1. For the assessment years 1979-80 and 1980-81, assessments under the Wealth-tax Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), were made on December 20, 1983, on the estate of late V. S. Meenakshi Achi, represented by the executor V. S. Sivalingam Chettiar of Poolankurichi in the status of an individual, under section 16(3) read with section 17 of the Act. Against the assessments so made, the assessee, viz., the executor to the estate, preferred appeals before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and secured relief in respect of the valuation of certain unquoted shares held by the assessee in Messrs. Abirami Cotton Mills Ltd. Aggrieved by the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, the Revenue preferred appeals before the Tribunal against Smt. V. S. Meenakshi Achi, who was impleaded as the respondent in the appeals. These appeals were dealt with by the Tribunal and disposed of in the manner indicated in its order for statistical purposes. In these tax case petitions, under section 27(3) of the Act, the Revenue has sought a direction to the Tribunal to refer a question of law, stated to arise on the application of rule 1D of the Rules framed under the Act. An objection has been raised regarding the maintainability of these applications, on the ground that the assessee, viz., the estate represented by its executor, was not at all impleaded as a party-respondent to the appeals preferred by the Revenue before the Tribunal, but the dead person and not the assessee, had been shown as the respondent and, in these tax case petitions also, the dead person alone has been shown as the respondent and not the assessee. It was, therefore, submitted that these tax case petitions under section 27(3) of the Act, not having been preferred against the assessee who was subjected to the assessment could not be entertained and a case referred. In meeting the objection so raised, learned counsel for the Revenue pointed out that the omission to show the name of the assessee, viz., the estate represented by its executor, as the respondent before the Tribunal and also before this court was only on account of a typographical error and that should not be made much of. Attention was also drawn to the files where, with reference to the address to which the notice may be sent, it had been stated that the notice should be sent to the executor and that is sufficient to indicate that the appeals were filed only against the assessee, viz., the estate represented by its executor and not the deceased person. Reliance in this connection was also placed on the decisions in Rajah Manyam Meenakshamma v. CIT : [1956]30ITR286(AP) and Swaran Kanta v. CIT . Counsel for the Revenue also brought to our notice that T.C.M.P. Nos. 891 and 892 of 1992 have been filed to amend the cause title in the tax case petitions and that, if those petitions are ordered, the defect could be remedied.
2. We have carefully considered the objection raised and also the argument of learned counsel for the Revenue to maintain the applications, as filed. In this case, from a perusal of the assessment orders, it is seen that the assessments were made on the estate. This is also affirmed in paragraph 2 of the affidavit filed in support of T.C.M.P. Nos. 891 and 892 of 1992. There cannot, therefore, be any doubt that, even according to the Revenue, the assessee was not the deceased person, but only the estate of the deceased person, represented by the executor. This assessee had preferred appeals before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in which the Revenue figured as the respondent. It is at once obvious that, even during the course of the assessment proceedings and also the appeals before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, it was only the estate, represented by the executor, which figured as the assessee and also the appellant and this was within the knowledge of the Revenue. However, when the appeals were referred by the Revenue before the Tribunal, they had been filed against the deceased person and not against the assessee. The reliance placed upon column 11 regarding the issue of notice cannot be availed of any the Revenue to sustain the applications, as filed. When the respondent in the appeals before the Tribunal is, admittedly, a dead person, the mere filling up of a column regarding the issue of notice, to a third person cannot avail to the Revenue. In other words, the appeal is against one person and the issue of notice is requested with reference to another who is not the respondent and, under those circumstances, the reliance on the filling up of the column relating to the issue of notice cannot, in any manner, advance the case of the Revenue.
3. A reference to the decisions relied on by learned counsel for the Revenue may now be made. In Rajah Manyam Meenakshamma v. CIT : [1956]30ITR286(AP) , the assessee, in the course of the assessment for the assessment year 1947-48, returned only the proportionate lease amount in respect of certain graphite mines which were leased out for 25 years and 30 years, respectively, on a lump sum royalty and claimed that only the proportionate lease amount for one year was taxable. This was rejected by the Income-tax Officer and, on appeal, it was contended that the amount received represented premium and was, therefore, capital in nature and that was also rejected and later, the assessee died. Later, on July 4, 1951, an appeal was filed before the Tribunal purporting to be by the assessee, but signed by a power of attorney agent of Meenakshamma, wife of the deceased assessee. The Tribunal, after giving an opportunity to have the legal representative brought on record, which was not availed of, concluded that the appeal was not validly presented. On a reference under section 66(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court pointed out that the widow of the assessee, being the legal representative of the deceased assessee, was also liable to pay the tax assessed on her husband and was an assessee within the meaning of the definition of an assessee in the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 and was entitled to file an appeal in her own right. It was further held that the power of attorney agent of the legal representative had signed the memorandum of grounds of appeal and that was as good as the appeal having been presented by the legal representative of the original assessee. It was under those circumstances that the court held that the description was only a mistake and that the memorandum of appeal could be treated as having been filed by the legal representative herself and, therefore, the presentation to the Tribunal was proper. It requires to be pointed out that this decision was one which related to the filing of an appeal by the legal representative of an aggrieved assessee before the Tribunal and not a case where, as here, the Revenue was fully aware of who the assessee was and in spite of that, it had chosen to show the name of the deceased person as the assessee, instead of the real assessee. We are of the view that this of this case. Similarly, the decision in Swaran Kanta v. CIT , relied on by the learned counsel for the Revenue also does not, in any manner, assist. In that case, Sain Dass Abbi filed a return of his income for the assessment year 1975-76, and that return was revised, but during the pendency of the assessment proceedings, he died on March 7, 1977. Subsequently, his widow was impleaded and notice was issued to her and, in her presence, the assessment was finalised and in the course of the assessment order, the death of the original assessee, the bringing on record of the legal representative of the deceased and the issue of notice to her and the taking of further proceedings in her presence, were all noticed, but in the heading of the order, the name of the deceased assessee was shown, instead of the legal representative. The assessment order was questioned on the ground that it was null and void, as it was made on a dead person. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner agreed with the stand and annulled the assessment. But, on further appeal by the Revenue to the Tribunal, the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was reversed and the assessment order was restored. Questioning this, a reference was made to the High Court and, in answering the reference, the High Court held that the widow, as legal representative, became a deemed assessee for the purpose of completion of the proceedings and for the recovery of the tax, in her hands, and, therefore, no exception could be taken to the order passed by the Tribunal. In addition, it was also pointed out that, under section 292B of the Income-tax Act, 1961, any mistake, defect or omission in the assessment, if the assessment is in substance and effect in conformity with or according to the intent and purpose of the Act, would not invalidate the assessment and that, as the entire proceedings were conducted after the death of the original assessee, in accordance with law, the Tribunal was justified in restoring the order of assessment. We are of the view that the decision also does not in any manner assist the Revenue. Initially, the husband was the assessee and on his death, his widow, as his legal representative, was impleaded, issued notice and in her presence, the assessment proceedings were completed and in fact and in law, she was the assessee at the time when the assessment was so completed and she could not have, therefore, complained that the assessment had been passed against a dead person and, therefore, void. In this case, what we find is, that the deceased was not in the picture at all even in the course of the assessment proceedings, as the assessments were made admittedly on the estate and there could not have, therefore, been any mistake whatever with reference to the assessee who has objected to the assessment. Equally, there could not have been any mistake whatever with reference to the appellant in the appeals filed by the assessee before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. In such as situation, it is extremely difficult for us to accept that, when the Revenue preferred appeals before the Tribunal, a typographical error had crept in, in that, the name of the dead person has been given as the respondent. Even section 42C of the Act, comparable to section 292B of the Income-tax Act, 1961, cannot be pressed into service by the Revenue for, it cannot be stated that, in substance and effect, the appeals preferred by the Revenue before the Tribunal were either in conformity with or according to the intent and purpose of the Act. Ordinarily, the appeals at the instance of the Revenue before the Tribunal could be filed only against the assessee and not against a dead person and in this case, the Revenue, with full knowledge as to who was the real assessee, had not chosen to file the appeals against the real assessee, but filed them against a non-existent person. Under these circumstances, section 42C of the Act also cannot be called in aid by the Revenue. We also do not see any useful purpose being served by the amendment applications now filed, for, if ordered, they could at best, cure the defect in the cause title in the tax case petitions before this court and would not have the effect of bringing the real assessee on record as a party to the proceedings before the Tribunal. As matters stand, the Revenue had preferred the appeals before the Tribunal and also the reference applications before this court, against a dead person who is not the assessee and such applications cannot, therefore, be countenanced. We, therefore, dismiss T.C.P. Nos. 215 and 216 of 1988, and T.C.M.P. Nos. 891 and 892 of 1992. There will be, however, no order as to costs.