Judgment:
(Prayer: This Writ Appeal Is Filed Under Section 4 Of The Karnataka High Court Act Praying To Set Aside The Order Passed In Writ Petition No.4865/2013 (L-Ter) Dated 22.04.2013.)
D.H. Waghela, CJ.
1. The appeal is preferred from order dated 22.04.2013 of learned Single Judge of this Court in the petition filed by the respondent herein. The relevant facts in brief are that, the respondent -workman was terminated by order dated 30.07.2007, following which he had raised an industrial dispute under Section 10(4A) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which was referred to the Labour Court as I. D. No. 10/2008 and was later re-numbered as I.D.No. 1/2012. The respondent -workman appears to have appeared as party-in -person just as he has insisted upon doing before this Court as well. In an earlier round of litigation, the Division Bench of this Court had directed the Labour Court to consider the respondent's application for revival of the dispute, after he having admittedly withdrawn the case. Upon the direction of the Division Bench as aforesaid, to sympathetically consider the application of the respondent herein, the Labour Court entertained his application for revival of the dispute, but that application was dismissed on the ground that the Labour Court had no power to revive the proceeding. Thus, in short, the respondent has been struggling in one after the other proceeding to revive his industrial dispute, after withdrawal thereof by himself.
2. By the impugned order of learned Single Judge, it is again observed that the approach of the Labour Court was not proper and besides being inconsistent with the earlier order of the Division Bench, it was not in consonance with the observations of the Apex Court in Grindlays Bank Limited v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal ([1981] 1 LLJ 327) and in Jet Plywood (P) Ltd., vs Madhukar Nowlakha ([2Q06]3 SCC 699). Taking such view of the matter, learned Single Judge again observed that the petitioner appeared to have withdrawn his dispute under mistaken notion and under great pressure and disappointment. He did not appear to be legally well versed with the procedure and niceties of law. On the basis of such reasoning in the impugned order, the order dated 22.12.2012 of the Labour Court was set aside and the earlier order dated 07.02.2009 made by the Labour Court disposing of the dispute was recalled and the original case i.e., I.D.No. 1/2012 (Old No.ID 10/2008) was restored. The net result of the proceeding so far is that the industrial dispute referred to the Labour Court in the year 2008 and withdrawn by the respondent -workman himself stood restored to file, without any reference to any statutory provision in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and only on grounds of sympathy and on the assumed application of two judgments of the Apex Court.
3. The respondent, appearing as party-in-person, conceded that there was no provision in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for reviving the industrial dispute after it being expressly and consciously withdrawn. It cannot be gainsaid that the authorities constituted to adjudicate industrial disputes are creatures of the statute with limited jurisdiction. The Labour Courts, Tribunals and National Tribunals are duty bound under the provisions of Section 15 of the Industrial Disputes Act to hold its proceedings expeditiously and submit its award to the appropriate Government. The provisions of Section 17(2) clearly provide that, subject to the provisions of Section 17A, the award published under sub-section (1) shall be final and shall not be called in question before any Court in any manner whatsoever. Under the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 18, an award of the Labour Court or tribunal is binding on all parties to the industrial dispute. The only exception which could be found in the aforesaid statutory scheme would be in the case of an ex parte award made due to absence of a party before the Court. Thus, in short, the claim made by the respondent for revival of the dispute has no statutory basis.
4. As referred and recorded in the impugned order itself, the judgment of the Apex Court in Grindlays Bank Limited (supra) clearly observes that when a review is sought due to a procedural defect, the inadvertent error committed by the tribunal must- be corrected ex debito justitiae to prevent the abuse of its process, and such power inheres in every Court or tribunal. It is farther observed that the tribunal's order setting aside its ex parte award amounts to a procedural review. The argument that the tribunal had become functus officio after making of an award and therefore had no jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte award did not appeal to the Supreme Court. It is ultimately held that the tribunal was competent to entertain an application to set aside the ex parte award. In the facts of the present case, it was not an ex parte award, but practically an order invited by the respondent himself. The second judgment relied upon in the impugned order viz., Jet Plywood (P) Ltd., (supra) was related to a matter covered by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, wherein inherent powers are expressly conferred upon the Court. However, that is not the case when the creatures of the Industrial Disputes Act, 194 7 are empowered to adjudicate with limited powers, and jurisdiction.
5. Under the express provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, procedure and power of the Courts and Tribunals constituted under it are enumerated. Sub-section (3) of Section 11 empowers every Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal and National Tribunal, with the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit in respect of the following matters namely :-
(a) enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath;
(b) compelling the production of documents and material objects;
(c) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses;
(d) in respect of such other matters as may be prescribed.
Other special powers of such quasi-judicial authorities are also delineated in other sub-sections of Section 11 of the Act; but they do not include any inherent power as distinguished from incidental or ancillary powers to discharge their functions. Therefore, it would appear that inherent powers of a Civil Court are excluded by necessary implication from the list of special powers conferred upon the adjudicating authorities constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, In this context, a four Judge Bench of the Apex Court has in Punjab National Bank Ltd., v. Sri, Ram Kanwar, Industrial, Tribunal, Delhi and others (AIR 1957 SC 276) observed as under:
"6, In our opinion, the question admits of only one answer. Sub-section (3) of Section 11 enumerates certain powers vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, and says that every board, court and tribunal under the Act shall have those powers; the last enumerated power is in general terms, being "in respect of such other matters as may be prescribed". No rules made under the Act bearing on the question of costs have been brought to our notice; therefore all that can be said, with regard to the effect of sub-section (3) of Section 11, is that except the enumerated powers, other powers vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure have not been given to the board, court or tribunal under the Act."
6. Under these circumstances and for the reasons discussed hereinabove, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order is set aside, with no order as to cost. In view of disposal of the appeal, the pending interim applications do not survive for consideration and are accordingly disposed.