, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner also contended that though, learned tribunal has jurisdiction, it has refused to exercise jurisdiction and that therefore inspite of the statutory remedy writ petition is maintainable. Mr. Thakore, learned Senior Counsel also submitted that the petitioner will have to deposit 50% or 25% of demand. Mr. Thakore, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner also relied on the decision in case of J. M. Baxi and Company vs. Commissioner of Customs New Kandla so as to support his submissions. Mr. Thakore, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner also relied on the observation by Honble Apex Court in paragraph No.9 of decision in case between Ram and Shyam Company vs. State of Haryana (1985 3 SCC 267). He also relied on the observations in paragraph No.3 of decision in case of Union of India and another vs. State of Haryana (2000 [10] SCC 482). Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner also submitted that the suit property / secured asset is situate in Gujarat State and that therefore learned tribunal at Ahmedabad i.e. respondent no.1 has territorial jurisdiction to entertain the said SA No.77 of 2013. learned Senior counsel for the petitioner also submitted that the learned Tribunal has committed error of law in relying on the provisions under Section 19 of the Recovery Act of 1993 (RDB Act for short). So as to support and justify the said contention, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner relied on the judgment dated 13.9.2012 in writ petition (C) No. 3957 of 12 by full bench of High Court of Delhi.
7.1 In addition to the earlier mentioned preliminary objection against the maintainability of the petition raised by him Mr. Joshi, learned Senior counsel for the respondent bank submitted that this is not the case where the learned tribunal has not exercised jurisdiction. According to learned senior counsel for respondent bank it is upon exercise of power to decide and to rule about its own jurisdiction that the learned tribunal reached the conclusion that the SA No.77 of 2013 filed by the petitioner is not maintainable before the learned tribunal at ahmedabad for want of territorial jurisdiction to entertain the said securitization application and that therefore the petitioners claim that the petition should be entertained because there is failure to exercise jurisdiction is not justified.
7.2 Learned senior counsel of the respondent bank further submitted that it was the petitioner who, being aware about the said position, had instituted petition before Honble Calcutta High Court and now to suit his own convenience the petitioner chose to file the securitization application before the learned tribunal at ahmedabad. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent bank also submitted that the petitioner can raise same contentions, including the contention in light of the decision by Honble HighCourt of Delhi, before learned Appellate Tribunal. Mr. Joshi, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent bank, relied on the decision by Honble Apex Court in case of united bank of India vs. Satyavati Tondon (2010 8 SCC 880).
8. Mr. Mehta, learned senior counsel for respondent no.4 has submitted that the respondent no.4 is bonafide purchaser of the property in question and the respondent no.4 has already paid entire sale consideration i.e. the total amount of the offer made by it at the time of auction sale. He also submitted that the offer by the respondent no.4 was highest offer and has been accepted, approved and finalized by the respondent no.2 bank and now sale certificate is also issued in favour of the respondent no.4. he also submitted that now there is no justification on part of respondent bank to delay the process of handing over the actual and physical possession of the property in question to the respondent no.4. as regards the contention on ground of statutory remedy and other submissions, Mr. Mehta, learned Senior Counsel adopted the submissions by Mr. Josh, learned senior counsel for the respondent bank. Mr. Mehta, also relied on the decision in case of G.M, Shri Siddheshwar Co-operative Bank Limited vs. Shri Ikbal and others (2013 (10) SCALE 396).
9. I have heard learned Senior Counsel of the petitioner and respondents at length and I have also considered the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the contesting parties. I have also considered the material on record and the impugned decision by the learned tribunal.
9.1 Since the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent bank and learned Senior Counsel for the respondent No.4 have raised objection against the petition on the ground that the petitioner has statutory remedy by way of appeal and that therefore he should first approach learned appellate tribunal instead of short circuiting said remedy and preferring this petition and since the learned Counsel for the petitioner has also made submission on the said preliminary objection, it would be appropriate to address the said issue at the outset.
9.2 It is pertinent to note that though Section 18 of the Act provides statutory remedy by way of appeal before the learned appellate tribunal the petitioner has not approached learned appellate tribunal against order passed by learned tribunal by which the petitioner is aggrieved and instead the petitioner has preferred present petition.
9.3 It is a well settled restriction accepted by the writ Court that when a statute as its integral part provides remedy-adjudication as well as appellate remedy-then, ordinarily “ loath and circumspect or extremely slow in allowing a person to short circuit statutory remedy of appeal.
9.4 However, in present case the petitioner has preferred this petition instead of approaching learned Appellate Tribunal. The ground on which the statutory remedy is frowned upon by the petitioner is that the remedy, according to the petitioner, is onerous.
9.5 In this context it is relevant to mention that the Act under which the petitioner initiated the proceedings by filing SA No. 77 of 2013 is a special Act enacted for special purpose and when the special Act itself provides appellate remedy and special forum where the order of first authority can be challenged the Court, exercising prerogative and discretionary writ jurisdiction, would be, ordinarily, loath to entertain a writ petition and would be reluctant or extremely slow in deviating from the accepted principle and the wisdom to not entertain a writ petition when statutory remedy is available and the Court would not render the statutory remedy otiose.
9.6 On examination of the provision under Section 18 of the Act, it emerges that the provision does not require that total demand - amount should be deposited for maintaining proceedings under Section 18 but the provision contemplates deposit @ 50% of demanded amount. Not only the provision contemplates deposit of only part of the demand amount but it also confers power on the learned tribunal to even further waive the requirement to the extent of another 25%.
9.7 The learned Appellate Tribunal has power and discretion to partially waive the requirement and restrict the amount of predeposit to 25% if the appellant “ applicantcan establish that the compliance would cause undue hardships.
9.8 Actually the provision under said section 18 of the Act and the requirement of pre-deposit and petitioners objection are required to be considered in light of the fact that the demand in the cases under the Act are related to and arise on account of the borrowers default to repay the borrowed amounts i.e. the amount borrowed from the bank / financial institution, and are not repaid. In view of such circumstances and having regard to the object of the Act when the legislature has made provision for deposit of a part of demand a condition for maintaining appeal, then the provision cannot be rendered nugatory on the ground that the condition would cause hardship “ more so when the demand has arisen on account of unpaid borrowed amount.
9.9 It is pertinent that in present case it is the borrower / guarantor in default who is raising such grievance when he is called-upon and required to repay the amount which he owes to the bank / financial institution.
9.10 Besides this, such objection cannot be appreciated by divorcing or detaching “ it from the provision requiring the borrower in default to deposit part of the demand amount, and that too at the appeal stage “ the above mentioned fact coupled with the fact that for recovery of such claims special Act is enacted and special forum is created and having regard to the fact that the demand is related to amount borrowed from bank / financial institution and then not paid, that the provision for pre-deposit is made.
9.11 Having regard to the relevant provision, the object of the Act and above mentioned aspects, in view of this Court there is no room or scope to hold that the said provision and the remedy are onerous or illusory.
9.12 The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, however, relied on the decisions in case of J.M. Baxi (supra) and in the case of Ram and Shyam (supra) and in case of Union of India vs. State of Haryana.
10. In the decision in case of J.M. Baxi (supra) the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that:-
œ3. Normally, the High Court ought not to interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 when adequate alternative remedy is available, but in the special facts of this case when the demand was raised and the same had been challenged on the ground that it was barred by time and where the demand is nearly of 46 lakhs of rupees which will have to be deposited before any appeal can be filed, we are of the opinion that the High Court ought to have exercised its jurisdiction and determined the questions which were raised in the writ petition on merits. In dealing with the contentions raised by the appellant, the High Court would necessarily have to consider the contentions of the respondents as well.?
The said decision does not assist the petitioner in asserting that it need not approach the learned Appellate Tribunal i.e. special forum created under the Special Act, i.e. statutory remedy. In the said case the question was not about unpaid borrowed amount and the question was also not about the undisputed fact that loan was availed and was undisputedly not repaid completely and remained substantially unpaid (which constitutes the demand in this case) whereas in the cited case the demand was for disputed liability towards duty / tax. Actually, Hon'ble Apex Court has observed in the said decision that normally, the High Court should not interfere in exercise of prerogative writ jurisdiction when statutory remedy is available.
10.1 So far as the observation by Hon'ble Apex Court in the decision in case of Ram and Shyam Company (supra) are concerned, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner relied on observations in para 9 of the said decision wherein Hon'ble Apex Court observed that:-
œ9. Before we deal with the contentions, let us have a look at the relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules. Rule 28(1) of the Rules provides that contracts for extraction of minor mineral may be granted by the Government by auctioning or tendering for a maximum period of five years after which no extension shall be granted' Sub-rule (2) provides that 'the amount to be paid annually by the contractor to the Government shall be determined in auction or by tender to be submitted for acceptance, by the authority competent to grant the contract.' Rule 29 confers power on the Presiding Officer to reject or accept any bid or tender without assigning any reason to the bidders or tenderers. However, where the highest bid or tender is rejected, the reason shall however, be reported to the Government. Rule 30 provides for notifying of the proposed auction on the notice board of the Director, Mining Officers and at least in one newspaper having wide circulation in the locality nearest to the area in question in the regional language as also in the Government Gazette. Sub-cl. (4) of sub-r. (2) of Rule 30 provided that 'no bid shall be regarded as accepted unless confirmed by Government.' Rule 58 confers power on the Government to relax any of the provisions of the Rules in the interest of mineral development or better working of the mine. Before we deal with the larger issue, let me put out of the way the contention that found favour with the High Court in rejecting the writ petition. The learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench recalling the observations of this Court in Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. Jainson Hosiery Industries rejected the writ petition observing that 'the petitioner who invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of the court under Art. 226 of the Constitution must have exhausted the normal statutory remedies available to him'. We remain unimpressed. Ordinarily it is true that the court has imposed a restraint in its own wisdom on its exercise of jurisdiction under Art. 226 where the party invoking the jurisdiction has an effective, adequate alternative remedy. More often, it has been expressly stated that the rule which requires the exhaustion of alternative remedies is a rule of convenience and discretion rather than rule of law. At any rate it does not oust the jurisdiction of the Court. In fact in the very decision relied upon by the High Court in The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh it is observed that there is no rule, with regard to certiorari as there is with mandamus, that it will lie only where there is no other equally effective remedy. It should be made specifically clear that where the order complained against is alleged to be illegal or invalid as being contrary to law, a petition at the in stance of person adversely affected by it, would lie to the High Court under Art. 226 and such a petition cannot be rejected on the ground that an appeal lies to the higher officer or the State Government. An appeal in all cases cannot be said to provide in all situations an alternative effective remedy keeping aside the nice distinction between jurisdiction and merits. Look at the fact situation in this case. Power was exercised formally by the authority set up under the Rules to grant contract but effectively and for all practical purposes by the Chief Minister of the State. To whom do you appeal in a State administration against the decision of the Chief Minister? The clutch of appeal from Ceasar to Ceasar wife can only be bettered by appeal from one's own order to oneself. Therefore this is a case in which the High Court was not at all justified in throwing out the petition on the untenable ground that the appellant had an effective alternative remedy. The High Court did not pose to itself the question, who would grant relief when the impugned order is passed at the instance of the Chief Minister of the State. To whom did the High Court want the appeal to be filed over the decision of the Chief Minister. There was no answer aud that by itself without anything more would be sufficient to set aside the judgment of the High Court.?
10.2 In this context it is relevant to note that the said observation came to be made by Hon'ble Apex Court in light of the fact of the said case. This is evident and apparent in view of the other observations made in the said decision which read thus:-
œLook at the fact situation in this case. Power was exercised formally by the authority set up under the Rules to grant contract but effectively and for all practical purposes by the Chief Minister of the State. To whom do you appeal in a State administration against the decision of the Chief Minister? The clutch of appeal from Ceasar to Ceasar wife can only be bettered by appeal from one's own order to oneself.?
10.3 Thus, it was in the fact situation in the cited case that Hon'ble Apex Court considered that the petition ought not have been disposed of on ground of alternative remedy.
10.4 However, in present case, it is pertinent that the fact situation is materially different inasmuch as the dispute and the proceedings in the case have arisen in light of the provision of Special Act under which Special and independent Fora i.e. learned tribunal and learned appellate tribunal are created for special purpose as mentioned in statement of objects and reasons. In this view of the matter and such circumstances, it would not be proper or justified for the Court to entertain present petition.
10.5 So far as the 3rd decision i.e. decision in case between Union of India vs State of Haryana (supra) on which learned Counsel for the petitioner relied, Hon'ble Apex Court has, in paragraph No.3 of the judgment, observed that:-
œ3. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties at length, we are of the view that these are the matters which should have been dismissed by the respective High Courts in suggesting an alternative remedy. The question raised was pristinely legal which required determination as to whether provision of telephone connections and instruments amounted to sale and even so why was the Union of India not exempt from payment of sales tax under the respective statutes. The respondents counter such stance. We think the question raised was fundamental in character and need not have been put through the mill of statutory appeals in the hierarchy. For this reason alone, we set aside the respective impugned orders of the High Courts and remit the writ petitions back to them for decision in accordance with law. The recovery of tax would stand stayed till the disposal of the writ petitions. Orders accordingly. No costs.?
10.6 In the said case Hon'ble Apex Court considered that the issue raised in the petition was fundamental in character and ought to have been decided by Hon'ble High Court instead of relegating the petitioner to alternative remedy. The said decision being in light of the facts of the cited case and also in light of the subsequent decision by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of united bank of India vs. Satyavati Tondon (2010 8 SCC 880) and also in view of the recent decision by Hon'ble Apex Court in 2013 in case between GM, Sri Siddeshwara Co-operative Bank Ltd (supra), the cited decision does not help the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner.
10.7 When the proceedings have arisen under special statute and the order under challenge is passed by special forum under the special statute and when such special statute provides for appeal remedy, then party aggrieved by the order passed by learned tribunal ought to take out proceeding before the learned appellate tribunal and this Court would not be inclined, rather the Court would be loathe to entertain petition under Article 226 and / or 227 of the Constitution of India. In present case asking the petitioner to approach the learned appellate tribunal would not mean asking the petitioner to approach the same authority which has passed order as was the situation in the cited decision.
10.8 Thus, in the facts of present case, the decisions on which reliance is placed by the petitioner do not assist the petitioner in supporting the contentions raised formaintaining the petition and not approaching the statutory remedy against the order under challenge in present petition.
As mentioned earlier, petitioner's submissions against statutory appeal remedy are required to be considered in light of special facts viz. the petitioner is a borrower / guarantor in default and has failed to repay borrowed money i.e. loan availed from respondent No.2 bank and the legislature has enacted special Act for addressing such situation i.e. borrowers/ guarantors not repaying their debt.
Therefore, while examining the contention and the allegation that the appeal remedy is onerous, it would be appropriate to take into account the introduction as well as the statement of object and reasons, of the Act. In the introduction the legislature has mentioned that:-
œINTRODUCTION
The financial sector has been one of the key drivers in Indias efforts to achieve success in rapidly developing its economy. ¦¦¦..There is no legal provision for facilitating secularization of financial assets of banks and financial institutions. Unlike international banks, the banks and financial institutions in India do not have power to take possession of securities and sell them. This has resulted in slow pace of recovery of defaulting loans and mounting levels of non-performing assets of banks and financial institutions. For the purpose of examining banking sector reforms Government constituted Committees which had suggested the need for charges in the legal system. Acting on the suggestions of the Committees the President, on 21st day of June, 2002, promulgated the Secularization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Ordinance, 2002¦¦¦¦¦.
STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REAONS
The financial sector has been one of the key drivers in India's efforts to achieve success in rapidly developing its economy. While the banking industry in India is progressively complying with international prudential norms and accounting practices there are certain areas in which the banking and financial sector do not have a level playing field as compared to other participants in the financial markets in the world. There is no legal provision for facilitating secularization of financial assets of banks and financial institutions. Further, unlike international banks, the banks and financial institutions in India do not have power to take possession of securities and sell them. Our existing legal frame work relating to commercial transactions has not kept pace with the changing commercial practices and financial sector reforms. This has resulted in slow place of recovery of defaulting loans and mounting levels of nonperforming assets of banks and financial institutions. Narasimham committee I and II and Andhyarujina Committee constituted by the Central Government for the purpose of examining banking sector reforms have considered the need for changes in the legal system in respect of these areas. These committees, inter alia, have suggested enactment of a new legislation for secularization and empowering banks and financial institutions to take possession of the securities and to sell them without the intervention of the court. Acting on these suggestions, the Secularization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Ordinance 2002 was promulgated on the 21st June, 2002 to regulate secularization and reconstruction of financial assets and enforcement of security interest and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The provisions of the Ordinance would enable banks and financial institutions to realize long-term assets, manage problem of liquidity, asset liability mismatches and improve recovery by exercising powers to take possession of securities, sell them and reduce non-performing assets by adopting measures for recovery or reconstruction.?
10.9 From the statement of object and reasons and the statement of introduction the legislature's intention for enacting the said Act emerges very clearly. When special Act is enacted with the object to address the problems in the matter of recovery of loans and advance by banks “ more particularly delay in recovery of loans and when special fora viz. learned Tribunal and Appellate Tribunal are created under the Act for the purpose of adjudicating all disputes arising from and the action taken or being taken under the Act, then the action of entertaining writ petition by exercising discretionary and prerogative jurisdiction under Article 226 and / or Article 227 of Constitution of India would render the special provision under special Act redundant and otiose or it would render the special forum created under the Act ineffective.
10.10 When the legislature has, in its wisdom, prescribed the provision / condition which imposes requirement of pre-deposit of the demand “ amount (i.e. unpaid loan amount) and when the same provision simultaneously allows discretion to the appellate tribunal to partially wave the condition and reduce the amount, then, such statutory remedy cannot be considered or branded as illusory or onerous and Court would not render such statutory remedy redundant by readily or casually or light-heartedly allowing the aggrieved party (by the first authority's order) to short-circuit and by-pass the statutory remedy.
10.11 Otherwise, it would tantamount to defeating legislature's intention and statutory provision. Besides this, it is the duty and obligation of Court to give effect to all provisions of the Act, unless the provision itself is declared ultra-vires.
11. For the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the view that having regard to the facts of the case the relevant provision and the remedy cannot be considered onerous.
11.1 Whether, in any particular case the prescribed requirement causes hardships will depend on facts of that case and will have to be established before the competent authority in each case, on strength of relevant facts, figures, details and data and there cannot be a generalization that the provision which prescribes condition of deposit for availing appellate/revisional remedy would be, per-se, in all cases inefficacious and onerous.
11.2 For the aforesaid reasons and in view of the foregoing discussions, the petitioners contention that Section 18 of the Act and the remedy and forum prescribed and constituted under Section 18 are onerous is not sustainable and cannot be accepted and entertained.
11.3 So far as the petitioners contention that the learned Tribunal refused to exercise jurisdiction is concerned, it is necessary to note, at this stage, that there is a world of defence between inherent lack of jurisdiction and irregular exercise of jurisdiction conferred by law. In present case the learned tribunal had initially passed order of interim arrangement and then considered the objection on ground of territorial jurisdiction and after examining the case and facts the learned tribunal reached the conclusion that in the facts of the case it lacks territorial jurisdiction and cannot exercise territorial jurisdiction. According to the petitioner the said decision is erroneous and incorrect. In that view of the matter this Court would refrain from making any observation as regards the decision. Whether the decision is correct or erroneous can be decided by the learned Appellate Tribunal and this Court would not after any comments at this stage “ lest it may affect the proceedings before the learned Appellate Tribunal. If in a given case any irregularity is committed in exercising jurisdiction by the learned tribunal then learned appellate tribunal can take care of such situation as well. If such situation writ court would not readily step-in and would not quickly and readily exercise discretionary writ jurisdiction, rather the court would relegate the petitioner to statutory remedy viz. appellate tribunal.
11.4 There are 3 (three) well-recognized exceptions to the general restriction accepted by a Writ Court in the matter of exercising prerogative and discretionary writ jurisdiction. If the Court finds that, (a) petitioner seeks enforcement of fundamental right; or (b) the impugned action or order is, ex-facie in violation of principles of natural justice; or (c) it is noticed that the action or the order or the proceedings suffer from inherent lack of jurisdiction, then, despite alternative and efficacious remedy available, the Court may, if the facts of the case justify, exercise the discretion and entertain a writ petition.
11.5 In present case, the petition is not filed for enforcement of fundamental right and upon examination of facts and the events as well as the impugned order, it is also noticed that the proceedings or the order are not vitiated by violation of principles of natural justice. So far as the third exception is concerned, it is noticed on examination of relevant provisions vis-a-vis the petitioner's contentions that the purport of the petitioner's objections is that the learned tribunal has exercised its jurisdiction arbitrarily and with material irregularity and has declined to exercise jurisdiction though it is vested with the jurisdiction (territorial jurisdiction) to entertain the application. According to the petitioner though the learned tribunal possesses jurisdiction, it has erroneously held that it does not have territorial jurisdiction. Such order would not fall within the three exceptions recognized and settled by the decision in the case of Whirlpool Corporation. In the decision in case of Whirlpool Corporation, Hon'ble Apex Court reached the conclusion that the œRegistrar? and consequently the proceedings and the order, inherently lacked jurisdiction. The petitioner cannot derive benefit from said decision so as to maintain present petition. In present case none of the said three ingredients exist.
12. On this count useful reference may be made to the observations in the decision in case of Punjab National Bank vs. O.C. Krishnan and other (2001 [6] SCC 569) wherein almost similar situation obtained, Honble Apex Court observed that:-
œ4. The respondent who was a guarantor and whose property was stated to have been mortgaged filed a petition under Art. 227 before the High Court at Calcutta. The High Court allowed the petition by observing that as the mortgaged property was situated in Chennai the Debts Recovery Tribunal had no territorial jurisdiction in respect thereto and it could not have directed sale of mortgaged property. It, accordingly, held that the Bank would be at liberty to proceed against defendant No.4, respondent herein, in appropriate forum for recovery of debts by sale of mortgaged property . Hence this appeal.
6. The Act has been enacted with a view to provide a special procedure for recovery of debts due to the banks and the financial institutions. There is hierarchy of appeal provided in the Act, namely, filing of an appeal under S. 20 and this fast track procedure cannot be allowed to be derailed either by taking recourse to proceedings under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution or by filing a civil suit, which is expressly barred. Even though a provision under an Act cannot expressly oust the jurisdiction of the Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution, nevertheless when there is an alternative remedy available judicial prudence demands that the Court refrains from exercising its jurisdiction under the said constitutional provisions. This was a case where the High Court should not have entertained the petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution and should have directed the respondent to take recourse to the appeal mechanism provided by the Act.?
12.1 In this context it is appropriate at this stage to refer to the decision in case of CCT, Orissa and Ors. v. Indian Explosives Ltd. [(2008) 3 SCC 688] wherein Hon'ble Apex Court observed that :-
œ3........The High Court was of the view that the writ petition can be entertained even though an alternative remedy is available. Accepting the stand of the assessee the High Court held that the notice issued was to be quashed and accordingly quashed the impugned notice dated 14-1-2004.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition more particularly when for the assessment year 1997-98 and 1998-99 another Division Bench in Writ Petition Nos. OJC Nos. 16928 of 1998 and 1500 of 2000 had rejected the stand of the assessee. Though it was brought to the notice of the High Court that such is the position, unfortunately the High Court did not even refer to the said decision.
8. The High Court seems to have completely lost sight of the parameters highlighted by this Court in a large number of Cases relating to exhaustion of alternative remedy. ......?
12.2 In this context, reference may also be made to the decision in case of State of M.P. v. Nerbudda Valley Refrigerated Products Company Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. [AIR 2010 SC 2859] wherein Hon'ble Apex Court has, in para-12 observed that :-
œ12) In Punjab National Bank vs. O.C. Krishnan and Ors., (2001) 6 SCC 569, this Court held:-
œ6. The Act has been enacted with a view to provide a special procedure for recovery of debts due to the banks and the financial institutions. There is a hierarchy of appeal provided in the Act, namely, filing of an appeal under Section 20 and this fast-track procedure cannot be allowed to be derailed either by taking recourse to proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution or by filing a civil suit, which is expressly barred. Even though a provision under an Act cannot expressly oust the jurisdiction of the court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, nevertheless, when there is an alternative remedy available, judicial prudence demands that the Court refrains from exercising its jurisdiction under the said constitutional provisions. This was a case where the High Court should not have entertained the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution and should have directed the respondent to take recourse to the appeal mechanism provided by the Act.?
(emphasis supplied)
12.3 In the decision in case of United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon and Ors. [AIR 2010 SC 3413], Hon'ble Apex Court considered the issue related to statutory remedy and / or justification for entertaining writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India where the petitioning litigant, despite statutory remedy being available, did not approach statutory remedy and instead preferred writ petition. Hon'ble Apex Court observed in the said decision that:-
œ19. In Thansingh Nathmal v. Superintendent of Taxes (1964) 6 SCR 654, the Constitution Bench considered the question whether the High Court of Assam should have entertained the writ petition filed by the appellant under Article 226 of the Constitution questioning the order passed by the Commissioner of Taxes under the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947. While dismissing the appeal, the Court observed as under:
œThe jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is couched in wide terms and the exercise thereof is not subject to any restrictions except the territorial restrictions which are expressly provided in the Articles. But the exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary: it is not exercised merely because it is lawful to do so. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be exercised subject to certain selfimposed limitations. Resort that jurisdiction is not intended as an alternative remedy for relief which may be obtained in a suit or other mode prescribed by statute. Ordinarily the Court will not entertain a petition for a writ under Article 226, where the petitioner has an alternative remedy, which without being unduly onerous, provides an equally efficacious remedy. Again the High Court does not generally enter upon a determination of questions which demand an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce which the writ is claimed. The High Court does not therefore act as a court of appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal, to correct errors of fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction under Article 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal, or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not permit by entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the machinery created under the statute to be bypassed, and will leave the party applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up.?
25. In Raj Kumar Shivhare v. Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement and another (2010) 4 SCC 772, the Court was dealing with the issue whether the alternative statutory remedy available under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 can be bypassed and jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution could be invoked. After examining the scheme of the Act, the Court observed:
œ31. When a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievance and that too in a fiscal statute, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. In this case the High Court is a statutory forum of appeal on a question of law. That should not be abdicated and given a go-by by a litigant for invoking the forum of judicial review of the High Court under writ jurisdiction. The High Court, with great respect, fell into a manifest error by not appreciating this aspect of the matter. It has however dismissed the writ petition on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction.
12.4 In the decision in case of Bank of Baroda vs. Balbir Kumar Paul and other (2010 (2) GLH 790) the Division Bench of this Court has observed that:-
7. It is not in dispute that orders passed by the Recovery officer were appealable under Section 30 of the said Act. Section 30 of the said Act reads as follows :
?30. Appeal against the order of Recovery Officer ¦¦¦¦.
7.1 In view of availability of statutory appeal under the Act, we are of the opinion that ordinarily this Court would not entertain a writ petition before the person aggrieved has availed of such alternative remedy.
8. From the decision of Learned Single Judge, no reasons are forthcoming to indicate why the petition was entertained without insisting on the petitioner availing of such statutory appeal. As observed by the Apex Court in case of Punjab National Bank v. O.C. Krishnan and others (supra) when the statutory appeal is available, writ petition would normally not be entertained.?
12.5 In recent decision in case of Sri Siddeshwara Co-operative Bank Ltd. (supra) the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that:-
œ30. In Satyawati Tondon[1], the Court was concerned with an argument of alternative remedy provided under Section 17 of SARFAESI Act. Dealing with this argument, the Court had observed that where an effective remedy was available to the aggrieved person, the High Court must insist that before availing the remedy under Article 226 the alternative remedies available to him under the relevant statute are exhausted. In paragraphs 43, 44 and 45 (pg. no. 123) of the Report, the Court stated as follows :
œ43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasijudicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute.
44. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, directions, orders or writs including the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose are very wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of that power but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High Court is bound to keep in view while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution.
45. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance.?
31. No doubt an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 but by now it is well settled that where a statute provides efficacious and adequate remedy, the High Court will do well in not entertaining a petition under Article 226. On misplaced considerations, statutory procedures cannot be allowed to be circumvented.?
12.6 In LPA No. 1708 of 2009 and allied matters, the Division Bench, while referring the decision in case of Union Bank of India vs Satyawati Todon, observed that:-
œ12. The aforesaid issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of United Bank of India vs. Satyawati Tondon reported in (2010) 8 SCC 110. Therein, the Supreme Court held that issuance of notice to guarantormortgagor u/Sec.13(2) and (4) and filing an application u/Sec.14 of the SARFAESI Act without first initiating action against the principal borrower is permissible. In the said case, the Supreme Court also noticed that there was alternative remedy of appeal u/Sec.17, which could have been availed by any aggrieved person, and held that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person, and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In the said case, the Supreme Court held as follows:-
"42. There is another reason why the impugned order should be set aside. If respondent No.1 had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under Section 13(4) or action taken under Section 14, then she could have availed remedy by filing an application under Section 17(1). The expression any person used in Section 17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under Section 13(4) or Section 14. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective.
"43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc., the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute".
13. In view of the settled principle under the SARFAESI Act, it is always open to the secured creditor to take measures u/Sec.14, 13(4) against a guarantor, without initiating any action against the principal borrower, as both stand in the same footing of borrower, and action can be taken against any one or other borrower, we hold that it was well within the jurisdiction of the secured creditor to take separate action against the principal borrower and/or to settle the issue with such principal borrower, and a separate action against the guarantor, and/or to settle with the guarantor. In case the provisions of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 or the Rules framed thereunder are violated, it will be always open to the aggrieved person to assail such action or measures taken by secured creditor by filing appeal u/Sec.17 before the Debt Recovery Tribunal. Learned Single Judge, thereby, having refused to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226, there being aremedy of appeal, no interference is called for against such order. The appellantpetitioner is given liberty to move before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, if it is aggrieved, within a reasonable period, say within a month. The Letters Patent Appeal and the connected Civil Application are dismissed with the aforesaid observations, but there shall be no order as to costs.?
12.7 It emerges from the above mentioned judicial pronouncements and precedents that when statutory appeal remedy is available the writ Court would relegate the petitioning litigant to the statutory remedy. The writ Court would exercise strict control and highest degree of restrain and would decline to entertain petition when statutory remedy is available.
12.8 Thus, having regard to the fact that the proceedings in question are related and arise from a special Act enacted for special purpose under which special forum viz. Appellate Tribunal is created and constituted and having regard to the facts of present case including fact that the learned Tribunal has while exercising rival contentions raised with reference to its jurisdiction held that the S.A. No.77 of 2013 is not maintainable for want of territorial jurisdiction however, said decision can be examined by the learned Appellate Tribunal and having regard to the fact that the said order cannot be termed as an order without jurisdiction and having regard to the observations by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the decision in case between CCT, Orissa and Ors. v. Indian Explosives Ltd. (supra) and in the recent decision in case of Sri Siddeshwara Co-operative Bank Ltd. (supra) this Court is of the view that since a statutory alternative remedy by way of Appeal before learned tribunal is available to the petitioner a writ petition does not deserve to be entertained and the petitioner should be relegated to avail his statutory alternative remedy of appeal before learned appellate tribunal. The petitioner has failed to make out any strong exception to entertain the petition. Any case to entertain the petition instead of directing the petitioner to approach statutory appeal remedy is not made out and petitioner deserves to be relegated to statutory appeal remedy.
13. Hence, the petitioner is relegated to the statutory remedy of Appeal before learned Appellate Tribunal. In this context, it is appropriate to recall recent decision in case of G.M, Shri Siddheshwar Co-operative Bank Limited (supra), wherein Hon'ble Apex Court has expressed a word of caution against entertaining petition under special statute when special forum is created under a statute. Hon'ble Apex Court observed thus:-
œ31. No doubt an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 but by now it is well settled that where a statute provides efficacious and adequate remedy, the High Court will do well in not entertaining a petition under Article 226. On misplaced considerations, statutory procedures cannot be allowed to be circumvented.? (Emphasis supplied)
14.1 In this view of the matter the Court is not inclined to entertain present petition in light of the said decision. The petitioner is relegated to the alternative remedy under the Act.
14.2 Accordingly the petition stands disposed of. Notice discharged.
14.3 At this stage learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the interim arrangement which continued i.e. status-quo may be continued for period of 3 weeks to enable the petitioner to take out appropriate proceedings against present order.
14.4 Learned advocate for the petitioner also submitted that property is already disposed, sale certificate is also issued and now the question is only about handing over the possession therefore, request may be considered and granted.
14.5 Mr. Hawa, learned advocate for the respondent No.4 fairly submitted that if reasonable time is granted then the respondent No.4 has no objection.
13.6 Considering the request made by learned advocate for the petitioner, interim arrangement which is in operation until now will continue until 24.12.2013.