1. This appeal is preferred against the judgment and order passed on 25th September, 2001 by the Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Nagpur in Claim Petition No.432 of 1994.
2. The appellants No. 1 to 3 were respectively father, mother and brother of deceased Pramod, an unfortunate victim of an accident, which occurred at about 10.30 a.m. on DhapewadaVadhona road in front of the house of one Bapurao Shrirao. This accident was caused by a motor vehicle, which was a truck bearing registration No. MHG5383 owned by respondent No.1, ensured with respondent No.2 and driven by one Shalikram Shivaji, who is not a party to this appeal. At the relevant time deceased Pramod was returning to his house after attending the school and as he reached the spot of the accident, the said truck, coming from behind, hit deceased Pramod in a forceful manner, with the result the deceased came under one of the wheels of the truck and both of his legs were crushed thereunder. The deceased was hospitalized and he was discharged after some time, although he had not recovered fully from the injuries. Thereafter, he continued with his treatment as an outdoor patient. Subsequently, complications developed and Pramod was again required to be admitted to the hospital and on 03/9/1991 he died due to complications arising from the injuries he had sustained in the said accident.
3. The appellants had submitted in their claim petition that Pramod was a 14 years old boy studying in 8th standard at the time of accident and that he was a clever student having bright future. They submitted that after attaining the majority, deceased Pramod would have certainly supported them and since the accident had occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle by its driver, the respondents were liable to pay compensation to the appellants. They had claimed the compensation of Rs.1,50,000/.
4. After considering the evidence brought on record and hearing both the sides, learned Member of the Tribunal allowed the petition and granted compensation of Rs.1,50,000/on all counts inclusive of no fault liability with interest @ Rs.5/- per annum from the date of the petition by his judgment and order dated 25/9/2001. The appellants felt that since the interest so granted by the Tribunal was not in accordance with the prevailing market rates, the appellants preferred the present appeal. The appellants had not challenged the sufficiency and reasonableness of the amount of compensation so granted.
5. I have heard Ms Katariya, learned Counsel for the appellants. None has appeared for either of the respondents, though duly served and duly noticed about final hearing today. With the help of learned Counsel Counsel for the appellants, I have carefully gone through the memo of appeal and paper book including the impugned order.
6. The points raised in this appeal and which call for my consideration are as follows. :
(1) Whether the rate of interest @ Rs.5 per annum granted on the amount of compensation determined by the M.A.C.T., Nagpur is reasonable and in accordance with the prevailing interest rates given by Banks?
(2) Whether any enhanced compensation can be granted to the appellants without there being any challenge to the reasonableness and sufficiency of the quantum of compensation granted by the M.A.C.T., Nagpur?
7. So far as the first point is concerned, learned Counsel for the appellants has submitted that since the award has been made in the year 2001, the Tribunal ought to have considered the rates of interest given by Banks in the year 2001. She submits, on the basis of judgment rendered in the case of Kaushnuma Begum (Smt.) and others Vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and others “ (2001) 2 SCC 9, that the nationalized banks were granting interest @ 9% on fixed deposits for one year at the time when the Hon'ble Apex Court delivered its judgment. Therefore, according to her, this is a fit case wherein the interest should also be granted at similar rate. She further submits that the Tribunal ought to have granted interest at the said rate not from the date of registration of the petition but from the date of the application filed by the appellants for condonation of delay that had occurred in presenting the claim petition under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 as it existed in the year 1991.
8. As regards the contention that the interest should have been granted from the date of application filed for condonation of delay, it must be stated here that it is well settled now that ordinarily the interest is to be granted in view of Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, from the date of the petition, unless there is evidence to show that the petitioner was responsible for delay in disposal of the petition in which case the date from which the interest would be liable to be paid can be postponed. It is not the law that the date from which the interest would be required to be paid by the respondents can be stretched back to some date which is before the date of filing or registration of the claim petition. The date of registration of the claim petition has to be taken as the date of its filing or the date of making the claim as contemplated under Section 171, and therefore, I find no error whatsoever in the direction given by the Tribunal about payment of interest from the date of registration of the application. So, the argument of learned Counsel for the appellants in this regard cannot be accepted.
9. About the rate of interest fixed by the Tribunal, I find that there is substance in the argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant. 2001 was the year when considerable changes had occurred in the Indian economy after the liberalization measures were enforced with full vigour by the Central Government. As a result of the liberalization of the economy, there had been considerable fall in the lending rates of the Banks and consequently, reduction in the rates of interest granted by the Banks on the term deposits had occurred. Rates of interest which were till then on a higher side had slid down considerably, though I hasten to add, not as low as 5% percent per annum. This fact has been noted by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of KaushnumaBegum (supra) in paragraph 24, in the words; œ..Earlier, 12% was found to be the reasonable rate of simple interest. With a change in economy and the policy of Reserve Bank of India, the interest rate has been lowered. The nationalised banks are now granting interest at the rate of 9% on fixed deposits for one year...?.The Hon'ble Supreme Court then directed payment of interest at the rate of 9% per annum on the amount of compensation granted by it. From these observations what could be understood is, while deciding as to what could be the reasonable rate of interest, the Tribunal would be required to consider the prevailing rates of interest, as of the date of the judgment, accepted and given by the Indian Banks. Then, there would also be no difficulty in determining the appropriate rate of interest as prevailing in the year 2001, when the impugned judgment and order were passed in the instant case. In that year, the prevailing rate of interest granted by the Banks on fixed deposits for one year was of 9% and same could also be directed to be paid to the appellants by the respondents, in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of KaushnumaBegum (supra).
10. I, therefore, find that the 5% interest granted by the Tribunal was not reasonable and certainly not consistent with the prevailing interest rates given by Banks. I, therefore, further find that the impugned judgment and order are required to be modified by enhancing the rate of interest from 5% to 9% per annum. The first point is answered accordingly.
11. Learned Counsel for the appellants has also submitted that even though the enhanced compensation has not been claimed in this appeal, this Court would have power to grant the same in view of the nature of jurisdiction exercised under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. No doubt, it is well settled law that while exercising power under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal can always grant compensation which is higher than the compensation claimed in the petition. But, with due respect, it must be said that while this power is available to a Tribunal, same cannot be exercised by the Appellate Court without there being any challenge made to the reasonableness of the compensation and without putting the other side on adequate notice of such a challenge. The reason being that before the Tribunal, there is no compensation determined and granted by any authority and in determining the reasonableness of the compensation, the Tribunal does not act under any limitations created by recording of a finding that the compensation granted is reasonable. As such, the Tribunal does not have to reason out as to how the earlier compensation is improper and unreasonable and how the compensation being granted by it is just and proper. But, such is not the case when the matter is carried to the appellate Court. The appellate Court is required to consider the legality and correctness of the finding recorded on the aspect of justness of the compensation and this cannot be done unless a specific challenge is made in this behalf and other side is given its adequate notice so as to enable it to meet out the challenge effectively. If reasonableness of compensation is not challenged specifically, the finding recorded by the Tribunal in that regard would attain finality and it can be taken that the appellant accepts the reasonableness and sufficiency of the compensation so granted. In the instant case, admittedly, the appellants have not raised any challenge in the memo of appeal about the reasonableness and sufficiency of the amount of compensation granted by the Tribunal. Therefore, the appellants cannot be heard now on this point inasmuch as the respondents have also not been noticed about this point now being raised on behalf of the appellants.
12. Learned Counsel for the appellants, in order to support her argument about enhancement of compensation by applying higher multiplier has invited my attention to the decisions rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases of ManjuDevi Vs. Musafir Paswan, VII (2005) SLT 257, and R. K. Malik Vs. Kiran Pal, II (2009) ACC 705. She also referred to the decision of learned Single Judge of Delhi High Court given in the case of Suresh Chand and another Vs. Ram Pal Yadav and others reported at III (2013) ACC 753 to support her said argument. But, with due respect, I must say that it is not necessary to consider applicability of ratio of these cases to the facts of the instant case, once it is held, for the reasons stated earlier, that now appellants cannot be heard on the point of reasonableness and sufficiency of the compensation granted. The second point is, therefore, answered as in the negative.
13. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment and order are modified and now it is directed that respondents No. 1 and 2 shall pay jointly and severally to the petitioners the compensation of Rs.1,50,000/(rupees one lac fifty thousand only) on all counts inclusive of no fault liability amount with interest @9% per annum from the date of registration of application till deposit of the amount in the Court.
Costs shall follow the result.
Decree shall be drawn up accordingly.