V.K. Mehrotra, J.
1. Respondent Shri M. S. Mandyal (at present posted as Additional District and Sessions Judge, Shimla) was posted as Sub-Divisional Judi-cial Magistrate, Palampur in the month of July, 1981. On July 7, 1981 head constable Bidhi Singh (petitioner before us) escorted some under-trial prisoners for their production in the Court of Shri Mandyal along with some constables. The under-trial prisoners were produced in hand-cuffs before the learned Magistrate. It is said that on seeing that the under-trial prisoners were brought before him hand-cuffed, the learned Magistrate lost his temper and abused Bidi Singh by uttering the words 'non-sense' and 'bloody fool'.
2. On July 22,1981 applicant Bidhi Singh filed a complaint in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate. He alleged that by his conduct in the open Court Shri Mandyal had intentionally insulted the complainant Bidhi Singh and had given provocation to him, knowing that it was likely to cause the complainant to break public peace. Preliminary evidence was recorded by the Chief Judicial Magistrate. He directed issue of summons to Shri Mandyal to answer an offence under Section 504 IPC. This was on October 30, 1981.
3. Shri Mandyal felt aggrieved by this order and assailed it in criminal revision No. 1 of 1982 which came to be heard by the Additional Sessions Judge, Kangra Sessions Division at Dharamshala. The learned Additional Sessions Judge held in his order of February 10, 1983 that cognizance could not have been taken by the Chief Judicial Magistrate of the complaint against Shri Mandyal in the absence of a proper sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. He also held that there is no, prima facie, case justifying issuance of the process to Shri Mandyal. The proceedings pending before the Chief Judicial Magistrate were quashed.
4. The present petition has remained pending for several years in view of an order of September 19, 1983 by the then Chief Justice of this Court that it be listed for admission 'after the decision of Contempt Petition (Cr.) No. 3 of 1982 - Court on its Own Motion v. Milkhi Ram'. After disposal of the Contempt petition, the present pro-ceedings came up before us on June 2, 1992. After hearing Shri K. C. Rana appearing for petitioner Bidhi Singh we directed issue of notice, pending admission of the petition, to respondent Shri Mandyal. Shri M. S. Chandel appeared on behalf of the respondent. After hearing him as well, we directed that the matter be listed for dictation of judgment in open Court.
5. Shri Malkiat Singh Chandel has, with his usual fairness, urged before us that the view taken by the learned Additional Sessions Judge that cognizance of the complaint made by petitioner Bidhi Singh against the Presiding Officer Shri M. S. Mandyal could not be taken in the absence of a proper sanction as envisaged by Section 197(1) Cr. P.C. is sound law and the present petition should be dismissed at this stage itself. He has also urged, in the alternative, that having regard to the circumstances of the present case this Court should not interfere with the order of the Additional Sessions Judge quashing the proceedings against Shri Mandyal.
6. It has not been disputed before us that Shri Mandyal, while functioning as the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate at Palampur on July?, 1981 used the two words attributed to him, namely, 'Non-sense' and 'Bloody fool' addressing them to complainant Bidhi Singh when he escorted certain under-trial prisoners and produced them before the Court of the Magistrate in hand-cuffs, along with some other constables. It is also not disputed that Shri Mandyal falls in the category of persons contemplated by Section 197(1) Cr. P.C.
7. Section 197(1), Cr. P.C. in its material part, says:
'197. Prosecution of Judges and public servants:
(1) When any person who is or was....Magistrate ...not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the, discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction -
(a) ....
(b) in the case of person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of a State, of the State Government.
(4) The....State Government...may determine the person by whom, the manner in which, and the offences for which, the prosecution of such....Magistrate...is to be conducted, and may specify the Court before which the trial is to be held.'
8. The provision has come up for consideration, time and again, before various Courts in this Country. In S.B. Saha v. M.S. Kochar, AIR 1979 SC 1841 : (1979 Cri LJ 1367) the Supreme Court, speaking through Sarkaria, J. said, (in paragraph 18), that :
'the words 'any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty' employed in Section 197(1) of the Code, are capable of a narrow as well as a wide interpretation. If these words are considered too narrowly, the Section will be rendered altogether sterile, for, 'it is no part of an official duty to commit an offence, and never can be'. In the wider sense, these words will take under their umbrella every act constituting an offence, committed in the course of the same transaction in which the official duty is performed or purports to be performed. The right approach to the import of these words lies between these two extremes ...an act constituting an offence, directly and reasonably connected with his official duty win require sanction for prosecution under the said provision. As pointed out by Ramaswami, J. in Baijnath v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 220 : (1966 Cri LJ 179) at p. 222 'it is the quality of the act scope and range of his official duties, the protection contemplated by Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code will be attracted.'
9. Later, (in paragraph 21) the Supreme Court extracted the observations from an earlier Constitution Bench decision in Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari, AIR 1956 SC 44 : (1956 Cri LJ 140) where it had said that :
'in the matter of grant of sanction under Section 197, the offence alleged to have been committed by the accused must have something to do, or must be related in some manner, with the discharge of official duty...there must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty, the act must bear such relation to the duty, that the accused could lay a reasonable claim, but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty.'
10. The aforesaid observations have been extracted from those made by the Supreme Court in paragraph 17 of its judgment in Matajog Dobey. These observations echo the view expressed by the Supreme Court earlier in Amrik Singh v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1955 SC 309 : (1955 Cri LJ 865) when it said (in paragraph 8) that :
'It is not every offence committed by a public servant that requires sanction for prosecution under Section 197(1), Criminal P.C.; nor even every act done by him while he is actually engaged in the performance of his official duties; but if the act complained of is directly concerned with his official duties so that, if questioned, it could be claimed to have been done by virtue of the office, then sanction would be necessary; and that would be so, irrespective of whether it was, in fact, a proper discharge of his duties...'.
And, (in paragraph 9) that :
'...If the acts complained of are so integrally connected with the duties attaching to the office as to be inseparable from them, then sanction under Section 197(1) would be necessary; but if there was no necessary connection between them and the performance of those duties, the official status furnishing only the occasion or op-portunity for the acts, then no sanction would be required.'
11. The view expressed in these decisions has been reiterated by the Supreme Court again and again as is clear from what it said in B.S. Sambhu v. T.S. Krishnaswamy, AIR 1983 SC 64: (1983 Cri LJ 154); Balbir Singh v. D.N. Kadian, AIR 1986 SC 345 : (1986 Cri LJ 314) and Bakhshish Singh Brar v. Smt. Gurmej Kaur, AIR 1988 SC 257: (1988 Cri LJ 419).
12. The legal position admits of no doubt in view of these pronouncements.
13. Our attention was invited by Shri Malkiat Singh Chandel to some decisions of a few High Courts wherein proseuction for use of abusive language by the Presiding Officer, during the course of proceedings before him was said to require sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. or example, in Lala Bhagirath v. Saiyid Ali Hamid Sahib, AIR 1931 Oudh 392 : (32 Cri LJ 991) a complaint against the Subordinate Judge of Bara Banki, before whom a miscellaneous application was presented by 145 persons, was returned by the Judge on the ground that it did not contain the parentage and place of residence of the applicants, while observing 'in a somewhat facetious vein that there was only one personage known to him in history whose miraculous birth gave rise to the Christian theological dogma of the Immaculate Conception, and that surely these 145 aplicants did not claim the same divine origin.' and further remarking that the application which was written in Urdu was so badly written that the name of one of the applicants Gupta could be read as 'kutta' (dog), was held not sustainable for want of sanction, interalia, on the ground that Mr. Gupta himself had filed no complaint against the Subordinate Judge for the alleged defamatory remark said to have been made against him and that, 'to compare the birth of Jesus Christ with that of these two complainants is not to defame the latter however in-apposite and irreverent the comparison may be.'
14. In Harumal Hotchand v. Haji Imambux Jatoi, AIR 1933 Sindh 165 : (34 Cri LJ 819) an Executive Engineer, while dealing with an application made by a Zamindar requesting to provide him a more liberal supply of water used abusive language in relation to the Zamindar. It was held that a complaint made against the Executive Engineer was not maintainable in absence of a valid sanction, because when he uttered those words 'he was clearly acting in his official capacity. The words used by him could not have been uttered except in that capacity.'
15. The occasion when the offending words used by the Executive Engineer alone seems to have been taken into consideration by the Court in coming to this conclusion.
16. Sukhdeo v. Emperor, AIR 1934 All 978 : (36 Cri LJ 331) was a case where the Special Magistrate of Benares (as Varanasi was then called) used abusive language towards the complainant when he was appearing as a witness before the Magistrate in the witness box. The complaint by the witness against the Magistrate was dismissed for want of sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. The learned Judge, dealing with the matter in the High Court, said at Page 332 :
'In the present case there is no doubt that Rai Kishanji was acting or atleast purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, when it is said that he used insulting language to the petitioner. The test is whether the officer at that particular moment was actually engaged in the discharge of his official duty.'
17. This decision overlooks that it is not only the occasion when offending words are used by the Presiding officer which is to be considered but also the fact that 'there should be something in the nature or quality of the act complained of which attaches to or partakes of the official capacity of the offender.' and that there should be 'reasonable connection between the act...and the doer.'
18. Yet another single Judge in M. Subbiah v. T. Ramacharlu, AIR 1939 Madras 604: (40 Cri LJ 853) took the view that on being disturbed in the dictation of judgment, the President of a Panchayat Court:
'who...got up from his seat abusing the complainant and slapped him on the cheek twice and on his protest unlaced his shoe, took it up in his hand raised it saying 'I will beat you with my shoe':.'.
was acting throughout, till the very minute when the alleged offence had been committed in, official capacity and that no Court could take - cognizance of the matter in the absence of a sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C.
19. Mewalal v. Totalal, AIR 1957 MP 230 : (1957 Cri LJ 1413) was a case where the complainant was examined as a witness in a case and while he was being so examined, the learned Civil Judge before whom be was being examined, was said to have used the expression 'Nalayak' (unfit) and ultimately to have expressed that the witness would be turned out after being given shoe beating.
The view taken was that:
'What was said to have been done was an offence in relation to the official act of a Judge.'
20. Likewise, in Prabhu Dayal v. Milap Chand, AIR 1959 Rajasthan 12: (1959 Cri LJ 82) the Sarpanch of a Panchayat which was acting as a Court is said to have asked the complainant to go out of the Court-room and upon the complainant trying to argue out against it, abused the complainant. The view taken by the High Court was that the Sarpanch '...purported to act in the discharge of his official duty when he asked the complainant to go out of his Court-room,' though he was not expected to use objectionable language. As such, sanction under Section 197 Cr. P. C. was necesary before cognizance could be taken by the Court of the matter.
21. In State v. P.C. Sharma, (1975 ILR Himachal Series 700) a Divisional Forest Officer, while making an inguiry from his subordinate, lost his temper when this sub-ordinate gave a reply and he, in a fit of anger, dragged him and gave a cane blow to the subordinate. The Court took the view that the action of the D.F.O. was not proper. But since he was making an inquiry from the subordinate in the purported exercise of official duties, the action attributed to him though in excess of his authority under a wrong notion about the extent of powers, could not be said to be one which was not done in purported exercise of his official duties. Sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. was thus, necessary before prosecution the Divisional Forest Officer.
22. These decisions, we feel, are not apposite precedents in view of the legal position clarified by the Supreme Court.
23. We would like to borrow the words from the opinion of Lord Simonds in H.H.B. Gill v. King, AIR 1948 PC 128 : (49 Cri LJ 503) when he says (in paragraph 30) that:
'A public servant can only be said to act or to purport to act in the discharge of his official duty, if his act is such as to lie within the scope of his official duty. Thus, a Judge neither acts nor purports to act as a Judge in receiving a bribe, though the judgment which he delivers may be such an act : nor does a Government medical officer act or purports to act as a public servant in picking the pocket of patient whom he is examining, though the examination itself may be such an act. The test may well be whether the public servant, if challenged, can reasonably claim that, what he does, he does in virtue of his office...'.
24. a Presiding Judge is expected to maintain decorum in the proceedings before him. He is expected also to act with restraint. One would expect him to be sober, unruffled and temperate in language even when faced with a situation where those appearing before him may tend to lose their composure. True it is that the Presiding Officer has to be firm in maintaining decorum in the Court and deal decisively with those who present themselves in the Court-house irrespective of the distinction that they possess, yet, we reiterate, that the action should be consistent with the dignity of the high pedestal on which society places him, while he is discharging his duty as a Judge. In this scheme of things any vituperative outburst on the part of the Presiding Officer, howsoever grave the provocation to him, cannot be countenanced as an action sustainable as one performed by him 'while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty.'
25. Thus viewed, the use of the words 'Non-sense' and 'Bloody fool' by Shri Mandyal cannot be said to be one attributable to him 'while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty'. We are unable to accept the submission made by Shri M. S. Chandel in this regard or to uphold the view taken by the learned Additional Sessions Judge that sanction under Section 197(1) Cr.P.C. was necessary, before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kangra could take cognizance of the offence in respect whereof complaint had been filed by - petitioner Bidhi Singh against Shri Mandyal.
26. In spite of the view expressed by us, we feel disinclined to interfere with the order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge way back in the year 1983. Shri Chandel is plainly right in his submission that the action complained of has become stale by lapse of time, albeit, without much fault on the part of the complainant. It would seem inappropriate to permit it to be reopened after the lapse of more than a decade from July 7, 1981 when the incident is said to have taken place in the Court of Shri M. S. Mandyal. Moreso, when we find that in respect of the same incident the Presiding Officer, that is Shri M. S. Mandyal, had made a reference requesting this Court for initiation of contempt proceedings against petitioner Bidhi Singh and his witnesses Gian Singh and Kanshi Ram. This was through a letter dated July 8, 1981. The complaint against the Presiding Officer was filed by petitioner Bidhi Singh thereafter on July 22, 1981.
27. We, therefore, refuse to intervene in the matter and dismiss the present petition.