ORDER
1. The petitioners in these petitions have filed these revisions against the Orders, dismissing their applications for review.
2. The petitioners are owners of the lands which was acquired by the respondent. The Land Acquisition Officer passed an award on 3.3.1976. The petitioners put-forth their enhanced claim for the compensation and references were made to the Principal Sub-Court, Pondicherry under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. The said references were numbered as 139 and 140 of 1976 and the Sub-Court enhanced the compensation. Against the said judgment of the sub Court, the respondent herein filed appeals in A.S. Nos. 568 and 579 of 1982 before this Court. Those appeals were disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court on 12.4.1989. While dismissing the appeals, the Division Bench gave liberty to the petitioners herein to seek for a review of the judgment after final orders are passed by the Supreme Court in respect of the amended provision Section 23(2) and 25 of the Land Acquisition Act in the following terms:-
'So far as solatium and interest are concerned, we find, that question has been referred to the larger Bench of the Supreme Court as to the applicability of the amended Act to the acquisitions made before the commencement of the said Act. We also find, in such cases the Supreme Court has given liberty to the claimants to ask for review of the judgment after final orders are passed by the Supreme Court. Following the said procedure, we give liberty to the respondents to ask for review of the judgment regarding solatium and interest payable under the amended Act. It is made clear that we do not decide anything about the right of the respondents to receive the said amounts at this stage.'
On the basis of this liberty given by the Division Bench, the petitioners filed the Review Petition No. 20 of 1994 in I.A.P.No. 139 of 1976 and Review Petition No. 19 of 1994 in L.A.O.P.No. 140 of 1997 before the Principal District Judge, Pondicherry. By order dated 30.4.1996, the Principal District Judge dismissed both the review applications. Aggrieved by the same the petitioners filed these two civil revision petitions.
3. The learned Counsel for the petitioners, contended that in view of the liberty given by the Division Bench, it is open to the petitioners to file the review petitions before the lower Court as soon as they came to know about the judgment of the Supreme Court. It is further contented though the larger Bench of the Supreme Court has decided the matter on 16.5.1989 and judgment was reported in A.I.R. 1989 itself Union of India v. Raghbi Singh, : [1989]178ITR548(SC) , but the petitioners came to know about the judgment only one hearing from their counsel in 1994 and immediately the review applications have been filed and so the question of limitation does not arise. Even otherwise, the petitioners are entitled to the benefit of Article 2262 of French Civil Code and they are entitled to file the review petition within 307 years from the date of the judgment or the knowledge. Hence, the order of the lower court dismissing these petitions on the question of limitation, is not correct. The Government Pleader on behalf of the respondent contended that this Court has granted liberty to the petitioners to seek for the review of the judgment after final orders are passed by the Supreme Court, by the larger Bench and that the liberty for review was given by this Court is only to seek for the review of the judgment of this Court and not the trial court and as such the application filed by the petitioner before the trial court cannot be entertained, of course, the objection has not been raised before the lower court.
4. So far as the limitation is concerned, the Government Pleader contended that the judgment of the larger Bench has been reported in the law Journal 1989 and the review application has been filed after 5 years and as such the same is barred by limitation, in the absence of any specific plea with regard to date of knowledge of the applicant.
5. On careful consideration of the above contentions I am of the opinion that this is a fit case to be decided by a division Bench for the following reasons:-
1. The earlier first appeal has been decided by the Division Bench and the question arises is whether the liberty given to the petitioners is to seek for the review of the judgment of this Court or whether they are at liberty to file review application before the lower court itself after the verdict of larger bench of the Apex Court.
2. Whether the review application is within time and in case, if it is found that it is barred by limitation whether the same can be entertained without any application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act?
6. As these 2 vital questions are of some importance, I direct the office to place the papers before my Lord, the Chief justice for being posted before the Division Bench. In pursuance of the aforesaid order the matter was placed before the Hon'ble the Acting Chief Justice for further orders, and as directed by his Lordship these petitioners coming on for hearing on 22.4.97 in presence of the said advocates and having stood over for consideration till this day the court made the following.
Raju. J.
1. The above two revisions filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure may be dealt with and disposed of together since they involve identical and common questions of law.
2. C.R.P. 2536 of 1996 has been filed against the order dated 30.4.1996 in C.R.A.No. 20 of 1994 in L.A.O.P.No. 139 of 1976. C.R.P. 2537 of 1996 has been filed against the order dated 30.4.1996 in C.R.A. 19 of 1994 in L.A.P. 140 of 1976. Both the above orders have been passed by the principal District Judge at Pondicherry. The applications dealt with by the court below were filed under Order 47, Rule 1 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The common averments that have been made in both the applications are that in L.A.P.Nos. 139 of 1976 and 140 of 1976, the7 respective petitioners, i.e., the deceased 1st petitioner in C.R.P. 2536 of 1996 and the petitioner in C.R.P. 2537 of 1996, were claimants and the matter was disposed of by the learned Subordinate Judge, pondicherry. The matter has been pursued on appeal by the State and the deceased 1st petitioner in C.R.P. No. 2536 of 1996 was the respondent in A.S.N. 568 of 1983 before this Court. While disposing of the main appeal, their Lordships of the Division Bench ordered in paragraph 8 of the judgment as following:
'So far as solatium and interest are concerned, we find that question has been referred to the larger Bench of the Supreme Court as to the applicability of the amended Act to the acquisitions made before the commencement of the said Act. We also find, in such cases the Supreme Court has given liberty to the claimants to ask for review of the judgment after final orders are passed by the Supreme Court. Following the said procedure, we give liberty to the respondents to ask for review of the judgment regarding solatium and interest payable under the amended Act. It is made clear that we do not decide anything about the right of the respondents to receive the said amounts at this stage.'
As a consequence of the above, the present applications dealt with and disposed of by the court below came to be filed.
3. In the applications, the respective petitioners averred that the Supreme Court decision indicated was delivered and was reported in Union of India v. Raghbi Singh, : [1989]178ITR548(SC) . Wherein it was held that the of benefits the provisions of the amended Act would he available in respect of the appeals decided by the High Court from 30.4.1982 to 24.9.1982 and since the appeals in these cases have been preferred on 26.4.1983, they are entitled to claim the solatium as per the amended provisions. It was also stated that the petitioners were not parties to the said division reported in Union of India v. Raghbi Singh, : [1989]178ITR548(SC) and they were not furnished with also the particulars relating to the cases pending before the Supreme Court relating to the point and consequently. They were not aware as to when the judgment was delivered. In such circumstances, invoking the power under Article 2262 of the French Civil Code read with Section 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, the applications were filed for reviewing the judgment and decree in L.A.O.P. Nos. 139 and 140 of 1976 a dated 26.4.1983.
4. The respondents have filed a counter-affidavit, opposing the claim, apart from contending that the claim of the respective petitioners for solatium and interest under the amended provisions are not maintainable. The applicability of the French Code itself to cases arising under the Land Acquisition Act was also disputed and consequently, it was contended that the applications for view were barred by limitation.
5. The learned principal District Judge, Pondicherry after considering the materials on record and the submissions of the parties, has held that the petitions were barred by limitation. In the view of the learned Principal District Judge, Pondicherry, Article 2262 of the French Code Civil had on application to the cases on hand, arising under the Land Acquisition Act which was held to be a self-contained Act, and therefore, the applications were barred by limitation. On that view, both the applications for review came to be rejected.
6. Aggrieved, the respective petitioners filed the above revisions. The revision petitions initially came before S. Jagadeesan, J. The learned counsel for the petitioners seems to have contended before the learned single Judge that in view of the liberty given by the Division Bench, it is open to the petitioners to file the review petitions before the Court below in their coming to know of the judgment of the Supreme Court and that such knowledge of the judgment of the Supreme Court was only in 1994 through their counsel and immediately thereafter, the review applications have been filed and consequently, the question of bar of Limitation does not arise. It is was also contended before the learned single judge that they are entitled to the benefit of Article 2262 of the French Code Civil and the application can be filed even within 30 years from the date of the judgment on knowledge of the error. Apart from the dispute raised by the learned Government Pleader appearing for the respondent about the permissibility to filing the review application before the Court below, the applicability of the French Civil Code also to the cases on hand was raised to non-suit the petitioners. In such circumstances, the Learned single Judge thought fit to refer the revisions and the questions arising in the said revisions as formulated by the learned Judge for consideration by a Division Bench. The order of the learned single Judge insofar as it relates to the same is as follows:-
'5. On careful consideration of the above contentions, I am of the opinion that this is a fit case to be decided by a Division Bench for the following reasons:-
1. The earlier first appeal has been decided by the Division Bench and the question arises is whether the liberty given to the petitioners is to seek for the review of the judgment of this Court or whether they are at liberty to file review application before the lower court itself after a the verdict of larger Bench of the Apex Court?
2. Whether the review application is within time and in case, if it is found that it is barred by limitation whether the same can be entertained without any application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act?
6. As these 2 vital question are of some importance, I direct the office to place the papers before my Lord, The Chief Justice for being posted before the Division Bench. Thereupon, under orders of the Honorable the Chief Justice, the matters are before us.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioners, while placing reliance upon a decision of a learned single Judge of this court in Cooppousamy v. Alamelu 1988 (I) MLJ 432 and the relevant provisions contained in the limitation Act, 1963, as also the Land Acquisition Act and the French Code Civil, contended that the learned Judge in the court below was in error in holding that the application was barred by limitation and that the learned trial Judge ought to have held that Article 2262 of the French Civil Code applied on bill fours to the case on hand and there should have been an adjudication of the claims on merits.
8. Per contra, Mr. R. Natarajan, learned Additional Government Pleader (Pondicherry) contended that the French Code Civil has ceased to apply, that the Indian Limitation Act alone has to be applied and in the absence of any application for condonation, the learned trial Judge was right in dismissing the application for review, to which was hopelessly barred by limitation. Argued the learned Additional Government Pleader further that the application for review, if at all, could have been filed only before this Court in the appeal which was disposed of and not before the court below and on this ground also, the petitioners have to be non-suited in their application before the court below. In this context, reliance has been placed by the learned Additional Government Pleader on the decision in Bai Shakriben (Died) v. Special Land Acquisition Officer 1997 (I) MLJ 13 and Officer of Special Duty v. Shah Manilal Chandulal etc., : [1996]2SCR366 .
9. We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel appearing on either side. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Actlays down that save insofar as they may be inconsistent with anything contained in the said Act, The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall apply to all proceedings before the court under the Land Acquisition Act. There is nothing in the Land Acquisition Act, which militate against the applicability of Section 114 and Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to review to proceeding before courts exercising powers under the said Act. The next aspect that requires in this context to be adverted to is the period of limitation applicable. Under the Limitation Act, 1963 Article 122 of the Schedule to the Act prescribes the period of limitation for review, among other things, as thirty days from the date of the order sought to be reviewed. If the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, alone applied to the case on hand, no exception could be taken to the conclusions arrived at by the court below. But, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act provides that where any special local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply lay in so far as and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such a special or local law. In Coopousamy's case 1988 (I) MLJ 422 Sathiadev, J, had dealt with a similar issue interpreting the scope of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act in the context of a similar claims the one made before us with reference to the French Code Civil, particularly Article 2262, and the learned single Judge had held therein that in the absence of a specific extension of the Limitation Act to the Union Territory of Pondicherry by virtue of extension of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure with effect from 1.8.1966, the law of limitation, namely Limitation Act, 1963, also cannot be considered to have been extended or that it became automatically applicable enforceable in the Union Territory of Pondicherry. In coming to such, a conclusion, he learned single judge placed strong reliance upon the earlier decisions of this court in Chockalingan Mudaliar. v. Manivanna Pillai 1978 (2) MLJ 544 and Justiniane v. Antenion, : [1979]3SCR494 . The decision of the Apex Court was rendered in the context to an identical situation as the one arising now pertaining to the French Settlements in India, now Union Territory of Pondicherry, in relation to the Portuguese settlements, which are now Union Territories of Goa, Diu and Daman, Consequently, the learned single Judge held that Article 2262 would contain to have application on the Union Territory of Pondicherry and the extended period of limitation provided there in will be available to a litigant. So far as the Union Territory of Pondicherry is concerned, it is only there after the pondicherry Limitation (Repeal of Local Laws) Act, 1994 (Act 15 of 1994), was passed. The said Act provided for in Section 3, repeal of local laws in force in the Union Territory of Pondicherry or any area therein corresponding to the Limitation Act, 1963 on and from the date of coming into force of the said Act. Section 1(3) provided that the Act shall come into force on such date as the Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, appoint, The Government of Pondicherry issued G.O.Ms.No. 9/95 L.D. dated 28.2.1995 appointing first day of March. 1995 as the date on which the provision of Act 15 of 1994 shall come into force in the whole of the Union Territory of Pondicherry. Inview of the above, the Local law, namely, the French Code Civil in so far as it relates to the relevant provision pertaining to the period of limitation visualised under Article 2262 of the French Code Civil, could, if at all, be said to have ceased application only on and from 1.3.1995. The judgment and decree which are sought to be reviewed in this case were made on 26.4.1983 and the respective petitions for review were presented before the court below on 14.9.1989. It is well a settled law, that the law of limitation that is applicable is the one which is in force at the time when the cause or action is instituted, unless any special provision is made to the contra, consequently, we are of the view that the petitioners herein are entitled to relay upon Article 2262 of the French Code Civil and the period of limitation of thirty years provided therein will ensure to the benefit of the petitioners. We are unable to agree with the learned Additional Government pleader that there is no scope for extending the period made by him by relying upon the decision in Shah Manilal Chanulal's case, : [1996]2SCR366 . That was a case which concerned the construction of Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the nature of the power that was conferred therein. It is no wonder that the Apex Court held that it was a statutory power conferred upon the statutory authority and not upon any court and the claim for reference within period stipulated being a condition subject to the fulfilment of which only a reference can be sought for and made, there was no scope for extending the period of six weeks provided in Section 18 by invoking or applying the provisions of the Limitation Act particularly Section 5 of the said Act. The said judgment has no relevance whatsoever to the case on hand.
10. The further submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent on the basis of the issue formulated by the learned single Judge for consideration of this Court is as to the permissibility of the application for review being made before the lower court. In paragraph of the judgment which has been extracted supra, the division bench was pleased to reserve liberty to the claimants petitioners herein to ask for review of the judgment after the final orders are passed by the Supreme Court. The learned judges have not specified as to the from before which that has to be made or the proceedings that need to be taken. In the teeth of the observation of the Division Bench that it is made clear that they do not decide may nothing about the right of the respondents to receive the said amounts claimed under the amended provisions, there is hardly any scope for seeking review of the Division Bench judgment and if at all, the benefit, has to be obtained and if it is permissible according to law it should be by seeking for the review of the judgment of the court below so as to alter the quantum compensation payable. The learned judges of the Division Bench have not inerfered with the judgment of the learned trial judge in this case and consequently, we are of the view that the application filed before the court below is maintainable and there was no need to justification to file such review application before this court in the first appeal disposed of by the learned judges of the division bench.
11. Consequently, we answer question No. l holding that the application filed before the court below for review, on the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and the nature of the liberties granted in paragraph 8 of the judgment of the division bench, is quite in accordance with law and justified and on question No. 2 referred to us, we held that the period of limitation applicable to the case on hard being the one provided for under Article 2262 of the French Code Civil, namely, thirty years of limitation, the application filed and not barred by limitation and there was no need to file any application under Section 5 of the Indian limitation Act 1963 for condonation.
12. Having regard to the fact that the learned trial judge has summarily rejected the application on the question of bar of limitation, without going up into the merits of the claims, we hereby set aside the order of the learned judge in the court below. Learned Judge has on chosen to make certain observations or the tenability of the claime, we do not so consider it to be a proper consideration of the merits of the claim at all. Any such claims on merits could be made or sustained in a properly instituted appeal against the proceedings of the court below and not in any revision petition. The petitioners would be entitled to the claim only if they satisfy the requirements of the statutory provisions as elucidated by the Apex Court. The learned judge in the court below having referred to the statutory provisions properly did not apply the relevant judgment rendered which governs the issue. Consequently, while setting aside the conclusions in paragraph 6 among other things. We direct the learned judge in the court below to restore the proceedings to his file, give an opportunity to both parties to decide the issue on merits of the claim made and in accordance within law. All the contentions of the respective parties in this regard are left open. Except the two issues decided by us in this order. There will be no order as to costs.