CWP No.2488 of 1987 -1- IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH (1) CWP No.2488 of 1987 Inder Singh(deceased) through his LRs ....Petitioners Versus Gram Panchayat, Janherian & others ......Respondents (2) RSA No.56 of 1993 Gram Panchayat Janherian ....Appellant Versus Inder Singh(deceased) through his LRs .....Respondents Date of decision:
24. 09.2013 CORAM: HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE JASBIR SINGH HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE G.S.SANDHAWALIA Present: Mr.Sudhir Mittal, Advocate, for the petitioners (in CWP No.2488 of 1987). Ms.G.K.Hundal, Advocate, for the appellant (in RSA No.56 of 1993). **** G.S.Sandhawalia J.
1. This judgment shall dispose of CWP No.2488 of 1987 and RSA No.56 of 1993 as common question of facts and law are involved. Facts of CWP No.2488 of 1987 2. The present writ petition has been filed challenging the order dated 07.10.1986 (Annexure R4) which is the warrant of possession, issued by the Collector, Patiala. The dispute pertains to 29 bighas 10 biswas of land falling in the revenue estate of Village Janherian, Tehsil & District Patiala, comprising in khasra Nos. 650 (6-3), 651(8-16), 652 (4-15) and 653 (6-15).
3. As per the case of the petitioner, now represented through his LRs, the petitioner had filed civil suit No.290 of 1972, for declaration as owner in Sailesh Ranjan possession of the land mentioned above that the land did not vest in Gram 2013.10.11 13:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.2488 of 1987 -2- Panchayat. The suit was decreed on 13.06.1972. On the basis of the said decree, mutation was entered in his favour on 21.09.1978 and the petitioner continued being in possession. However, respondent-Gram Panchayat kept on interfering in the possession of the petitioner, who filed another suit on 21.05.1982, for permanent injunction, which was decreed on 17.05.1984, in his favour. Thereafter, Gram Panchayat filed proceedings under the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as '1961 Act') and respondent No.2 passed an order on 07.10.1986 holding that the land in dispute vested in the Gram Panchayat-respondent No.1 and the decree was invalid. The said order was not supplied to the petitioner and symbolic possession was handed over to the Gram Panchayat on a rapat roznamcha of the Patwari dated 19.11.1986 though the actual physical possession continued with the petitioner. The said order was illegal as the amendment in the 1961 Act was prospective regarding the right to claim title and since there was an earlier decree of the Civil Court in favour of the Gram Panchayat, the same would be binding inter se between the parties.
4. In the written statement filed by respondent No.1, it has been averred that the petitioner is guilty of concealing material facts before this Court in order to get favourable finding and interim orders. Vide order dated 13.03.1984, the application under Sections 7 and 11 of the 1961 Act, had been allowed regarding 29 bighas 10 biswas of land and the Gram Panchayat was declared owner of the same and ejectment had been ordered. The said order had been upheld in appeal vide order dated 20.02.1987 and thereafter, the warrant of possession had been issued on 07.10.1986, as per the rapat roznamcha of the Patwari. It was submitted that the decree passed in favour of the petitioner was a collusive decree obtained by fraud and in collusion with the then Sarpanch of the village which Sailesh Ranjan would be clear from the judgment dated 13.06.1972 and the same had no force in 2013.10.11 13:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.2488 of 1987 -3- the eyes of law. The Collector, Patiala, in the application filed for deciding the question of title and ejectment of the respondents under Sections 7 & 11 of the 1961 Act, has specifically held that it was a collusive decree and the petitioner had surrendered possession in writing on 21.11.1974 and the land had been leased out to number of persons, in auction, subsequently. In pursuance of the order of the Collector, warrants of possession had been issued on 25.05.1984 but could not be executed due to injunction orders passed by the Civil Court. The appeal was dismissed on 20.02.1987. The petitioner was well aware of all these facts and withheld material facts from this Court and on 08.12.1986, the land was auctioned on lease for the year 1986-87 and bid of one Ajmer Singh was accepted and he was in possession of the land. The petitioner had entered into a compromise on 21.11.1974 and surrendered the possession of the land on the terms that he shall not be liable for payment of lease money and by way of resolution, the said condition had been accepted by the answering respondent. Facts of RSA No.56 of 1993 5. The present regular second appeal has been filed by the Gram Panchayat against the judgment and decree dated 30.01.1989, whereby a suit for declaration, filed by Inder Singh, whereby the order dated 13.03.1984, allowing the application of the Gram Panchayat under Sections 7 & 11 of the 1961 Act, was held to be illegal, void, without jurisdiction and against the provisions of 1961 Act. The title was held to be that of the plaintiff-Inder Singh and relief of permanent injunction was granted, restraining the Gram Panchayat from dispossessing him. The said order was further upheld in appeal by the Additional District Judge, Patiala on 07.08.1992.
6. The question of law that arises in the present regular second appeal is Sailesh Ranjan 2013.10.11 13:50 “Whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to decree the said I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.2488 of 1987 -4- suit regarding the proceedings pertaining under the 1961 Act regarding the land which was shamilat in nature and whether the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred under Section 13 of the 1961 Act.”. 7. As noticed above, the facts in the civil writ petition and the regular second appeal are common in both the cases and the orders passed are also common. The plea taken in the civil suit was that plaintiff was owner in possession of the suit land on the strength of the decree dated 13.06.1972 and the proceedings under Sections 7 & 11 of the 1961 Act, before the Collector, Patiala, for determining the title and interest, were illegal and invalid and so was the order in appeal which upheld the said eviction and the vesting of the land in Gram Panchayat. The bar of jurisdiction of the Civil Court was introduced, for the first time, in 1976 and the application was representative in nature and the Collector could not set aside the decree of the Civil Court before 1976. On the basis of the said pleadings, the Civil Court had held that the plaintiff was owner of the land and the orders dated 13.03.1984 of the Collector were without jurisdiction and that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to try the suit and the plaintiff was entitled for the declaration and the suit had not become infructuous as it was filed in the year 1984 and the possession was allegedly delivered in the year 1986. Arguments 8. Counsel for Inder Singh (now represented by his LRs) submitted that once the matter had already been settled by the Civil Court in the year 1972, in favour of the plaintiff/writ petitioner, the subsequent proceedings were without jurisdiction regarding the issue of title inter se the parties and therefore, principle of res judicata was involved and the decrees passed by the competent Civil Sailesh Ranjan Courts, between the parties, before the amendment, could not be ignored. 2013.10.11 13:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.2488 of 1987 -5- Accordingly, the judgment and decree passed, which is subject matter of challenge in the regular second appeal, was defended.
9. Counsel for the Gram Panchayat, on the other hand, placed reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Gram Panchayat of Village Naulakha Vs. Ujagar Singh 2000 (7) SCC543to contend that the decree dated 13.06.1972 was a collusive decree and there was no necessity to file an independent suit. It was pointed out that the judgment of Full Bench, in the case of Gram Panchayat, Village Bathoi Kalan Vs. Jogar Ram & others 1991 (1) PLR260had been overruled by the Apex Court. It was further submitted that there was concealment on the part of the plaintiff and they were not entitled for any relief. Conclusion 10. After hearing arguments of counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed, on account of various reasons, which are delineated below and the regular second appeal, filed by the Gram Panchayat, is liable to be allowed.
11. The anchor-sheet of the counsel for the petitioner is the judgment and decree dated 13.06.1972 and the whole case rotates around the said judgment. A close perusal of the same would show that there was collusion writ large between the plaintiff and the Sarpanch. The sole case of the plaintiff was that the land was banjar qadim and did not vest in the Gram Sabha and it was in his possession and never been used for common purposes. The said plea was admitted by the then Sarpanch. On the basis of the said pleadings and the findings, the Trial Court took into consideration the jamabandi entries for the year 1971-72 and also of the year 1966-67 and noticed that the plaintiff was in possession and in view of the fact that the land was banjar qadim and in view of the admission, allowed the suit. Relevant portion of giving the admission reads Sailesh Ranjan as under:
2013. 10.11 13:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.2488 of 1987 -6- “Defendants in their written statement admitted the fact of possession of plaintiffs. They also admitted that the suit land was Banjar Qadim at the time when the Village Common Land Act came into force. They also admitted that suit land was not ever used for the common purposes of the village and this fact was also not denied that Shamlat Deh was more than 25 per cent of the total area of the village, but they denied that plaintiffs are not the owner of the suit land. So it is pleaded that plaintiffs have got no right over the suit land.”. 12. Thus, the decree itself was on the strength of a concession given by the then Sarpanch against the interest of the Gram Panchayat and the decree could not be held to be a valid decree but only was a collusive one, obtained by fraud. The Collector, while adjudicating on the application under Section 7 of the 1961 Act, noticed that thereafter, on 09.11.1974 (Exhibit P4), the petitioner had compromised the matter with the Gram Panchayat and surrendered the land in dispute. The application under Section 7 of the 1961 Act was filed and once the question of title was raised, the same was adjudicated upon and it was held that the possession of the petitioner was not established from 26.01.1950, as per the revenue record. Once the possession was not established from the said date, the Gram Panchayat was declared to be the owner of the land. The fact that the decree was collusive, was also taken into account, as per the admission made. The said order was upheld in appeal by the appellate authority by noting that there was collusion and the possession was not proved from 26.01.1950. Relevant portion of the appellate order dated 20.02.1987 reads as under: “On perusal of the judgment of learned Sub-Judge, 2nd Class, Patiala, it is evident that representative of the Panchayat admitted the claims of the plaintiff (present applicant). Regarding this it is mentioned in para No.2 of the judgment of the Civil Court. That respondents Gram Panchayat in its written statement has accepted the claim of the plaintiff (present applicant). From this it is evident that decree dated 13/6/72 is collusive. This was Sailesh Ranjan obtained by collusion with the Gram Panchayat at that time. On the 2013.10.11 13:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.2488 of 1987 -7- basis of a collusive decree of this type the Gram Panchayat which is legal authority cannot be divested of such huge property. This decree being collusive is illegal. Therefore, this matter is not covered by the doctrine of Res Judicata. Except this no other evidence has been produced by the appellant either in this court or in the court below from which it can be proved that the land was owned by him or he was in possession of the land in dispute from 26/1/50. In view of these contentions I conclude that the present appeal is without any force. This appeal is rejected. This order is announced on 20/2/87 in the presence of parties.”. 13. The Apex Court, in Gram Panchayat of Village Naulakha (supra), set aside the Full Bench judgment of this Court passed in Jogar Ram's (supra) case and laid down that the Collector could take into account whether the earlier decree passed before 1976 was obtained by fraud or collusion and there was no necessity to file an independent suit to set aside the same. The property of the public institution could not be allowed to be jeopardised at the hands of the persons who were supposed to defend the said interest of the community property. Relevant portion of the judgment reads thus: “Thus, in order to contend in a latter suit or proceeding that an earlier judgment was obtained by collusion, it is not necessary to file an independent suit as stated in Jagar Ram's case for a declaration as to its collusive nature or of setting it aside, as a condition precedent. In our opinion, the above cases cited in Sarkar's Commentary are correctly decided. We do not agree with the decisions on the Full Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Jagar Ram's case. The Full Bench has not referred to Section 44 of the Evidence Act nor to any other precedents of other Courts or to any basic legal principle.
7. The law in England also appears to be the same, that no independent suit is necessary. In Spencer-Bower and Turner on Res Judicata (2nd Ed., 1969) it is stated (para 369) that there are exceptions to the principle of res judicata. If the party setting up res Judicata as an estoppel has alleged all the elements of an estoppel Sailesh Ranjan 2013.10.11 13:50 I attest to the accuracy and (i.e. ingredients of res judicata), it is still open to the latter (the integrity of this document CWP No.2488 of 1987 -8- opposite party) to defeat the estoppel by setting up and establishing certain affirmative answers. Of these there are four main classes - fraud, cross-estoppel, contract and public policy. The author clearly says that no active proceedings for 'rescission' of the earlier judgment are necessary. They state (para 370) as follows: “The avoidance of a judicial act on the ground of fraud or collusion is effected not only by active proceedings for rescission... but also by setting up the fraud as a defence to an action on the decision, or as an answer to any case which, whether by way of estoppels/or otherwise, depends for its succession on the decision being treated as incontrovertible.”
. Thus, the law is well settled that no independent suit as a condition precedent is necessary.
8. Collusion, say Spencer-Bower and Turner (para 378), is essentially play-acting by two or more persons for one common purpose - a concerted performance of a fabula disguised as a judicium - an unreal and fictitious pretence of a contest by confederates whose game is the same. As stated by Lord Selborne L/C in Boswell v. Cooks (1894) 6 Rep. 167, there is no Judge; but a person invested with the ensigns of a judicial office, is misemployed in listening to a fictitious cause proposed to him, there is no party litigating... no real interest brought into question and to use the words of a very sensible civilian on this point, fabula non judicium, hoc est; in scena, non in foro, res agitur. That, in our view, is the true meaning of the word 'collusion' as applied to a judicial proceeding.
9. Further property of a public institution cannot be allowed to be jeopardised by persons who, at an earlier point of time, might have represented it and who were expected to effectively defend public interest and community property. Persons representing public bodies are expected to discharge their functions faithfully and in keeping with the trust reposed in them.”. 14. Accordingly, keeping in view the said observations, it cannot be said that the proceedings have become final inter se the parties and the petitioner could lay any claim in the property on the strength of a collusive decree and the Sailesh Ranjan 2013.10.11 13:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.2488 of 1987 -9- Collector was right in examining the effect of the decree. Another reason that the Collector was right to hold that the petitioner failed to prove its possession before 26.01.1950 was that it was the case of the petitioner himself that the land was banjar qadim and was not used for the common purposes of the village but was in his possession. As referred above, the revenue record was only pertaining to the year 1966-67 which reflected the ownership of the Nagar Panchayat. Once the petitioner himself had not pleaded that the land was in his cultivating possession before 26.01.1950, as provided under Exceptions (iii) or (viii) of Section 2(g) of the 1961 Act, he could not claim any right in the suit property. The basic requirement was of cultivating possession which was not the case of the petitioner himself as his case was that the land was banjar qadim and thus, was not being cultivated.
15. The Division Bench of this Court in Gurmail Singh & another Vs. Director, Rural Development & Panchayats, Punjab & others 2012 (3) PLR783has held that cultivating possession is the pre-requisite before any right can be claimed for title under Exception (viii) of Section 2(g) of the 1961 Act. The relevant paragraph reads as under:
“9. According to Section 2(g)(viii) of the 1961 Act, in order to exclude the land from shamilat deh, it is incumbent upon the petitioners to prove that the said land was assessed to land revenue and has been in individual cultivating possession, not being in excess of their respective shares in such shamilat deh, on or before 26.01.1950. Section 4(3)(ii) provides exclusion of land from vesting in Panchayat, if it is proved that the person was in cultivating possession for more than 12 years immediately preceding the commencement of the 1961 Act, i.e., 22.04.1961, without payment of rent or by payment of charges not exceeding the land revenue and cesses payable thereon. The benefit of Section 2(g)(v) of the 1961 Act, on the ground of not being used for common purposes, was never effectively proved since the suit was Sailesh Ranjan 2013.10.11 13:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.2488 of 1987 -10- totally collusive in nature and before the Collector also, no effort was made to bring it within the ambit of Section 2(g)(v) of the 1961 Act, though the petitioner had right to prove the said fact before the Collector but he did not do so, for the reasons best known to him.
16. Under Section 11 read with Section 13 of the 1961 Act, it has been provided that the claim of title is to be decided by the Collector and the Civil Court's jurisdiction is barred. Section 13 & 13-B further specifies that the legality of any action taken by the authorities under the Act, cannot be challenged before the Civil Court. Section 11, 13 & 13-B of the 1961 Act reads as under:
“11. Decision of claims of right, title or interest in shamlat deh.-(1) Any person claiming right, title or interest in any land vested or deemed to have been vested in a Panchayat under this Act, or claiming that any land has not so vested in a Panchayat, may submit to the Collector, within such time as may be prescribed, a statement of his claim in writing and signed and verified in the prescribed manner and the Collector shall have jurisdiction to decide such claim in such manner as may be prescribed.
13. Bar of jurisdiction of civil courts.-No civil court shall have jurisdiction- (a) to entertain or adjudicate upon any question whether any property or any right to or interest in any property or is not shamlat deh vested or deemed to have been vested in a Panchayat under this Act; or (b) to question the legality of any action taken by the Commissioner or the Collector or the Panchayat under this Act; or (c) in respect of any matter which the Commissioner or the Collector is empowered by or under this Act to determine. 13-B. Provisions of this Act to be over-riding- The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law, or any agreement, instrument, custom or usage-or any decree or order of any court or other authority.”
. Sailesh Ranjan 2013.10.11 13:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.2488 of 1987 -11- 17. The Apex Court in Ram Singh Vs. Gram Panchayat, Mehal Kalan 1986 (4) SCC364has held as under:
“4. Section 11 of the Act provides that any person claiming right, title or interest in any land vested or deemed to have been vested in a Panchayat under the Act, or claiming that any land has not so vested in a Panchayat, may submit to the Collector, within such time as may be prescribed, a statement of his claim in writing and signed and verified in the prescribed manner and that the Collector shall have jurisdiction to decide such claim in such manner as may be prescribed. Any person aggrieved by the decision of the Collector is entitled to prefer an appeal to the Commissioner. Under section 12 of the Act every order made by the Collector or by the Commissioner, as the case may be is final save as otherwise expressly provided in the Act and such order cannot be called in question in any court by way of appeal or revision or in any original suit, application or execution proceedings. Section 13 of the Act provides that no civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain or adjudicate upon any question whether any property or any right to or any interest in any property is or is not shamlat deh vested or deemed to have been vested in a Panchayat under the Act or to question the legality of any action taken by the Commissioner or the Collector or the Panchayat under the Act or in respect of any matter which the Commission or the Collector is empowered by or under the Act to determine. The contention of the Panchayat before the trial court was that the land in question was shamlat deh and it had been vested in it.”
. Similarly, in Babu Ram Vs. Gram Sabha Buhavi 1988 (1) PLR683 the Apex Court also held to the same effect which was followed by Hari Parkash Vs. Lakshmi Narain 1996 AIR (SC) 105. In Punjab Wakf Board Vs. Gram Panchayat @ Gram Sabha 2000 (2) SCC121 the appeal filed by the Board was dismissed and it was held that Section 13 of the 1961 Act would apply and the suit, filed by the Board, regarding the nature of the property would be barred. In Dhruv Green Field Ltd. Vs. Hukam Singh 2002 (6) SCC416 the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was held to be barred as the same were to be determined by the Sailesh Ranjan authorities, under the 1961 Act, who were competent to adjudicate on the issue. 2013.10.11 13:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.2488 of 1987 -12- It was held as under: “A perusal of the section, quoted above, would show that the jurisdiction of a civil court stands ousted : (a) to entertain or adjudicate upon any of the following question : (i) any land or other immovable property is or is not shamlat deh; (ii) any land or other immovable property or any right, title or interest in such land or other immovable property vests or does not vest in a Panchayat under the Act; (b) in respect of any matter which any revenue court, officer or authority is empowered by or under this Act to determine; or (c) to question the legality of any action taken or matter decided by any revenue court, officer or authority empowered to do so under the Act. Clauses (b) and (c), noted above, are relevant for our purpose. In respect of any matter which any revenue court, officer or authority is empowered by or under the Act to determine the issue, the jurisdiction of the civil court in respect of that matter is barred. So also, where the Act empowers any revenue court, officer or authority to decide the legality of any action taken or matter decided by such court or authority such a question cannot be entertained or adjudicated upon by a civil court.”. 18. Another issue is as to whether the petitioner's writ petition is maintainable on account of concealment of facts. It is apparent that the petitioner was well aware of the proceedings before the Collector which was decided against him on 13.03.1984. He, thereafter, filed an appeal against the said order which was also decided against him on 20.02.1987. However, he chose to file the present writ petition, without challenging the said orders though he had filed a civil suit against the said orders and had been successful in getting the decrees passed and getting the said orders set aside. Therefore, it would not lie in his mouth to aver in the writ petition that he was only challenging the order dated 07.10.1986 which was the warrant of possession. The concealment of material facts itself would dis-entitle him for any relief from this Court. It has been time and again held that the writ Court, under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India, is a Court of equity and exercising extraordinary jurisdiction. Where the Sailesh Ranjan 2013.10.11 13:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.2488 of 1987 -13- party itself conceal some facts from the Court and gets some interim orders and retains possession of the land, illegally, on the strength of said interim orders, it is not liable to be heard on merits. The petitioner, by approaching this Court in the year 1987, got an interim order on 06.05.1987 and got order of stay from dispossession and auction till further orders, by virtue of concealment of material facts. The principle laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in Chiranji Lal & others Vs. Financial Commissioner Haryana & others 1978 PLR582was that a party is not entitled to be heard on merits under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if there is material concealment. The Apex Court in Prestige Lights Ltd. Vs. State Bank of India (2007) 8 SCC449also observed on similar lines and upheld the judgment of the High Court wherein petition had been dismissed in limine by holding that the petitioner was not entitled to any relief due to suppression of material facts. The relevant observations read as under:-
“33. It is thus clear that though the appellant- Company had approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, it had not candidly stated all the facts to the Court. The High Court is exercising discretionary and extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Over and above, a Court of Law is also a Court of Equity. It is, therefore, of utmost necessity that when a party approaches a High Court, he must place all the facts before the Court without any reservation. If there is suppression of material facts on the part of the applicant or twisted facts have been placed before the Court, the Writ Court may refuse to entertain the petition and dismiss it without entering into merits of the matter. xxxx xxxx xxxx 35. It is well settled that a prerogative remedy is not a matter of course. In exercising extraordinary power, therefore, a Writ Court will indeed bear in mind the conduct of the party who is invoking such jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose full facts or suppresses relevant materials or is otherwise guilty of misleading the Court, the Court may dismiss Displaced Persons Action without adjudicating the matter. The rule has been evolved in Sailesh Ranjan 2013.10.11 13:50 larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.2488 of 1987 -14- the process of Court by deceiving it. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true, complete and correct facts. If the material facts are not candidly stated or are suppressed or are distorted, the very functioning of the writ courts would become impossible. xxxx xxxx xxxx 37. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that by dismissing the petition in limine, the High Court has neither committed an error of law nor of jurisdiction. The appellant-Company is not entitled to any relief. Though the respondent-Bank is right in submitting that the appellant has suppressed material facts from this Court as also that it has not complied with interim order passed by the Court and it has, therefore, no right to claim hearing on merits, we have considered the merits of the matter also and we are of the considered view that no case has been made out for interference with Displaced Persons Action taken by the respondent-Bank or the order passed by the High Court.”. 19. Accordingly, keeping in view the above authorities in mind and the nature of dispute involved, the question of law formulated above in paragraph No.6, regarding whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to subsequently set aside the orders passed by the authorities, is answered in favour of the Gram Panchayat and against the petitioner/plaintiff, as no Civil Court, under Section 13(b) of the 1961 Act, could question the legality of the action taken by the authorities, under the 1961 Act.
20. Resultantly, the writ petition is dismissed, the orders passed by the authorities under the 1961 Act are upheld and the regular second appeal is allowed, in favour of the Gram Panchayat and the judgments and decrees dated 30.01.1989 and 07.08.1992 are set aside and the suit of the plaintiff/petitioner is dismissed. (G.S.SANDHAWALIA) JUDGE2409.2013 (JASBIR SINGH) Sailesh Ranjan sailesh 2013.10.11 13:50 JUDGE I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document