IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE ANTONY DOMINIC & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN MONDAY,THE10H DAY OF FEBRUARY201421ST MAGHA, 1935 WA.No. 1444 of 2013 () ------------------------------------- (AGAINST THE JUDGMENT
IN WP(C).NO. 15295/2011 DATED2907-2013) ------------------------------------- APPELLANT(S)/2ND AND3D RESPONDENTS: ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1. THE THIRUVALLA EAST CO-OPERATIVE BANK LTD, NO.3260, H.O.ERAVIPEROOR, THIRUVALLA, REP.BY ITS GENERAL MANAGER, PIN-689 101.
2. THE MANAGING COMMITTEE, THE THIRUVALLA EAST CO-OPERATIVE BANK LTD, NO.3260,H.O.ERAVIPEROOR, THIRUVALLA-689 101, REP. BY ITS PRESIDENT. BY SRI.P.RAVINDRAN,SENIOR ADVOCATE ADV. SMT.APARNA RAJAN RESPONDENT(S)/PETITIONER/RESPONDENTS1AND4 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1. E.A.ABRAHAM,S/O.E.C.ABRAHAM, THEKKANAMALAYIL, KUNNAMTHANAM.P.O., THIRUVALLA, (FORMERLY SENIOR CLERK, THIRUVALLA EAST CO-OPERATIVE BANK LTD. NO.3260, H.O.ERAVIPEROOR, THIRUVALLA, PATHANAMTHITTA- 689 101.
2. THE JOINT REGISTRAR OF CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES (G), OFFICE OF THE JOINT REGISTRAR OF CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES, PATHANAMTHITTA, PIN-689 645.
3. THE ADMINISTRATOR, THIRUVALLA EAST CO-OPERATIVE BANK LTD. NO.3260, H.O.ERAVIPEROOR, THIRUVALLA, PIN-689 101. R1 BY ADV. SRI.R.SANJITH SRI.S.SUBHASH CHAND R2 BY SPL.GOVERNMENT PLEADER SRI.D.SOMASUNDARAM R3 BY ADV. SRI.GEORGE POONTHOTTAM THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON1002-2014,ALONG WITH W.A.NO.121 OF2014 THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: sts ANTONY DOMINIC & ANIL.K.NARENDRAN, JJ.
............................................................................. WA Nos.1444 of 2013 & 121 of 2014 ............................................................................. Dated this the 10th day of February 2014 Judgment Antony Dominic, J.
The parties to these appeals are common and therefore, these appeals are being heard together and disposed of by this common judgment.
2. WA No.1444/13 is filed by respondents 2 and 3 in WP(C) No.15295/2011 and WA No.121/14 is filed by the petitioner in WP(C) No.32168/13. The facts of the cases are as follows : The first respondent in WA No.1444/13, Sri.E.A.Abraham, who filed WP(C) No.15295/11, was a Senior Clerk in the Thiruvalla East Co-operative Bank Limited, the first appellant in the aforesaid appeal. Following certain misconducts allegedly committed by him in March 2006, he was placed under suspension, pending enquiry. An enquiry was conducted and by Ext.P2 order dated 2.3.2007 in WP(C) No.15295/13, he was WA Nos.1444/13 & 121/14 2 removed from service. By his proceedings dated 16.4.2007, the Joint Registrar rescinded the aforesaid proceedings in exercise of his power under Rule 176 of the Co-operative Societies Rules. That was challenged by the Bank before this Court in WP(C) No.12420/07 and an interim order of stay was passed in the said writ petition.
3. In the meanwhile, the appeal filed by the first respondent against Ext.P2 mentioned above was pending before the Board of Directors and that appeal was dismissed by the appellate authority by its order dated 29.06.2007. Thereupon, the first respondent, the employee filed WP(C) No.4820/08 before this Court. That writ petition was disposed of by Ext.P3 judgment dated 18.09.2008, relegating the first respondent to seek his remedy before the Arbitration Court. On the same day, WP(C) No.12420/07 was filed by the Bank, impugning the proceedings of the Joint Registrar, was dismissed as infructuous in view of the developments leading to Ext.P3 mentioned above.
4. Accordingly, the first respondent moved the Arbitration Court and by Ext.P4 award rendered on 5.12.2009, the Arbitrator set aside the proceedings and ordered his reinstatement WA Nos.1444/13 & 121/14 3 with back wages. The Bank challenged the award of the Arbitrator in an appeal filed before the Tribunal and the Tribunal, by Ext.P9 order dated 28.3.2011, dismissed the appeal. Thereupon, the Bank filed OP(C) No.2058/11 before this Court. The first respondent also approached this Court by filing WP(C) No.15295/11, seeking enforcement of Ext.P4 award.
5. By a common judgment rendered on 29.07.2013, the OP(C) and the WP(C) were disposed of. Paragraph Nos.33, 34 and 35 of the said judgment read as follows : "33. Though it could be said that some of the charges against the 1st respondent are vague, in the charge relating to preparing a so-called profit and loss account of the bank and other documents, the charge is specific. It does not require any further clarification or elaboration. In the second charge, it is alleged that even before the bank published their profit and loss account for the year ending with 31st March 2006, the 1st respondent had obtained the accounts of the bank secretly and prepared a profit and loss account by himself and published it among the share holders and depositors stating that it is the actual profit and loss account of the bank. In the said balance sheet, it is shown that the WA Nos.1444/13 & 121/14 4 bank has suffered a loss of Rs.93.72 lakhs and the same was published in several meetings among the public and especially among the customers thereby affecting the trust imposed by them on the bank. The third charge is that on 03.02.2005, he entered the bank auditorium where a joint meeting was being held between the Managing Committee members and the employees. He forcibly entered the dias and addressed the gathering exhibiting the balance sheet copies, showing that the balance sheet and profit and loss account for the year 1995-1996 which was approved by the Reserve Bank of India and Joint Registrar (Audit) was false. In Charge No.4, the allegation is that based on a false document prepared by the 1st respondent on 17.03.2006, he had convened a Dharna in front of the bank and published false documents prepared by him. These three charges substantially gives an indication that the 1st respondent has prepared certain false documents purporting it to be the balance sheet and profit and loss account of the bank. The enquiry officer in his report, has found, on the basis of evidence adduced before him that charges 1 to 6 in the first charge memo which includes WA Nos.1444/13 & 121/14 5 charges 2,3 and 4 are proved in addition to the charges levelled against the 1st respondent in the 2nd charge memo. The Arbitration Court found that the 2nd charge levelled against the 1st respondent is vague since the petitioner has not stated how the 1st respondent collected the data and prepared the profit and loss account. It is further found that it is not a profit and loss account nor a balance sheet. In respect of charge No.3, it is found that evidence of DW3 would disprove the said charge. In respect of charge No.4, it is found that the evidence of the petitioner bank does not prove the said charge. The appellant authority had considered the actions of the 1st respondent as part of Trade Union activities. True that a Trade Union leader is entitled to address the gatherings of the employees and make speeches about the mal-functioning of a society. The short question is whether such an officer of the bank could publish such materials which are available with the bank and proclaiming the same as balance sheet or the profit and loss account of the bank when the bank had not finalised the balance sheet and profit and loss account for the said year. This aspect of the matter was not considered WA Nos.1444/13 & 121/14 6 by the Arbitration Court or the Tribunal. The charges to that extent is very specific. It is not merely the addressing of gatherings that matters, it is the publication of the documents which, according to the bank, were prepared on the basis of the information the 1st respondent had while working as an officer of the bank. Such an act can be treated by any employer as a serious misconduct on the part of the employee. Therefore, I am of the view that at least charges 2, 3 and 4 in Ext.P1 memo of charges cannot be brushed aside as vague or not specific. The delinquent had understood the charges and had given replies, evidence was adduced, the evidence was considered by the enquiry officer and it is found that the charges were proved. Having found so, unless there is any perversity n the findings rendered by the enquiry officer, the Arbitration Court could not have come to a different finding. In that view of the matter, the findings in respect of the aforesaid charges are liable to be set aside and I do so.
34. In WP(C) No.15295 of 2011, the petitioner, the 1st respondent in OP(C) No.2058 of 2011 had sought for implementing the direction to reinstate him with back wages WA Nos.1444/13 & 121/14 7 and appropriate seniority. Since I am relegating the matter to the disciplinary authority for reconsideration of the disciplinary proceedings from the stage of preparation of the enquiry report in respect of charge Nos.2, 3 and 4 in Ext.P1, I am of the view that since the petitioner has remained out of service from 03.03.2006, having regard to the fact that I am relegating the matter to the disciplinary authority for taking further action, the petitioner shall be reinstated in service with 50% back wages and his entitlement for the balance back wages can be considered after the completion of the disciplinary proceedings. The bank shall start further disciplinary proceedings as stated above only after reinstatement of the petitioner and on payment of the back wages, which shall be done as early as possible and not later than fifteen days from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment.
35. Having regard to the aforesaid factual situation, I am of the view that these writ petitions can be disposed of as follows : (i) OP(C) No.2058 of 2011 is partly allowed. The findings in Ext.P15 and P17 are set aside, in respect of charges 2, 3 WA Nos.1444/13 & 121/14 8 and 4 in charge memo, Ext.P1 and it shall be open for the petitioner to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings from the stage after receiving the enquiry report." 6. WA No.1444/13 has been filed by the bank and the managing committee, respondents 2 and 3 in WP(C) No.15295/11, aggrieved by the directions in the said judgment to reinstate the first respondent and also to pay 50% of the back wages. WA No.1444/13 came up for orders before a Division Bench of this Court on 26.09.2013 when this Court stayed the order of reinstatement and payment of back wages as ordered by the learned single Judge, subject to payment of subsistence allowance to the first respondent.
7. In the meanwhile, the first respondent challenged the judgment in OP(C) No.2058/11 before the Apex Court by filing SLP(C) No.34550/13 and the said petition was dismissed by the Apex Court by order dated 29.11.2013.
8. Accordingly, as directed by the learned single Judge, a copy of the enquiry report was furnished to the 1st respondent employee and he also filed his representation against the findings of the enquiry officer. These were considered by the disciplinary WA Nos.1444/13 & 121/14 9 authority in their meeting held on 14.12.2013 and the disciplinary authority, by its order dated 15.12.2013, rejected the representation filed by the first respondent and accepted the enquiry report. He was also informed that the disciplinary committee has unanimously resolved to award him punishment of dismissal under Rule 198(h) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules and he was directed to appear before the committee on 28.12.2013 at 11 am. Producing the order dated 15.12.2013, marking it as Ext.P5, the first respondent in WA No.1444/13 filed WP(C) No.32168/13, mainly complaining that he ought to have been heard by the disciplinary committee before it resolved to reject his representation against the findings of the enquiry officer. Rejecting that contention, the learned single Judge, by Judgment dated 8.1.2014, dismissed the writ petition. It is aggrieved by this judgment, the 1st respondent, the employee, filed WA No.121/2014 wherein, this Court passed an order dated 21.1.2014, staying further proceedings in the enquiry. The enquiry is, therefore, kept in abeyance. It is at that stage, these appeals are coming up for hearing. WA Nos.1444/13 & 121/14 10 9. We heard the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants in WA No.1444/13, who are also respondents 3 and 4 in WA No.121/14 and the learned counsel for the first respondent in WA No.1444/13, who is the appellant in WA No.121/14. The learned Government Pleader appearing for the Joint Registrar was also heard.
10. The main contention raised by the Senior Counsel appearing for the Bank and the Managing Committee was that having set aside the punishment imposed, on the ground that the enquiry report was not furnished to the delinquent, the learned single Judge ought not to have directed reinstatement with payment of 50% back wages. According to the learned Senior Counsel, once the matter is remitted to the disciplinary authority, it is upto the disciplinary authority to consider whether the delinquent should be retained in service or placed under suspension and the issue of back wages is also a matter to be decided by the disciplinary authority after conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings against him, depending upon the outcome of such proceedings. WA Nos.1444/13 & 121/14 11 11. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the delinquent, the first respondent in WA No.1444/13, who is the appellant in WA No.121/14 contended that the very appeal filed by the Bank is not maintainable for the reason that the directions for reinstatement and payment of back wages were issued by the learned single Judge in his judgment in OP(C) No.2058/11 which was a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He also contended that though the Bank was entitled to proceed afresh with the disciplinary action furnishing a copy of the enquiry report to the delinquent, the disciplinary committee ought to have heard the delinquent before it took its decision on the representation submitted by the delinquent against the findings of the enquiry officer.
12. We have considered the submissions made by both sides. We shall first decide whether there is any substance in the contention raised by the delinquent that WA No.1444/13 filed by the Bank and it is Managing Committee is not maintainable. This contention is raised on the basis that the direction for reinstatement and payment of 50% back wages was issued by the learned single Judge in his Judgment in OPC No.2058/11, which is WA Nos.1444/13 & 121/14 12 a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. According to the learned counsel, if the Bank was aggrieved, the remedy available to the Bank was to move the Apex Court and not to file an intra-Court appeal before a Division Bench.
13. It is true that against a proceedings initiated under Article 227 of the Constitution, Section 5 of the High Court Act does not provide an intra-Court appeal to the Division Bench. However, the objection raised by the learned counsel for the delinquent, can be upheld only if the directions were issued by the learned single Judge in his Judgment in OPC No.2058/11.
14. We have already extracted paragraphs 33, 34 and 35 of the common judgment rendered on 29.07.2013, disposing of OP(C) No.2058/2011 and WP(C) No.15295/2011. A reading of paragraph 33 shows that the learned single Judge interfered with the findings of the Arbitration Court and the Tribunal and in paragraph 34 of the judgment, the learned single Judge has ordered continuance of the enquiry and also ordered reinstatement with payment of 50% back wages. As is evident from paragraph 34, these directions are issued not in OP(C) No.2056/11 but, in WP(C) No.15295/11. Any doubt in this respect WA Nos.1444/13 & 121/14 13 can be clarified from the manner in which paragraph 35 has been drafted, which show that the directions for reinstatement and payment of 50% back wages are in the judgment in WPCNo.15295/11/. Therefore, having gone through paragraph nos.33 to 36 of the common judgment, we are clear in our mind that the directions, which gave rise to WA No.1444/13 were issued by the learned single Judge in his judgment in WP(C)No.15295/11. Consequently, we hold that there is no merit in the aforesaid objection raised by the delinquent and the objection is overruled.
15. Insofar as WA No.1444/13 is concerned, we have already stated about the grievance of the bank is confined to the order for reinstatement and payment of 50% back wages to the delinquent for the continuance of the disciplinary proceedings. The question as to what are the consequential directions, which can be issued by a Court or Tribunal on invalidating an order of punishment in a disciplinary action for not furnishing the enquiry report to the delinquent, has been answered by the Apex Court itself in its decision in Managing Director, ECIL v. B.Karunakar (1993) 4 SCC727 wherein the relevant principles have been summarised in paragraph 31, which reads thus : WA Nos.1444/13 & 121/14 14 "Hence, in all cases, where the enquiry officer's report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings, the Courts and Tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before coming to the Court/Tribunal and give the employee an opportunity to show how his or her case was prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report. If after hearing the parties, the Court/Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the Court/Tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment. The Court/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The courts should avoid resorting to short cuts. Since it is the Courts/Tribunals which will apply their judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishment (and not any internal appellate or revisional authority) there would be neither a breach of the principles of natural justice nor a denial of the WA Nos.1444/13 & 121/14 15 reasonable opportunity. It is only if the Court/Tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment. Where after following the above procedure, the Court/Tribunal sets aside the order of punishment, the proper relief that should be granted is to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the authority/management to proceed with the inquiry, by placing the employee under suspension and continuing the inquiry from the stage of furnishing him with the report. The question whether the employee would be entitled to the back wages and other benefits from the date of his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement if ultimately ordered, should invariably be left to be decided by the authority concerned according to law, after the culmination of the proceedings and depending on the final outcome. If the employee succeeds in the fresh inquiry and is directed to be reinstated, the authority should be at liberty to decide according to law how it will treat the period from the date of dismissal till the reinstatement and to what benefits, if any and the extent of the benefits, he will be entitled. The WA Nos.1444/13 & 121/14 16 reinstatement made as a result of the setting aside of the inquiry for failure to furnish the report, should be treated as a reinstatement for the purpose of holding the fresh inquiry from the stage of furnishing the report and no more, where such fresh inquiry is held. That will also be the correct position in law." These principles have been again followed by the Apex Court in Coal India Limited v. Ananta Saha (2011) 5 SCC142 where, in paragraph 48 to 50, the Apex Court has held thus : "48. In ECIL v. B.Karunakar and Union of India v. Y.S.Sadhu, this Court held that where the punishment awarded by the disciplinary authority is quashed by the court/tribunal on some technical ground, the authority must be given an opportunity to conduct the enquiry afresh from the stage where it stood before the alleged vulnerability surfaced. However, for the purpose of holding fresh enquiry, the delinquent is to be reinstated and may be put under suspension. The question of back wages, etc. is determined by the disciplinary authority in accordance with law after the fresh enquiry is concluded.
49. The issue of entitlement of back wages has been WA Nos.1444/13 & 121/14 17 considered by this Court time and again and consistently held that even after punishment imposed upon employee is quashed by the court or tribunal, the payment of back wages still remains discretionary. Power to grant back wages is to be exercised by the court/tribunal keeping in view the facts in their entirety as no straitjacket formula can be evolved, nor a rule of universal application can automatically make him entitled to back wages as entitlement to get back wages is independent of reinstatement. The factual scenario and the principles of justice, equity and good conscience have to be kept in view by an appropriate authority/court or tribunal. In such matters, the approach of the court or the tribunal should not be rigid or mechanical but flexible and realistic. (Vide UPSRTC v. Mitthu Singh, Akola Taluka Education Society v. Shivaji and Balasaheb Desai Sahakari S.K.Ltd. v. Kashinath Ganapati Kambale.
50. In view of the above, the relief sought by the delinquent that the appellants be directed to pay the arrears of back wages from the date of first termination order till date, cannot be entertained and is hereby rejected. In case the WA Nos.1444/13 & 121/14 18 appellants choose to hold a fresh enquiry, they are bound to reinstate the delinquent and in case he is put under suspension, he shall be entitled to subsistence allowance till the conclusion of the enquiry. All other entitlements would be determined by the disciplinary authority as explained hereinabove after the conclusion of the enquiry. With these observations, the appeal stands disposed of. No costs." The Principles laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid two judgments would make it clear that once the order of punishment is set aside, the course open to the court is to direct reinstatement with liberty to the disciplinary authority to proceed with the enquiry either keeping the delinquent in service or by placing him under suspension. The question whether the employee would be entitled to back wages should be left to be decided by the authority concerned after the culmination of the proceedings and depending upon the final outcome. If the delinquent succeeds in the fresh round of proceedings and he is ordered to be reinstated, then also, the disciplinary authority should decide in accordance with law as to what benefits and also the extent of benefits that he will WA Nos.1444/13 & 121/14 19 be entitled to.
16. In this case, since the learned single Judge has set aside the order of dismissal, the delinquent is entitled to be reinstated in service as held by the Apex Court in the judgments mentioned above. This shall, however, be without prejudice to the right of the disciplinary authority to decide whether to retain him in service or place him under suspension, pending completion of the disciplinary action. Insofar as the monetary benefits are concerned, that also is a matter to be decided by the disciplinary authority once the fresh proceedings are concluded. Therefore, it was premature for the learned single Judge to have ordered payment of 50% back wages while remitting the matter to the disciplinary authority to proceed afresh. Therefore, the direction in the judgment in WP(C) No.15295/11 to pay 50% back wages for the continuance of the disciplinary proceedings afresh cannot be sustained and has to be vacated.
17. Insofar as WA No.121/14 is concerned, by Ext.P5 order in WP(C)No.32168/13, the disciplinary authority has rejected the representation filed by the delinquent against the findings of the enquiry officer. The challenge raised against Exhibit WA Nos.1444/13 & 121/14 20 P5 was on the ground that the order was passed without affording an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent. According to the counsel for the delinquent, the appellant in this appeal, such a right has been recognised as part of the principles of natural justice and he made detailed reference to the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the judgment in Managing Director, ECIL, v. B.Karunakar (1993(4) SCC727.
18. Having considered the submissions made by the learned counsel and in the light of the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Karunakar's case(supra), we are unable to accept the contention urged. In the said judgment, though the right of the delinquent to represent against the findings of an Enquiry Officer in cases where the enquiry is held by an authority other than the disciplinary authority has been recognised, the Apex Court has not held that the delinquent is entitled to any hearing before the disciplinary authority takes a decision on the representation made by him. This is evident from paragraph 63 of the judgment, where the Apex Court has held thus: "63. The emerging effect of our holding that the delinquent is entitled to the supply of the copy of WA Nos.1444/13 & 121/14 21 the report would generate yearning for hearing before deciding on proof of charge or penalty which Forty-second Amendment Act had advisedly avoided. So while interpreting Article 311(2) or relevant rule the court/tribunal should make no attempt to bring on the rail by back track the opportunity of hearing as was portended by the Gujarat High Court. The attempt must be nailed squarely. Prior to the Forty-second Amendment Act the delinquent had no right of hearing before disciplinary authority either on proof of charge or penalty. So after Forty-second Amendment Act it would not be put on higher pedestal. The Gujarat High Court's decision is, therefore, not good law. However, the disciplinary authority has an objective duty and adjudicatory responsibility to consider and impose proper penalty consistent with the magnitude or the gravity of the misconduct. The statute or statutory rules gave graded power and authority to the disciplinary authority to impose either of the penalties enumerated in the relevant provisions. It is not necessarily the maximum or the minimum. Based on the facts, circumstances, the nature of imputation, the gravity of misconduct, the indelible effect or impact on the discipline or WA Nos.1444/13 & 121/14 22 morale of the employees, the previous record or conduct of the delinquent and the severity to which the delinquent will be subjected to, may be some of the factors to be considered. They cannot be eulogised but could be visualised. Each case must be considered in the light of its own scenario. Therefore, a duty and responsibility has been cast on the disciplinary authority to weigh the pros and cons, consider the case and impose appropriate punishment. In a given case if the penalty was proved to be disproportionate or there is no case even to find the charges proved of the charges are based on no evidence, that would be for the court/the tribunal to consider on merits, not as court of appeal, but within its parameters of supervisory jurisdiction and to give appropriate relief. But this would not be a ground to extend hearing at the stage of consideration by the disciplinary authority either on proof of the charge or on imposition of the penalty. I respectfully agree with my brother Sawant, J.
in other respects in the draft judgment proposed by him." Therefore, in the light of the aforesaid principles laid down by the Apex Court, Writ Appeal No.121/2014 filed by the delinquent WA Nos.1444/13 & 121/14 23 against the dismissal of W.P.(C)No.32168/2013 filed by him deserves to be dismissed and we do so. In the result, W.A.No.1444/13 is disposed of setting aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)No.15295/11 to the extent it orders payment of 50% of backwages to the 1st respondent-delinquent for continuance of the enquiry against him from the stage of furnishing enquiry report. We direct the disciplinary authority to reinstate the delinquent in service and decide as to whether he should be retained in service or placed under suspension, pending completion of the disciplinary proceedings. On conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings and depending upon the outcome thereof, the disciplinary authority will also take a decision on the monetary benefits that are payable to the delinquent. W.A.No.121/14 filed by the delinquent against the dismissal of W.P.(C)No.32168/13 filed by him will stand dismissed. ANTONY DOMINIC, JUDGE ANIL.K.NARENDRAN, JUDGE sta/dsn WA Nos.1444/13 & 121/14 24 WA Nos.1444/13 & 121/14 25