P.C.
1. Heard.
2. By consent, admitted and heard finally.
3. The applicant is the husband of the respondent no.1. The respondent no.1 has filed proceedings under the Protection of Woman from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as âDomestic Violence Actâ) in the Metropolitan Magistrates 27th Court at Mulund. By making an application under section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act, the respondent no.1 prayed for several reliefs including the residence order, under section 19 of the said Act. The respondent no.1 also prayed for various interim reliefs. The learned Magistrate, by an order dated 25 November 2009 granted maintenance and relief towards medical expenditure to the respondent no.1, but declined to pass any order in respect of residence. Thereafter, the respondent no.1 filed another application, specifically praying for a residence order. She prayed that the present applicant and his relatives (respondents before the Magistrate) be restrained from entering in the matrimonial house i.e. Flat No.A/8, Shivam Building, Hansoti Lane, Kama Galli, Ghatkopar (W), Mumbai 400086. The learned Magistrate, after hearing the parties, dismissed the said application holding, inter alia, that the said flat could not be termed as a 'shared household' within the meaning of clause (s) of section 2 of the Domestic Violence Act. In coming to this conclusion, the Magistrate apparently placed reliance on the observations made by the Apex Court in S.R. Batra and Anr. Vs. Smt. Taruna Batra (2007 ALL SCR 908).
4. Being aggrieved by the order dated 3 September 2011, the respondent no.1 approached the Court of Sessions by filing an appeal and the Court of Sessions, allowed the same. The Court of Sessions declared that the respondent no.1 (appellant before the Sessions Court) had a right to reside in the matrimonial house and the petitioner (respondent no.1 before the Sessions Court) was restrained from violating the said right.
5. Being aggrieved thereby, the applicant has approached this Court invoking its inherent powers.
6. I have heard Mr.Niranjan Mundargi, learned advocate for the applicant and Mr.Nitin Sejpal, learned advocate for the respondent no.1. I have gone through the application and the annexures thereto which include copies of the relevant orders.
7. Mr.Mundargi submitted that the flat in question is owned by the father of the applicant and was his self-acquired property. He submitted that, the order passed by the Magistrate, was proper and legal, and that the order passed by the Sessions Court in appeal, is not in accordance with law. According to him, the issue is decided by the Supreme Court of India in the aforesaid case of Mr.S.R. Batra (supra), wherein, Their Lordships have considered the definition of 'shared household' as given in clause (s) of section 2 of the Domestic Violence Act. He placed reliance on the observations made by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court of India, in paragraph nos.25 and 28 of the reported judgment.
8. Mr.Sejpal, learned advocate for the respondent no.1, however, contended that the ratio of the said decision is not applicable to the facts of the present case. According to him, in that case, the property said to be 'shared household' was owned by the mother-in-law of the wife. He also submitted that in Batra's case, the husband and wife had already left the matrimonial house and were staying somewhere else in Ghaziabad. According to him, these facts had made all the difference and therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the observations made by the Supreme Court would not be applicable.
9. I have carefully gone through the reported judgment in the Batra's case. It would be appropriate to reproduce the observations made in paragraph no.28 of the reported judgment.
â28. As regards Section 17(1) of the Act, in our opinion the wife is only entitled to claim a right to residence in a shared household, and a 'shared household' would only mean the house belonging to or taken on rent by the husband, or the house which belongs to the joint family of which the husband is a member. The property in question in the present case neither belongs to Amit Batra nor was it taken on rent by him nor is it a joint family of which the husband Amit Batra is a member. It is the exclusive property of appellant No.2, mother of Amit Batra. Hence, it cannot be called a 'shared household'
(Emphasis supplied)
These observations indicate that a 'shared household' could only mean 'the house which belongs to the joint family of which the husband is a member'. These observations indicate that the house which neither belongs to the husband, nor belongs to the joint family of which he is a member, cannot be covered by the term 'shared household'. Whether it belongs to the mother of the husband, or to his father (as in the present case) does not seem to be a factor relevant in that regard. Their Lordships further observed as follows:
âNo doubt, the definition of 'shared household' in Section 2(s) of the Act is not very happily worded, and appears to be the result of clumsy drafting, but we have to give it an interpretation which is sensible and which does not lead to chaos in society.â
(Emphasis supplied)
10. In view of these observations, it is difficult to accept the interpretation of the term 'shared household' as attempted to be put forth by Mr.Sejpal, claiming, in effect, that even a place which does not belong to the husband or to the joint family of which he is a member would be covered by the definition of the said term. The submission of Mr.Sejpal that the observations in Batra's case would not be applicable to the facts in this case, cannot be accepted. The aforesaid observations of Their Lordships of the Supreme Court is nothing but a pronouncement of law; and by virtue of Article 141 of the Constitution of India, the law thus pronounced, would be binding on all the Courts within the territory of India. Clearly, Their Lordships were of the view that the premises in which the husband had no right â not even as a member of the joint family which owns such premises would not be covered by the definition of 'shared household' under clause (s) of sub-section (2) of the said Act. The observations in paragraph no.29 clearly indicate that this was the interpretation of the relevant provisions made by Their Lordships. Once a legal provision has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of India, after considering all the aspects of the matter, such interpretation made by the Supreme Court would be binding on all Courts within the territory of India. It would therefore, not be possible to adopt a different interpretation of what is meant by a 'shared household'.
11. Anyway, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it is not necessary to go further deeper into this aspect and analyse the same. It is because the proceedings before the Magistrate are still pending and whatever orders would be passed, would be only by way of the interim and temporary arrangement. The petitioner has already expressed his inclination to provide alternate accommodation to the respondent no.1 as contemplated under clause (f) of section 19(1) of the Domestic Violence Act. In fact, the provisions of section 19 of the Domestic Violence Act indicate that the Magistrate would have an option either to restrain the respondents before him from dispossessing the wife from the 'shared household', or directing the respondents to secure same level of alternate accommodation for her, or to pay rent for the same, should the circumstances so require.
12. In the instant case, the respondent no.1 has already filed criminal complaints against the applicant and his relatives, with respect to an offence punishable under section 498A of the IPC. She has also filed some prosecution with respect to the offences punishable under section 323 and 506 of the IPC. She has also filed proceedings for maintenance, which are pending in the Family Court. Under these circumstances, it would be proper any way, that she is given an alternate accommodation as contemplated under clause (f) of sub-section (1) of section 19, rather than insisting that she should be allowed to stay in the shared household.
13. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties on this aspect of the matter.
14. Mr.Sejpal submits that the respondent no.1 would be satisfied if an amount of Rs.15,000/- per month is paid to her towards the alternate accommodation, which she would be securing. Mr.Sejpal also submits that a deposit, if any, required to be paid for such accommodation should also be paid by the applicant.
15. Mr.Mundargi submits that he has no objection to accept such a proposal till the final hearing of the proceedings before the Magistrate. He submits that the respondent no.1 would be at liberty to mention the premises in which she wants to reside and that the applicant would secure the premises for her and pay the monthly rent/compensation thereof not exceeding rs.15,000/- per month, directly to the landlord of the premises. Mr.Mundargi also agrees that the petitioner shall continue to pay such amount till the disposal of the proceedings before the Magistrate and naturally, after the disposal of the proceedings before the Magistrate, the parties shall be governed by the final order that would be passed by the Magistrate.
16. In view of this, the application is disposed of as follows:-
17. The order dated 6 March 2012, passed by the Addl.Sessions Judge in Criminal Appeal No.548 of 2011, is set aside.
18. The applicant shall however, pay an amount of Rs.15,000/- per month towards the expenses of securing an alternate accommodation by the respondent no.1, which accommodation shall be named and mentioned to the applicant by the respondent no.1. The applicant shall also pay the deposit, if any, required for obtaining such accommodation.
19. This arrangement shall continue till the final disposal of the proceedings before the Magistrate. Needless to say that thereafter, the parties shall be governed by the order, as may be passed by the Magistrate, finally.
20. The learned Magistrate shall expedite the hearing and final disposal of the application under section 12 of the Act.
21. Application is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.