K.A. Nayar, J.
1. This original petition is filed to quash Exhibit P-3 said to be contrary to the provisions of the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961. Exhibit P-3 is the duty schedule issued to the workmen of the first respondent. Their case is espoused by petitioners Nos. 1 and 2 union. The averment in the petition is that there was a conciliation settlement, viz., Exhibit P-1, which was valid up to 1st February, 1990, and that was modified by another conciliation settlement. Exhibit P-2, on December 28, 1990. In Sub-clause 14 of clause 37 of Exhibit P-2, it is stated that all existing provisions which are not modified by agreement will continue to operate as such. Therefore, even though the term of settlement evidenced by Exhibit P-1 expired on February 1, 1990, the same will remain in force by virtue of Exhibit P-2 agreement aforementioned. The contention of the petitioners is that Exhibit P-3 schedule is in violation of the provisions of the two agreements and, therefore, Exhibit P-3 is illegal. If that alone was there, I would have dismissed the petition in limine. But it is stated that Exhibit P-3 is in flagrant violation of the Motor Transport Workers Act. Section 13 of the Motor Transport Workers Act provides that no adult motor transport worker shall be required or allowed to work for more than eight hours in any day and forty-eight hours in any week. In cases where a motor worker is engaged in the running of any motor transport service on long distance routes, etc., more than eight hours in any day or forty-eight hours in any week can be allowed, but in no case for more than ten hours in a day and fifty-four hours in a week. Section 37(1) of the Act says that the provisions of the Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or in terms of any award, agreement or contract of service, whether made before or after the commencement of the Act. The proviso therein stipulates that if the motor transport worker is entitled to some benefits that cannot be denied and the worker shall continue to get the same. Counsel for the petitioner referred me to Exhibit P-3 schedule especially duty No. 2 and submitted that at a stretch a worker is made to work 11.30 hours in steering duty with a spread over time of 14.30 hours. It is seen that the duty hours start at 2 p.m. and the day will end with 12 midnight and for the next day for another 10 hours the workman is made to work. In that way strictly Section 13 of the Act has been complied with. That means he is made to work only 10 hours in a day and in no case more than 54 hours in a week. It is submitted that the workman is made to work below 40 hours in a week. Hence, there is strict compliance with the law. Section 13 restricts the hours of work per day to 10 hours, but taking a day commencing from 2 p.m. and making him to work at a stretch for more than 13 or 14 hours will not be strictly in compliance with the spirit of the Act. The law may be an ass, but its administration is not asinine. Inhuman wrongs will not be tolerated by judiciary conscious of human rights and the rule of law. Hence, I thought a deeper probe is called for. But, it is seen that even under the existing work schedule the workmen were working more than 10 hours and the violation was there even in the existing schedule covered by Exhibits P-1 and P-2 settlements. None of the workmen appeared before this Court and only the union espousing their cause filed the petition. Added to that, there is the fact that except the workmen in Ernakulam and Trivandrum area, all others have accepted the duty as per revised schedule. Therefore, when the petition came up for admission, I issued notice to respondents to show cause why the petition should not be admitted. The existence of an alternative remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act by itself would not prevent me from admitting the petition because if the statute is violated and when the policy of the enactment is clear I would be forsaking a great tradition, if I say I am helpless to entertain the writ petition because of the existence of alternate remedy. It is for the purpose of satisfying myself whether there is any substantial injury to the workmen concerned, I issued notice for admission. At the time of issuing notice, I also directed counsel for the first respondent, the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, to discuss the matter and settle, if possible, for, in matters like this when public interest is involved and not only the security of the workmen but also safety of the pedestrian and the public are stated to be at peril, I should be more duty conscious and act like a catalyst to bring about an amicable settlement.
2. A statement has been filed by the respondent in which it is stated that Exhibit P-3, which is sought to be challenged in this petition, has been substantially modified. The Corporation on June 12, 1992, had given notice to the unions regarding the implementation of the revised duty schedule. The revised schedule of 42 duties was also served on the petitioners on June 12, 1992, which they have refused to accept. Exhibit R-1 (b) is the revised schedule. It is stated in para 4 of the statement that the four representations produced by the petitioners as Exhibits P-9(a), P-9(b), P-10(a) and P-10(b) have not been received by the respondents. Exhibit P-3 itself has not been implemented and they have implemented Exhibit R-1(b) after making adequate modifications in consultation with the unions. Therefore, Exhibit P-3, which was in challenge, has no legal validity. The statement says that Exhibit P-3 has been modified by Exhibit R-1(b) in consultation with the unions. What is important to notice is that more than 10 hours work is required only because of the double duty system. The double duty system was implemented, according to the statement, mainly on the request of the employees of the Corporation. It was after considering the convenience of the employees and the convenience of the passengers, the double duty system was implemented in the service of the Corporation. It is explained that when a double duty is done by a worker, he is entitled to get attendance for two days. Therefore, in a week if he does three double duties in three days he is entitled to get salary of seven days. The employees of the Corporation preferred this facility. It is on account of that that more than 10 hours of duty was provided in the revised schedule. The system was in vogue in the Corporation for the past several years. It is staled in para 6 that in all the existing schedules the double duty system was implemented and the employees were doing double duty without any objection up to June 13, 1992. The details of this have been given in the said paragraph. In nine duties, viz., duty Nos. 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, 22, 25 and 27, there was no change before and after revision. Duty time is increased to only 25 minutes in duty Nos. 7, 8, 9 and 26. In duty Nos. 24 and 30, the running time in the revised schedule is less than in the existing schedule. In duty Nos. 2,6 and 29, special allowance was given, viz., Rs. 20, for the first two duties and Rs. 10 for the third duty. Thus, the matter has been explained in paragraph 6 of the statement, though its veracity has been disputed by the petitioner. The statement further says that the Corporation has implemented the rescheduling in all the 64 units of the Corporation before June, 1992, and only in Trivandrum Central and Ernakulam rescheduling has not been done and this original petition only relates to Ernakulam depot.
3. When the matter came up before me at the admission stage itself, I directed the counsel for the respondent to convene a meeting for conciliation and, if possible, arrive at a settlement. The result has been reported in paragraph 10 which I extract hereunder:
'10. Pursuant to the oral suggestion of this Hon'ble Court on June 15, 1992 the respondents summoned a conciliation conference on June 18, 1992, giving notice to the petitioners and all the affected parties. The Chairman and Managing Director of the Corporation was present in the conference. He has agreed to the petitioners that the Corporation is prepared to consider and examine the recasting of the schedules, strictly in accordance with the Motor Transport Workers Act and the Corporation is prepared to change the double duty system to those who are unwilling to do double duty. He has also agreed in the conference that the Corporation is prepared to rectify the anomalies, if any, to be shown by the petitioners, in Exhibit R-1(b). It is also pointed out that the Corporation by Exhibit R-1(b) has already made necessary modification in the original duty schedule, Exhibit P-3. But, unfortunately, the petitioners were not prepared to accept the very lenient suggestions of the Managing Director. They were not prepared to increase the duty hours more than the duty time specified in the existing schedules.'
4. It is seen that the Managing Director has agreed to the petitioners that the Corporation is prepared to consider and examine the recasting of the schedule strictly in accordance with the Motor Transport Workers Act and the Corporation is prepared to change the double duty system to those who are unwilling to do double duty. He also agreed that the Corporation is prepared to rectify the anomalies, if any, to be shown by the petitioners in Exhibit R-1(b). Petitioners challenge Exhibit P-3 in this writ petition. Petitioners produced Exhibit P-11 which, according to them, is the same as Exhibit R-1 (c) and it is submitted that there is no material change in Exhibit P-3 and Exhibit P-11 or Exhibit R-1(c). There is no amendment to the original petition sought for challenging Exhibit P-11 as well. Since it is agreed by the Managing Director of the Corporation to rectify the anomalies, if any, to be shown by the petitioners in Exhibit R-1(b), there cannot be any further grievance to the petitioner at this stage.
5. The Corporation submitted that it is necessary to make some change in the duty for the very existence of the Corporation. Comparative analysis of the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation with other State Transport undertakings are also given. The bus/staff ratio in Kerala is 11 while a Tamil Nadu and Karnataka, it is 7.50 and 7.67 respectively. The staff cost per kilometer in Kerala is 402 and in Tamil Nadu and Karnataka it is only 185 and 186 respectively. Staff productivity per employee per day is 25 in Kerala, whereas in Tamil Nadu and Karnataka, it is 48 and 44 respectively. Steering hours is 5.50 in Kerala, whereas in Tamil Nadu and Karnataka, it is 8 and 8.15 respectively. Therefore, a case for increase in working hours has been made out by the Corporation for its very existence. It is emphasised that the double duty system, which is very much objected to, is adopted only for the convenience and benefit of the employees. It is specifically averred, if the employees do not want to implement the double duty system, the Corporation is readily agreeable to allot them work in single duty schedules strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Motor Transport Workers Act. The Corporation is prepared to give duty for eight hours in a day, for six days, instead of the present three double duty in a week and 39 hours of work in a week, provided the willing worker shall give his option in writing. The petitioners are not willing to accept the said undertaking by the Managing Director in the meeting held on June, 18 1992. Since my apprehension that the workman is made to work like a bonded labour was found to be without any basis, I find no ground to entertain this writ petition.
6. In India Cement Ltd. v. Union of India., (1990)3 JT 572 (SC), the Supreme Court pointed out that what is best to the industry and in what manner the policy should be formulated and implemented, bearing in mind the objects of the industry and purpose of the enactment, is not a matter for judicial review. In Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, (1992) 1 JT 462 (SC), it was pointed out that judicial review is not concerned with matters of economic policy. The Court does not supplant the 'feel of the expert' by its own views. The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment, and not to ensure that the authority, after according fair treatment, reaches on a matter which it is authorised by law to decide for itself, a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the Court, for judicial review, as the word implies, is not an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was made. It was so held by Lord Hailsham of St. Marylcbone L.C. (H.L.) in Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans, (1982) 1 WLR 1155. In Mahabir Auto Stores v. Indian Oil Corporation, (1990) 1 JT 363 (SC), the Supreme Court held that every action of the State or an instrumentality of the State in exercise of its executive power must be informed by reasons. In appropriate cases, actions uninformed by reason may be questioned as arbitrary in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. If, after mature consideration, the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, a statutory authority, in exercise of the power, entered into a settlement, Article 14 of the Constitution may not be attracted for judicial review of such an action. Of course, the action of the authority, even if it spells in the nature of contractual rights, the manner, the method and motive of a decision of entering into a contract are subject to review on the touchstone of relevance and reasonableness, fair play, natural justice, equality and non-discrimination, etc. But, there will not be any judicial review if a policy has to be evolved to maintain the economy of the industry. Such a policy also will not be amenable to judicial review. The authority of this Court is only to see that the administrative authorities like Kerala State Road Transport Corporation act within the bounds of law. If they are acting against law, irrespective of the fact that there is alternative remedy, this Court may, in appropriate case, issue a writ to see that the authority complies with the Act within the boundaries of law. Only the lawfulness of the administrative action this Court will look into and whether the rescheduling is required and how the industry itself can be worked profitably, etc., is a matter strictly within the domain of the administrative authority. Legal audit of the administrative action only will be done by this Court.
7. The Inland Revenue Commissioners v. National Federation of Self employed and Small Business Ltd., (1982) AC 617, is an authority for the proposition that as regards the efficiency and policy of the administrative action, though the officers are not accountable to the Court, they are responsible to the Court for the lawfulness of what they do. Lord Diplock observed:
'....It is not, in my view, a sufficient answer to say that judicial review of the actions of officers or departments of Central Government is unnecessary because they are accountable to Parliament for what they do so far as regards efficiency and policy, and of that Parliament is the only Judge; they are responsible to a Court of justice for the lawfulness of what they do, and of that the Court is the only Judge.'
8. The jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is supervisory in nature and not appellate and the remedy under Article 226 is not intended to supersede the modes of obtaining relief before a Civil Court or obtaining relief under the special enactments.
9. In this case, several facts have to be ascertained, the distance to be covered, the time for each duty, etc., which can be better done by the forum specifically made for the purpose. Petitioners already produced two conciliation settlements Exhibits P-1 and P-2. If there is a violation of the settlement that may spell in the realm of industrial dispute. If duty has been changed without notice under Section 9A that is also an industrial right which can be adjudicated better under the special enactment of the Industrial Disputes Act. Therefore, in the nature of this case, I am convinced that this is not a matter to be adjudicated by this Court. Hence, noting the undertaking contained in the statement filed on behalf of the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation regarding remedial steps that will be taken by them if proper request is made by the employees in writing to the Corporation , I dismiss the original petition.