1. These appeals are being disposed of by this common judgment for the reasons that parties to both these appeals are same and the challenges underlying the disputes involved in these appeals are in their form and substance, similar.
2. The appellants and respondents in both the appeals are the original plaintiffs and defendants in the two suits that were filed before and decided by the Courts below. For the sake of convenience, the appellants are being refererred to as plaintiffs and the respondents the defendants. It may be mentioned here, respondent No.2 (defendant No.2) in each of the appeals, having died during the pendency of the appeals, has been deleted as party-respondent No.2 as per the orders passed by this Court.
3. Second appeal No. 328 of 1994 is directed against the judgment, order and decree dated 30/6/1994 rendered in Regular Civil Appeal No. 171 of 1985 thereby reversing the judgment and decree of the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Chikhali passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 232 of 1983 on 20/4/1985. Second appeal No. 90 of 2009 has been preferred against the judgment, order and decree passed on 18/11/1997 in Regular Civil Appeal No. 18 of 1994 by 2nd Additional District Judge, Buldana thereby confirming the judgment, order and decree passed on 27/12/1993 by Civil Judge, Junior Division, Chikhali in Regular Civil Suit No. 74 of 1986. In short, both these appeals arise from the disputes as originally involved in Regular Civil Suit Nos. 232 of 1983 and 74 of 1986 prosecuted in between the same parties. The challenges underlying the disputes in both the suits are identical and the only difference in between these two suits is a difference between dates of two sale transactions. In Regular Civil Suit No. 232 of 1983 sale deed executed by deceased defendant No.2 in favour of defendant No.1 on 29/3/1982 has been challenged, whereas, in Regular Civil Suit No. 74 of 1986, sale deed executed by deceased defendant No.2 in favour of defendant No.1 on 22/4/1983 has been challenged. Both these sale deeds relate to portions of an agricultural land from out of land bearing gat No.95 admeasuring 2.44 H.R. (6.02 acres) situated at village Eklara, tahsil Chikhali, district Buldana.
4. It was the case of the plaintiffs that plaintiff No.1 Parvati and plaintiffs No. 2 and 3 â Dnyandeo and Vandana, were the wife and children of deceased defendant No.2. The suits were filed by plaintiff No.1 Parvati on behalf of herself and as a guardian of plaintiffs No. 2 and 3, who were then minors, against defendant No.1 Sk. Rasul and her own husband Vishwanath, deceased defendant No.2. She had contended that plaintiffs and defendant No.2 constituted a joint Hindu family governed by Mitakshara Law and that the agricultural land bearing Gat No. 95 (new Gat No.2), field Survey No.76 admeasuring 2.41 H.R. situated at village Eklara, was ancestral property, which fell to the share of deceased defendant No.2 in an oral partition amongst deceased defendant No.2, his father, Balaji, and his brothers namely, Digambar and Jagannath, in the year 1974. She had further submitted that since then, her husband-deceased defendant No.2, became the owner in possession of agricultural land bearing Gat No.95 admeasuring 2.44 H.R. and plaintiff No.1 being wife and plaintiffs No. 2 and 3 being children of defendant No.2 also acquired right, title and interest, as members of the joint Hindu family headed by deceased defendant No.2. According to plaintiff No.1, agricultural land bearing Gat No.95 being the joint family property of the joint Hindu family comprising the plaintiffs and defendant No.2, defendant No.2 was not competent to alienate the suit land or any portion thereof in favour of defendant No.1. The plaintiffs submitted that defendant No.2, by cultivating the said agricultural land, was deriving sufficient income to maintain his family and also meet agricultural expenses and that there was no legal necessity for him to alienate the said land or any portion thereof. The plaintiffs submitted that since about year 1980, deceased defendant No.2 fell into bad company, defendant No.1 Sk. Rasul being one of them, and developed vice of drinking liquor. The plaintiffs submitted that taking advantage of the drinking habit of deceased defendant No.2, defendant No.1 allured defendant No.2 to transfer to him portions of the agricultural land bearing gat No.95 on two occasions, firstly, in the year 1982 to the extent of 2.10 acres and secondly in the year 1983, to the extent of 2.02 acres. The plaintiffs submitted that these alienations made by deceased defendant No.2 in favour of defendant No.1 were not for meeting any legal necessity but simply for fulfilling the thirst of defendant No.2 for liquor. The plaintiffs also contended that even though, the sale deed dated 29/3/1982 executed in respect of the portion of the agricultural land from out of Gat No.95 to the extent of 2.10 acres (hereinafter referred to as 'the suit land No.1') was apparently for a consideration of amount of Rs.4,500/, and sale deed executed on 22/4/1983 in respect of another portion of land from out of Gat No.95 to the extent of 2.02 acres (hereinafter referred to as 'the suit land No.2') was apparently for a consideration of Rs.4,000/, the fact was that no consideration amounts whatsoever were paid by defendant No.1 to defendant No.2. The plaintiffs also submitted that the market prices of both the suit lands were much more than what was shown in the sale deeds of 29/3/1982 and 22/4/1983, the suit lands being fertile. The plaintiffs also challenged the said transfer of suit lands on some legal grounds as well. However, those grounds being not relevant for the purpose of deciding these appeals, no reference is being made to them. On these grounds, it was urged that said sale deeds were illegal and not binding on the plaintiffs. Accordingly, these suits, Regular Civil Suit No. 232 of 1983 and Regular Civil Suit No. 74 of 1986 for declaration, recovery of possession and mesne profits came to be filed against the defendants.
5. Defendant No.1 resisted both the suits and denied that defendant No.2 was in sound financial position and that the suit lands No.1 and No.2 were not sold for any legal necessity. He also denied the contention that deceased defendant No.2 fell into bad company and that he sold the suit lands No.1 and No.2 in order to beat his thirst for liquor. He submitted that he did not take any undue advantage of the alleged vice of deceased defendant No.2 and that the suit lands were sold to him by defendant No.2 to meet agricultural expenses and to repay the debt of a society. He denied the allegation that the sale deeds of suit lands No.1 and No.2 were illegal and void and not binding upon the plaintiffs. He submitted that the sale deeds were valid and that he was a bona fide purchaser for value of the suit lands No.1 and No.2 and, therefore, the sale deeds were binding upon the plaintiffs and defendant No.2.
6. Defendant No.2 resisted Regular Civil Suit No.232 of 1983 contending that he had sold suit land No.1 for consideration of Rs.4,500/to defendant No.1 because he was in need of money to meet agricultural expenses and also for repayment of loan which he had taken from Gramseva Sahakari Society, Eklara. In short, he contended that the sale deed of suit land No.1 was executed by him for legal necessity and for meeting his necessary expenses. Thus, defendant No.2 supported the claim of defendant No.1, denying all allegations of the plaintiffs adverse to him. But, he took a different stand in Regular Civil Suit No. 74 of 1986. Unlike the first suit, he admitted the entire claim of plaintiffs by filing his written statement vide Exh.19.
7. So far as concerned the Regular Civil Suit No. 232 of 1983, the learned trial Judge, by his judgment, order and decree dated 20/4/1985 substantially decreed the suit. It was declared that sale deed dated 29/3/1982 (Exh.82) of suit land No.1 was null and void and not binding on the plaintiffs and that defendant No.2 had no right to sell the suit land No.1 to defendant No.1. Defendant No.1 was directed to handover possession of suit land No.1 to the plaintiffs within one month from the date of order. Defendant No.1 was also restrained from interfering with and obstructing the possession of the plaintiffs over suit land No.1. Damages or mesne profits, however, were not granted.
8. In the first appeal preferred against this judgment and decree, learned Additional District Judge, however, reversed some of the findings recorded by the trial Court by his judgment, order and decree dated 30/6/1994. The most important of the findings recorded by him related to the validity of the sale deed dated 29/3/1982. The first appellate Court found that defendant No.1 proved that deceased defendant No.2 had sold suit land No.1 to him for legal necessity and, therefore, the sale deed dated 29/3/1982 was valid and binding upon the plaintiffs. Accordingly, the learned Additional District Judge dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs with costs. The plaintiffs had also filed cross-objection against denial of mesne profits to them, but they were dismissed with costs by the learned Additional District Judge. Second Appeal No.328 of 1994 is preferred against this judgment and decree.
9. So far as concerned the Regular Civil Suit No.74 of 1986, the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division by his judgment, order and decree delivered on 27/12/1993, found that defendant No.1 was a bona fide purchaser of suit land No.2 for value and that the sale deed dated 22/4/1983 of suit land No.2 was proved by defendant No.1 to have been executed for legal necessity of the joint family of plaintiffs and defendant No.2 and thus, dismissed the suit. In the first appeal that was preferred against this judgment and decree, learned Additional District Judge, Buldana, by his judgment, order and decree dated 18/11/1997, reversed the finding of the trial Court on the point of legal necessity but, found that the suit not having been filed for partition and separate possession, and having been filed only for recovery of possession of the entire land, was not maintainable. On this ground, learned Additional District Judge dismissed the appeal of the plaintiffs. Second appeal No.90 of 2009 is directed against this judgment and decree.
10. Second appeal No.328 of 1994 has been admitted by this Court on 21/9/1995 on the following substantial questions of law:
(1) Whether the appellate Court was right in completely ignoring the admissions of D.W.Vishwanath regarding his drunkenness?
(2) What is the effect of wrong placement of burden of proof regarding legal necessity?
11. Second appeal No. 90 of 2009 was admitted by this Court by its order passed on 24/7/2009 on the substantial questions No.1 and 2 of appeal memo, which questions were reformulated by this Court on 04/9/2013 in such a way as to form one question as under:
Whether the suit filed by the appellant claiming reliefs of the declaration and possession without claiming the reliefs of partition and separate possession in respect of the suit land, was maintainable?
12. I have heard Shri Kavimandan, learned Counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs in Second Appeal No. 328 of 1994, Shri R. L. Khapre, learned Counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs in Second Appeal No. 90 of 2009 and Shri O. W. Gupta, learned Counsel for respondent/defendant No.1 in both the appeals. I have also, with the assistance of learned Counsel for both the sides, gone through the appeal memos and paper books of these appeals and also the record of Regular Civil Suit No. 232 of 1983.
13. Learned Counsel for the appellants in Second Appeal No. 328 of 1994 has invited my attention to some of the admissions given by deceased defendant No.2, Vishwanath (Exh.78), when he examined himself as a witness on his behalf before the trial Court in Regular Civil Suit No. 232 of 1983. These admissions have appeared in cross-examination of deceased defendant No.2 taken on behalf of the plaintiffs. Shri Kavimandan, learned Counsel submits that these admissions, together with the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case go to the root of the whole case and, therefore, should not have been ignored by the first appellate Court. He further submits that in fact, such being the importance of these admissions, the trial Court in Regular Civil Suit No. 232 of 1983 has rightly given importance due to them and accordingly drew right conclusion in holding that there was no legal necessity for deceased defendant No.2 to alienate suit land No.1 to defendant No.1. Shri Gupta, learned Counsel for respondent No.1/defendant No.1 submits that in the examination-in-chief itself, deceased defendant No.2 has stated in clear words that he had sold suit land No.1 to defendant No.1 for consideration of Rs.4,500/for the reason that he was in need of money for paying debts of Bank and, therefore, the first appellate Court was right in holding that this evidence together with the specific contentions taken in written statement filed by deceased defendant No.2 sufficiently demonstrated the fact that there was passing over of the consideration from defendant No.1 to defendant No.2 and that the sale of suit land No.1 was for meeting legal necessity of the joint family of the plaintiffs and defendant No.2.
14. In this case the finding regarding absence of legal necessity for execution of the sale deed in respect of suit land No.1 recorded by the trial Court has been reversed by the first appellate Court, even though there were on record some admissions of deceased defendant No.2. Therefore, it will have to be seen whether or not this finding of the first appellate Court is perverse and in ignorance of material evidence available on record.
15. It is well settled law that in second appeal, it is not permissible to reverse a finding of fact simply because in the opinion of the second appellate Court, another view is possible upon appreciation of evidence. It is equally well settled that when the finding of fact recorded by any Court below is shown to be perverse or against the material evidence on record or is based upon non consideration of some material evidence or is the result of consideration of inadmissible evidence, a substantial question of law arises warranting it's appropriate address by High Court in second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. In this regard, I would like to draw support from the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Gurvachan Kaur and others Vs. Salikram (dead) through lrs. reported in (2010) 15 SCC 530 and Mohan Singh Vs. Late Amar Singh through lrs. reported in (1998) 6 SCC 686.
16. In the instant case, it can be seen from perusal of record of case that the finding of fact regarding absence of legal necessity returned by trial Court is the result of elaborate consideration of the evidence brought on record by both the sides and particularly the admissions given by deceased defendant No.2 in his cross-examination taken on behalf of the plaintiffs. While doing so, the trial judge had also considered the background facts and circumstances of the case. However, this finding of the trial Court has been reversed by the appellate Court and it appears that the appellate Court only relied upon the statements of deceased defendant No.2 as appearing in his examination-in-chief and also his specific contentions raised in his written statement. The appellate Court did not consider the other attending facts and circumstances of the case and also ignored the admissions given by deceased defendant No.2 in his cross-examination taken on behalf of the plaintiffs. The first appellate Court ought to have considered the statements in cross-examination as well, for, when a Court considers oral evidence, it must consider all the statements made in the examination-in-chief, cross-examination and reexamination, if any, and not a few of them selectively.
It is a different matter that the Court accepts or rejects all or some of the statements as being reliable or unreliable, as the case may be, but must it consider them all. The reason is that under Section 3, Indian Evidence Act, 1872, oral evidence means and includes all statements permitted or required to be made before the Courts in relation to matters of fact under inquiry. When it is said that Court is under a legal duty to consider oral evidence, it must consider all statements in examination-in-chief as well as cross-examination of the witness in view of well defined meaning of 'oral evidence' under Section 3, Indian Evidence Act, 1872. This has not been done in this case and, therefore, it must be said that the whole process of scrutiny of evidence available on record and particularly the evidence of deceased defendant No.2 undertaken by the first appellate Court, in the facts and circumstances of this case, was flawed and also perverse.
17. No doubt, deceased defendant No.2 in his written statement had contended that since he was in need of money for agricultural purposes and also for repayment of loan, which he had taken from the Society, he had sold suit land No.1 to defendant No.1 for consideration of Rs.4,500/and that he had also received the said consideration amount. In his deposition before the trial Court vide Exh.78, deceased defendant No.2 initially also stated that he had sold suit land No.1 for consideration of Rs.4,500/to defendant No.1 because he was in need of money for paying the debts of the Bank. But, later on, when he was cross-examined thoroughly by learned Counsel for the plaintiffs, he gave certain important admissions. He stated that there was no necessity for him to sell suit land No.1 to defendant No.1 as his financial position was good and that defendant No.1 got executed from him the sale deed (Exh.82) when he was under the influence of liquor. He further admitted that he used to consume every day liquor to the extent of 100 ml.
18. Aforestated admissions were required to be considered by both the Courts below very minutely also for the reason, apart from legal reasons, that it was the case of the plaintiffs that financial condition of the joint family of plaintiffs and defendant No.2 was good and there being no legal necessity existing for sale of suit land No.1, the transfer of suit land No.1 by defendant No.2 to defendant No.1 was not legal and binding upon the plaintiffs. The evidence led by the plaintiffs' side had also sufficiently established the fact that defendant No.2 was a spoilt man, who wasted his time, energy and property on liquor.
19. The trial Court with such nature of the case and evidence on record indeed scrutinized the said admissions of deceased defendant No.2 threadbare under a magnifying glass, when it found that these admissions received much support from the other attending facts and circumstances of the case. The trial Court particularly found that the sale deed of suit land No.1 vide Exh.82 was a registered document and as such had its own importance in the eyes of law. It found that nowhere in the body of the sale deed at Exh.82 was there any mention about the fact that defendant No.2 had sold the suit land to defendant No.1 to meet any legal necessity of his joint family or for making payment of outstanding loan amount of the society. There were no recitals to this effect in the sale deed and, therefore, the afore stated admissions given by deceased defendant No.2 assumed great importance.
20. Apart from the above referred facts, there have been other facts and circumstances worth mentioning here. Suit land No.1 was transferred by defendant No.2 to defendant No.1 in March, 1982 when, the evidence on record, particularly that of P.W.2 Pralhad (Exh.53) showed that no notice demanding repayment of loan by the society had been issued to deceased defendant No.2. P.W.2 Pralhad was, at the relevant time, working as Group Secretary of the Society of which deceased defendant No.2 was member and he had taken from it a loan of Rs.1,000/. A demand notice to deceased defendant No.2 was issued by the Society on 16/12/1982, whereas, the alienation took place on 29/3/1982. That means, at that time, there was no dire need for defendant No.2 to sell suit land No.1 to anybody much less the defendant No.1. Then, there was also evidence of plaintiffs' witnesses, who in unison, had stated about drinking habit of deceased defendant No.2 and absence of any legal necessity for him to sell suit land No.1 to defendant No.1. These pieces of evidence together provided a supporting background to the admissions given by deceased defendant No.2 in his evidence vide Exh.78 and which have been discussed earlier.
21. In the light of the facts and circumstances noted above and also the law governing oral evidence, the admissions given by deceased defendant No.2 ought to have been considered by the Courts below and one of them, the trial Courts did consider them, as already stated, and it held that they together with other evidence available on record, proved the fact that there was no legal necessity for defendant No.2 to sell suit land No.1 to defendant No.1. But, the first appellate Court ignored these admissions completely and held that except for words of plaintiffs' witnesses, there was nothing on record to show that, in fact, defendant No.1 was enslaved by bad habit of drinking. It held that merely on the words of interested witnesses, it cannot be held that plaintiffs proved their case that defendant No.2 sold his land to satisfy his craving for drining. These findings recorded by the first appellate Court are obviously perverse, being in ignorance of very important pieces of evidence or record. They are the result of non-consideration of the overwhelming evidence available in favour of good financial position of defendant No.2 and absence of legal necessity for defendant No.2 to sell suit land No.1 at the relevant time and thus perverse, warranting interference with them.
22. In view of the above discussion, I find that the appellate Court was not right in completely ignoring the admissions given by defendant No.2 Vishwanath regarding his drunkenness. These admissions together with other evidence available on record, sufficiently indicated that the sale deed in question vide Exh.82 had been executed by deceased defendant No.2 in favour of defendant No.1 only to quench his thirst for liquor and that there was no legal necessity for him to alienate suit land No.1. The first substantial question of law in Second Appeal No.328 of 1994 is, therefore, answered as in the negative.
23. There is also second substantial question of law in Second Appeal No.328 of 1994. It relates to the effect of wrong placement of burden of proof regarding legal necessity. However, it is seen from the judgments of both the Courts below that burden of proof regarding legal necessity has been placed by these Courts upon defendant No.1 and rightly so. There is no wrong placement of burden of proof in this regard. Therefore, I find that no substantial question of law on this aspect of the case arises in Second Appeal No.328 of 1994. However, learned Counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs has referred to me the case of Joseph John Peter Sandy Vs. Veronica Thomas Rajkumar and another reported at AIR 2013 S.C. 2028 in support of his argument that when execution of document is denied, onus lies on propounder of the document. In this case, defendant No.1 was the propounder of document, the sale deed (Exh.82), when he pleaded that it was duly executed and for legal necessity. The burden regarding proof of legal necessity, it is seen from the impugned judgments and decrees, has been placed on defendant No.1 by both the Courts below, and rightly so. Therefore, it must be stated that the principle of law laid down in the cited case is already followed in the instant matter. Hence, second substantial question of law is answered in terms that it does not arise in Second Appeal No. 328 of 1994.
24. In Second Appeal No. 90 of 2009, the only substantial question of law framed relates to maintainability of the suit bearing Regular Civil Suit No. 74 of 1986 filed by the appellants/plaintiffs against defendant No.1 and deceased defendant No.2.
25. The trial Court, while dismissing Regular Civil Suit No. 74 of 1986, found that the sale deed executed on 22/4/1983 (Exh.41) in respect of suit land No.2 was for legal necessity of joint Hindu family of plaintiffs and defendant No.2 and that it was binding on the plaintiffs. It also observed in para 23 of its judgment that âIn (sicwhen) the alienation made by manager of the joint family is challenged by other coparcener, then in such circumstances, as per the provision of article 268 of Hindu Law, a suit for partition and separate possession is required to be filedâ. It then went on to hold that since the suit was filed by the appellants/plaintiffs only for declaration and possession, plaintiffs, âin the light of aforesaid provision of Hindu Lawâ ought to have filed a suit for partition and separate possession.
26. The first appellate Court, however, did not agree with the finding recorded by the trial Court as regards presence of legal necessity for alienation of suit land No.2. The first appellate Court found that the alienation of suit land No.2 was done during the pendency of the first suit bearing Regular Civil Suit No. 232 of 1983 and, therefore, it was not possible to accept the contention of defendant No.1 as probable that he purchased suit land No.2 from defendant No.2 with consent of plaintiff No.1. The first appellate Court also reasoned that defendant No.1 had not pleaded in his written statement that defendant No.2 alienated suit land No. 2 in his favour for legal necessity, that at least he made enquiry about legal necessity of defendant No.2, and that the loan of Rs.1,000/from the Society had been obtained only once by defendant No.2 in the year 198182, and, accordingly held that there was no substance in the theory propounded by defendant No.1 that legal necessity did exist for defendant No.2 to alienate the suit land No.2 to him. Thus, holding that the observations of the trial Court in this regard being improper and unconvincing, the first appellate Court found that defendant No.1 failed to prove that defendant No.2 alienated the suit land in his favour on 22/4/1983 for any legal necessity. After finding this, the first appellate court went on to record another finding that the sale deed (Exh.41) to the extent of shares of plaintiffs could be declared as ineffective, provided, plaintiffs filed the suit for partition and separate possession. The first appellate Court further found that since the plaintiffs filed suit for recovery of possession of the entire land, the suit was not maintainable and thus dismissed the appeal of the appellants/plaintiffs. In effect, the first appellate Court confirmed the decree of dismissal of suit passed by trial Court.
27. Both the Courts below while holding that the suit, filed in the form in which it was filed by the appellants/plaintiffs, was not maintainable, took recourse to a ground, as already stated, that the appellants/plaintiffs, in addition to declaration that the sale deed in question was void, ought to have filed the suit for partition and separate possession. The trial Court made a reference to Article 268 of the Principles of Hindu Law. In fact, Article 268 of the Principles of Hindu Law by Mulla (Twentieth Edition, Vol I â page 483) states that, âWhere an alienation is made by a coparcener in excess of his powers, it may be set aside to the extent mentioned in Articles 268 and 269, at the instance of any other coparcener, who was in existence at the time of the completion of the alienation. It may also be set aside at the instance of any coparcener who, though born subsequent to the date of alienation, was in his mother's womb at the date of alienation; the reason is that under the Hindu Law a son conceived is, in many respects, equal to a son born.â There are some illustrations appearing in Article 268 and, in general, they indicate that whenever karta or manager of a joint Hindu family alienates the joint family property on the ground of legal necessity, the other coparceners or members of a joint family covered by Mitakshara law, are entitled to challenge the validity of the alienation on the ground that it was made without legal necessity. Article 269 of the Principles of Hindu Law relates to commencement of the period of limitation for setting aside alienation by father of a joint family property, which is 12 years from the date when the alienee takes possession of the property.
28. The Article 268 does not show that other members of joint family seeking to challenge validity of alienation made by karta of joint family on the ground of legal necessity, must file a civil suit for partition and separate possession. In fact, all the members of a Hindu joint family have an undivided interest in the joint family property and, therefore, when karta of such a joint family alienates the entire joint family property or even a portion thereof on the ground of legal necessity, which is not there, other coparceners or members of joint family can very well challenge such an alienation entirely on the ground that there is no legal necessity for sale of the joint family property. I am supported in my view by the law laid down by Privy Council in the case of Lachhman Prasad and others Vs. Sarnam Singh and others A.I.R. 1917 Privy Council 41 wherein it held that alienation in the nature of mortgage by the manager (father) neither for discharging antecedent debt nor for family necessity is void in toto and cannot in the absence of special circumstances bind over the share of the manager (father) which he may get on partition. The Privy Council in laying down the decision followed the general law stated in the case of Madhao Parshad Vs. Mehrban Singh (1890) 18 Cal.157. Relevant observations of Privy Council appearing on pages 41 and 42 are reproduced thus:
â.....The General law is quite plainly laid down by Lord Watson in delivering the judgment of this Board in the case of Madho Parshad v. Mehrban Singh (2) where he says, at page 196, this:-
âAny one of several members of a joint family is entitled to require partition of ancestral property, and his demand to that effect if it be not complied with, can be enforced by legal process. So long as his interest is indefinite, he is not in a position to dispose of it at his own hand and for, his own purposes; but as soon as partition is made, he becomes the sole owner of his share, and has the same powers of disposal as if it had been his acquired property. The actual partition is not in all cases essential. An agreement by members of an undivided family to hold the joint property individually in definite shares, or the attachment of a member's undivided share in execution of a decree at the instance of his creditor, will be regarded as sufficient to support the alienation of a member's interest in the estate of a sale under the execution.â
Therefore, other coparceners seeking to challenge alienation in it's entirety on the ground of it being made without legal necessity need not file a suit for partition and separate possession, such alienation being void in toto. If any such suit for partition and separate possession was to be filed, it should have been by defendant No.1 as he, being the purchaser of coparcener's (deceased defendant No.2) undivided interest in joint family property, was not entitled to possession of what he had purchased without effecting of partition. Law in this regard is stated by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.V.S. Manikayala Rao Vs. M. Narasimhaswami and others, reported in AIR 1966 S.C. 470. In para 5, page 473, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed thus:
â...Now, it is well settled that the purchaser of a coparcener's undivided interest in joint family property is not entitled to possession of what he has purchased. His only right is to sue for partition of the property and ask for allotment to him of what which on partition might be found to fall to the share of the coparcener whose share he had purchased. His right to possession âwould date from the period when a specific allotment was made in his favourâ: Sidheshwar Mukherjee v. Bhubneshwar Prasad Narain Singh, 1954 SCR 177 at p. 188: (AIR 1953 SC 487 at p.491)...â
This case, in fact, has been referred to me by learned Counsel for respondent No.1 (defendant No.1). But, it lends no support to the case of defendant No.1, rather goes against him.
29. There is another reason why the suit in the present form without claiming reliefs of partition and possession by other coparceners is maintainable. It is the choice of the coparceners to decide as to when they would like to put on end to their status of jointness and be separate in property. In law, coparceners cannot be forced to file a suit for partition and separate possession, though a purchaser of coparcener's undivided interest can file a suit for partition and possession, and, that is also for a limited purpose of putting into his possession that which on partition might be found to fall to the share of the coparcener whose share he had purchased. At this juncture, it would be very relevant to state that intention of plaintiffs and deceased defendant No.2, as revealed by evidence on record, was also to stay joint in property. So, in the absence of any law compelling them to file a suit for partition and possession in such a case, the plaintiffs could not have been asked to shed their intention to maintain jointness of the property. Therefore, suit as filed in the present form was and is maintainable.
30. The only bar to a suit, as the present one, can probably be said to be arising under the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. It lays down that in a suit filed for seeking declaration of a Court as to the legal character or to any right in any property, the Court shall not make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so. In other words, a suit that is filed merely for declaration of title without claiming any further relief of possession, when defendant is in possession, would not be maintainable as there would be a bar upon power of the Court to only grant relief of declaration of title. In the instant case, the suit as filed by the appellants/plaintiffs was not only for declaration that the sale deed in question was null and void and not binding on them, but also for a decree of possession and permanent injunction. Therefore, even under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, the suit filed by the appellants/plaintiffs was and is maintainable.
31. In view of above discussion, the substantial question of law in Second Appeal No. 90 of 2009 is answered as in the affirmative.
32. Having answered the substantial questions of law involved in both the appeals in favour of the appellants, and having found that the suit lands No. 1 and 2 were not alienated for any legal necessity by defendant No.2 to defendant No.1, it would be proper for this Court to consider granting of consequential reliefs to the appellants/plaintiffs. Respondent No.1/defendant No.1 has not challenged the finding recorded by the first appellate Court in Regular Civil Appeal No.18 of 1994 that the sale deed dated 22/4/1983 vide Exh.41 was not executed by defendant No.2 in favour of defendant No.1 for any legal necessity. If this is so, this sale deed too will not be binding upon the appellants/plaintiffs. There is no dispute about the fact that defendant No.1 has been put in possession of the suit lands No. 1 and 2 in pursuance of the sale deeds dated 29/3/1982 (Exh.82) and 22/4/1983 (Exh.41). The possession of the suit lands alienated under these sale deeds, therefore, would have to be restored to the appellants/plaintiffs. At the same time, having considered the evidence brought on record by the rival parties, I find that the appellants/plaintiffs would have to be directed to refund the amounts of Rs.4,500/and Rs.4,000/, being considerations for alienation of the suit lands No. 1 and 2 to defendant No.1 by defendant No.2 on equitable grounds. The evidence shows that deceased defendant No.2 had received the consideration amounts under both these sale deeds and at that time he was the karta of joint family of the plaintiffs and defendant No.2. So, after his death, it would fall upon his son and in son's absence upon the surviving members of joint family to fulfill the obligations of karta of the family, as the consideration amounts received by deceased defendant No.2 would amount to debts due from karta. As regards mesne profits, it is seen that the appellants/plaintiffs have not pressed for the same. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to consider the grant of relief of mesne profits. About the permanent injunction, I must say, since the possession is now being directed to be delivered, question of grant of permanent injunction at this stage would not arise.
33. In the circumstances of the case and having answered the substantial questions of law involved in both these appeals in the above terms, both the appeals deserve to be allowed and they are allowed accordingly.
(1) The judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court in Regular Civil Appeal No. 171 of 1985 is hereby quashed and set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court in Regular Civil Suit No. 232 of 1983 is hereby confirmed except with regard to the grant of permanent injunction.
(2) The judgments and decrees passed by the trial Court in Regular Civil Suit No. 74 of 1986 and by the first appellate Court in Regular Civil Appeal No. 18 of 1994 are hereby quashed and set aside.
(3) It is declared that the sale deeds (Exhs. 82 and 41) of suit lands No. 1 and 2 are null and void, not binding on the appellants/plaintiffs and respondent No. 1/defendant No.1 gets no title to the suit lands No. 1 and 2.
(4) It is directed that respondent No.1/defendant No.1 shall handover possession of the suit lands No. 1 and 2 to the appellants/plaintiffs within three months from the date of this order, failing which the appellants/ plaintiffs would be at liberty to recover the possession of the suit lands in accordance with law.
(5) It is further directed that appellants/plaintiffs shall refund consideration amounts of Rs.4,500/and Rs.4,000/under sale deeds vide Exhs. 82 and 41 to respondent No.1/defendant No.1 with interest at the simple rate of 6% per annum from the date of respective suits till the date of payment, at the time of delivery of possession of suit lands No.1 and 2 or within three months from the date of this order, whichever is earlier.
(6) The costs shall follow the result.
(7) Decree be drawn up accordingly.