P. Bhavadasan, J.
1. Four persons were sought to be prosecuted for the offences punishable under Sections 302and 392 read with Section 34 Indian Penal Code. Among them accused Nos. 2 and 3 had absconded and were not available for trial. Accused Nos. 1 and 4 alone stood trial. They were found guilty of the offences alleged against them. They were therefore convicted and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs. 5000/- each, in default of payment of which they have to suffer simple imprisonment for six more months for the offence punishable under Section 302IPC. They were also directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for ten years each and to pay a fine of Rs. 3000/- each for the offence punishable under Section 392 IPC, in default of payment of fine to suffer simple imprisonment for a further period of three months. The substantive sentences were to run concurrently. Set off as per law was also allowed.
2. The first accused has preferred Crl. Appeal No. 64 of 2006 and the fourth accused had preferred Crl. Appeal No. 2186 of 2005.
3. Asharaf, the unfortunate victim, was a driver by profession. He was driving a Tata Sumo vehicle belonging to P.W.4 bearing registration No. KL-5E-6433. As usual, on 23.8.2001 also the deceased took the vehicle from the house of P.W.4. While waiting at Changanacherry Municipal Taxi Stand, accused Nos. 1 and 4 approached him. The first accused talked to Ashraf, while the fourth accused stood in front of the car. Accused Nos. 2 and 3 stood on the opposite side of the road. It appears that accused Nos. 1 to 4 hired the vehicle driven by Ashraf to go to Thodupuzha. All the four got into the vehicle. Since Ashraf felt that he could return only late in the night, he called P.W.3, the brother-in-law of P.W.4 from Ettumannoor. Ashraf informed P.W.3 that 3-4 persons hired the vehicle for a trip to Thodupuzha and he will return late in the night. P.W.4, the owner of the vehicle had gone to Coimbatore. On his return late in the night, he did not find the vehicle. On enquiry, he was informed that Ashraf had called and informed that the vehicle has been hired for a trip to Thodupuzha. To the surprise of P.W.4, Ashraf did not return the next day morning also. He found it to be unusual. He therefore enquired in the Municipal Taxi Stand at Changanacherry and came to know that on the previous day the vehicle had been hired to go to Kottayam side.
4. In the meanwhile, P.W.1, a driver by profession at Thodupuzha saw the dead body of Ashraf lying in a bush by the side of the road on 24.8.2001. He informed the Thodupuzha police station and Ext.P1 first information statement was recorded. P.W.1 was not familiar with Ashraf. When he learned that dead body of a person was lying in a bush by the side of a road, he had gone to see the same. Ext.P1 was recorded by P.W.29, the Sub Inspector of Police attached to Thodupuzha Police Station. He accordingly registered crime under Ext.P23 FIR. He then summoned the services of Finger Print Expert, Dog Squad and Scientific Expert. He had conducted inquest and prepared Ext.P14 report. M.Os. 1 and 3 series of articles were seized. P.W.31 took over investigation. In the meanwhile, autopsy was conducted by P.W.26 who prepared Ext.P21 postmortem report. Opinion in Ext.P21 report was that death was caused due to penetrating injury sustained on the chest of Ashraf, and that injury could be caused by a knife.
5. P.W.31, who took over investigation recorded statements of the witnesses. On the basis of the statement given by P.W.10 on 27.4.2002, he had arrested accused No. 4 on 29.4.2002 at about 8.30 p.m. On 30.4.2002 a team of officers went to Maharashtra. The team was headed by P.W.30. They reached Maharashtra and located accused Nos. 2 and 3. They were arrested on 6.5.2002 at 7.30 a.m. On search of accused Nos. 2 and 3 they were able to recover a metal chain from the possession of accused No. 2. Based on the confession statement of accused No. 3, namely, Ext.P24(a), the car was recovered as per Ext.P24 mahazar. Based on Ext.P6(a) confession statement said to have been given by accused No. 4, battery of the vehicle and number plates, namely M.O.10, 3 and 4 series were recovered. Search of the house of accused No. 1 resulted in recovery of M.Os. 6, 7 and 9. Ext.P25 is the search list. On 6.5.2002 at about 5 p.m. the search of the house of accused No. 4 was conducted and M.O.16 was recovered. Ext.P26 is the search list. Thereafter accused No. 2's house was searched and Ext.P27 is the search list. In the meanwhile P.W.31 had the body hair, scalp hair, blood and body tissues of accused Nos. 1 and 4 collected with the aid of P.W.23. He obtained the site plan and various other documents necessary for the case, recorded statements of witnesses and completed investigation and laid charge before court.
6. JFCM, Thodupuzha, before whom final charge was laid, took cognizance of the offences. All the accused entered appearance. The learned Magistrate completed all the legal formalities. The learned Magistrate found that the offence is one exclusively triable by a court of Sessions and therefore committed the case to Sessions Court, Thodupuzha under Section 209 Cr.P.C. The said court made over the case to Additional Sessions Court, Ad hoc I, Thodupuzha for trial and disposal.
7. Even though before the said court all the four accused appeared initially, later on accused Nos. 2 and 3 absconded and the case against them was split up and re-filed. After hearing both sides, charge was framed for the offences punishable under Sections 302and 392 read with Section 34 Indian Penal Code. The charge was read over to accused Nos. 1 and 4. They pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. Prosecution therefore had P.Ws. 1 to 31 examined Exts.P1 to P31 marked. They also had M.Os. 1 to 17 identified and marked. After the close of the prosecution evidence, the accused were questioned under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code. They denied all the incriminating circumstances brought out in evidence and maintained that they were innocent. Finding that the accused could not be acquitted under Section 232 Cr.P.C. they were asked to enter on their defence. Accused Nos. 1 and 4 chose to adduce no evidence. On the basis of the available evidence, the court came to the conclusion that the prosecution has established the guilt of accused Nos. 1 and 4. Accordingly conviction and sentence as already mentioned followed. The said conviction and sentence are assailed in this appeal.
8. The question is are there any grounds made out to interfere with the conviction and sentence passed by the court below.
9. The prosecution says that accused Nos. 1 and 4 along with accused Nos. 2 and 3 with a common intention to rob the vehicle hired the vehicle to go to Thodupuzha. On the way, they killed Ashraf and took away the vehicle.
10. P.W.1 lodged the First Information Statement as he had the occasion to see the dead body of Ashraf lying in a bush by the side of the road. P.W.2 is the brother of the deceased. On 23.8.2001 Asharaf had gone as usual with the vehicle and parked his vehicle in the Municipal Taxi Stand at Changanacherry. Usually Ashraf returned early in the evening. On the date of the incident Ashraf had not come home as night advanced. Therefore P.W.2, the brother of the victim telephoned to the house of P.W.4, the owner of the vehicle. P.W.2 was informed that Ashraf had gone to Thodupuzha on a trip and would return late in the night. Next day the body of Ashraf was found in a bush by the side of the road. Ashraf had taken up employment with P.W.4 only four months ago. P.W.4 had good opinion about him. It appears that whenever Ashraf found that he will be able to return only very late in the night, he used to inform the same to P.W.4. P.W.4 had gone to Coimbatore on 23.8.2001. He returned late in the night. When he did not find his vehicle, he enquired and found that Ashraf had telephoned and said that he would come late in the night as he had been hired for a trip to Thodupuzha. On enquiry the next day by P.W.4 he came to know that on the previous day his vehicle had been hired by three or four persons to go to Thodupuzha. On his way, it seems that Ashraf had occasioned to pass by the shop of P.W.5. Ashraf told P.W.5 that if anybody called from his house, they may be told that he will return late in the night as he was going to Thodupuzha.
11. P.Ws.6 and 7 are two important witnesses for the prosecution. They were drivers who parked their vehicles in the Municipal Taxi Stand at Changanacherry. Their evidence shows that on 23.8.2001 the accused had come to the Taxi Stand at about 6.30 p.m.. Two of them stood on the opposite side of the road and accused Nos. 1 and 4 approached Ashraf. One of them stood in front of the vehicle. Soon accused Nos. 1 and 4 called accused Nos. 2 and 3 and they left in the car driven by Ashraf. According to these witnesses, they came to know that Ashraf was no more from the newspaper Rashtradeepika on the next day. P.Ws. 8 and 9 deposed that the accused persons had taken a room in the lodge owned by P.W.8 on 22.8.2001. This is not of much significance at all. P.W.10 is the uncle of accused No. 4. Accused No. 4 was a friend of the first accused. P.W.10 deposed that first accused had worked with him for for years. Since the conduct of accused No. 1 was far from satisfactory, P.W.10 sent him away. It seem from his evidence that accused No. 4 had worked at a place in Muvattupuzha for four years and then he left Kerala. From the evidence of this witness, it is seen that accused No. 4 had called P.W.10 and enquired about first accused. It was revealed to him that accused No1 owed Rs. 25,000/- and that accused No. 4 had come in search of accused No. 1. The evidence is to the effect that accused No. 4 told him that he along with others had taken a Tata Sumo vehicle. As per the evidence of P.W.10 he telephoned to the house of accused No. 4. The call was attended by the father of fourth accused, who informed P.W.10 that a Tata Sumo had been brought to the house and he does not know how fourth accused came into possession of the same. P.W.10 seems to have passed on this information to a Police Constable by name Faizal. Faizal told him to inform the Crime Branch. P.Ws. 11 and 12 are the witnesses to the recoveries and other matters. Their evidence will be discussed at the appropriate places. P.W.26 had conducted autopsy over the body of deceased Ashraf and furnished Ext.P21 report. P.W.24 is the Assistant Director of FSL who prepared Exts.P17 and P18. P.W.27 had conducted identification parade. P.W.28 is the Joint Director of FSL, who had collected hair samples from the car. The evidence of P.Ws. 29, 30 and 31, who are the police officers had already been referred to.
12. The court below seems to have been impressed by the evidence of P.Ws. 6, 7, 8, 9, 27, 30 and 31. Reliance was also placed on the extra judicial confession alleged to have been made by accused No. 4 to P.W.10 as one of the circumstances which went against the accused. So also the court below found that various recoveries were properly proved. Finding that cogent evidence was adduced by the prosecution, the court below held accused Nos. 1 and 4 guilty.
13. Learned Counsel appearing for the first accused in Crl. Appeal 64 of 2006 pointed out that the case is built on circumstantial evidence. In such cases, no link should remain unsubstantiated. The link established should form a complete chain leading to an irresistible conclusion of the guilt of the accused and should be inconsistent with his innocence. Learned Counsel pointed out that the court below had relied on the following circumstances:
a) Identification of accused Nos. 1 and 4 by P.Ws. 6, 7, 8 and 9.
b) Extra judicial confession to P.W.10 by accused No. 4.
c) The hairs taken from the vehicle matched with the hair samples of accused Nos. 1 and 4.
d) Recovery and seizure of various articles.
14. Learned Counsel for the appellant in Crl. Appeal 64 of 2006 pointed out that none of the above circumstances is established beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence of P.Ws. 6, 7, 8 and 9 regarding the identification of the accused cannot be accepted. After the arrest of accused Nos. 1 to 4, atleast on two occasions, they were produced before the JFCM court for extension of remand and the witnesses could have easily seen them. Custody of first and fourth accused was obtained on 6.5.2002 and accused Nos. 2 and 3 on 10.5.2002. Test identification parade was conducted only on 1.6.2002. Meanwhile, the evidence shows that, according to learned Counsel, the accused were taken to various places. It was very easy for the witnesses to see them and the test identification parade conducted by P.W.27 was an idle exercise. It was also pointed out that the persons selected for the identification parade had no comparison with the accused persons and that too vitiated the identification parade. In support of his contention, learned Counsel for the appellant relied on the decisions reported in Suryamoorthi v. Vogindaswamy : (1989) 3 SCC 24 and State of A.P. v. M.V. Ramana Reddy : (1991) 4 SCC 536. Relying on the above decision, it was contended that the identification parade said to have been made is of no value.
15. Drawing attention to the so-called confession statement said to have been made by accused No. 4 to P.W.10, the learned Counsel pointed out that that statement by accused No. 4 to P.W.10 cannot bind accused No. 1. In support of this contention, learned Counsel relied on the decision reported in Basanti v. State of Himachal Pradesh : (1987) 3 SCC 227.
16. As regards the hair samples, learned Counsel pointed out that it is true that the car was seized long before the arrest of accused. But the hair samples taken from the car and hair samples of the accused reached the FSL on the same date. There is no explanation from the side of the prosecution as to why there was delay in forwarding the hair samples taken from the car to the FSL. Under the given circumstance, according to learned Counsel, manipulation by the investigating agency cannot be ruled out. According to learned Counsel, equally shabby is the evidence regarding the recoveries made. As regards the recoveries, it is stated that most of the recoveries were made from the house of the accused while they were in custody. For reasons best known to the investigating agency, they did not feel it necessary to take the accused to their houses. It is also pointed out that none of the witnesses to the various recoveries was examined. Therefore, according to learned Counsel, the recoveries cannot be relied on.
17. Learned Counsel appearing for accused No. 4 in Crl. Appeal 2186 of 2005 in addition to the grounds urged by the learned Counsel for he appellant in the other case pointed out that the so called confession statement given by accused No. 4 to P.W.10 does not implicate accused No. 4 at all. If that be so, it could not be treated as an extra judicial confession.
18. Learned Public Prosecutor countering the above arguments pointed out that the contentions taken by the appellants are without any basis. The court below, according to the learned Public Prosecutor has considered the evidence in considerable detail and had come to the conclusion that they are acceptable. According to the Public Prosecutor, identification parade conducted was proper. There is no fixed formula regarding the conduct of identification parade and effect of the identification parade conducted varies from case to case depending upon the facts of each case. Learned Public Prosecutor also pointed out that there can be no precedents with respect to the appreciation of evidence as the evidence in each case will have to be independently evaluated. Learned Public Prosecutor stressed that the prosecution has produced all the possible evidence and none should expect the impossible from the prosecution. Identification of the accused by P.Ws.6 to 9, recovery of M.O.11 book and various other articles some of which were parts of the vehicle belonging to P.W.4 are sufficient to show the involvement of accused Nos. 1 and 4 in the crime. Ext.P19 report furnished by the expert regarding the hair analysis also indicate that the accused were involved. All the links in the chain had been independently proved and according to the learned Public Prosecutor the cumulative effect of the links so proved lead to the irresistible conclusion that it was the accused and the accused alone, who had committed the gruesome act. Therefore, the learned Public Prosecutor, summed up by saying that no grounds are made out to interfere with the judgment under appeal.
19. The case is built of circumstantial evidence. Principles to be applied are well known. While appreciating circumstantial evidence, it is stated that the court must adopt a very cautious approach and should record a conviction only if all the links in the chain are complete, pointing to the guilt of the accused and every hypothesis of innocence is capable of being negatived on evidence. Great care must be taken in evaluating circumstantial evidence and if the evidence relied on is reasonably capable of two inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted. Circumstantial evidence relied on must be found to have been fully established and must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt. But it is not to say that the prosecution must meet each and every hypothesis put forward however far fetched or fanciful it may be. The prosecution evidence must not be rejected on the slightest ground because law permits rejection if the doubt is reasonable and not otherwise. It is unnecessary to refer to plethora of decisions on this aspect. It will be sufficient if one refers to the decision reported in Kusuma Ankama Rao v. State of A.P. : AIR 2008 SC 2819, wherein it was held as follows:
It has been consistently laid down by this Court that where a case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of any other person. (See Hukam Singh v. State of Rajasthan : AIR 1977 SC 1063; Eradu and Ors. v. State of Hyderabad : AIR 1956 SC 316; Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka : AIR 1983 SC 446; State of U.P. v. Sukhbasi and Ors. : AIR 1985 SC 1224; Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab : AIR 1987 SC 350; Ashok Kumar Chatterjee v. State of M.P. : AIR 1989 SC 1890. The circumstances from which an inference as to the guilt of the accused is drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred from those circumstances. In Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab : AIR 1954 SC 621, it was laid down that where the case depends upon the conclusion drawn from circumstances the cumulative effect of the circumstances must be such as to negative the innocence of the accused and bring the offences home beyond any reasonable doubt.
We may also make a reference to a decision of this Court in C. Chenga Reddy and Ors. v. State of A.P. : (1996) 10 SCC 193, wherein it has been observed thus:
In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all the circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence....
In Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P. and Ors. : AIR 1990 SC 79, it was laid down that when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy the following tests:
(1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established; (2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused;
(3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and
(4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence.
In State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava 1992 Cri.L.J 1104, it was pointed out that great care must be taken in evaluating circumstantial evidence and if the evidence relied on is reasonably capable of two inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted. It was also pointed out that the circumstances relied upon must be found to have been fully established and the cumulative effect of all the facts so established must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt.
20. It also needs to be noticed that it is not every lingering or fanciful doubt that can be regarded as a reasonable doubt. A doubt must be reasonable and it must be such that a reasonable person would entertain. Doubts of fleeting nature approximating to vague hunches cannot pass muster for reasonable doubt. It will be sufficient to refer to the decision reported in State of Madhya Pradsh v. Dharkole : AIR 2005 SC 44 wherein it was held as follows:
A person has, no doubt, a profound right not to be convicted of an offence which is not established by the evidential standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Though this standard is a higher standard, there is, however, no absolute standard. What degree of probability amounts to 'proof' is an exercise particular to each case? Referring to of probability amounts to 'proof is an exercise the inter-dependence of evidence and the confirmation of one piece of evidence by another a learned author says: (See 'The Mathematics of Proof II' Glanville Williams : Criminal Law Review, 1979, by Sweet and Maxwell, p. 340(342).
The simple multiplication rule does not apply if the separate pieces of evidence are dependent. Two events are dependent when they tend to occur together and the evidence of such events may also be said to be dependent. In a criminal case, different pieces of evidence directed to establishing that the defendant did the prohibited act with the specified state of mind are generally dependent. A junior may feel doubt whether to credit an alleged confession, and doubt whether to infer guilt from the fact that the defendant fled from justice. But since it is generally guilty rather than innocent people who make confessions and guilty rather than innocent people who run away, the two doubts are not to be multiplied together. The one piece of evidence may confirm the other.
Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford any favourite other than truth. To constitute reasonable doubt, it must be free from an over emotional response. Doubts must be actual and substantial doubts as to the guilt of the accused persons arising from the evidence, or from the lack of it, as opposed to mere vague apprehensions. A reasonable doubt s not an imaginary, trivial or a merely possible doubt; but a fair doubt based upon reason and commonsense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case.
21. The main items of evidence are the deposition of P.Ws. 6 and 7. It is necessary to refer to their evidence in detail. Both these witnesses, as already noted, are taxi drivers, who park their vehicles in the same Municipal Taxi stand as was done by the deceased. The evidence of these witnesses show that on the date of the incident, four persons had come to hire a taxi. Among them accused Nos. 1 and 4 approached late Ashraf, while the other two stood on the opposite side of the road. Both of them said that while accused No. 1 was talking to late Ashraf, accused No. 4 stood in front of the car. Soon thereafter accused No. 4 called accused Nos. 2 and 3 and all the four of them left in the car driven by Ashraf.
22. Though much criticism is levelled against the witnesses, they are without any substance at all. One must remember that they are natural witnesses and they had no reason to speak falsehood. P.W.6 has categorically stated that his vehicle was parked only ten meters away from the vehicle of Ashraf. He was standing in front of his car. They are all waiting for passengers to hire their vehicle. Accused Nos. 1 and 4 passed him when they went towards Ashraf. It has also come out in evidence that he has been plying taxi for over twenty years. Evidence of P.W.7 shows that the accused persons talked to Ashraf for about ten minutes and he also deposed that it is usual for taxi drivers to watch the persons who come to hire the vehicle. He had also deposed that the first accused occupied the front seat of the car driven by Ashraf and the others took the rear seat. Even though these witnesses were cross-examined at length, nothing advantageous to the accused persons could be brought out from their testimony. They gave a consistent, cogent, uniform and convincing version regarding the hiring of the vehicle by the accused on the date of the incident. It will be only appropriate at this juncture to refer to the decision reported in State of Maharashtra v. Siraj Ahmed Nisar Ahmed : (2007) 5 SCC 161 wherein it was held as follows:
While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of a witness read as a whole, appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence, more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence, as a whole, and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. Minor discrepancies on trivial matter not touching the core of matter in issue, hypertechnical approach by taking sentence out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer not going to the root of the matter, would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole.
23. One may recollect that the vehicle was hired on 23.8.2001 in the evening to be more precise between 6.30 - 7.00 p.m. The next day the body of Ashraf was found. P.Ws.6 and 7 have given convincing evidence that Ashraf was last seen in the company of the accused persons. There are other items of evidence, which also show that Ashraf's vehicle was hired to go to Thodupuzha. In the light of the above facts, the last seen theory comes into play and it is for the accused to explain as to what had happened to Ashraf after they hired his vehicle to go to Thodupuzha.
24. In the decision reported in State of Goa v. Pandurang Mohite : AIR 2009 SC 1066, the Apex Court, after following the decisions reported in Kusuma Ankama Rao v. State of A.P. : AIR 2008 SC 2819 and in State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran (2007) 2 SCC (Cri.) 162, it was held as follows:
So far as the last seen aspect is concerned, it is necessary to take note of two decisions of this Court. In State of U.P. v. Satish : 2005 (3) SCC 114 it was noted as follows:
22. The last seen theory comes into play where the time-gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were seen last alive and when the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any person other than the accused being the author of the crime becomes impossible. It would be difficult in some cases to positively establish that the deceased was last seen with the accused when there is a long gap and possibility of other persons coming in between exists. In the absence of any other positive evidence to conclude that the accused and the deceased were last seen together, it would be hazardous to come to a conclusion of guilt in those cases. In this case there is positive evidence that the deceased and the accused were seen together by witnesses P.Ws.3 and 5, in addition to the evidence of P.W.2.
In Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy v. State of A.P. : 2006 (10) SCC 172 it was noted as follows:
27. The last-seen theory, furthermore, comes into play where the time gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were last seen alive and the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any person other than the accused being the author of the crime becomes impossible. Even in such a case the courts should look for some corroboration.
25. It has already been noticed that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing from the evidence of P.Ws.6 and 7 that it was the accused persons, who had hired the vehicle of Ashraf on 23.8.2001 late in the evening and it has also come out in evidence that the vehicle had been hired to go to Thodupuzha. No explanation is offered by the accused persons regarding the cause of death of Ashraf. As already noticed, there is no doubt regarding the fact that death of Ashraf was homicidal.
26. Much criticism is levelled against the identification of the accused by P.W. 6 and 7. It is pointed out that the investigating officer had openly paraded the accused and the witnesses had sufficient opportunity to see them before test identification parade was conducted.
27. It will be useful to refer to the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for the appellants in this regard. In the decision reported in Suryamoorthi v. Govindaswamy : (1989) 3 SCC 24 it was held that the test identification parade conducted was bad in the light of the fact that photographs of accused had appeared in the local newspapers and that the accused had been kept in police lock up for a few days. In the decision reported in Satrughana v. State of Orissa : 1995 Supp (4) SCC 448 it was held that the identification parade was conducted one and a half months after the incident and it was held that that evidence could not be relied on.
28. In the decision reported in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Dr. M.V. Ramana Reddy : (1991) 4 SCC 536 there was ten days delay in conducting test identification parade. There also it was established that the accused were in custody for a long time and they were shown to the witnesses before identification parade was held.
29. A close reading of the above decisions will reveal that there are other circumstances in those cases which made the prosecution evidence very suspicious. It was not solely based on test identification parade that the cases were decided. One should remember here that it is the identification in Court that forms substantive evidence and the identification parade conducted during the investigation is only to ensure that the investigating agency is proceeding in the correct direction.
30. There is a plethora decisions regarding the purpose and evidentiary value of identification parade. In the decision reported in Ankush Maruti Shinde v. State of Maharashtra : (2009) 6 SCC 667 it was held as follows:
If potholes were to be ferreted out from the proceedings of the Magistrate holding such parades possibly no TI parade can escape from one or two lapses. If a scrutiny is made from that angle alone and the result of the parade is treated as vitiated every TI parade would become unusable. TI parades are not primarily meant for the court. They are meant for investigation purposes. The object of conducting TI parade is twofold. First is to enable the witnesses to satisfy themselves that the prisoner whom they suspect is really the one who was seen by them in connection with the commission of the crime. Second is to satisfy the investigating authorities that the suspect is the real person whom the witnesses had seen in connection with the said occurrence.
31. In the decision reported in Saji v. State of Kerala 2007(2) KHC 595 it was held as follows:
The conduct of test identification parade is only for helping the investigating agency to proceed in the right lines for booking the real culprits. Merely because of any such factors like publication of photographs in newspapers, the veracity of the identification parade is not lost.
The previous identification in the test identification is a check valve to the evidence of identification in Court of an accused by a witness and the same is a rule of prudence and not law. Their Lordships also held that in exceptional circumstances only, evidence of identification for the first time in Court, without the same being corroborated by previous identification in the test identification parade or any other evidence can form the basis of conviction.
It has been held that the identification of the accused made in Court by a witness is substantive evidence whereas that of identification in the identification parade is, though primary evidence but is not substantive and the same can be used only to corroborate the identification of accused by a witness in Court.
32. In the decision reported in Amitsingh Bhikamsing Thakur v. State of Maharashtra 2007 (1) KHC 487 it was held as follows:
As was observed by this Court in Matru v. State of U.P. : 1971 (2) SCC 75 identification tests do not constitute substantive evidence. They are primarily meant for the purpose of helping the investigating agency with an assurance that their progress with the investigation into the offence is proceeding on the right lines. The identification can only be used as corroborative of the statement in Court. (See Santokh Singh v. Izhar Hussain : 1973(2) SCC 406. The necessity for holding an identification parade can arise only when the accused are not previously known to the witnesses. The whole idea of a test identification parade is that witnesses who claim to have seen the culprits at the time of occurrence are to identify them from the midst of other persons without any aid or any other source. The test is done to check upon their veracity. In other words, the main object of holding an identification parade, during the investigation stage, is to test the memory of the witnesses based upon first impression and also to enable the prosecution to decide whether all or any of them could be cited as eyewitnesses of the crime. The identification proceedings are in the nature of tests and significantly, therefore, there is no provision for it in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. It is desirable that a test identification parade should be conducted as soon as after the arrest of the accused. This becomes necessary to eliminate the possibility of the accused being shown to the witnesses prior to the test identification parade. This is a very common plea of the accused and, therefore, the prosecution has to be cautious to ensue that there is no scope for making such allegation. If, however, circumstances are beyond control and there is some delay, it cannot be said to be fatal to the prosecution.
It is trite to say that the substantive evidence is the evidence of identification in Court. Apart from the clear provisions of Section 9 of the Evidence Act, the position in law is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court. The facts, which establish the identity of the accused persons, are relevant under Section 9 of the Evidence Act. As a general rule, the substantive evidence of a witness is the statement made in Court. The evidence of mere identification of the accused person at the trial for the first is from its very nature inherently of a weak character. The purpose of a prior test identification, therefore, is to test and strengthen the trustworthiness of that evidence. It is accordingly considered a sage rule of prudence to generally look for corroboration of the sworn testimony of witnesses in Court as to the identity of the accused who are strangers to them, in the form of earlier identification proceedings. This rule of prudence, however, is subject to exceptions, when, for example, the Court is impressed by a particular witness on whose testimony it can safely rely, without such or other corroboration. The identification parades belong to the stage of investigation, and there is no provision in the Code which obliges the investigating agency to hold or constitute substantive evidence and these parades are essentially governed by Section 162 of the Code. Failure to hold a test identification parade would not made inadmissible the evidence of identification in Court. The weight to be attached to such identification should be a matter for the courts of fact. In appropriate cases it may accept the evidence of identification even without insisting on corroboration.
33. In the decision reported in Heera v. State of Rajasthan : AIR 2007 SC 2425 it was held as follows:
It is trite to say that the substantive evidence is the evidence of identification in Court. Apart from the clear provisions of Section 9 of the Evidence Act, the position in law is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court. The facts, which establish the identity of the accused persons, are relevant under Section 9 of the Evidence Act. As a general rule, the substantive evidence of a witness is the statement made in Court. The evidence of mere identification of the accused person at the trial for the first is from its very nature inherently of a weak character. The purpose of a prior test identification, therefore, is to test and strengthen the trustworthiness of that evidence. It is accordingly considered a sage rule of prudence to generally look for corroboration of the sworn testimony of witnesses in Court as to the identity of the accused who are strangers to them, in the form of earlier identification proceedings. This rule of prudence, however, is subject to exceptions, when, for example, the Court is impressed by a particular witness on whose testimony it can safely rely, without such or other corroboration. The identification parades belong to the stage of investigation, and there is no provision in the Code which obliges the investigating agency to hold or constitute substantive evidence and these parades are essentially governed by Section 162 of the Code. Failure to hold a test identification parade would not made inadmissible the evidence of identification in Court. The weight to be attached to such identification should be a matter for the courts of fact. In appropriate cases it may accept the evidence of identification even without insisting on corroboration.
In Jadunath Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh : (1970) 3 SCC 518, the submission that absence of test identification parade in all cases is fatal, was repelled by this Court after exhaustive considerations of the authorities on the subject. That was a case were the witnesses had seen the accused over a period of time. The High Court had found that the witnesses were independent witnesses having no affinity with the deceased and entertained no animosity towards the appellant. They had claimed to have known the appellants for the last 67 years as they had been frequently visiting the town of Bewar. This Court noticed the observations in an earlier unreported decision of this Court in Parkash Chand Sogani v. The State of Rajasthan (Criminal Appeal No. 92 of 1956, decided on January 15, 1957), wherein it was observed. 'It is also the defence case that Shiv Lal did not know the appellant. But on a reading of the evidence of P.W.7 it seems to us clear that Shiv Lal knew the appellant by sight. Though he made a mistake about his name by referring to him as Kailash Chandra, it was within the knowledge of Shiv Lal that the appellant was a brother of Manak Chand and he identified him as such. These circumstances are quite enough to show that the absence of the identification parade would not vitiate the evidence. A person who is well known by sight as the brother of Manak Chand, even before the commission of the occurrence, need not be put before an identification parade in order to be marked out. We do not think that there is any justification for the contention that the absence of the identification parade or a mistake made as to his name, would be necessarily fatal to the prosecution case in the circumstances.
The Court concluded.
It seems to us that it has been clearly laid down by this Court, in Parkash Chand Sogani v. The State of Rajasthan (supra) that the absence of test identification in all cases is not fatal and if the accused person is well- known by sight it would be waste of time to put him up for identification. Of course if the prosecution fails to hold an identification on the plea that the witnesses already knew the accused well and it transpires in the course of the trial that the witnesses did not know the accused previously, the prosecution would run the risk of losing its case.
34. P.W.27, the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Thodupuzha had conducted the test identification parade on 1.6.2002. In that identification parade conducted by the learned Magistrate, P.W.6 had identified the first and third accused and P.W.7 had identified all the accused. In court, they identified accused Nos. 1 and 4. It may be remembered that accused Nos. 2 and 3 are absconding. There is nothing to indicate that the accused were exposed to the witnesses. The learned Magistrate has stated in detail in his evidence about the procedure followed by him. The Magistrate has stressed that he had taken sufficient care to ensure that the non-suspects were almost having similar features. In the light of this evidence furnished by P.W.27, there is little merit in the contention taken by the appellants that the test identification conducted was not proper.
35. Apart from the identification by P.Ws. 6 and 7, P.Ws. 8 and 9 have also identified the accused. P.W.8 is the owner of a lodge at Kottayam. P.Ws. 8 and 9 pointed out that since the accused were not Malayalees, they had specifically noted them. One cannot omit to note the evidence disclosed as per Exts.P18 and P19 reports of the FSL. The blood samples, scalp hairs, body hairs of the accused compared well with the samples taken from the car. These are clinching items of evidence, which goes against the accused persons. Taken independently, they may not be of conclusive nature. But taken along with other items of evidence, they too have importance.
36. The investigating officer, namely, P.W.30 has stated in detail regarding the various steps taken by him during investigation. It was based on the confession statement of the accused persons that various articles have been recovered. It is on the basis of the confession statement given by the third accused that the car was seized from the house of one Sanjay Dutt. It was from the said car that the samples were collected. May be that the samples collected from the car and the samples collected from the body of the accused persons reached the FSL on the same day. But that by itself is not a ground to doubt the veracity of the prosecution case. The various items recovered from the investigation based on the confession statement said to have been given by the accused and also the evidence have been considered in detail by the court. It is unnecessary to repeat them. There is a criticism that several items were said to have been recovered from the house of the accused while they were in custody and that they were not taken to their houses when the recovery was effected. Even assuming that there is any such flaw, that by itself is not sufficient to reject the prosecution case. It is not each and very error or impropriety in the investigation that should prove fatal.
37. One cannot omit to note the recovery of M.O.11, which is a book titled '...'. The evidence of P.W.17, who owns the Book Stall at Changanacherry reveals that this book was brought from the Book Stall by Ashraf. The evidence of P.W.30 shows that he was able to recover M.O.11 while conducting a search in the house of accused No. 4. It is indeed a clinching item of evidence against the accused persons.
38. It is necessary to refer to the decision reported in Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra 2006 (4) KLT 638(SC), wherein it was held as follows:
The law does not require the prosecution to prove the impossible. All that it requires is the establishment of such a decree of probability that a prudent man may, on its basis, believe in the existence of the fact in issue. Thus, legal proof is not necessarily perfect proof; often it is nothing more than a prudent man's estimate as to the probabilities of the case. Since it is exceedingly difficult, if not absolutely impossible for the prosecution to prove facts which are especially within the knowledge of the opponent or the accused, it is not obliged to prove them as part of its primary burden. The pristine rule that the burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused should not be taken as a fossilised doctrine as though it admits no process of intelligent reasoning. The doctrine of presumption is not alien to the above rule, nor would it impair the temper of the rule. On the other hand, if the traditional rule relating to burden of proof of the prosecution is allowed to be wrapped in pedantic coverage, the offenders in serious offences would be the major beneficiaries and the society would be the casualty. Presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other facts, unless the truth of such inference is disproved. Presumption of fact is a rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the court exercises a process of reasoning and reaches a logical conclusion as the most probable position.
39. The above discussion will clearly show that the appellants had a significant role in causing the death of Ashraf. The court below has considered the matter in considerable detail and on an impartial appreciation of the evidence in the case had come to the conclusion that the offences have been established as against accused Nos. 1 and 4. The findings of the court below are fully justified going by the evidence on record. No legal or factual infirmities could be established regarding the findings of the court below.
The result is that, these appeals are without merits and they are accordingly dismissed confirming the conviction and sentence passed by the court below.