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K. Balakrishna Rao Vs. Southern Railway and anr. - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citation
SubjectTenancy
CourtChennai High Court
Decided On
Reported in(1997)1MLJ298
AppellantK. Balakrishna Rao
RespondentSouthern Railway and anr.
Cases ReferredIn Jiwan Dass v. Life Insurance Corporation of India
Excerpt:
- .....on 31.7.1996, the respondent herein issued a notice to the petitioner under section 4 of the public premises (eviction of unauthorised occupants) act, 1971. petitioner was directed to explain why action should not be taken against him for eviction. an explanation was offered by the petitioner as per his written statement dated 26.8.1996. according to him, he has paid a sum of rs. 12,000 on 2.4.1996 being the licence fee for the year 1996-97 and, therefore, he cannot be treated as a unauthorised occupant. the respondent, as per order dated 2.9.1996, rejected the objection, and, by a reasoned order, held that the petitioner is liable to be evicted, and it was declared that he and other persons who are in occupation of the said premises should vacate within 15 days from the date of.....
Judgment:
ORDER

S.S. Subramani, J.

1. This revision is filed by the petitioner who is conducting a Vegetarian Light Refreshment Room in Platform No. 2, at Madras Egmore Railway Station, alleging that after the period of licence expired on 31.7.1996, the respondent herein issued a notice to the petitioner under Section 4 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. Petitioner was directed to explain why action should not be taken against him for eviction. An explanation was offered by the petitioner as per his written statement dated 26.8.1996. According to him, he has paid a sum of Rs. 12,000 on 2.4.1996 being the licence fee for the year 1996-97 and, therefore, he cannot be treated as a unauthorised occupant. The respondent, as per Order dated 2.9.1996, rejected the objection, and, by a reasoned Order, held that the petitioner is liable to be evicted, and it was declared that he and other persons who are in occupation of the said premises should vacate within 15 days from the date of publication of the Order, failing which they will be evicted as per the provisions of the Act.

2. Aggrieved by the Order, the petitioner filed a statutory appeal before the Principal City Civil Judge, Chennai, as C.M.A. No. 148 of 1996. The Appellate Court confirmed the Order of the Estate Officer and dismissed the appeal. That Order is challenged in this civil revision petition. In this revision also, the main and only ground urged is that since' he has paid Rs. 12,000, being the licence fee for 1996-97, till 31.3.1997 he is entitled to conduct the canteen, and he cannot be treated as an unauthorised occupant. The finding that the petitioner is an unauthorised occupant is liable to be set aside. In the judgment of the lower appellate Court, it held that there was no renewal of any licence and the mere collection of Rs. 12,000 will not give the petitioner any right as a licensee for a further period. It was further held by the Appellate Authority that even before the notice was issued, petitioner had agreed to surrender vacant possession of the premises and on his request he was allowed to be in possession for some time. Under the above circumstances, the present contention that he is entitled to continue as of right cannot be correct. How far the reasoning of the Appellate Authority is correct, and whether he acted in accordance with law, is the only point to be considered in this revision.

3. In the notice dated 4.8.1996, respondent has stated reasons why the petitioner has to be treated as an unauthorised occupant. In the notice, the first ground mentioned is, 'The agreement entered into by the Railway Administration with you for running a VLR Stall at Egmore railway station had expired and time-limit granted lapsed on 31.7.1996. The railway administration has not renewed your licence. Therefore, you are in unauthorised occupation'. It is not disputed by petitioner that he has not obtained any written order for having renewed the licence. In fact, the licence had lapsed long before that period. It is true that the petitioner seems to have paid amount of Rs. 12,000 on 2.4.1996. Before 14.8.1996, there is various correspondence between the parties. On 28.5.1996, petitioner was directed to handover possession within 15 days from the date of receipt of that letter. The same was replied by petitioner on 11.6.1996 wherein he had stated that in view of the Union problems, he is not in a position to vacate the same and, therefore, wanted two to three months' time to surrender possession. In that letter, he did not have any case that he is a licensee and the payment was in consideration of his having been granted a fresh licence. When the petitioner sought two to three months' time, respondent informed the petitioner that since he has expressed his difficulties, he will be given one month time to surrender vacant possession, failing which action will be taken. The petitioner obtained benefit of that Order. Thereafter, on 24.7.1996, petitioner was directed to handover possession by 31.7.1996. For the said letter also, he sent a reply on 2.8.1996, stating that he requires some more time to make alternate arrangements, and if the time prayed for by him was granted, he will adhere to their communication. In that letter also, he did not have a case that his licence was renewed. It was thereafter, when a notice under Section 4 was issued, he put forward a case that his licence was renewed. In this connection, it may be noted that the petitioner owes huge amount to the Department. Even towards electricity charges, he owed more than Rs. 40,000. That is only upto the period February, 1996. He was asked to pay that amount. But no payment was made. Amounts were due towards water charges, and that was upto the period of October, 1995. When huge amount was due to them, and when the petitioner was continuing in possession, by a mere of Rs. 12,000 it can never be said that the parties intended to continue the relationship.

4. In this connection, the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Ashoka Marketing Limited v. Punjab National Bank and Ors. : [1990]3SCR649 (in paragraph 30) requires reference. Therein it was held thus:

The definition of the expression 'unauthorised occupation' contained in Section 2(g) of the Public Premises Act is in two parts. In the first part the said expression has been defined to mean the occupation by any person of the public premises without authority for such occupation. It implies occupation by a person who has entered into occupation of any public premises without lawful authority as well as occupation which was permissive at the inception but has ceased to be so. The secondxpart of the definition is inclusive in nature and it expressly covers continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever. This part covers a case where a person had entered into occupation legally under valid authority but who continues in occupation after the authority under which he was put in occupation has expired or has been determined. The words 'whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer' in this part of the definition are wide in amplitude and would cover a lease because lease is a mode of transfer under the Transfer of Property Act. The definition of unauthorised occupation captained in Section 2(g) of the Public Premises Act would, therefore, cover a case where a person has entered into occupation of the public premises legally as a tenant under a lease but whose tenancy has expired or has been determined in accordance with law.

In that case, their Lordships said that though a person might have entered a premises legally, after expiry of the term, of if the term of lease is determined in accordance with law, thereafter his continued occupation will be unauthorised, and, therefore, he is liable to be evicted under the Act.

5. In Jiwan Dass v. Life Insurance Corporation of India (1994 )3 S.C.C. (Supp.) 694 their Lordships said thus:.The actions of these companies and statutory bodies while dealing with their properties under the Public Premises Act will not have to be judged by the standard that they would not act as private landlords and their actions would be informed by reason and guided by public interest.

Their Lordships further held thus:.An owner is entitled to deal with his property in his own way profitable in its use and occupation. A public authority is equally entitled to use the public property to the best advantage as a commercial venture. As an integral incidence of ejectment of a tenant/licensee is inevitable. So the doctrine of livelihood cannot indiscriminately be extended to the area of commercial operation....

6. In this case, no argument was put forward that it is not a public premises. No argument is also advanced about the validity of Section 4 notice. The only argument urged was regarding the consequence of payment of Rs. 12,000.

7. In this connection, it may be noted that before the institution of this proceedings, the Railway Authorities increased the licence fee and the petitioner was also directed to pay the enhanced licence fee. He expressed his inability. Even at that time, he expressed his willingness to surrender vacant possession. When notice demanding enhanced payment was made, he filed a writ petition before this Court challenging the validity of the notice as Writ Petition No. 4885 of 1990. He also filed in W.P. No. 6683 of 1990 to restrain the Railway Department from realising the enhanced licence-fee. While confirming the interim order prohibiting the Railways from collecting the enhanced licence fee, this Court directed the Railways to take necessary steps to get the licensee evicted from the premises.

8. Even at that time, the respondents Railways had made up its mind to evict the petitioner. Hjuge amount was due at that time. So, the mere receipt of Rs. 12,000 by the Railways cannot prevent it from initiating proceedings under Section 4 of the Act. When the parties never intended or thought of continuing or renewing the relationship of licensor and licensee, mere receipt of the amount will not create a new relationship not thought of by the parties.

9. The decision of the Appellate Court that the petitioner is liable to be evicted under the Act is, therefore, confirmed. The Revision is dismissed, but, however, without any order as to costs.

10. After arguments were over, learned Counsel for petitioner submitted that in case this Court dismisses the revision petition, his client must be given some time to surrender vacant possession. Even the petitioner sought for time only upto 31.3.1997. In case, petitioner files an affidavit of unconditional undertaking before this Court within a week from to-day that he will unconditionally surrender vacant possession of the premises to the Authorities of the respondents, dispossession will not take place till 31.3.1997. In case, petitioner does not file the undertaking within the time granted, respondents are entitled to take possession as if not time is granted.


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