ORDER
K.J. Joseph, J.
1. The petitioner is an advocate practising before the Courts at Quilon. She was appointed as the Government Pleader and Public Prosecutor by the State Government for Quilon District for conducting cases for and on behalf of the State of Kerala. Apart from the Criminal and Civil cases, for and on behalf of the State, she has to represent the State Government on its various Departments, before the Tribunals or quasi judicial authorities.
2. It is the case that she was directed on behalf of the State to conduct certain Motor Accident Claims filed before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal at Quilon. While passing the awards, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had fixed the advocate fees to be paid in respect of those cases in the award itself. But when she applied for payment of the said amount fixed by the Tribunal, the same was declined by the respondents on the basis of Ext. P-l letter dated 17-8-1988, issued by the District Collector, Quilon to the petitioner, wherein it is stated that the Government in their Circular No. 7621/B3/86/LAW dated 1-8-1988 had ordered that the advocates who appear before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal and Labour Tribunal are entitled to get fees as per Item 17 of Rule 32 of the Kerala Government Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) and Conduct of Cases Rules, 1978. She was, therefore, directed to prefer a fresh claim as laid down in the above Rule duly signed by the presiding officer of the Court.
3. The petitioner challenges the validity of the above circular issued by the Government and Ext/ P-1 letter issued by the District Collector in this proceedings filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and prays for issuance of a writ of certiorari or other appropriate writ, order or direction and also to issue a writ of mandamus or other appropriate writ, direction or order directing the District Collector, Quilon to take urgent steps for disbursing the advocate fees to the petitioner fixed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal in the cases mentioned in the Original Petition. She also prays for consequential reliefs.
4. According to the petitioner, she is entitled to get her fees for the cases conducted by her on behalf of the State not as per item No. 17 of Rule 32 of the Rules, but her claim for advocate fee would come under item No. 21, Rule 32 of the Kerala Government Law Officers (Appointment and Condition of Service) and Conduct of Cases Rules, 1978. According to the petitioner, the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is a quasi judicial tribunal having the powers of a Court and the presiding officer of the tribunal is a District Judge in the judicial service of the State. She further states that for all practical purposes, it is the provision of the Civil Procedure Code which is applicable for trial and adjudication of the claims before the tribunals are concerned. She has also a case that while prescribing the Rules, the Government have not cared to revise the tariff taking into consideration the shooting up of the cost of living index, the standing of the advocate in the bar to get qualified for appointment as Government Pleader. She further contended that the Rules do not specifically prescribe the fees for conducting cases before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal and, therefore, the residuary clause in the Rules alone is applicable in respect of fixation and payment of the advocate fees.
5. On behalf of respondents 1 and 2, a counter-affidavit has been filed in the case wherein it is stated by the respondents that the petitioner was appointed as a District Government Pleader, Quilon for conducting Government cases. Rule 32 of the Kerala Government Law Officers (Payment and Conditions of Service) and Conduct of Cases Rules, 1978 deals with the duties of Government Law Officers at the District Court, Additional District Court and Sub-Court Centres. Items 10, 11, 12, 13 and 21 of the said Rules have subsequently been amended by the Government as per G.O. (P.) No. 58/ 87/LAW dated 24-2-1987 enhancing the rate of remuneration. It is also stated in the counter-affidavit that item No. 17 under Rule 32 provides the rate of fee for appearance before the Tribunal such Income-tax Tribunal, Sales-tax Tribunal, etc. Item 21 relates to the rate of fee for cases not specifically provides for any of the items. According to the respondents. Item No. 17 specifies the rate of fee for appearance before the Tribunals generally and the mention of 'Income-tax Tribunal, Sales-tax Tribunal, etc.' therein is intended only to indicate certain example and they are only illustrative and not exhaustive. Since the item is not exhaustive, Government as per Circular No. 7621/B3/86/LAW dated 1-8-1988 have clarified that the Government Law Officers fee for appearance before the fee for appearance before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal and Labour Tribunals shall be in accordance with item 17 of Rule 32 of the Rules mentioned above. Since the fee for appearance before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is specifically provided in Item 17 as per the Circular referred to above dated 1-8-1988, no Government Pleader is entitled to claim fee for such appearance as per the previsions in Item No. 21.
6. In respect of the petitioner's allegation that the fee paid to the advocates of the Insurance Companies, which according to the petitioner is higher than the fee paid to the advocates appointed by the State Government, Government have stated that the salary and other earnings of the employees of the Insurance Company are higher than that of Government of India and State of Kerala and hence any increase as prayed for by the petitioner cannot be given unless the relevant Government Orders in that regard is changed. It is also stated in the counter-affidavit that Government is the authority to take a final decision in the matter and as such the petitioner is entitled to the remuneration as fixed by the Government then and there as per the Rules in force. The counter-affidavit further states that the Government circular dated 1-8-1988 is not against the provisions of the Kerala Government Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) and Conduct of Cases Rules, 1978 and, therefore, Ext. P-1 letter issued by the District Collector, Quilon based on the said circular is perfectly legal and justified. The counter-affidavit further proceeds that item No. 21 of the Rules is applicable only when the fees is not specifically provided in other items in the said Rules. Since appearance before the Tribunals such as Income-tax Tribunal, Sales-tax Tribunal, etc. is provided under item 17, it is stated that Item No. 21 of the Rules are not applicable. It is further stated in the counter-affidavit that it is the duty pf the Government Pleader and Law Officers of the State to protect Government interest in all cases and Law Officers are being paid fees under the provisions mentioned above and, therefore, Government Pleader is not entitled to get any higher amount than that is prescribed under Item 17 of the Rule 32 of the Rules referred to above. The respondent, therefore, states that the petitioner is not entitled to get any relief in this Original Petition.
7. I heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner as well as the learned Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the respondents. The only question to be considered is whether the petitioner is entitled to get advocate fees in respect of the claim petition filed before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal under Clause 21 of Rule 32 of the Kerala Government Law Officers (Appointment and Condition of Service) and Conduct of Cases Rules, 1978 which prescribes the remuneration of Government Law Officers at District Court, Additional District Court and Sub-Court Centres. According to the respondents, the relevant item is Clause 17 whereas, according to the petitioner, the relevant item is 21. Relevant portions of Rule 32 are extracted below :
'Rule 32. Remuneration of Government Law Officers at District Court, Additional District Court and Sub-Court Centres:-- (1) A Government Law Officer at District Court, Additional District Court or Sub-Court Centre shall be paid fees in accordance with the rates specified below:--
1. Original Suits
Regulation fee or the fee decreed byCourt.
9. Land Acquisitions Cases
Regulation fee or the fee fixed byCourt.
10. Sessions cases and Criminal Appeals.
Rs. 50 per day foreach case, a period of 3 hours or more being taken for purposesof calculating as constituting a day's work in Court, and Rs. 20 per day maximum fee for a case occupying less than 3 hours in Court. When more than one case on the same day Rs. 70 in all. For conducting cases in outlying Stations Rs. 70 per day.
17. Appearance before tribunals such as Income tax Tribunal/ Salestax Tribunal, etc.
Rs. 25 pereffective appearance occupying a period of three hrs. or more and a maximumfee of Rs. 15 per work occupying less than three hrs.Total fees not to exceed Rs. 40 per day.
19. Appearance on behalf of Boards Corporations. Commercialconcerns, Local authorities etc.
Same fee as for the conduct of Statecases or as agreed to by the concerned body or authority.
21. Other cases not specifically provided for
Regulation fee or the fee fixed by Courtor Rs. 15 whichever is higher.
Note: (1) When two or more cases are heard together or where in a number of connected cases, the result is virtually determined by the issues in one of such cases, fee for only one case will be paid
(2) All the appeals, revisions or petitions from one judgment or order will be together considered as one case if they heard together.'
8. According to the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is in effect is functioning as a Court while making the award on the claim petition made by the claimants under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. Even though such authorities are called as Tribunals, according to the learned counsel, they were really discharging the functions of Court and having the trapping of a Court, wherein they are also deciding issues interpartes, taking evidence on oath, summoning witnesses, compelling their presence, imposing fine and exercising some of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. These functions are essentially done by a Court also. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, the petitioner is entitled to claim advocate fee under Clause 21 of Rule 32 since no fee has been specifically prescribed under any of the items stipulated in Rule 32 of the Rules and, therefore, the residuary clause viz. Clause 21 is applicable. But according to the learned Government Pleader, who appears on behalf of the respondents, it is stated that Clause 21 is not applicable at all in respect of cases conducted before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. In Clause 17 of Rule 32 of the Rules specifically provides for fees for effective appearance before Tribunals such as Income-tax Tribunal, Sales Tax Tribunal, etc. The learned Government Pleader submits that the Government has clarified by Circular dated 1-8-1988 that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal as well as Labour Tribunate also would come under Clause 17 of Rule 32 of the Rules. It is the further case of the learned Government Pleader that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal are not 'Courts' within the meaning of the said expression used in the Code of Civil Procedure and, therefore, the functions exercised by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal are not the same as that of a Court exercising powers of a Civil Court.
9. Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 reads as follows :
'Section 110: Claims Tribunals: (1) A StateGovernment may, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one or more MotorAccident Claims-Tribunals (hereinafter referred to as Claims Tribunals) for such area asmay be specified in the notification for thepurpose of adjudicating upon claims forcompensation in respect of accident involvingthe death, of, or bodily injury to personsarising out of the use of motor vehicles, ordamages to any property of a third party soarising, or both.'
Section 110-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 reads:
'110-C. Procedure and powers of Claims Tribunal-- In holding any inquiry under Section 110-B, the Claims Tribunal may, subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit.
(2) The Claims Tribunal shall have all the powers of a Civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects and for such other purposes as may be prescribed; and the Claims Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter XXXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.
(2A) ........
(3) ........
Section 110F. Bar of jurisdiction of Civil Courts:-- Where any Claims Tribunal has been constituted for any area no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to any claim for compensation which may be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal for that area, and no injunction in respect of any action taken or to be taken by or before the Claims Tribunal in respect of the claim for compensation shall be granted by the Civil Court.
Section 111A. Power of State Government to make rules-- A State Government may make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of Sections 110 to 110E, and in particular, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:--
(a) ........
(b) ........
(c) the powers vested in a Civil Court which may be exercised by a Claims Tribunal;
(d) ........
(e) .....
10. Therefore, the question to be decided is while exercising the powers under Section 110 of the Act whether the Tribunal is acting as a Court or not, even though now, the District Judges are exercising the powers of Tribunal. In respect of the powers conferred on the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal regarding administration on oath and recording the evidence of the witnesses examined before the said Tribunal and the applicability of the Evidence Act, the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Union of India v. T. R. Varma, AIR 1957 SC 882 : (1958 All LJ 126) at page 885 has stated :
'Now, it is no doubt true that the evidence of the respondent and his witnesses was not taken in the mode prescribed in the Evidence Act; but that Act has no application to enquiries conducted by tribunals, even though they may be judicial in character. The law requires that such tribunals should observe rules of natural justice in the conduct of the enquiry and if they do so, their decision is not liable to be impeached on the ground that the procedure followed was not in accordance with that, which obtains in a Court of law.
Stating it broadly and without intending it to be exhaustive, it may be observed that rules of natural justice require that a party should have the opportunity of adducing all relevant evidence on which he relies, that the evidence of the opponent should be taken in his presence, and that he should be given the opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses examined by that party, and that no materials should be relied on against him without his being given an opportunity of explaining them.
If these rules are satisfied, the enquiry is not open to attack on the ground that the procedure laid down in the Evidence Act for taking evidence was not strictly followed. Vide the recent decision of this Court in New Prakash Transport Co. v. New Suwarna Transport Co., (1957 SCR 98 : (S) AIR 1957 SC 232 (C)) where this question is discussed.'
11. The Tribunal is not a Court, and its constitution is not governed by the legislation applicable to Civil Courts. The proceeding itself has to be commenced by an application in the prescribed form and the resulting order is not even called a decree. Section 110C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 provides for a procedure and it shows that the Tribunal is entitled to follow such summary procedure as it may think fit, subject to the rules that may have been made. It also provides by Section 110E that the amount due under the award shall be recovered through the Collector as arrears of revenue. Section 110F express bars of jurisdiction of Civil Courts in places where Claims Tribunals have been constituted. The State by reason of the powers conferred upon it under Section 111 of the Act, framed Rules for procedure for the Tribunals and it is only where no specific rules exist that the Tribunals are enabled to follow the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is, therefore, impossible to hold that the Tribunal is a Court. Similar provisions contained in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 are incorporated in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 also.
12. In the decision reported in British General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Chanbi Shaikh Abdul Kader, 1968 ACJ 322 : (AIR 1968 Goa 78) it is said at page 81:
'The Claims Tribunal is not a Court as ordinarily understood. It has some trappings of a Court as stated earlier, but that is all. In a manner of speaking it has borrowed plumage for a limited purpose.... In view of the scheme of the Act and the rules made thereunder I am of the view that the Claims Tribunal cannot be regarded as a Civil Court for the purposes of interference in revision under Section 115(c) of the Civil Procedure Code and Section 8(2)(b)(l) of the 1963 Regulation.'
In Khairunnisa v. Municipal Corporation, Bombay, 1966 ACJ 37, it is said:
'The Tribunal is not a Court, and its constitution is not governed by any legislation applicable to civil Courts. The proceeding itself has to be commenced by an application in the prescribed form, and the resultant order is not even called a decree. Section 110C of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for the procedure and it shows that the Tribunal is entitled to follow such summary procedure as it may think fit, subject to the rules that may have been made. It also provides by Section 110-E that the amount due under the Award shall be recovered through the Collector as arrears of revenue. Section 110F expressly but the jurisdiction of Civil Courts in places where Claims Tribunals have been constituted. The State, by reason of the powers conferred upon it by Section 111 of the Act, framed rules of procedure for the Tribunals, and it is only where no specific rules exist that the tribunals are enabled to follow the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. It is, therefore, impossible to hold that the Tribunal is a Court.'
In S. D. Ghatge v. State, AIR 1977 Bom 384 a Full Bench of the High Court of Bombay considered the contention that if for purposes of Article 136(1) of the Constitution the expression 'Court' has been interpreted as meaning 'Court' in the technical sense, that is, a tribunal constituted by the State as part of the ordinary hierarchy of Courts, then the same meaning should be given to the expression in the amended Article 226 said (at page 393):
'In the first place, neither the expression Court nor the expression 'tribunal' has been defined in the Constitution and therefore the dictionary meaning or the normal connotation of these expressions will have to be considered. Secondly, the proposition is well settled that all Courts are tribunals but all tribunals are not Courts.... the proposition in other words mean that some tribunals would be basically Courts i.e. Courts in their normal connotation while some others would not be Courts and therefore it cannot be said that Parliament wanted to exclude all tribunals from the purview of the High Court's superintendence under the amended Article 226 but it can be said that Parliament intended to exclude only such tribunals as are not basically Courts from the High Court's superintendence. It is obvious that this result will follow if the expression 'Courts' is understood and regarded in its ordinary meaning or its accepted normal connotation, namely an adjudicating body which performs judicial function of rendering definitive judgments having finality and authoritativeness to bind the parties litigating their rights before it and that too in exercise of the sovereign judicial power transferred to it by the State. Any tribunal or authority possessing these two attributes will be a Court.... As regards the Supreme Court decisions on which reliance has been placed by counsel for the Union of India, it may be pointed out that in both the cases the question that had arisen was whether the concerned adjudicating body was a 'tribunal' within the meaning of Article 136(1) of the Constitution or not and if so, whether an appeal against the impugned decision or order of that body would lie to the Supreme Court under that article, the distinction between a Court and a tribunal was never in issue before the Supreme Court and hence the observations explaining the two concepts in contradistinction to one another would be obiter, if not casual observations. Even if obiter these observations were made in the context of Article 136(1) where both the expressions 'Court' and 'tribunal' have been used and, therefore, those observations will have no bearing when the concept of 'Court' is to be understood in the amended Article 226 where the expression 'Courts' stands by itself and not in juxtaposition with the other expression 'tribunal'; the context having changed the expression 'Courts' in the amended Article 226 cannot be interpreted to mean the same thing when that expression is used in juxtaposition with the expression 'tribunal' in one and the same article like Article 136(1). Therefore, de hors the concept of 'tribunal' the expression 'Courts' occurring in the amended Article 226 will have to be understood in its normal accepted connotation especially in the absence of any definition being given in the constitution and would include such tribunals as satisfy the two tests mentioned above.'
In Yaswant Rao v. Sampat, AIR 1979 MP 21 : (1979 Lab 1C 176) a Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court had occasion to consider whether a revision will lie under Section 115, C.P.C. from an order passed by the Commissioner appointed under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, The Full Bench said at page 24:
'In our opinion, the word 'Court' as used in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is used in a narrow sense meaning only a Civil Court in the normal hierarchy of Courts. The word 'Court' as it occurs in Section 115 will not include tribunals which are established under special Acts and exercise special jurisdiction.'
13. Again the Andhra Pradesh High Court in its decision reported in S. Mohammed Ali & Sons v. V. Madhava Rao, AIR 1964 AP 132 held that the rent controller under Andhra Pradesh (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act is not a Court within the meaning of Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The essential ingredients of a Court had been staled in the said decision and the difference between a 'Court and Tribunal' has also been clearly stated in the said decision firm of Section Mohammed Ali & Sons v. V. Madhava Rao, AIR 1964 AP 132.
14. As stated earlier, the question to be ultimately decided is whether the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is a Court and where it had the trappings of a Court as contended by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. It is true that evidence also is being taken by the Tribunal after administering oath to the witnesses like ordinary Civil Court. Even though the Tribunals also record the summary of the evidence given by the witnesses under the rules, the Division Bench of this Court in the Decision reported in Beeran v. Rajappan, 1980 Ker LT 210 has considered the question whether the Claims Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act is a 'Court' and the orders passed by the said Tribunal, if got revised under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Division Bench also considered the distinction between 'Court and Tribunal' and held:--
'A Tribunal like the Claims Tribunal set up under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 is another authority to which the State can transfer a part of its judicial powers. The Civil Court and the Tribunal both are vested with judicial powers of the State. But that does not mean that both are same. The Constitution does not define 'Court' or 'Tribunal'. The Code of Civil Procedure also does not contain a definition. But the indication in the preamble to the Code is that in it is consolidated the laws relating to the procedure of the Courts of Civil Judicature. Courts of civil judicature can only be ordinary Civil Courts of the land. In one sense, all Courts are tribunals. But all tribunals will not be Courts, Courts in the strict sense. It is judicial power of the State that is exercised by a Court and a tribunal. But there is one difference . A Court (a Civil Court) has judicial power of the State to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits the cognizance of which is expressly or impliedly barred. But on the other hand, judicia, power is statutorily conferred on a tribunal to deal with special matters. It will have some of the trappings of a Court, but that by itself will not make it one among the hierarchy of Courts established under the Constitution. If a Court and a tribunal are one and the same, there is no reason why the Constitution makes a distinction. The relevant provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 also give sufficient indication that a claims Tribunal constituted under Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act is not a civil court. The Act shuts out the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts. The Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a Civil Court for certain purposes. Some of the provisions in the Civil Procedure Code are made applicable to the Claims Tribunals. So, the only possible conclusion is that a Claims Tribunal is not a Court.'
15. Again the very same question has come up before this Court in E. K. Joy v. Tom Jose, 1987 (1) Ker LT 478 and this Court has held that the claims tribunal is not a Civil Court. It is not bound by the strict rules of Evidence Act. This Court also found that it is more akin to quasi judicial authority. This Court further found that all the trappings of a Court cannot be made applicable to a tribunal. It is further held that, like other quasi judicial authorities, the claims tribunals should act fairly and in accordance with principles of natural justice, and the law does not require that the deposition given by the witnesses before the tribunal should be recorded verbatim or that should be read over and got signed by the witnesses etc., under Rule 16 of the Claims Tribunal Rules, 1977. The above two decisions of this Court would positively show that a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is not a Civil Court as contended by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner.
16. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has sited certain passages from the text book by S.A.de Smith on Judicial Review of Administrative Action Vol. III page 70 and submitted that the trappings and procedure before a civil court and before a tribunal are substantially the same. The learned author has stated thus:--
'A second test, or group of tests, for ascertaining whether statutory functions are of a judicial character turns primarily on the presence or absence of certain formal and procedural attributes. The manner in which Courts proceed is distinguished by a number of special characteristics. They determine matters in cases initiated by parties; they must normally sit in public; they are empowered to compel the attendance of witnesses, who may be examined on oath; they are required to follow the rules of evidence; they are entitled to impose sanctions by way of imprisonment, fine, damages or mandatory or prohibitory orders, and to enforce obedience to their own commands. The fact that a body has been endowed with many of the 'trappings of a Court' may not always be sufficient to establish conclusively that it has been invested with judicial power; but the presence of such trappings tends to support that conclusion. Thus in seeking to establish that the proceedings (or the functions) of a statutory body are to be classified as judicial for any given purpose, it may be material to show that the body is called a 'tribunal' which holds 'sittings' and makes 'decisions' in relation to 'cases' before it, that it is empowered to summon witnesses and administer oaths, that it is normally required to sit in public, that its members are debarred from sitting if personally interested in a matter before them, that it has power to award costs or to impose sanctions to enforce compliance with its orders.
Perhaps the most obvious characteristic of ordinary Courts is that they determine, on the basis of evidence and arguments submitted to them, disputes between two or more parties about their respective legal rights and duties, powers and liabilities, privileges and immunities. 'It is a truism that the conception of the judicial function is inseparably bound up with the idea of a suit between parties, whether between crown and subject or between subject and subject, and that it is the duty of the Court to decide the issue between those parties....'
As stated by the learned author in the above quoted passage, the fact that a body has been empowered with many of the 'trappings of a Court' may not always be sufficient to establish conclusively that it has been investigated with judicial powers and the existence of such trappings tends to such a conclusion. It is not always correct to say that the functions of the claims tribunals are exactly the same as that of a civil court. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the functions of Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and the Industrial Tribunal are similar to the duties and functions of a Civil Court. In the decision of the Supreme Court in Bharat Bank v. Employees of the Bharat Bank, AIR 1950 SC 188, Kama C. J. has said at page 189:--
'While the powers of the Industrial Tribunal in some respects are different from those of an ordinary Civil Court and it has jurisdiction and powers to give the reliefs which a Civil Court administering the law of the land (for instance ordering the reinstatement of a workman) does not possess in the discharge of it duties it is essentially working as a judicial body--.... Having considered all the provisions of the Act it seems to me clear that the Tribunal is discharging functions very near those of a Court, although it is not a Court in the technical sense of the word.'
17. Again the Supreme Court has considered the same question in subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sundar Jhunjhunwala, AIR 1961 SC 1669 Hidyathullah, J. has said :
'All tribunals are not Courts, though all Courts are tribunals. The word 'Courts' is used to designate those tribunals which are set up in an organised State for the administration of justice. By administration of justice is meant the exercise of judicial power of the State to maintain and uphold rights and to punish wrongs. Whenever there is an infringement of a right or an injury, the Courts are there to restore the Vinculam Juris, which is disturbed.'
It is clear that Industrial Tribunal cannot equate with that of a civil court and in the case of Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal also, the same cannot be considered as a Court.
18. The learned counsel for the petitioner places reliance under Item 21 of Rule 32 of the rules. But Item 21 of Rule 32 is applicable only in case where the fee has not been specifically provided in any other items. The expression that has been used in Item 17 of Rule 32 of the rules is 'appearance before the tribunal such as the Income-tax Tribunal, Sales-tax Tribunal etc.' The said definition is not exhaustive. Therefore, the Motor Accident Claims Tribunals are also coming under the expression 'Tribunals'. Therefore. Government as per its Circular No. 7621/B.3/86/LAW dated 1-8-1988 ordered that the advocates who are appearing before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal and Labour Tribunals are entitled to get fees under Item 17 of Rule 32 of the Kerala Government, Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1978. In the light of the decisions referred to above, the Motor Accidents Claims would come under Item 17 of Rule 32 of the above rules and the advocates appearing before the said Tribunal are entitled to get only fees prescribed under the said clause and Clause 21 of Rule 32 has, therefore, no application. The Government is perfectly justified in issuing the said circular and I see no illegality or irregularity in the said Circular or Ext. P-1 letter issued by the District Collector, Quilon to the petitioner. The petitioner is not entitled to get any relief in this Original Petition. The Original Petition is devoid of merits and the same is, therefore, dismissed. But, in the circum stances, there will be no order as to costs.