Permod Kohli, J.
1. This appeal arises out of an award dated 19-11-1994 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Bhadarwah on the basis of a compromise arrived at between the parties in Lok Adalat, whereby an amount of Rs. 1,50,000/-was awarded in favour of the appellant in respect of death of four members of his family i.e. his wife, two minor daughters and a minor son, aged 26 years, 3 years, 1 year 5 months and 3 years 8 months respectively.
2. The facts as mentioned in the appeal are that in a road accident which occurred on 2-11-1988 at Raghi Nallah, NH 1B Batote, Kishtwar, the deceased were killed on spot. A claim petition was filed by the appellant before Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Bhadarwah through one Mr. M.A. Kitchloo, Advocate. While the said petition was pending, a transfer application being C.T.A. No. 59/94 was filed before this Court seeking transfer of the claim petition from Bhadarwah to Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Jammu. The High Court was pleased to transfer the claim petition vide order dated 28-7-1995. The appellant could not appear before Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Jammu and under these circumstances the claim petition was sent back to Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Bhadarwah. The counsel engaged by the appellant entered into a compromise in a hot haste with the Insurance Company when the case was listed before Lok Adalat held on 19-11-1994 at Bhadarwah. On the basis of compromise so arrived at before the Lok Adalat, the claim was settled for an amount of Rs. 1,50,000/-inclusive of interim relief. This award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal has been assailed on the solitary ground that the counsel should have made the statement before the Lok Adalat after obtaining consent of the appellant. Counsel entered into the settlement for a paltry sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- and deprived the appellant of his due compensation. The appellant has also accused his counsel of misconduct. The appellant has also placed on record copy of a letter (post card) whereby appellant was asked to appear for evidence on 3-3-1993, otherwise the evidence may be closed on that day.
3. According to the learned counsel for the respondents the appeal against the consent award is not maintainable under law. He wanted to press into service the provisions of Section 20(2) of J&K; Legal Services Authority Act, 1997. In addition to this, he has stated that even under general principles of law i.e. Section 96 of Code of Civil Procedure, no appeal lies against a consent decree.
4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and examined the record.
5. The case was settled in the Lok Adalat on the basis of agreement of the learned counsel and consequently the impugned award dated 19.11.1994 came to be passed. The appellant has attributed motives to his counsel on whose statement the compromise was recorded. No specific allegations have been made. What is stated is that the appellant has been cheated and robbed of his due compensation for a petty monetary gain by the counsel and the counsel has misconducted himself to deprive the appellant of his due compensation under law. Even counsel has not been made a party to the appeal. The fact whether the counsel has misconducted and entered into compromise before the Lok Adalat is a question of fact which cannot be determined in appeal. The better course for the appellant was to have approached the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Bhadarwah for seeking recalling of the order and it was only that Court which was competent to deal with the metter and even could permit the parties to lead evidence. The compromise is sought to be challenged on the basis of some vague allegations of cheating, fraud and misconduct of the counsel. This Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction cannot examine these allegations without there being any evidence or material on record and in absence of the counsel, who is a necessary party, if an inquiry is to be conducted in regard to the allegations. As far the compromise is concerned, it is regulated by Order 23 of Code of Civil Procedure. Rule 3 of Order 23 deal with the compromise. Under proviso to this rule, where one of the parties to the compromise denies the compromise, adjustment etc., he is required to apply to the same court as this question can be decided by the same court.
6. Now coming to the question of maintainability. Though the appeal is to filed under the provisions of Motor Vehicle Act, yet the general principles of Code of Civil Procedure are applicable. Under Section 96 Sub-section 3 no appeal lies from a decree passed by the court with the consent of the parties. Learned counsel for the appellant relies upon two judgments of the Karnataka High Court in cases 'General Manager, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v. Pandu and Ors.', 1998 ACJ 1389 and 'United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Patramma and Anr.', 1996 ACJ 427. In 1998 ACJ 1389 the Court held as under :
'15. The Lok Adalats are held with a laudable object of achieving the object of reducing the heavy pendency in courts. The Government also has spent a huge sum in this regard and Lok Adalats are held in every Taluk and District headquarters to settle the disputes between the parties. These matters were discussed in detail in the presence of the advocates of the respective parties and also the petitioners. The assistance of Senior advocate and retired District Judge was taken as a conciliator to decide the quantum of compensation and the parties also were satisfied in the normal course and arrived at a just quantum of compensation. Taking into consideration the nature of the injuries sustained by them, age and other factors, such agreement arrived at between the parties cannot be lightly brushed aside or refused to act upon by the Tribunal. The Tribunal also has a responsibility to see that due sanctity is given to such compormises and the parties are encroached to settle matters so that the Tribunal also would be contributing and encouraging the parties to compromise their cases instead of making them to wait for the compensation which would be awarded after a lapse of long years. If the Tribunals were to insist in all the cases for finding out as to whether the compromise arrived at is just and reasonable or that the agreement is otherwise tainted with doubt, etc. the very purpose of conducting the Lok Adalat would be defeated. In this case as stated above, when the parties are not making any allegations against the agreement to compromise, only the Tribunal holding that the compensation awarded is not just is not a ground to reject it. With this background now it is necessary to find out to some extent as to whether the compromise arrived at is just and reasonable.'
Similarity in 1996 ACJ 427 the Court held as under:
'4. The appellant's learned advocate had demonstrated to me that in the present instance admittedly the parties voluntarily referred the matter to the Lok Adalat and that the Lok Adalat indicated what according to it would be a fair compensation. An assessment of the facts and circumstances of the case is bound to differ from a person to person and authority to authority. Appellant's learned advocate placed reliance on a decision of this Court in case of Sakamma v. Divisional Controller, 1994 ACJ 1266 (Karnataka), wherein the court was considering a situation whereby the parties had arrived at a compromise which was acceptable to both of them and which was therafter placed before the Tribunal and an award obtained in those terms. Subsequently, the award was sought to be challenged on the ground that had the matter been adjudicated through the traditional manner it would have qualified for a higher amount of compensation and this Court while considering the facts of that case had occasion to observe that one needs to take cognizance of the fact that where a quick assessment is done and a figure fixed, that undoubtedly it may be slightly higher or lower than what would have otherwise emerged at the end of a full-dressed hearing, but that the court takes notice of the other aspect of the matter, namely, that in the interest of a speedy conclusion to the dispute, the parties themselves bargain to settle for possibly even a lower amount as they would receive the compensation much earlier. There are many such aspects to the matter which do not require to be recounted, but the principle is very clear, namely, that once the matter is referred for settlement and it is accepted, that it shall thereafter not be open to parties to resile therefrom unless exceptional circumstances such as the quantum being absolutely perverse are demonstrated.'
7. On the other hand learned counsel appearing for respondents has relied upon cases, titled 'The Union Of India v. Mohinder Singh & Co.', AIR 1971 J&k; 10, 'Smt. Raksha Rani v. Ram Lal', AIR 1987 P&h; 60 And 'katikara Chintamani Dora and Ors. v. Guatreddi Annamanaidu and Ors.', AIR 1974 sc 1069, to convass that no appeal lies against a consent decree.
8. It is settled proposition of law that no appeal lies against a consent decree. However the consent decree can definitely be interfered with if the same is the result of fraud and misrepresentation or such like factor. Even in the ratio of judgments relied upon by the appellant, what is held by the Karnataka High Court is that the compromise entered into between the parties is binding. It is only under exceptional circumstances that the court may interfere with the same. In the persent case no exceptional circumstances have been indicated in the memo of appeal. Some vague allegations against the counsel without there being any proof or material can not lead to a conclusion or inference that the consent was a result of fraud played by the counsel for the appellant. And important question which needs attention of this Court is that the compromise was entered into between the insurance company and the appellant through his counsel. It is riot a compromise with some private individual where the counsel could have managed some under hand benefit and entered into compromise. According to the terms of compromise the case was settled for a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- and the appellant is entitled to the entire amount inclusive of interim compensation already received by the appellant. There does not appear to be any fishy transaction with the counsel.
There is another aspect of the issue. The appellant has contended that for the death of four members of the family a meager amount of Rs. 1,50,000/-has been agreed to by the counsel. The quantum of compensation has to be measured at the time of accident when unfortunate death of four members of the appellant's family took place. Admittedly the accident was caused in 1988 and all the members died on spot. Only one member of the family was major i.e. wife of the appellant and all others members were minors between 11/2 year to 5 years. Keeping in view the period when the accident took place and death was caused, it can not be said that the quantum of compensation awarded suffers from perversity. From the post card placed by the appellant on record, it also appears that the case was listed for evidence and till 1993 appellant could not produce evidence to prove his case though the petition was pending for about five years at that time. It may be that the counsel for the appellant thought it proper to enter into a compromise for want of assistance from the appellant and in absence of adequate evidence.
In view of the above, I am of the opinion that the appeal is not maintainable and the same is liable to dismissed. It is ordered accordingly.