Judgment:
1. In these batch of appeals, common question of law and facts are involved, hence they are all taken up together for disposal as per law.
2. The Revenue is the aggrieved party and they have filed appeal against the respective orders of the Collector (Appeals). The respondents had imported "Heat Resisting Steel Sheets in Coils" which has been so described in the case of Gemini Metals, Mithuna Industries, while in the case of New India Industries, the goods had been described as "Stainless Steel in Coils". The dispute is regarding the assessment of these items in the erstwhile Tariff and as to whether they fall under Item 63(14) as Iron or Steel hoops and strips, not otherwise specified of Indian Customs Tariff or under Item 63(20A) of the said Tariff as Stainless Steel Sheets and as to whether they are entitled for the concessional rate of benefit in terms of Notification No.118/65, dated 20-8-1965 as amended, which grants concessional rate of benefit to 'Cold Rolled hoops and strips of stainless steel of 250 mm width or more falling under Item 63(14) of ICT are exempted from the payment of (i) so much of that portion of customs duty leviable thereon under Indian Tariff Act, 1934 as an excess of 10% ad valorem where standard rate of duty is leviable and (ii) the whole of the duty of Customs leviable thereon under Indian Tariff Act, 1934 where the preferential rate of duty is leviable.
3. In the present case the Learned DR has prepared a chart setting out the appeal numbers, Bill Respondent, Bill of Entry No. & Date, Description as per invoice/Bill of entry, Specification/Thinkness/Width. The same is annexed to this order as annexure.
4. The respondents/importers had preferred a refund claim on the ground that the goods are correctly classifiable under Item 63(14) of ICT. The refund claims were rejected on merits as well as on time bar as the claims had been preferred after the statutory period of 6 months prescribed under Section 27(1) of the Customs Act, 1962. The importers prefered writ petition to the Delhi High Court. The Hon'ble High Court directed the Assistant Collector to consider the issue on merit in accordance with law and pass the appropriate orders in the light of its order. The Assistant Collector considered the issue de novo on merits and rejected the respondents' contention for classification under Item 63(14) of ICT. They preferred the appeal before the Collector, who on consideration held that in the light of ISI definition of 'strips' the goods have to be considered as 'strips'. He also referred to an order No. 232 to 244B/82 of 1982 passed by the Government of India, wherein an identical issue had been dealt with. In the said decision, the Government of India had observed that in a situation where there is no statutory definition of the terms "Sheets" and "Strips", it would be reasonable to accept the ISI definition of the said terms as providing such criteria. The Learned Collector held that the Government of India did not recognise the position that stainless steel strips could be of a width more than 250 mm. He has also held that there is no indication in the invoice that the goods were cold rolled. He accepted the inspection certificate produced by the respondents to show that the goods are cold rolled products only. He accepted the contention of the importers that the hot rolled products were semi-finished and were made into sheets /strips by cold rolling as was being done by M/s. Salem Steel Plant. He further accepted the contention that hot rolled products were thicker and could not be used by the ultimate consumer and the same could have very little gloss or surface smoothness. Gloss and surface smoothness are attained only if the hot rolled products are passed several times through cold rolling mills. The further contention was also accepted by the Collector that they have imported only cold rolled products, which could straightaway be used for making utensils and other consumer articles. In this connection, technical literature on the production of stainless steel sheets and strips given in the Metals Handbook (Ninth Edition 1980 American Society for Metals, Ohio, USA) showing that hot rolled sheets or "hot bands" are cold rolled to achieve thickness reduction and then again cold rolled on either bright or dull rolls to produce the required finish and surface characteristics was also accepted by the Learned Collector.
5. The Revenue in these appeals are challenging these findings and are contending that the imported items are sheets in coils and the description in each of the Bill of Entry given squarely fit into the description of "sheets". As the thickness is less than 1 /8th of inch (3.17 mm) and more than 5" (127 mm) in width, the impugned goods had been supplied in sheets in coil form. In the invoice and Bills of Entry, the impugned goods were described as 'Stainless Steel Sheets in Coil'. It is stated that dimensions and size fit squarely into the description 'sheets' as per ICT 1934 read with Tariff Rule 1/34. It is stated that while deciding a similar case, the Hon'ble Madras High Court on writ petition filed by the department, in the case of Premn Metal Works and Ors. discussed the issue at length and in detail and held that the dimension of 'strips' and 'sheets' given in the ISI 1956-1962 (as amended) vary with the dimension given in the Brussels Nomenclature and the specifications of AISI. Thus even the specifications according to which the goods have been manufactured controverts the petitioners' claim that these are 'strips'. The Court has further held that if the trade had understood the goods imported as 'stainless steel sheets', it is not for the respondents to contend that applying the ISI Specifications the goods imported must be classified as 'strips'. In this regard, the High Court relied on the ruling of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as reported in 46 STC 256, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down that in determining the meaning or connotation of the words, expressions describing an article or commodity, the turnover of which is taxed in a sates tax enactment; if there is one principle fairly well-settled, it is that the words or expression must be construed in the sense in which they are understood in the trade by the dealer and the consumer. It is they who are concerned with it, and it is the sense in which it is understood that contitutes the definitive index of the legislative intention, when the statute was enacted. Relying on this judgment, the Revenue states that the reference to ISI Specifications and various tax books is unnecessary.
Therefore, they state that the conclusion of the Hon'ble Madras High Court judgment that the item is stainless steel sheets classifiable under Item 63(20A) is required to be upheld. It is also contended that decision of the Government of India in the case of Carat Watch Co., relied by the Collector is not applicable in the instant case, as in that case the item imported was 'strips' and was assessable as such. In the instant case, the goods imported are not 'strips' but 'sheets' and hence the reliance on the order of the M/s. Carat Watch Co. is not proper and correct and therefore, it is stated that the assessment under Item 63(20A) and denial of benefit of Notification No. 118/65 (as amended) is in order.
6. We have heard the Learned DRs, Shri K.K. Jha and Shri S.N. Ojha for the appellants and the Learned Advocates, Shri N.V.R. Iyer and Shri T.Vishwanathan for the respondents.
7. The Learned DR pointed out that only in two Bills of Entry, the specification has been shown as width 125 mm while in all other cases width of 1000 mm and thickness of 0.5 mm. The Learned DR also referred to the judgment of the Andhra High Court rendered in the case of Venkateswara Stainless Steel & Wire Industries v. Government of India and Ors., as reported in 1983 (14) E.L.T. 2217, wherein a view had been taken that heat resisting Steel Sheets in coils of 48" width is liable to duty under Item 63(14) of Indian Customs Tariff read with Customs Notification No. 118/65 (as amended) and not under Item 63(20A). He submits that this judgment is distinguishable in the light of Hon'ble Supreme Court's judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. as reported in 1978 (2) E.L.T. Q439), wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court had laid down that in the absence of statutory definition, whether the product can come under the description of 'skelp' or 'strip', it would require some evidence to be taken as the level of the taxing authority provided however, there is an identifiable, uniform and determinate test by which 'skelp' can be properly distinguished from 'strip'. The absence of any identifiable standards would naturally give rise to scope of arbitrary assessment at the hands of the different taxing authorities. The Learned DR pointed out that the Brussels' Nomenclature had indicated the width to be not more than 500 mm for considering it as 'strip' while ISI states that it could be of a width more than 600 mm. He submitted that in view of the Hon'ble Supreme Court's judgment in the case of Venkateswara Stainless Steel & Wire Industries v. Union of India and Anr., as reported in 1996 (26) E.L.T. 201 had laid down that the specifications of 'stainless steel coils' in Indian Standard Institute are not relevant for classification of 'circles' and 'sheets'. He submits that the item in question exceeds the width of 500 mm and therefore, the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of Madras High Court in the case of Prema Metal Works and Ors. should be accepted and followed. The Learned DR however, agreed to concede in respect of Bill of Entry No. C551, dated 26-9-1969 in Appeal Nos. C/3476 to 3482, M/s. Venketeshwar Stainless Steel, Bill of Entry No. C882, dated 29-1-1971 and Bill of Entry No. C/191, dated 4-2-1971 in Appeal Nos. C/3159/89 and C/3184-85/89 of M/s. Gemini Metal Ind. He also conceded in regard to Bill of Entry No. D/200, dated 4-6-1969, D/477, dated 12-2-1971 and D/252, dated 5-3-1970 in the said appeal of M/s. Gemini Metal Industries. The Learned DR submitted that the Hon'ble Madras High Court had rightly followed the Hon'ble Supreme Court's judgment and the Hon'ble Supreme Court's judgment pertains to Hindustan Aluminium Corporation Ltd. v. State of U.P., as reported in 1993 (13) E.L.T. 1656 on the proposition that ISI is for quality control and also relied on the judgment rendered in the case of Veto Co. v. Collector of Central Excise,Indian Aluminium Cables Ltd. v. Union of India,Collector of Central Excise v. J.K. White Cement Works, as reported in 1994 (73) E.L.T. 861. He submitted that the party has described the goods as 'sheets' and that is how the item was identified and understood and treated and therefore, it cannot be considered as a 'strips'. He submitted that as regards the subsequent classification, the matter has been decided in the case of Collector of Central Excise v. Kamlesh Industries, as reported in 1995 (60) ECR 524, wherein it has been held that when there is an uncertainty in deciding the nature of the product on the basis of dimensions, classification should be on the basis of the mill in which it is manufactured. It has been held that applying this criterion, the products "pattis or pattas" manufactured by the respondents are not "strips", but "pieces roughly shaped by rolling or forging of iron or steel not elsewhere specified" falling under TI 26AA(ia) before 1-8-1983 and under TI 25(8) after 1-8-1983 and then under CETA, 7208.00.
8. The Learned DR also submits that the claims filed by the respondents were time barred as having been filed beyond the statutory limit. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Miles India Ltd. v. Assistant Collector of Customs, as reported in 1987 (30) E.L.T. 641 held that statutory authorities are bound by the limit of statutory period and therefore, the direction given by the Madras High Court to consider their claim is beyond jurisdiction and against the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. He submits that the Hon'ble Supreme Court had clearly clarified in the case of Union of India v. Kirloskar Pneumatic Company, as reported in 1996 (84) E.L.T. 401 that High Court under writ jurisdiction cannot direct the Customs authorities to ignore the time limit prescribed under Section 27 of the Customs Act even though High Court itself may not be bound by the time limit of the said Section. In fact the Learned DR submits that the directions given by the Madras High Court in the present appeals to consider the claim of the respondents which were statutory barred is bad in law in view of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Union of India v. Kirloskar Pneumatic Company.
9. The Learned Advocate Shri N.V.R. Iyer arguing for the respondents submitted that the item in question is not 'strips' but they are 'sheets'. They are in coil form only for easy purpose of transportation. He supported the order of the Collector (Appeals) and also stresses the need to accept the order passed by the Government of India in the case of Carat Watch Co., which deals with the same issue and in which the Government of India had also referred to Brussels' Tariff Nomenclature which divides the line between the 'strips' and 'sheets' is at 500 mm. He pointed out that the order had noted that the item 73.12 of BTN specified the maximum limit of width as 500 mm for strips and item 73.13 indicates that width in excess of 500 mm would render the goods classifiable as sheets (or plates). The order had noted that although BTN had not been adopted in India, yet should provide guidelines for preparation of which considerable technical expertise has gone into, and it is also adopted by a number of countries all over the world and particularly when it happens to be in line with the standard specifications in India. The Counsel also pointed out from the judgment of the Government of India that CBEC in 1965 had issued instructions that flat products of width upto 600 mm had to be treated as 'strips'. He also submitted that in view of this judgment and the clarification, the impugned orders are required to be confirmed. He pointed out that the Madras High Court in the case of Venkateswara Stainless Steel & Wire Industries (supra) had clarified that the expression 'sheet' is generic term and means an expanse or spread out and can be in any form in circle, square, rectangular, hexagonal, octagonal. The judgment further held that merely because 'sheet' takes the shape of a 'circle' it is not permissible to take it out of the category of 'sheet' and bring it under the residuary heading 73.15(1). He also pointed out that the judgment had laid down that the specifications of 'stainless steel coils' in Indian Standard Institute is not relevant for classification of 'circles' and 'sheets'. He submitted that this judgment is clearly distinguishable on this point and also on the basis of facts described in the Bills of Entry. It states that the item is a heat resistance steel sheets in coils and therefore, they cannot be classified as 'stainless steel sheets' under Item 63(20A) and are rightly classifiable under Item 63(14). He also pointed out that where there is a benefit of doubt then the same should go in the favour of assessee in view of the definition of these terms in the statute. He submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has referred to ISI Specifications in the case of Union of India v. Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. as reported in 1978 (2) E.L.T. Q439) and in that of Collector of Customs v. Krishna Carbon Paper Co., as reported in 1988 (37) E.L.T. 480. He emphasised the need to apply the ISI Standard in the present case to determine the nature of the goods. The Learned Advocate also submitted that the Andhra High Court in the case of Venkateswara Stainless Steel & Wire Industries v. Government of India mid Other* as reported in 1983 (14) E.L.T. 2217 dealt with the heat resistance stainless steel strips in coils of 48" width and held to be liable to duty under Item 63(14) of Indian Customs Tariff and granted the benefit. It is his submission that in this judgment the High Court has also held that the meaning given to articles by ISI is based upon the meaning attached to the articles by those dealing in commercial parlance or by those dealing in them during the relevant period, therefore, a reference to the definition of 'strip' and 'sheet' given by the American Iron and Steel Institute or contained in Brussel's Nomenclature ignoring the meaning attached to them by ISI is wholly unreasonable. It is his submission that the ruling of single judge in the Vcnkateswara Stainless Steel & Wire Industries should not be relied. He also submitted that the single judge had no occasion to refer to the Andhra High Court's judgment as well. He submits that the single judge of the Madras High Court had considered the item as 'sheet' on the basis of their admission and they were clearing the goods as 'sheets' and therefore, that judgment was not binding.
10. The Learned Advocate submitted that the Delhi High Court had condoned the delay in filing the refund claim and had remitted the case to the lower authorities for adjudication. It is his submission that the question of time bar cannot be raised at this stage although in law, even if the order of the Delhi High Court condoning the delay in filing refund claim is bad as the forum for agitating such a ground is before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Learned Advocate, Shri T.Vishwanathan appearing for some of the importers adopted the arguments of the Learned Advocate, Shri N.V.R. Iyer and later filed written brief, which has also been taken into consideration.
11. Countering the reply of the Advocates, the Learned DR pointed out that the Madras Division Bench in the case of Government of India v.Prema Metal Works as reported in 1986 (26) E.L.T. 529 has categorically held in the importers' own case that the items were "Stainless Steel Plates" classifiable under Item 63(20A) and therefore, on merits, the matter has to be decided in favour of the Revenue by admitting the appeals.
12. We have carefully considered the submissions made by both the sides and have perused the citations and the grounds made out by the respondents.
13. The Collector while allowing the importers' claim had relied on the judgment rendered by the Government of India in the case of Carat Watch Co. and held that the items are classifiable under Item 63(14) of ICT read with Notification No. 118/65 with consequential refund benefit to the respondents. However, while he decided this case, the Collector had not taken notice of the Division Bench's judgment of the Madras High Court in the case of Prema Metal Works and Ors.. Before this Madras High Court, the importers were also parties. This Division Bench of Madras High Court had gone into all aspects of the matter which has been raised before the revisional authorities i.e. Government of India as well as the Collector, which has also been agitated before us. On a very detailed examination of the matter, and taking into consideration the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court with regard to the manner in which an items is required to be classified, it has been now a settled law that the item is required to be classified in the manner it is understood in the trade and commercial usage; in the absence of any statutory definition. In this case the trade had understood the imported item as 'stainless steel sheets'. The importer's contention is for applying the ISI Specifications, and that the goods imported should be classified as 'strips'. While rejecting this contention, the Division Bench relied on the ruling of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case reported in 46 STC 256 rendered in the case of Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. - 1980 (6) E.L.T. 383 (SC). In view of this judgment, the Division Bench held that it is unnecessary for the Court to refer to the ISI Specifications or various text books relied by the importer. The Court further held that they do not find any good reason to differ from the conclusion of the revision authority that the goods imported were understood commercially both in the country of shipment and in the court of importation as 'stainless steel sheets' and therefore, concluded that the item is classifiable only under Tariff Item 63(20A).
The Court further overruled the instructions given by the Central Board of Revenue and Customs in the order of 1934 on the ground that the facts presented before the Division Bench had not been pleaded before the Learned Single Bench and if those fact had been considered by the Learned Judge of Single Bench, then the Learned Judge would not had come to the said conclusion. The Bench had further observed that: "Further, it would have been unnecessary for the learned Judge to go into this question once the goods imported were found to have been treated commercially both in the country of shipment and in the country of importation, as stainless steel sheets. Any reference to the meanings given by the Dictionary or other Standard Institution will not arise on the facts of these cases. As we have independently arrived at a conclusion that the goods imported were stainless steel sheets, satisfying the description found in Item 63(20A), we need not go into the correctness or otherwise of the other reasoning given by the learned Judge. Likewise, we need not go into the other points raised by the learned counsel for the respondents such as jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 in the light of Section 27(1) of the Customs Act. On the finding given by us, the judgment of the learned Judge has to be set aside.
16. We do not find any need to go into the decisions cited by the learned Counsel on both sides as the findings given by us to the effect that the goods were 'stainless steel sheets' answering the description in Item 63(20A) is based substantially on the facts presented before the revisional authority and also before us.
17. In the result, all the writ appeals are allowed, the judgment in the writ petitions are set aside and the rules nisi are discharged.
No costs. Leave to appeal refused." 14. In view of the categorical judgment rendered by the Division Bench, which was binding on the jurisdictional Collector (Appeals), we do not find any reason to differ from the same. It is to be observed that this Division Bench Judgment also overrules the single Judge judgment of the Andhra High Court referred to supra. The findings of this Division Bench of Madras High Court is required to be accepted by us in view of the findings based on commercial parlance test and also in view of settled law that ISI Specifications is only for maintaining the standards, which has since been reiterated and confirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court time and again, and has also been referred to by the Tribunal in several judgments which have been cited by the Learned DR as noted in this order.
15. The Learned DR pointed out from the annexure pertaining to several Bills of Entry that few of the items would be covered within the term and meaning of 'strips' and the benefit could be granted. Although this is conceded by the Revenue however, on a different question raised before us, that is pertaining to the clearances being time barred, the relief cannot be granted in respect of all these items. The Delhi High Court on a writ petition filed by the respondents had directed the lower authorities to condone the delay in filing the claims, and to consider it on merits. It is an admitted position before us that the claims filed by the respondents were beyond the statutory period of 6 months as laid down under Section 27 (1) of the Customs Act. While passing the order by the Delhi High Court for considering the claim, however, the Delhi High Court had not noticed the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Collector of Central Excise v. Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills, as reported in 1988 (37) E.L.T. 478 and that of Miles India Ltd. v. Assistant Collector of Customs, as reported in 1987 (30) E.L.T. 641. Thus, the judgment rendered by the Madras High Court is per inqurium. Such a judgment which has been rendered without reference to statutory provisions and the judgment-of Hon'ble Supreme Court being in the nature of per inqurium will not have biriding effect and are therefore, unenforceable. In this regard, the discussions made on this point by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of A. R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak and Anr., as reported in AIR 1988 SC 1531 by a Bench of 7 Judges be referred. It has since been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Kirloskar Pneumatic Company, as reported in 1996 (84) E.L.T. 401 that the High Court under writ jurisdiction cannot direct the Customs authorities to ignore the time limit prescribed under Section 27 of the Customs Act even though High Court itself may not be bound by the time limit of the said Section. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has referred to the judgment of Collector of Central Excise v.Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills as reported in 1988 (37) E.L.T. 478 and that of Miles India Ltd. v. Assistant Collector of Customs, as reported in 1987 (30) E.L.T. 641 (SC). The ruling of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered on this aspect in para 6 to 11 are noted herein below: "6. In this appeal we are not concerned either with the maintainability of the writ petition or its merits. The only contention raised and which we are considering is whether the direction given by the High Court that the Customs Authorities "shall not reject the refund application on the ground that it is time barred", is valid in law. With respect we think that it is not.In Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh v. Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Ltd., Jalandhar AIR 1988 S.C. 2052 this court had observed: "6. it appears that where the duty has been levied without the authority of law or without reference to any statutory authority or the specific provisions of the Act and the Rule framed thereunder have no application, the decision will be guided by the general law and the date of limitation would be the starting point when the mistake or the error comes to light. But in making claims for refund before the departmental authority, an assessee is bound within four corners of the Statute and the period of limitation prescribed in the Central Excise Act and the Rules framed thereunder must be adhered to. The authorities functioning under the Act are bound by the provisions of the Act. If the proceedings are taken under the Act by the department, the provisions of limitation prescribed in the Act will prevail. It may, however, be open to the department to initiate proceedings in the Civil Court for recovery of the amount due to the department in case when such a remedy is open on the ground that the money received by the assessee was not in the nature of the refund. This was the view taken by the Tribunal in a previous decision in the case of Miles India Ltd. v. The Asstt. Collector of Customs but it was assailed before this Court. The appeal was withdrawn. This Court observed that the Customs Authorities, acting under the Act, were justified in disallowing the claim for refund as they were bound by the period of limitation provided therefore in the relevant provisions of the Customs Act, 1962. If really the payment of the duty was under a mistake of law, the party might seek recourse to such alternative remedy as it might be advised. See the observations of this Court in Miles India Ltd. v. The Assistant Collector of CustomsMiles India Ltd. v. Assistant Collector of Customs 1987 (30) E.L.T. 641 (S.C.) has practically been reproduced in the above extract, we do not think it necessary to refer to that decision.
9. Section 27 of the Customs Act provides for claims for refund of duty. The Section has been substituted by a new section by Central Act 40 of 1991 (with effect from September 20,1991). The amended Section 27 severely curtails the right to refund but for the purpose of this appeal, it is not necessary to refer to that aspect. Suffice it to say that Sub-section (1) and (2) of Section 27 (both before and after amendment) provides for filing an application for amendment within a period of six months of payment of duty except in a case where it has been paid under protest. What is relevant herein is Sub-section (4) of unamended Section 27 and Sub-section (3) of amended Section 27. It would be sufficient if we set out the said sub-section. Sub-section (4) of unamended Section 27 read as follows : "27(4) Save as provided in Section 26, no claim for refund of any duty shall be entertained except in accordance with the provisions of this Section." 27(3) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any judgment, decree, order or direction of the Appellate Tribunal or any Court or in any other provision of this Act or the regulation made thereunder or any other law for the time being in force, no refund shall be made except as provided in Sub-section (2)".
10. According to these sub-sections, a claim for refund or an order of refund can be made only in accordance with the provisions of Section 27 which inter alia includes the period of limitation mentioned therein. Mr. Hidayatullah submitted that the period of limitation prescribed by Section 27 does not apply either to a suit filed by the importer or to a writ petition filed by him and that in such cases the period of limitation would be three years. Learned counsel refers to certain decisions of this Court to that effect. We shall assume for the purpose of this appeal that it is so, notwithstanding the fact that the said question is now pending before a larger Constitution Bench of nine Judges along with the issue relating to unjust enrichment. Yet the question is whether items permissible for the High Court to direct the authorities under the Act to act contrary to the aforesaid statutory provision. We do not think it is, even while acting under Article 226 of the Constitution. The power conferred by Article 226/227 is designed to effectuate the law, to enforce the Rule of law and to ensure that the several authorities and organs of the State act in accordance with law. It cannot be invoked for directing the authorities to act contrary to law. In particular, the Customs authorities, who are the creatures of the Customs Act, cannot be directed to ignore or act contrary to Section 27, whether before or after amendment. May be the High Court or a Civil Court is not bound by the said provisions but the authorities under the Act are. Nor can there be any question of the High Court clothing the authorities with its power under Article 226 or the power of a civil Court. No such delegation or conferment can even be conceived. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the direction contained in Clause (3) of the impugned order is unsustainable in law. When we expressed this view during the hearing Mr. Hidayatullah requested that in such a case the matter be remitted to the High Court and the Court be left free to dispose of the writ petition according to law.
11. The appeal is accordingly allowed, the order under appeal is set aside in its entirety and the matter is remitted to the High Court for disposal in accordance with law. We reiterate that we express no opinion upon the maintainability (IT the merits of the writ petition. That is for the High Court to consider.
16. In view of the Hon'ble Supreme Court's judgment, we have to hold that the demands are time barred and thus, claims which admittedly fall within the ambit of 'strips', would require to be rejected as time barred.
17. In that view of the matter, the impugned orders are set aside and the appeals are allowed.