ORDER
1. The petitioner herein is the tenant in respect of the premises bearing door No. 113, Gandhi Road, Kancheepuram. The respondents 1 to 3 are the owners of the petition premises and they are minors represented by their father and guardian A. Kanniappa Chettiar. The petition premises was let out on a monthly rent of Rs. 150/-. The owners of the petition premises filed H.R.C.O.P. No. 9 of 1982 for eviction of the tenant (a) on the ground of owner's occupation under S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act,(b) on the ground of demolition and reconstruction under S. 14(1)(b) of the Act and(c) on the ground of wilful default in payment of rent under S. 10(2)(i) of the said Act. On the side of the owners of the premises, Exts. A1 to A12 were filed. On the side of the tenant Exts. B1 to B10 were filed- On behalf of the Court. Exts, C1 and C2 were marked. On the side of the owners of the premises A. Kanniappa Chettiar was examined as a witness. On the side of the tenant, one Mr. Sanjivaraya Mudaliar was examined as a witness. After hearing the parties and on going through the records, the Rent Controller came to the conclusion that the landlords are entitled to an order of eviction on all the abovesaid three grounds.
2. Aggrieved by that order the tenant filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority on hearing the parties and on going through the records, confirmed the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller on the grounds of owner's occupation under S. 10(3)(a)(iii) and on the ground of demolition and reconstruction under S. 14(1)(b) of the Act. So far as the ground relating to the eviction sought for on the ground of wilful default in payment of rent is concerned, the Rent Control Appellate Authority reversed the order of the Rent Controller on this point.
3. As against the order of the Appellate Authority the tenant is in revision before this Court. Before this Court, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner herein by way of a preliminary objection contended that the petition for eviction filed by the three minors as represented by their father and guardian is not maintainable. Because, since the minors are partners in a partnership firm, they cannot file a petition for eviction on the ground of owner's occupation of the petition premises for the purpose of carrying on partnership business. In support of this contention a judgment of this Court rendered in the case of Gokulakrishnan v. M/s. Asiatic Automobiles. (1983) 1 MLJ 85 was relied on by the learned Counsel. On the other hand, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents herein contended that inasmuch as the petition for eviction is filed for own use and occupation of the premises by the minors, it cannot be said that R.C.O.P. No. 9 of 1982 is not maintainable. He further pointed out that the minors wanted to conduct their joint family business in the petition premises and therefore they require the petition premises for their own use and occupation.
4. It remains to be seen that in the petition for eviction, it was stated by the owners that they required the petition premises for their own use and occupation in order to carry on their family business. The petition for eviction is filed by the minors through their guardian and father requiring the petition premises for their ovn use and occupation. There is also evidence or record to show that the textile business now carried on at 109, Gandhi Road. Kancheepuram is a joint family business. The three minor petitioners along with the father are doing the said joint family business. The business was stated to be in existence even during the lilftime of the minor petitioners' grandfather. D.M.V. Appasamy Chettiar. In the evidence given by the petitioners' father it was stated that the textile business conducted by the minor petitioners along with their father is the joint family business and the joint family consist of the three minor petitioners and their father. There is no cross-examination on this point. No contra evidence was also produced by the tenant to falsify the case of the owners of the premises. No evidence was also produced by the tenant to show that the textile business conducted at door No. 109, Gandhi Road. Kancheepuram is a partnership business. In order to support the contention that the textile business is ajoint family business, the learned Counsel appearing tor the owners of the premises filed income-tax assessment orders by way of additional evidence wherein it was shown that the status of the assessee is that of a Hindu undivided family. The learned Counsel appearing for the tenant objected to the filing of the additional evidence at this stage. The learned Counsel for the tenant also relied upon two judgments reported in (1982) 2 Mad LJ 85 (Bank of Baroda v. Mahendra Dadha) and (1986) 1 Mad LJ 345 (A. G. Punyakoti v. M. Meera Bai) in order to support his abovementioned contention. In none of these judgments it was stated that no additional evidence can be received at this stage. On the other hand, it was stated in those judgments that while admitting the additional evidence at this stage care should be taken and additional evidence should not be accepted as a matter of course. Since Income-tax Demand Notice ana Income-tax Clearance Certificate are public documents they are admitted as additional evidence and taken into consideration. Accordingly C.M.P. 14190/88 is allowed.
5. Since the petition is filed for eviction by the minors represented by their father requiring the petition premises for their own use and occupation in order to conduct their own family business, it cannot be said that this eviction petition is not maintainable. The fact! that the minors are carrying on joint family: business is amply proved by oral and docu- mentary evidence. On the other hand, there is no evidence contra on the side of the tenant to show that the textile business carried on by the abovesaid minors along with their father is a partnership business or business in which the minors have no interest. Considering these facts. I hold that the eviction petition filed by the minors represented by their father is maintainable. The decision of this Court in Gokulakrishnan v. M/s. Asiatic Automobiles, (1983) 1 MLJ 85 is entirely on different facts. Therefore, that decision will not render any help to the tenant.
6. Eviction was sought for on the ground of owner's occupation as contemplated under S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. The necessary averments in the petition are as under :
'The petitioners are the owners of the schedule mentioned property they having purchased the same for their own use and occupation. The petitioners are the sons of Mr. A. Kanniappa Chcttiar. Mr. A. Kanni-appa Chettiar is carrying on Javuli business in a rented premises in door No. 109, Gandhi Road, Kancheepuram for himself and on behalf of the petitioners. The petitioners submit that their father's landlord has been pressing him to vacate, the petitioners have no other option except to purchase the schedule mentioned property for their father's own use and occupation, which is in effect for their own use and occupation. The petitioners submit that, the petitioners' father or the petitioners have no other non-residential premises of their own in this town except the petitioners purchased the property. The petitioners and their father's requirement is bona fide.'
Therefore, it is clear that the three minors purchased the petition premises through their father for the purpose of conducting their own family business. They are now carrying on textile business at No. 109, Gandhi Road, Kanclieeptiram. According to the owner's of the premises they (do not have) any other premises of their own in the city. It was stated that eviction notice was served on the father of the minors to evict the premises occupied by them at 109, Gandhi Road, Kancheepuram. In support of the landlord's case, P.W. 1, who is the father of the minors was examined. On the other hand, on the side of the tenant P. W. 1 Sanjeevaraya Mudaliar was examined. He was a partner in the tenant's concern. P.W. 1 stated that the three minors are also having interest in the textile business curried on at door No. 109, Gandhi Road, Kancheepuram.
7. Thus, the materials on record clearly show that the three minors are running the joint family business along with their father at door No. 109, Gandhi Road, Kancheepuram. They purchased the petition premises for the purpose of conducting their own business. They are not the owners of any other premises in the city. There were nine tenants in the petition premises. Out of 9 tenants 8 tenants were stated to be already evicted and handed over the possession to the landlords. There is no evidence on the side of the tenant to prove that the minors are having any other premises of their own in the city. It is also not controverted that they are carrying on their own business in the rented premises. Considering these facts, I am of the opinion that the owners of the premises satisfied all the conditions as enumerated under Sec. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act 18 of 1960. The owners of the premises adduced ample evidence both oral and documentary in order to show that the requirement of the petition premise is bona fide for their own use and occupation. Accordingly, the orders passed by the authorities below on this point in ordering eviction on the ground of owner's occupation as contemplated under S, 10(3)(a)(iii) of the said Act is confirmed.
8. Eviction was also sought for on the ground of demolition and reconstruction as contemplated under S. 14(1)(b) of the Act. In the petition for eviction it was stated that the petition premises is in a dilapidated condition and the age of the building is more than hundred years and therefore, was stated that the building is required for immediate demolition and reconstruction for their own use and occupation. The owners of the premises filed approved plan Ex. Al. Ex.A2.is the receipt evidencing the payment of licence fee. R.W. 1 admitted that the back portion of the demised premises had already been demolished. Ex. A11 is the letter sent by one of the tenants stating that the other tenants have vacated the building. Even according to R.W. 1, the petition premises is about 55 years old. The landord's financial soundness is not doubted. A Commissioner was appointed to assess the condition of the petition premises. He filed his report which is marked as Exhibit C1. In the report it was stated that there is a slight crack in the beam in the petition premises was (sic) stated to be covered with thatched roof. In room No. 2 it was stated that there are two places where bricks are exposed. The floor is cemenl plastered and appears to be an old one. It was staled that the only one rafter on the western side in room No. 2 is slightly cracked and rafters arc completely painted. In the backside of wall in room No. 3 it was stated that there are three light cracks in the cement plastering work. It was the case of the learned Counsel for the landlords that in order to hide the true conditions of the wall and rafters, the tenant painted them. Considering the pleadings contained in the petition, the deposition given by the witnesses and the Commissioner's report, the lower Court came to the conclusion that the requirement of the petition premises for demolition and reconstruction is bona fide as contemplated under S. 14(1)(b) of the Act. It is also stated that out of 9 tenants in the petition premises eight were already evicted. It remains to be seen that the landlords have already demolished the rest of the portions of the premises except that which is now in occupation of the tenant herein.
9. In order to support the orders passed . by the Courts below in the matter of ordering eviction under S. 14(1)(b) of the Act learned Counsel appearing for the landlords relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court, reported in : [1970]3SCR734 (Panchamal v. Basthi), wherein the Supreme Court held as follows (at p. 944 of A!R):
'The requirement contemplated under Cl. (i) of the proviso to sub-sec. (I) is that of the landlord and it does not have any reference to the condition of the building as such. What is necessary under that clause is that the landlord must satisfy the Court that he reasonably and bona fide required the premises for the immediate purpose of demolishing it and such demolition is for the purpose of erecting a new building in the place of the old one. No doubt, whether the landlord's requirement is reasonable and bona fide has to be judged in the light of the surrounding circumstances, which will include his means for reconstruction of the building, and other steps taken by him in that regard.
In considering the reasonable and bona fide requirements of the landlord under this clause, the desire of the landlord to put the property to a more profitable use after demolition and reconstruction is also a factor that may be taken into account in favour of the landlord. It is not necessary that the landlord should go further and establish under this clause that the condition of the building is such that it requires immediate demolition.'
Similarly the other decision of the Supreme Court relied on by the learned Counsel for the landlords was that reported in : [1979]3SCR1107 (Metalware & Co. v. Bansilal Sharma), wherein the Supreme Court held as under (at p. 1563 of AIR) :
'Thus, while it cannot be held that the old age and dilapidated condition of the building is a sine qua non or a decisive factor for eviction under S. 14(1)(b), it is impossible to accept the view that the said circumstance is totally irrelevant in pronouncing upon the bona fide requirement of the landlord. The age and existing condition of the building -- whether it is a recent construction or very old and whether it is in a good and sound condition or has become decrepit or dilapidated -- are relevant factors forming part of 'all the circumstances' that have to be considered while determining the bona fide requirement of the landlord under S. 14(1)(b) and in the totality of the circumstances these factors may assume lesser or greater significance depending upon whether in the scheme of the concerned enactment there is or there is not a provision for reinduction of the evicted tenant into the new construction. Such a view would be in accord with the main objective of the benign legislation enacted with the avowed intention of giving protection to the tenant.'
Another judgment relied on to support this point by the learned Counsel for the landlords was that reported in : (1985)2MLJ151 K. Janakiraman v. Hajee Abdul Sattar, wherein this Court held as follows :
'Undoubtedly a building dilapidated and decrepit could be one of the grounds on which the landlord could seek eviction of the tenant under S. 14(1)(b) of the Act. But such a case is not exhaustive of the applicability of Section 14(1)(b). There could be a case where a landlord may purchase a small structure with open land which is occupied by a tenant with the express intention of putting up his own residential building and the mere fact that the building already existing is neither dilapidated nor unsound would be no ground for rejecting the claim of the landlord if otherwise satisfied the Rent Control Authority about his bona fide requirement. The High Court has consistently taken the view that the decrepit or dilapidated condition of the building is not the only ground on which a petition under S. 14(1)(b) of the Rent Control Act can be made.'
10. It remains to be seen that there are sufficient evidences on record to show that the landlords purchased the property in question for the purpose of demolition and reconstruction so they can use the premises for their own business since they are carrying on their business in a rented premises. Thus, considering the pleadings, the depositions given by the parties, the Commissioner's report and the decisions cited supra, I am of opinion that the orders passed by the authorities below on this point appears to be quite correct and reasonable in ordering eviction and therefore, I am not inclined to interfere with the same.
11. In this revision filed by the tenant learned Counsel for the landlords made an attempt to support the order of the Rent Controller in ordering eviction on the ground of wilful default in payment of rent. It was pointed out that in the petition filed for eviction, the period of delay in payment of rent is not specifically staled. There is also no evidence to prove that the rent is due for which specific period. In the circumstances I consider that the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority is correct in holding that the eviction cannot be ordered on this ground.
12. In the result, the order passed by the Authorities below are confirmed and the revision petition filed by the tenant is dismissed. At the time of pronouncement of the order in this civil revision petition, the learned Counsel appearing for the tenant asks six month's time for eviction. On the other hand, the learned Counsel appearing for the landlords opposes this request on the ground that the landlords require the premises for demolition and reconstruction. Considering the submissions made time for eviction is granted for a period of four months from today on condition that the tenant should file an affidavit of undertaking to this effect within two weeks from today failing which the time granted for eviction will stand vacated. There will be no order as to costs.
13. Petition dismissed.