* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI Reserved on:
27. h March, 2014 Pronounced on:
13. h May, 2014 + CRL. A. 282/1998 SAT PARKASH YADAV Through ..... Appellant Mr. S.P. Singh Chaudhary, Advocate. Versus STATE (GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI) ..... Respondent Through Mr. Rajat Katyal, APP for the State. CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJIV KHANNA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.P. MITTAL
JUDGMENTG.P. MITTAL, J.
1. Appellant Sat Parkash Yadav impugns the judgment dated 07.03.1998 and the order on sentence dated 10.03.1998 whereby he was convicted for the offences punishable under Section 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC for short) for committing murder of his daughter Ruchi, aged about eight years and for destruction of the evidence with the intention of screening himself from the legal punishment. He was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs.1,000/- or in default to undergo simple imprisonment for one month for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. He was further sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay fine of Rs.1,000/- or in default of fine to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month for the offence punishable under Section 201 IPC. The substantive sentences awarded were to run concurrently. It goes without saying that the appellant was entitled to the benefit as provided under Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C. for short).
2. Before adverting to the contentions raised and appreciation of evidence, it would be appropriate to have an insight into the facts of the case leading to the registration of the FIR and arrest of the appellant.
3. On 17.06.1995 Smt. Sarita @ Rajwati (PW23) accompanied by her husband Sat Parkash Yadav (the appellant) and her brother Prem Dass approached Police Post ISBT with a complaint that her daughter Ruchi, aged eight years, height 3ft. 3 inch went missing from the mini bus stand, ISBT on the previous day at 08:00 a.m. Smt. Sarita @ Rajwati (PW23) by getting DD No.16 (Ex. PW15/A) recorded. She informed the police that on 16.05.2009 at about 8:30 a.m. she along with her daughter Ruchi was waiting for a bus at the mini bus stand. She felt thirsty and therefore went to drink water. On returning, she could not find her daughter. She searched for her and also waited for her but since Ruchi was not found she left for her house. On the next afternoon, she informed that on inquiry her daughter had not been traced anywhere and her daughter was also not available with her relations. The description of Ruchi’s wearing apparel was given to the police. According to the prosecution, a case under Section 363 IPC was got registered on 14.07.1995 vide FIR Ex. PW10/A in Police Station Kashmere Gate and wireless messages were communicated to the various parts of the country.
4. On 15.07.1995, Smt. Sarita @ Rajwati (PW23) came over to the PS along with the appellant and handed over a ransom letter (Ex. PW14/D) to SI Ishwar Singh (PW2), Incharge PP ISBT. According to the contents of the letter, one Chander Mohan (PW7) had demanded a ransom of Rs.1 lac for the release of PW23’s daughter Ruchi. The letter was seized by PW2 vide Ex. PW2/B and Section 364-A IPC was added in the case which was already registered. According to the prosecution, on interrogation, Chander Mohan (PW7) denied his involvement and laid suspicion on Sat Parkash Yadav himself who had allegedly raped two of PW7’s sisters and sodomised his younger brother in the year 1994 and was facing trial. It is alleged that there was lack of cooperation in the investigation from the appellant and his family members.
5. In the morning of 20.07.1995, dead body of a girl child, aged about 810 years was found in an unattended suitcase at the pavement, Rajghat Power House Road. The dead body was identified by the appellant and PW23 to be that of Ruchi, the appellant’s daughter. Information with regard to the recovery of Ruchi’s dead body was passed on to PS Kashmere Gate. The appellant was questioned/interrogated and on establishing his involvement, he was arrested from his brother Sham Manohar’s house at Sector 22, Noida, U.P. on 24.07.1995. The appellant allegedly made a disclosure statement Ex. PW19/B which led to discovery of fact that the ransom note was got typed by him from Sri Pal (PW16) and the address on the envelope of the note was got typed from Anil Kumar Gupta (PW17). The police also discovered the shop of Sita Ram (PW3) from whom the appellant had allegedly purchased the ‘Agfa‟ suitcase Ex.P-1 in which the dead body of Ruchi was recovered. Apart from certain other recoveries, keys of the suitcase Ex. P-5 & P-6 were also allegedly got recovered from a drain near Bus Stand Sector 56, Noida. The appellant is also alleged to have pointed out the PCO (telephone booth) of PW9 in Shakarpur wherefrom he gave information to the police regarding presence of the dead body; the same was, however, not connected to the appellant. On completion of the investigation, a report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. was presented against the appellant.
6. On appellant pleading not guilty to the charge for the offences punishable under Section 302/201 IPC and in order to establish its case, the prosecution has examined 28 witnesses. There is no direct evidence of commission of the offence against the appellant. The prosecution case therefore rests solely on circumstantial evidence. The prosecution during the course of adducing evidence tried to build up a case that the appellant had a motive to make his daughter (Ruchi) disappear and to falsely implicate Chander Mohan (PW7) in view of the fact that a criminal case for the offence punishable under Sections 376/377 IPC was registered against the appellant by PW7 for committing rape on two sisters of PW7 and sodomising his younger brother. It is the prosecution case that by falsely implicating Chander Mohan (PW7), the appellant wanted to put pressure on him (PW7) to be soft with the appellant in the criminal case and withdraw the serious charges against him. The prosecution further relied on the pointing out memo Ex. PW19/C in pursuance of the disclosure statement Ex. PW19/B towards the place of murder and the testimony of Anil Kumar Gupta (PW17) from whom the appellant had allegedly got typed the address on the envelope Ex. PW14/A. The prosecution further relied on the pointing out of typist Sri Pal (PW16) from whom the ransom letter Ex. PW14/D was allegedly got typed by the appellant on his (PW16) typewriter Ex.P-2. The prosecution heavily relied on the typed script on the envelope (Q-1) Ex. PW14/A and the ransom letter (Q-2) Ex. PW14/D which were found to have tallied with the specimen S1A-C (Ex. PW14/B) and the specimen S2, (Ex. PW14/E) which were handed over to the police by PW23 (the appellant’s wife) and which were found to have been typed on the typewriters Ex.P-2 and Ex.P-3 respectively on account of comparison of questioned typed version and the specimen typed version from the typewriters of PW17 and PW16 respectively vide CFSL report Ex. PW14/C. The prosecution also relied on the statement of Sita Ram (PW3) which led to the discovery of the fact that the suitcase ‘Agfa‟ make Ex. P-1 in which the dead body was recovered was purchased by the appellant on 19.07.1995 from PW3 for Rs.200/- from his shop in Aligarh. Relying on all these circumstances, the Trial Court opined that the prosecution case against the appellant was proved beyond shadow of all reasonable doubt and thus, the appellant was convicted and sentenced as stated earlier.
7. It is well settled that where the prosecution case rests purely on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn must, in the first instance be fully established; the circumstances should be of conclusive nature; the circumstances taken together must unerringly point to the guilt of the accused; the circumstances proved on record must be incompatible with the innocence of the accused and form the complete chain of circumstances and it must be proved that in all probabilities the offence was committed by the accused. (Hanumant Govind Nargundkar & Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR1952SC343and Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC116.
8. We have heard Mr. S.P. Singh Chaudhary, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Rajat Katyal, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State and have bestowed out thoughtful consideration to the contentions raised on behalf of the parties.
9. The learned counsel for the appellant urges that it is highly improbable that a father would commit murder of his own small daughter to get out of a criminal case got registered by Chander Mohan (PW7). In fact, it was PW7 who falsely implicated the appellant in a case under Sections 376/377 IPC for rape of his sisters and sodomisation of his brother with a purpose to get his house in Noida vacated from the appellant. The learned counsel very strenuously canvasses that no test identification proceedings (TIP) were got conducted to get the appellant identified by either PW16 or PW17 from whom the appellant allegedly got typed the ransom note and the address on its envelope respectively to falsely implicate PW7. PW16 and PW17 were not previously acquainted with the appellant and in the absence of previous TIP, it would be highly unsafe to rely on the testimonies of PWs 16 and 17. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the appellant places reliance on Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra, (1982) 1 SCC700and V.C. Shukla v. State (Delhi Administration),1980 Supp. SCC249 10. The learned counsel for the appellant attacks the testimony of Sita Ram (PW3) also on the ground that the appellant and PW3 were complete strangers. According to the prosecution, it was just a single incident of alleged purchase of a suitcase from PW3. PW3 would have encountered several customers every day and it would be very difficult for him to identify one of the customers having purchased a suitcase from his shop. Further, the learned counsel for the appellant contends that as per the death report Ex. PW11/A, height of the dead body was about 4 ft. whereas length, breadth and height of the suitcase Ex.P-1 was 22.55 inch, 16 inches and 9 inches respectively. The learned counsel points out that thus, it was not possible to fit dead body of a child, aged about eight years being four ft. in height in the said suitcase as claimed by the prosecution. The learned counsel therefore, urges that Sita Ram (PW3), the alleged seller of „Agfa‟ Luggage has been planted as a false witness.
11. The learned counsel for the appellant further points out that as per prosecution version Inspector Ved Singh (PW28) along with SI Vipin Kumar Bhatia (PW27), Head Constable Madan Singh (PW6), Constable Harinder Kumar (DW-1) and Constable Pratap Singh (PW19) had proceeded to Sector 22, Noida and arrested the appellant from the house of his brother Sham Manohar at about 10:30 p.m. on 24.07.1995. After interrogation the appellant was arrested, his disclosure statement Ex. PW19/B was recorded and he was brought back to the Police Station at around 3:00 a.m. on 25.07.1995. The learned counsel urges that although Constable Pratap Singh (PW19) is alleged to be a witness to the arrest and recovery of certain articles from the appellant, yet his name was not mentioned in the departure entry No.17-A (Ex.DW-2/E) dated 23.07.1995 at 09:10 p.m. and arrival entry No.23-A (Ex.DW-2/P2) on 24.07.1995 at 03:00 a.m. His signature appears on various documents. Moreover, the return of the police officers just within six hours of their departure would mean that the police acted with unbelievable speed. It was not possible to reach Sector 22, Noida, U.P., make inquiries, interrogate persons, arrest the accused, effect some recoveries and return to Kashmere Gate just within six hours. The learned counsel urges that the DD entries No.17-A and 23-A speak volume to indicate the appellant’s false implication. The learned counsel states that this fact is further compounded from the fact that no permission was obtained by the IO to leave the Police Station Kashmere Gate and no entry was made in the concerned Police Station wherefrom the appellant was arrested. RANSOM NOTE AND ADDRESSED ENVELOPE12 First of all, we would like to refer to the testimonies of PW16 and PW17, the witnesses who had allegedly typed the ransom note Ex. PW14/D and the address on the envelope Ex. PW14/A respectively. Sri Pal (PW16) deposed that on 21.08.1995, a police officer and a Constable of Delhi Police had contacted him at his seat in Collectorate, Farukhabad and had shown him the letter Ex. PW14/D. The witness stated that he identified the appellant who was known as Netaji and he confirmed that the letter Ex. PW14/D was typed by him at the instance of the appellant. In cross-examination by the learned APP, he denied the suggestion that PW7’s signatures were already there on the paper before the ransom note on the same was typed by him. In cross-examination, the witness admitted that several persons used to come to him every day for getting the typing work done in the normal course. He stated that he knew the appellant by face and came to know of his name from the newspapers.
13. Similarly, Anil Kumar Gupta (PW17) deposed that he was working as a typist at Karkardooma Court Complex. He deposed that on 25.07.1995, the appellant accompanied with four-five police officers came to his seat. The police showed him an envelope and he confirmed that the address on the envelope was typed by him. He proved the envelope Ex. PW14/A. He deposed that he typed the specimen Ex. PW14/B on his typewriter (Ex. P-3) which was seized by the police vide memo Ex. PW17/A. In cross-examination, this witness also agreed that several customers used to come to him occasionally for getting their papers typed. He stated that if any customer came to him repeatedly, he would be in a position to identify him. PW17 further deposed that the appellant used to get his papers typed from him in his other case and he used to come to him since the last about 1-1½ years.
14. The learned counsel for the appellant attacks PW17’s testimony urging that in June, 1995 the appellant was in custody only for eightnine months and thus, his (PW17’s) testimony that the appellant was visiting him for the last about 1-1½ years was totally false and it would be highly unsafe to rely on the testimonies of PWs 16 and 17 without there being any TIP.
15. We do not agree.
16. It cannot be laid down as a uniform proposition of law that in the absence of any TIP, no value can be attached to the testimony of a witness who had seen the culprit for the first time. The purpose of holding a TIP and the value to be attached to the identification of an accused in the Court was dealt with in great detail in Kunjumon @ Unni v. State of Kerala, 2012 (11) SCALE212and it was held that test identification proceedings are conducted merely to satisfy whether the investigation is proceeding in the right direction. It was held that the identification in the Court is the substantive evidence whereas test identification during investigation can only be used for the purpose of corroboration. Referring to State of Himachal Pradesh v. Lekh Raj, (2000) 1 SCC247 the Supreme Court held that the holding of a TIP is “a rule of prudence which is required to be followed in cases where the accused is not known to the witness or complainant.”
Referring to Budhsen v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1970) 2 SCC128 it was noted that where the Court is impressed by a particular witness on whose testimony it can safely rely, it can dispense with the corroboration by a previous TIP. In para 25, the Supreme Court observed as under:
“25. The sum and substance of the various decisions referred to above and ors. on the same lines is that the failure to hold a TIP is not fatal to the case of the prosecution, but the Trial Judge will need to be circumspect in accepting the identification of an accused by a witness in Court if the accused is a stranger to the witness.”
17. In Acharaparambath Pradeepan v. State of Kerala, (2006) 13 SCC643 while holding that where a witness had sufficient time to observe a culprit as against a fleeing glimpse, the Court can rely on the testimony of such a witness even in the absence of TIP. In para 52, the Supreme Court held as under:
“52. If some corroboration was necessary, PW5 was amply corroborated by PWs 3, 4 and 6. They might have not been able to identify A-1 in the test identification parade but the reasons stated by them cannot be wished away. A person may be identified with or without beard in different circumstances. The identification of A-1 cannot be discarded as each one of them had sufficient time to see him, particularly when as many as 44 injuries had been inflicted and a warning had been written on the blackboard. The deceased was evidently attacked by a large number of persons. It was therefore not a case of a fitting glimpse of the accused by the witnesses. Some of the witnesses ran but some of them did not. Sometime even identification in court is accepted even if no test identification parade is held.”
18. Turning to the facts of this case, we may say that PW16 who had typed the ransom note Ex. PW14/D went on to state that the appellant who got the letter typed was known as Netaji. Although, PW16 admitted that in the normal course, he may not identify a person who has just come to him once for typing purpose, but he went on to add that he knew the appellant beforehand as Netaji and therefore, could identify him. Similarly, PW17 was categorical that the appellant had visited him several times for getting his papers typed during the last 1/1½ years. As per the prosecution version, the ransom letter was got typed in June, 1995. FIR against the appellant under Sections 376/377 IPC was registered in 1994. The appellant was arrested in November, 1994. Thus, it can be assumed that till June, 1995, the appellant had visited PW17 for the last about 7-8 months and, therefore, he was identified by PW17. It is a known fact that witnesses give time only by approximation and thus, even if the appellant had been visiting PW17 for the last about 7-8 months, PW17 may have given the time as 1/1½ years. In our view, this is not such a major discrepancy as to reject PW17’s testimony.
19. Since the appellant had contacted PWs 16 and 17 on several occasions and even while typing the addressed envelope/ransom note, they had sufficient time and opportunity to see the appellant. Thus, PWs-16 and 17’s testimonies with regard to appellant’s identification in the Court even in the absence of previous TIP can very well be believed.
20. Further, S.L. Mukhi (PW14) also opined that the questioned address Q1 (Ex. PW14/A) and the questioned ransom note Q2 (Ex. PW14/D) respectively were typed from the same typewriters of PW17 and PW16 with typed script marked S-1A to S-1C (Ex. PW1/B) and S2 (Ex. PW14/E) respectively.
21. Admittedly, the ransom note Ex. PW14/D was handed over by the appellant’s wife Smt. Sarita @ Rajwati (PW23) to the police saying that it was received at their address in Farukhabad. As per the ransom letter, the author thereof was Chander Mohan (PW7). It does not stand to reason that a person kidnapping a child would demand ransom disclosing his name to the victim’s parents, unless he is a well known criminal and the intention is to create terror by the name of the culprit himself. Thus, PWs 16 and 17’s testimonies with regard to addressed envelope and the letter being typed by them at the instance of the appellant stands fortified from the testimony of PW14. It is highly improbable and apparently unrealistic to accept that if PW7 was the kidnapper, he would have disclosed his name in the letter. We are convinced that the letter Ex. PW14/D was posted in the envelope Ex. PW14/A by the appellant himself and the same was then later on produced by PW23 before the IO.
22. We do not attach much importance to the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that on absence of any separate seizure memo in respect of envelope Ex. PW14/A, there would be doubt with regard to the handing over and seizure of the envelope by SI Ishwar Singh (PW2). PURCHASE OF SUITCASE FROM PW3 23. Now is the time to turn to the testimony of Sita Ram (PW3). His testimony is also attacked on the ground that he had also seen the appellant for the first time and therefore, his testimony with regard to purchase of ‘Agfa‟ suitcase from him must be discarded.
24. We note that PW3’s testimony was left unchallenged in crossexamination. PW3 had the occasion to see and observe the appellant for sufficiently long time. Thus, in view of the judgment in Acharaparambath Pradeepan (supra), even in the absence of any TIP, we are inclined to place implicit reliance on PW3’s testimony that the suitcase ‘Agfa‟ Ex.P-1 was purchased by the appellant from him. It was from the said suitcase that the dead body of Ruchi was recovered. RECOVERY OF TAKHAT AND DARI25 Alleged recovery of takhat and dari in pursuance of the disclosure statement Ex. PW19/B cannot be covered under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872 as it has not been established that the takhat and dari were connected with the commission of the offence. Thus, the alleged recovery is of no consequence. The Trial Court also did not attach any importance thereto. ARREST AND DISCLOSURE STATEMENT26 The learned counsel for the appellant disputes the appellant’s arrest and the disclosure statement Ex. PW19/B purported to have been made by him on 24.07.1995 primarily on the ground that it was highly improbable that the local police from PS Kashmere Gate would have reached Sector 22, Noida, would have arrested and interrogated the appellant, would have recorded his disclosure statement running into six handwritten pages and then returned to the PS Kashmere Gate just within six hours. It is also urged that there was no permission obtained from the senior officers to leave the station and no DD entry was made in the concerned Police Station for arrest at Sector 22, Noida, U.P.
27. As per the prosecution case, the DD entry No.17-A dated 23.07.1995 (Ex. PW2/E) was made at 09:10 p.m. for departure and the police officers returned to the PS vide DD entry No.23-A of arrival dated 24.07.1995 (Ex. PW2/P2) on the next early morning at 3:00 a.m. In the year 1995, traffic movement between Delhi and Noida was much faster and quicker particularly during nights. We do agree that the disclosure statement Ex. PW19/B ran into six pages. There were two witnesses to this disclosure statement, i.e. SI Vipin Kumar Bhatia (PW27) and Insp. Ved Singh (PW28). Both PWs 27 and 28 were cross-examined at length on the aspect of their visit to the house of Sham Manohar (the appellant’s brother) in Sector 22, Noida. PW28 deposed that they reached house of Sham Manohar at about 10:30 p.m. He stated that apart from Sham Manohar, his wife, appellant Sat Parkash Yadav, appellant’s wife (PW23) and one Devender, (appellant’s jija) were present in the house of Sham Manohar. The witness deposed that they remained in the house of Sham Manohar till about 1:30 or 2:00 a.m. in the night and thereafter they returned to the Police Station. He stated that they returned to the PS in the night itself and then in the morning they recovered the takhat and a dari at the appellant’s instance from another place in Sector 58, Noida. No suggestion was given to PW27 that all this work was not possible in six hours.
28. To the same effect is the testimony of PW28 Inspector Ved Singh, IO of the case.
29. We are conscious of the fact that there is no independent witness to the arrest and disclosure statement of the appellant. However, this does not negate the prosecution case. Similarly, non-giving of information to the concerned Police Station at Noida regarding appellant’s arrest was a mere irregularity and it does not in any way affect the case of the prosecution adversely and we are not inclined to discard the appellant’s arrest merely on these grounds. MOTIVE30 It is not necessary to establish motive in every criminal case. It is, however, established that the appellant was arrested in a case under Section 376/377 IPC for committing rape on two sisters of PW7 and for committing sodomy on the younger brother of PW7. It is also established that the appellant had been released on interim bail for a period of three weeks in order to make arrangement for the marriage of his other daughter Jyoti. It appears that the appellant did not see any way out to get rid of the criminal case and therefore, wanted to put pressure on PW7 by lodging a false case under Section 364-A IPC against him. It is established from the testimony of PW23 that the ransom letter Ex. PW14/D was received by PW23 at the appellant’s house at Farukhabad and PW23 in turn had handed over the ransom letter to SI Ishwar Singh (PW2).
31. In normal course of events, a culprit would not mention his name in a ransom note. It is quite strange that PW7’s name was mentioned on the ransom note Ex. PW14/D which itself was sufficient to raise a suspicion that there was somebody else and not PW7 behind the ransom letter. Then the entire conduct of PW23 and the appellant in missing of their daughter Ruchi was suspicious and doubtful. It leads to an inference that the appellant and PW23 were responsible for lodging a false report regarding disappearance of their daughter Ruchi. There was a motive and desire to implicate PW7.
32. Here we would like to note a few facts. Initially, DD No.16 dated 17.08.1995 (Ex. PW15/A) was recorded about the missing of Ruchi. As per the said DD, the appellant’s daughter Ruchi was present at ISBT to catch mini bus along with her mother (PW23). PW23 left the place for a few minutes to quench her thrust. She returned to the place (where they were standing), but Ruchi went missing. PW23 had made a chance visit to ISBT and the fact was unknown to PW7. It is equally strange that no DD entry was lodged in respect of disappearance/missing of Ruchi on 16.06.1995 itself. It was only on the next afternoon at 12:45 p.m. that the appellant and PW23 came to Police Post ISBT to lodge a report. Even at this time, the appellant and PW23 did not lay any suspicion on anybody. The casual approach and puzzling and suspicious conduct of the appellant and PW23 is apparent and this clearly shows that they were not very serious in the search of their daughter. More importantly, after lodging of missing report on 17.06.1995, the appellant who was Ruchi’s father did not bother to pursue the same. After lodging the DD entry on 17.06.1995, it was only on 15.07.1995 that PW23 (Ruchi’s mother) approached the police with the ransom note. If appellant’s daughter was really missing since 16.06.1995, PW23 and the appellant would have been after the police to locate their daughter. As per prosecution, PW23 was sent to the PS along with ransom letter (purported to be written by Chander Mohan (PW7) by the appellant so that the police might not suspect the appellant. All these facts coupled with the subsequent events clearly indicate that the appellant wanted to implicate Chander Mohan (PW7) in a false case under Section 364-A IPC in order to put pressure on him to be soft in the criminal case under Section 376/377 IPC registered against the appellant by him.
33. In a criminal case where there is clear, cogent and reliable evidence, circumstantial or direct, the question of motive pales into insignificance. Normally, there is a motive behind every criminal act and if motive is established, the same lends credence and further assurance to the case of prosecution. In Subodh Nath & Anr. v. State of Tripura, (2013) 4 SCC122 it was held that motive becomes relevant as an additional circumstance in a case where the prosecution seeks to prove the guilt by circumstantial evidence only.
34. In Jarnail Singh & Anr. v. State of Haryana, 1993 Supp (3) SCC91 in para 8, the Supreme Court held as under:
“8. That is why this Court has repeatedly expressed the view that where the positive evidence against the accused is clear, cogent and reliable, the question of motive is of no importance. Reference may be made to the cases of Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab AIR1956SC460 Narayan Nathu Naik v. State of Maharashtra (1970) 2 SCC101 Pedda Narayana v. State of A.P. (1975) 4 SCC153 Faquira v. State of U.P. (1976) 1 SCC662and Molu v. State of Haryana (1976) 4 SCC362 But at the same time it must be impressed that motive behind a crime is a relevant fact and normally prosecution is expected to adduce evidence in respect thereof. Experience shows that one or other motive moves the culprit to a certain course of action. In cases where prosecution is not able to establish a motive behind the alleged crime it assumes importance especially in cases where the prosecution rests on circumstantial evidence or on witnesses who have an inimical background. Proof of motive on the part of the accused persons to commit an offence satisfies the judicial mind about the likelihood of the authoriship but in its absence it is only proper on the part of the court to have a deeper search. But if the court is satisfied that evidence adduced, oral or circumstantial, establishes the charge against the accused, the prosecution case cannot be rejected saying that there was no immediate impelling motive on the part of the accused persons to commit the crime.”
35. The learned counsel for the appellant has laid much stress on PW7’s character to urge that the witness was unworthy of reliance in as much as he levelled false allegations of incest against his own wife in a maintenance proceeding between them, on being misguided by his counsel, as admitted by him (PW7) in his cross-examination.
36. This contention is without much substance in view of the fact that it is not on PW7’s testimony that the appellant is being convicted. The main evidence against the appellant is his arrest, disclosure statement and the testimonies of PWs 16 and 17 from whom the appellant got the ransom note and the addressed envelope typed and the testimony of PW3 from whom he purchased the suitcase in which Ruchi’s dead body was found. In fact, PW7’s conduct and actions were analysed and he was not found to be involved at all. Thus, simply because some false allegations were levelled by PW7 in his defence to the maintenance petition, the appellant is not entitled to be acquitted.
37. The learned counsel for the appellant urges that PW7’s testimony that he used to send signed blank papers to his counsel was belied from the testimony of Girish Chand Saxena (DW-4). We have gone through DW-4’s testimony. Ransom note Ex. PW14/D bearing signatures purported to be of Chander Mohan were not connected with Chander Mohan. Although three blank papers purported to be signed by Chander Mohan were also recovered from the appellant’s house at Farukhabad, the same were also not proved to be actually signed by Chander Mohan (PW7) himself. What is important in this case is that a ransom note was prepared in the name of Chander Mohan (PW7) by the appellant. Since signatures of Chander Mohan (PW7) found on recovered blank papers were not positively connected to his admitted signatures, it was not proved that any blank paper purported to have been signed by Chander Mohan (PW7) allegedly given to his Advocate (DW-4) through the appellant was misused. That, however, is immaterial because typing on the envelope Ex. PW14/A and the ransom note Ex. PW14/D made by the appellant has been proved beyond all reasonable doubt.
38. The learned counsel for the appellant draws out attention to certain irregularities committed by the police. He urged that although the appellant was arrested from Noida, U.P. but he was not produced before the Ilaqa Magistrate for transit remand. He urges that the permission from the local court of Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi was also not taken to take the appellant to Farukhabad which was in violation of the police rules.
39. Normally, any person who is arrested outside the District or outside the State is produced before the Chief Judicial Magistrate/Chief Metropolitan Magistrate for obtaining the transit remand. The purpose of transit remand is to get sufficient time to produce the accused before the concerned Court within the stipulated period of 24 hours as provided under Article 22 (2) of the Constitution of India. Since the appellant could be brought to Delhi just within one hour, it was not essential to obtain transit remand from the Court of the concerned Magistrate at Noida, Gautam Budh Nagar. Similarly, no specific permission was required to make any particular recovery from Farukhabad when the appellant was in police custody.
40. The learned counsel for the appellant further points out that the testimony of PW3 is unreliable in view of the fact that in his deposition PW3 stated that the appellant purchased a grey colour suitcase from him but the suitcase in which the dead body was recovered was actually of light green colour. The contention is misconceived. Some people do not really differentiate between the similar colours. Many persons may describe a light green coloured suitcase as grey colour.
41. The learned counsel also points out that there were some discrepancies as to the actual place where the dead body was identified i.e. whether at the spot or in the Police Post IP Estate.
42. The factum of identification of the dead body by the appellant and PW23 is not in dispute. In fact, PW23, the appellant’s wife deposed that she along with her husband (the appellant) accompanied the police and she identified the dead body in PS IP Estate. Identity of the dead body and Ruchi’s homicidal death are not in dispute. The contention as to where the dead body was identified therefore loses significance.
43. We do agree that it is highly improbable that a person would commit the murder of his own daughter to get respite in some criminal case but there are people who behave differently. There are several cases where heinous crimes have been committed by one’s own near and dear ones. Simply because the appellant is Ruchi’s father, he cannot be absolved of the charge if the prosecution evidence clearly establishes the same.
44. In view of foregoing discussion, we are of the view that the prosecution case against the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302/201 IPC was fully and clearly established on the basis of circumstantial evidence which unerringly pointed out to the guilt of the appellant. It is clear that it was none other than the appellant who was responsible for this gruesome crime and the prosecution case was established beyond shadow of all reasonable doubt.
45. The appeal therefore, has to fail being devoid of any merit. The same is accordingly dismissed. (G.P. MITTAL) JUDGE (SANJIV KHANNA) JUDGE MAY13 2014 vk