Kuldeep Singh Vs. Ganpat Lal and anr. - Court Judgment |
| Tenancy |
| Rajasthan High Court |
| Mar-08-1989 |
| Civil Spl. Appeal No. 3 of 1989 |
| Kishore Singh Lodha and; R.S. Verma, JJ. |
| AIR1990Raj23; 1989(2)WLN417 |
| Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 - Sections 19A and 19A(3) |
| Kuldeep Singh |
| Ganpat Lal and anr. |
| Appeal rejected |
.....to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. the other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. a full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. if a person falls under the definition of workman under section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the i.d. act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said act. a perusal of section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the i.d. act. however, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. the..........learned single judge has reversed that finding and has decreed the suit.2. the defendant's contention that there was no second default based on the fact that before the expiry of six months the rent had already been deposited in court under section 19-a raj premises act and, therefore, the tenant could not be said to have committed a second default. the learned single judge has come to the conclusion that for the deposit of rent under section 19-a the necessary conditions were not fulfilled by the defendant, i.e. he had not tendered the rent by money order, before depositing the same under section 19-a. therefore mere depositing the rent in court would not absolve the defendant from default.3. learned counsel for the appellant, however, urged that under section 19-a(3), the tenant is permitted to pay rent personally also and, therefore, in this case when the tenant had offered the rent to the landlord who refused the same and then the deposit was made, the deposit was a valid deposit and would absolve the defendant from default. but we are not inclined to accept this contention and in our view, the opinion expressed by the learned single judge is correct. the very words of.....
Lodha, J.
1. This is a defendant's Special Appeal in suit for ejectment based on the ground of second default. The trial Court held in favour of the defendant that there was no second default whereas the learned single Judge has reversed that finding and has decreed the suit.
2. The defendant's contention that there was no second default based on the fact that before the expiry of six months the rent had already been deposited in Court under Section 19-A Raj Premises Act and, therefore, the tenant could not be said to have committed a second default. The learned single Judge has come to the conclusion that for the deposit of rent under Section 19-A the necessary conditions were not fulfilled by the defendant, i.e. he had not tendered the rent by money order, before depositing the same under Section 19-A. Therefore mere depositing the rent in Court would not absolve the defendant from default.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, urged that under Section 19-A(3), the tenant is permitted to pay rent personally also and, therefore, in this case when the tenant had offered the rent to the landlord who refused the same and then the deposit was made, the deposit was a valid deposit and would absolve the defendant from default. But we are not inclined to accept this contention and in our view, the opinion expressed by the learned single Judge is correct. The very words of Sub-section (c) of Section 19-A would make it clear that the deposit in Court can be made only where a tenant has remitted the rent by postal money order under Clause (a) and the money order is received back by him under postal endorsement of refusal or not found where the landlord does not specify a bank and account number under Clause (b) or where there is bona fide doubt as to the person or persons to whom the rent is payable. In referring to Clause (a) in Clause (c) the only mode of payment by sending a postal money order has been envisaged and the other mode of payment by personal payment has not been referred to. Therefore, if a tenant alleges that he had offered the rent personally to the landlord and it was refused, he cannot resort to Sub-section (3) of Section 19-A and deposit the rent in Court. Before making such a deposit, he will have to send the rent by money order. In this view of the matter, we do not find any substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant and according to us the appeal deserves to be rejected.
4. We accordingly reject the same.