Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J.
1. This mandamus appeal is at the instance of the unsuccessful writ petitioners and is directed against the order dated November 25, 2005, passed by a learned Single Judge by which His Lordship dismissed a writ application filed by the present appellants.
2. The facts giving rise to filing of the said writ application may be summarized thus:
(a) The appellant No. 1 is a partnership firm being represented by the appellant No. 2, one of its partners. The appellant No. 1 carries on business as a wholesale dealer in superior kerosene oil (hereinafter referred to as SKO) having various storage points including the one situated in Metiabruz and also having the required licence for all the storage points separately and has been receiving supply of SKO from Indian Oil Corporation, one of the respondents herein.
(b) The grievance of the appellants in the writ application was that the Indian Oil Corporation had illegally curtailed the required quota of the kerosene oil for the supply of the same to the ration-card-holders who are tagged with the appellant No. 1 by virtue of the order passed by the State-respondent in exercise of power conferred under the West Bengal Kerosene Control Order, 1968 ('the Control Order') as amended up-to-date. The writ petitioners complained that the Indian Oil Corporation had no right or authority to curb the quota of an agent, which is fixed by the State-respondent by tagging the ration-card-holders of the area to a particular agent. According to the writ petitioners, although they are entitled to an allotment of 218 KL of the Kerosene oil in accordance with the number of tagged ration-cards determined by the State-respondent, the Indian Oil Corporation has illegality reduced the said quota and has supplied 160 KL of Kerosene oil by which it is not possible for the writ petitioners to supply the Kerosene oil to the ration-card-holders attached to their agency. The writ-petitioners, therefore, prayed for mandamus directing the State-respondent to ensure that the allocation of the SKO is made in conformity with the tagged ration-cards in favour of the writ-petitioners under the Control Order. The writ-petitioners further prayed for a writ in the nature of prohibition, prohibiting the respondents from acting contrary to the provisions of the Control Order and also in violation of the Order dated March 21, 2002 passed by this High Court in a previous writ application.
3. The writ application was contested by the Indian Oil Corporation by filing aiffdavit-in-opposition thereby denying the allegations made in the writ application. According to the Indian Oil Corporation, it is not bound by any direction given by the State-respondent as regards allocation of Kerosene oil to its agent. The Indian Oil Corporation contended that the Control Order could not guide the contract between itself and its agents. In other words, according to the Indian Oil Corporation, it has the absolute authority to decide the amount of such allotment to its various agents. The Indian Oil Corporation, therefore, prayed for dismissal of the writ application.
4. The State-respondent, however, did not file any written objection to the writ application filed by the appellant.
5. The learned Single Judge, by the order impugned herein, on consideration of the provisions contained in the Control Order came to the conclusion that power or right to determine the quota of agents of the Oil Company is guided by the contract between the Oil Company and its agent and the agents are not under the Control of the Director of Consumer Goods except to the extent of terms and conditions mentioned in the licence but he had nothing to do with the allotment of quota to its agents. As regards the terms and conditions mentioned in the resolution taken by the parties pursuant to the earlier order passed by this Court in a different writ application, His Lordship was of the view that those terms and conditions were made to ensure smooth functioning of the public distribution system. Ultimately, His Lordship held that the right of the Oil Company and its agents are fully governed by the contracts executed by them and the provisions of the Control Order cannot in any way affect any right arising out of or in relation to the terms of the contract. His Lordship, thus, dismissed the writ application.
6. Being dissatisfied, the writ petitioners have come up with the present mandamus appeal.
7. Mr. Bandopadhaya, the learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has vehemently criticized the order passed by the learned Single Judge and has contended that after the amendment of the definition of the Oil Distributing Company in the West Bengal Kerosene Control Order, there is no scope of any argument that the Oil Companies are not bound by the West Bengal Kerosene Control Order or the Orders passed by the State-respondent under the provision of the Control Order. According to Mr. Bandopadhaya, the State-respondent has the absolute authority to fix the quota of any agent and the Oil Companies are bound to supply Kerosene oil in accordance with such quota. According to him, if a particular quota is fixed by the State-respondent by allotting a particular number of ration-cards tagged with an agent, the Oil Company cannot dishonour such order and is bound to supply Kerosene oil in accordance with the quota so fixed by the State-respondent. Mr. Bandopadhaya contends that if the Oil Companies are permitted to fix quota of allotment according to their sweet-will, the provisions contained in the West Bengal Kerosene Control Order will be frustrated and the ration-card-holders will not get the required amount of Kerosene oil fixed by the State-respondent. He, therefore, prays for setting aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge and for passing direction upon the Oil Company to allot the required quota to his clients fixed by the State-respondent.
8. Mr. Mitra, the learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Indian Oil Corporation, has, however, vehemently opposed the aforesaid contentions advanced by the learned Advocate for the appellants and according to him, the learned Single Judge rightly came to the conclusion that the relationship of principal and agent between the Oil Companies and the agents cannot be guided by the Kerosene Control Order. Mr. Mitra contends that under the West Bengal Kerosene Control Order itself, the Oil Companies are not required to take any licence from the State-respondent and the said fact indicates that the Oil Companies are not bound by the direction of the State-respondents as regards tagging of ration-cards with a particular agent. Mr. Mitra submits that if his client finds that a particular agent is inefficient or is not following the terms of the agreement, it has every right to take necessary action against its agent and in the process, can also reduce the quota of allotment of Kerosene oil. Mr. Mitra further submits that even in accordance with the resolution previously arrived at by the parties; the Oil Companies are given liberty to settle the quota of allotment of the SKO in such a way so that there is parity in distribution. Mr. Mitra submits that his client has taken decision that allotment of quota of Kerosene oil to an agent should not exceed 250 KL and at the same time, it must not be less than 75 KL. Mr. Mitra contends that as some of the agent's quota had fallen down below 75 KL, his client was forced to readjust the allotment of the quota, as a result, the quota of the writ petitioner was reduced. Mr. Mitra, therefore, prays for dismissing the appeal by affirming the order passed by the learned Single Judge.
9. Mr. Sarkar, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the State-respondent, has, on the other hand, supported the contention of the appellants and has contended that in the matter of supply of Kerosene Oil, his client is the absolute authority to take the policy-decision of supply of Kerosene Oil and in exercise of such power, the authorized officer of the State Government tags ration-cards to the agents who are given appropriate licence for the above purpose. Mr. Sarkar contends that the overall control of the supply of Kerosene Oil in the State of West Bengal is in the hand of the State-respondent and not only the agents but also the Oil Distributing Companies are bound by the decision of the State-respondent in exercise of power conferred under Kerosene Control Order. He, therefore, prays for setting aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge and for declaration of the authority of the State-respondent in the matter of supply of kerosene oil as the supreme one.
10. Therefore, the only question that falls for determination in this mandamus appeal is whether the Oil Distributing Companies are bound to supply kerosene oil to the various agents in accordance with the quota fixed by the State-respondent by way of tagging ration-cards to the agents.
11. To appreciate the aforesaid question, it will be profitable to refer to the following provisions of the West Bengal Kerosene Control Order, 1968 as amended up-to-date:
3(a) 'agent' means a person who has been appointed as an agent of an oil distributing company by such company and has been granted a licence under paragraph 5 of this order;
3(c) 'dealer' means a person who has been granted a licence under paragraph 6 of this order authorising him to carry on trade in kerosene oil;
3(h) Oil Distributing Company' means a company specified in Schedule II to this order.
SCHEDULE II
1. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited.
2. Hindusthan Petroleum Corporation Limited.
3. Indian Oil Corporation Limited.
4. Indo-Burma Petroleum Company Limited.
Amended 3(h) 'Oil Distributing Company' means a Company specified in Schedule II to this Order, which will supply S.K. Oil to the Agents having valid licence on the basis of ration cards tagged with the Agents through S.K. dealers retailers.
4. Ban on trade in kerosene without licence.-After such date as the State Government may specify by notification in the Official Gazette, not less than 60 days from the date on which this order comes into force, no person other than an oil distributing company shall carry on trade in kerosene unless he is in possession of a valid licence issued under this order,
5. Grant of licence to agent.-(1) The Director may grant a licence to any agent in West Bengal authorising him to carry on trade in kerosene as such agent.
(2) A licence granted under sub-paragraph (1) shall be in Form A and shall be subject to such conditions as are specified therein and such other conditions as the Director may lay down from time to time in the interest of fair distribution of kerosene oil within the State.
(3) No agent shall sell, supply or transfer kerosene to any person other than a dealer duly licensed under paragraph 6 of this order, or a holder of a permit or delivery order issued under Paragraph II of this order.
8. Refusal to grant or renew licence.-The Director or the District Magistrate elsewhere, may, after giving the agent or the dealer or 'hawker' concerned an opportunity of stating his case in writing and for reasons to be recorded in writing, refuse to grant or renew a licence under this order.
9. Cancellation or suspension of licence.-If it appears to the Director or the District Magistrate having jurisdiction that an agent or a dealer has indulged in any malpractice or contravened any provision of this order or any condition of the licence or any direction given under paragraph 12 of this order, he may forthwith temporarily suspend the licence:
Provided that the agent or the dealer whose licence has been so suspended shall be given an opportunity of being heard before cancellation of the licence or revocation of the order of suspension of the licence finally, by an order in writing, to be made within 30 days from the date of suspension of the licence. The order shall be passed ex parte if, the dealer whose licence has been so suspended fails to appear at the hearing.
11. Issue of delivery order or permit.-(1) The Director or the District Magistrate 'having jurisdiction' may issue a delivery order or permit requiring an agent within his jurisdiction to supply kerosene to-
(a) a dealer, or
(b) other person or establishment requiring kerosene for his or its own consumption, or
in any particular area, if in the opinion of the Director or the District Magistrate, as the case may be, is considered necessary.
(c) an agent.
12. After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties and after going through the aforesaid provisions contained in the Control Order, we find that SKO is a subsidised item of great demand and is allocated by the Central Government to the various States to be supplied by different Oil Companies. According to the State-wise/company-wise allocation chart issued by the Central Government, the State of West Bengal is also allocated a particular quantity of SKO. Every month, the State Governments, including the Government of the State of West Bengal, divides and allocates the State-wise allotment of SKO among the different districts to be supplied by different Oil Distributing Companies. In exercise of power conferred under the Essential Commodities Act, the West Bengal Kerosene Control Order, 1968 has been enacted. In terms of the aforesaid Control Order, the State Government is under the obligation to distribute the SKO to the people of the West Bengal. Therefore, in the matter of distribution of SKO in the State of West Bengal, the Kerosene Control Order, 1968 is the guide. According to those provisions, an agent or a dealer is required to take licence for supply of Kerosene oil in terms of Order 5 of the Control Order. The State-respondent grants such licence and it has also the power of cancellation or suspension of licence. According to Order 4, no person other than an Oil Distributing Company shall carry on trade in Kerosene unless he is in possession of a valid license issued under the said Order. According to the amended definition of Oil Distributing Company in the Control Order, it means a Company specified in Schedule II of the order which will supply SKO to the agents having valid license on the basis of ration-cards tagged with the agent through SK dealers retailers. Therefore, once the Indian Oil Corporation becomes an Oil Distributing Company within the meaning of Kerosene Control Order, it has a duty to supply SKO to the agents having valid license on the basis of ration-cards tagged with those agents through SK dealers retailers. It necessarily follows, that Indian Oil Corporation is bound to adhere to the provisions contained in the Control Order. The Indian Oil Corporation, therefore, cannot according to its own choice distribute Kerosene oil to its agents but it should supply the oils on the basis of ration-cards tagged to the agents by the State-respondent.
13. We, therefore, find no substance in the contention of Mr. Mitra, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the Indian Oil Corporation that the Control Order does not bind his client or that no licence is required to his client for the purpose of carrying on trade in Kerosene. The fact that Mr. Mitra's client is one of the Oil Distributing Companies within the meaning of Control Order itself suggests that it has agreed to supply SKO to the agents having valid license on the basis of ration-cards tagged with the agent through SK dealers retailers and thus, it is bound to comply with the provision contained in the Control Order.
14. We, therefore, find substance in the contention of Mr. Bandopadhaya that the Indian Oil Corporation having accepted the position of an Oil Distributing Company is bound by the provision contained in the Control Order and cannot ignore the decision of the State-respondent tagging a particular number of ration-card-holders to a particular agent. Moreover, the definition of an agent as mentioned in Order 3(a) of the Control Order itself indicates that in order to act as agent such person must not only be appointed as agent by the Oil Distributing Company but also should possess a licence from the District Magistrate or the Director under the provisions of the Control Order; in other words, an Oil Distributing Company cannot supply Kerosene oil to a person unless such person also possesses licence under the Control Order granted by the State-respondent. Therefore, a simple agent of Indian Oil Corporation without having any licence granted by the State-respondent cannot supply Kerosene oil to the public and unless, the Indian Oil Corporation agrees to comply with the provisions contained in the Control Order, it cannot also come within the purview of the term 'Oil Distributing Company' so as to carry on the trade of Kerosene in the State of West Bengal.
15. The Indian Oil Corporation, thus, is duty-bound to supply the exact quantity of SKO that is required to be supplied by an agent pursuant to the order of the concerned State authority under the Kerosene Control Order as per tagging of ration-cards to a particular agent.
16. We now propose to deal with the decisions cited by Mr. Mitra in this connection.
17. In the case of Special Officer & Competent Authority v. P.S. Rao reported in : [2000]1SCR257 , the Supreme Court was considering the meaning of the word 'hold' appearing in Sections 2(l) and 20(1)(a) & (b) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. In the said case, it was contended on behalf of the appellant that an application for grant of exemption under Section 20(1)(b) of the said Act was not maintainable once the excess land has been declared and the excess land has vested in the State under Section 10, inasmuch as that the declarant cannot be said to be 'holding' the land any longer. The Supreme Court overruled the said contention by observing that the definition of the words 'to hold' in Section 2(l) is relevant at the time of computation of the ceiling area and at the stage of the preliminary determination of the excess land and in the final determination under Sections 8 and 9 of the Act, the excess land is to be determined on the basis of the land permitted by the Act to be held by a person. But the word 'hold' in Section 20(1)(a) or Section 20(1)(b), the Supreme Court proceeded, cannot have the same meaning that can be attributed to it as in Section 2(l). According to the Supreme Court, the very definition in Section 2(l) states that it applies, unless there is anything in the context which suggests a different meaning to be given. The Supreme Court further held that in the context of Section 20(1)(a) and Section 20(1)(b), the definition given in Section 2(l) cannot be applied. The reason was that such a construction would make Section 20 unworkable and otiose. In the case before us, the definition of Oil Distributing Company as it originally stood has been amended so as to give effect to the intention of the legislature that the overall control of the distribution of the Kerosene oil would remain in the hand of the State-respondent; otherwise, there was no other plausible reason for such amendment. We, therefore, find that the aforesaid decision cannot have any application to the facts of the present case.
18. In the case of Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trademarks reported in : AIR1999SC22 , the Supreme Court reiterated the well-settled principle that in all statutes, definitions have to be read subject to the qualification variously expressed in the definition clauses which created them and it may be that even where the definition is exhaustive inasmuch as the word defined is said to mean a certain thing, it is possible for the word to have a somewhat different meaning in different sections of the Act depending upon the subject or context. That is why, the Supreme Court proceeded, all definitions in statutes generally begin with the qualifying words, as is used therein, namely, 'unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context'. According to the Supreme Court, there may be sections in the Act where the meaning may have to be departed from on account of the subject or context in which the word had been used. The Supreme Court further held that in view of such qualification, the Court has not only to look at the words but also to look at the context, the collocation and the object of such words relating to such matter and to interpret the meaning intended to be conveyed by the use of the word under those circumstances.
19. We do not for the moment dispute with the aforesaid proposition of law laid down by the Supreme Court. But in the case before us, Mr. Mitra, the learned senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the Indian Oil Corporation, could not show any reason why the definition of the Oil Distributing Company as it originally stood was amended so as to add the expression 'which will supply S. K. Oil to the agents having valid license on the basis of ration-cards tagged with the agents through S.K. dealers retailers'. In the case before us, we are of the opinion that the aforesaid amendment was made for the purpose of giving effect to the intention of the legislature that for the supply of Kerosene oil throughout the State of West Bengal, the State-respondent will have the absolute authority and everybody, right from the Oil Distributing Company up to the general public, will be bound by the decision of the State-respondent. We, thus, find that the principles laid down in the said decision cannot help Mr. Mitra's client in any way.
20. In the case of K.V. Muthu v. Angamuthu Ammal reported in 1997(2) SCC 51, the Supreme Court has repeated the aforesaid well-settled principle that the definition, like any other word in a statute, is to be read in the light of the context and scheme of the Act as also the object for which the Act was made by the legislature. In our opinion, this decision rather supports the contention of the appellant that the definition of the Oil Distributing Company as amended, really gives effect to the object of enacting the Kerosene Control Order that the total distribution and system of supply should be controlled by the State-respondent.
21. In the case of V.F. & G. Insurance Co. v. Fraser and Ross reported in : [1960]3SCR857 , the same principle that all definitions in the statutes generally begin with the qualifying words, namely, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context and in view of this qualification, the Court has not only to look at the words but also to look at the context, the collocations and the object of such words relating to such matters and interpret the meaning intended to be conveyed by the use of the words under the circumstances. We have already pointed out that by the amended definition of the Oil Distributing Company, the intention of the legislature was clear and unambiguous and the only possible view that can be taken is that the legislature intended to confer absolute power and authority to the District Magistrates and the Director, as the case may be, in the matter of supply and distribution of Kerosene oil.
22. Mr. Mitra also placed before us the 'Statutory Interpretation' by F.A.R. Bennion, 1984 Edition, for the purpose of pointing out to us the duty of a Court in the matter of interpreting a word appearing in a statute and the effect of such word appearing in the definition clause. According to the said authority, whether the defining enactment says so or not, the definition applies only where the contrary intention does not appear. This is because the legislature is always free to disrupt a definition whether expressly or by implication. In the case before us, Mr. Mitra could not place before us any other plausible meaning of the phrase 'Oil Distributing Company' apart from the one indicated in the definition clause.
23. We, therefore, find that the decisions and the authority mentioned above cited by Mr. Mitra are of no avail to his client.
24. We, accordingly, find substance in the contention of Mr. Bandopadhaya, the learned senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant that the learned Single Judge erred in law in dismissing the writ application filed by the appellants. We, consequently, set aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge and pass order in terms of prayers (a) and (b) of the writ application.
25. Since the points involved in other appeal being A.P.O. No. 630 of 2005 (Hemlata Khatri v. State of West Bengal and Ors.) is also the similar to the one involved herein and is also directed against the similar order passed by the learned Single Judge, the said appeal is also disposed of in terms of the present order by setting aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge and passing order in terms of prayers (a) and (b) of the writ application out of which this appeal arises.
26. The appeals are, thus, allowed. In the facts and circumstances, there will be, however, no order as to costs.
Prabuddha Sankar Banerjee, J.
27. I agree.