Ramakrishnan, J.
1. Has the Court power or jurisdiction to extend the time for payment of 9/10th Court-fee payable under Section 4A of the Kerala-fees and Suits Valuation Act (for short 'the Act') beyond the period of 30 days provided under the proviso to that Section even if there are sufficient reasons for non-payment of Court-fee within that time is the point referred for decision by the Division Bench in this case. A similar question regarding the power and jurisdiction of this Court and appellate Courts in general under Section 52 of the Act to extend the time for payment of 2/3rd of the Court-fee required to be paid at the time of admission of the appeal has come up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court on a reference in Elizabeth v. Francis, (1991) 2 Ker LT 779 : (AIR 1992 Kerala 108). The Division Bench has answered the reference by holding that this Court has power to extend the time beyond 30 days mentioned in the second proviso to Section 52 of the Act taking note of the very wide powers granted to the Court under Sections 148 and 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure, especially Section 149, in the matter of extending time fixed by the Court for payment of the required Court-fee.
2. In the reference order in this case, the learned Judge has taken the view that the decision in Elizabeth's case (AIR 1992 Kerala 108) (supra) requires reconsideration. The main reason indicated by the learned Judge for doubting the correctness of the decision in Elizabeth's case (supra) and taking a view in the matter contrary to that taken by the Division Bench in the above case is that the provisions in Sections 4A and 52 of the Act are provisions really extending a concession to the litigant coupled with the obligation to make up the balance Court-fee within the time stipulated in the respective Sections itself and no litigant can claim that he will take advantage of that limb of the provision which is to his advantage and will refuse to abide bythe limb that is to his detriment or which is not to his advantage in the light of the reference made, we have to consider once again the question as to what the Court should do when a suitor asks for extension of time for payment of balance Court-fee in view of the provisions in Section 4A, the scheme of which is more or less similar to the scheme of Section 52, though the earlier Division Bench has hopefully expected that their 'pronouncement may set at rest' that question.
3. The question referred may have to be decided with reference to Section 4A of the Act and Sections 148 and 149 and Order VII, Rule 11, CPC, which are thus :
'Section 4A. Levy of fee at the time of institution of suit:-- Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provisions of this Act, the amount of fee to be paid on plaint at the time of institution of suit shall be one-tenth of the amount of fee chargeable under this Act and the balance amount shall be paid within such period, not later than fifteen days from the date of framing of issues or where framing of issues is not necessary, within such period not exceeding fifteen days as may be specified by the Court:
Provided that the Court may for sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing extend the period up to thirty days.
Provided further that if the parties settle the dispute within the period, specified or extended by the Court for the payment of the balance amount, the plaintiff shall not be called upon to pay such balance.
Section 148. Enlargement of time.-- Where any period is fixed or granted by the Court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by this Code, the Court may, in its discretion, from time to time, enlarge such period, even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired.
Section 149. Power to make up deficiency of Court-fees.-- Where the whole or any part of any fee prescribed for any document by the law for the time being in force relating to Court-fees has not been paid, the Court may, in its discretion, at any stage, allow theperson, by whom such fee is payable, to pay the whole or part, as the case may be, of such Court-fee; and upon such payment the document, in respect of which such fee is payable, shall have the same force and effect as if such fee had been in the first instance.
Order VII, Rule 11. Rejection of plaint.--The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:--
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
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Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp papers shall not be extended unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature from correcting the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp papers, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal 'to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.'
4. Section 4A of the Act is a new provision introduced in the Act by the Amendment Act 6 of 1991. As per the above provision, the amount of fee to be paid on the plaint at the time of institution of the suit is fixed as 1/10th of the amount of fee chargeable under the Act. The Section also provides that the balance amount shall be paid within such period not later than 15 days from the date of framing of issues or where framing of issues is not necessary, within such period not exceeding 15 days as may be specified by the Court. The first proviso to Section 4A further provides that the Court may, for sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing, extend the period upto 30 days. In view of Section 4A, Section 5 may have application only to cases where the fee required to be paid at the time of presentation of any document itself is not paid fully and not to cases of default inpayment of balance Court-fee under Section 4A of the Act. Going by the wording of the proviso, it may not be reasonable to interpret and understand the said proviso as a provision intended to restrict the power of extension of time for payment of Court-fee conferred on the Court under any other Act. At best it can be considered only as a provision imposing an embargo on the power conferred on Court to extend the period for payment of Court-fee under that Section.
5. In the absence of any kind of indication in the Section itself in any other provisions of the Act as to what should be the consequence of the failure to pay the balance Court-fee payable under Section 4A of the Act, it becomes necessary to refer to the provisions contained in the CPC which prescribes the procedure to be followed generally in the case of all civil proceedings. If that be the correct legal position. Sections 148 and 149 and the provisions in Order VII, Rule 11, CPC have got direct application in the matter. Section 148 is a general provision couched in very wide terms conferring power on the Court for enlargement of time fixed or granted by the Court for doing of any act prescribed or allowed by the Court in its discretion from time to time either before or after the expiry of the period originally fixed or granted. Section 149 is a provision specifically conferring very wide powers on the Court for granting time for payment of Court-fee in its discretion at any stage, Order VII, Rule 11, CPC is the provision which specifically mandates that the plaint shall be rejected where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped and the plaintiff on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp papers within a time to be fixed by the Court fails to do so provided that the time fixed by the Court for supplying of the requisite stamp papers shall not be extended unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature from supplying the requisite stamp papers within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.
6. From the above analysis of the relevant provisions, it is fairly clear that even though as per the provisions in Section 4A of the Act and Order VII, Rule 11, CPC, restrictions have been imposed on the power of the Court to extend the time for payment of Court-fees as indicated in those provisions, such restriction cannot override or cancel the general power conferred on Courts in very wide terms to grant time for payment of the whole or any part of the Court-fee in its discretion at any stage under Section 149, CPC. As already indicated, there is nothing in the express wording of Section 4A of the Act to take the view that application of Section 149, CPC is altogether excluded by the provisions contained in that Section. Though Section 4A begins with a non-obstante clause, it refers only to the other provisions of the Act and not to any other law. As such, it is only reasonable to hold that the provisions in Section 4A may not have the effect of excluding the operation of Sections 148 and 149, CPC even if the provision in the proviso is held to be mandatory. In other words, it has to be held that the provisions in Section 4A and the provisions in Section 149 and Order VII, Rule 11, CPC are supplementary or complimentary to each other. A harmonious interpretation of the above provisions alone will be justifiable and acceptable when we keep in mind the principle of interpretation that no provision of an enactment should be interpreted and understood in such a manner as to render another provision in the same or another enactment totally ineffective or inoperative unless there is express indication to that effect. The direct result of holding that the proviso to Section 4A of the Act is mandatory in character and in view of the said provision the Court has no power at all to extend the time for payment of Court-fee payable under Section 4A of the Act beyond 30 days is to make the entire provision contained in Section 149 ineffective or nugatory. Such an interpretation of the two provisions would be quite contrary to well accepted principles of interpretation of statutes and cannot in ourview be accepted as legal.
7. We find sufficient justification for taking the above view in the followingweighty observations of the Supreme Court made in Mannan Lal v. Chhotka Bibi, AIR 1971 SC 1374, referred to and relied upon by the Division Bench in Elizabeth's case (AIR 1992 Kerala 108 at p. 114) (supra):
'Apart from the decisions bearing on the point, no doubt that Section 4 of the Court-fees Act is not the last word on the subject and the Court must consider the provisions of both the Act and the Code to harmonise the two sets of provisions which can only be done by reading Section 149 as a proviso to Section 4 of the Court-fees Act by allowing the deficiency to be made good within a period of time fixed by it...........'
In the same decision, it has also been pointed . out that 'the provisions of the Court-fees Act and the Code of Civil Procedure have to be read together to form a harmonious whole and no effort should be made to give precedence to provisions in one over those of the other unless the express words of a statute clearly override those of the other.' In Indian Statistical Institute v. Associated Builders, AIR 1978 SC 335, also the Supreme Court has reiterated the same principle with reference to Section 149 of the Code in the matter of payment of deficit Court-fee.
8. Of course, it is true that the Supreme Court has laid down the principles noted above with reference to Section 4 of the Court-fees Act 1872 and Section 149, CPC and the scheme for payment of Court-fee as it existed then. But it will be useful to note that before making the relevant observations, the Supreme Court has traced the historical background in which Section 582A (provision corresponding to Section 149) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882 was inserted by Act 6 of 1892. After pointing out the background, the Supreme Court has further pointed out that it was to mitigate the rigour of the provisions contained in Court-fees Act that Section 582A of the old CPC was enacted. Section 149 is the provision corresponding to Section 582A. If that was the purpose of enacting Sections 582A and 149 of the old and new CPCs, we find no justification to take the view that the proviso to Section 4A willpreclude a party from seeking time beyond 30 days mentioned in the proviso to Section 4A under Section 149 and the Court from granting such prayer in appropriate cases in its discretion at any stage of the proceedings under Section 149, CPC.
9. In this connection it is also relevant to refer to the Full Bench decision of this Court in Kathayee Cotton Mills Ltd. Alwaye v. V. R. Padmanabha Pillai, 1957 Ker LT 1175 : (AIR 1958 Kerala 88) wherein the Full Bench has taken a similar view while considering the effect of the proviso to Rule 11 of Order VII, CPC prior to 1976 amendment which was to the following effect:
'Provided that time granted under clauses (b) and (c) shall not exceed 30 days in all.'
The proviso to Section 4A of the Act is also similarly worded and no distinction can be made between the above two provisions. Even after holding that the proviso is mandatory, the Full Bench has held that it may not deprive the Court of the general power conferred on it under Section 149, CPC in granting time for paying the deficit Court-fee in appropriate cases even beyond 30 days under Section 149, CPC. The fact that the proviso considered by the Full Bench was one added to a provision in the CPC ifself and the proviso in question is one incorporated as part of a provision in the Court-fees Act may not be of much consequence if the provision of both the Act and the Code are to be interpreted harmoniously as laid down by the Supreme Court in Mannan Lal's case (AIR 1971 SC 1376) (supra).
10. Of course, we are not forgetting the historical reality that Section 149, CPC is a provision which existed at a time when there was no provision like Section 4A in the Act. but, at the same time, the existence of a mandatory provision restricting the power of extension of time up to a maximum period of 30 days contained in Section 4A may not in our view be a sufficient reason to interpret and understand the said provision as one having the effect of making the provision inSection 149, CPC nugatory. So long as Section 149 stands in the Code and so long as it is settled that the provisions in the CPC and in the Act are supplementary or complimentary to each other, we are inclined to take the view that in spite of the mandatory nature of the provision contained in Section 4A of the Act, the Courts have ample jurisdiction to extend the time for payment of deficit Court fee as provided in Section 149, CPC in appropriate cases though not under Section 4A. This we think is the correct legal position even if the facility afforded to pay only 1/10th of the full Court-fee payable at the time of filing the plaint is treated as a concession granted coupled with a liability to pay the balance within the time allowed by the Section itself, as assumed by the learned single Judge, so long as Section 149 is also a provision to be reckoned with in the matter as a provision which confers a discretionary power on the Court to grant time for payment of deficit Court-fee at any stage on the application of the parties in appropriate cases. As the said Section confers a discretionary power on the Court, the litigant may get a right to approach the Court to grant time in its discretion in appropriate cases using its judicial discretion.
11. We may, however, add a word of caution here itself so that the view taken by us in this matter should not be understood or treated as one permitting extension of time indiscriminately ignoring the significance of the restrictions imposed in the matter of extension of time for payment of balance Court-fee or deficit Court-fee contained in Section 4A of the Act and Rule 11 of Order VII, CPC, to all suitors who fail to pay the Court-fee within the time allowed under those Sections and who approach the Court under Section 149 of the Code as a last resort. We may note in this connection that as per the proviso to Section 4A even for extending the time up to 30 days the Court is directed to record sufficient reasons in writing. In this connection it is relevant to note that the suitor may get a further opportunity to make up the deficiency under Order VII, Rule 11, CPC wherever it applies. Under the said provision, the Couit is empowered to extend the time for supplying requisite stamp papers if theCourt finds for reasons to be recorded that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of exceptional nature from supplying the requisite stamp papers within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff. It is only after exhausting the above remedies available the question of extension of time under Section 149, CPC may arise and as such it is only in extraordinary circumstances such exercise of power will be justified. For all practical purposes an extension of time under Section 149, CPC can possibly be granted only in rarest of the rare cases. In this view, we would hold that Courts may have power to extend time even if the suitor has omitted to supply the requisite Court-fee or stamp papers within the time granted by the Court under Section 4A of the Act even assuming that the provision in the proviso is mandatory and that under that provision extension can be given only upto 30 days.
12. We would accordingly hold that in spite of the provisions in Section 4A of the Act, the Court may still have power to extend the time for supplying the deficit Court7fees though such cases may be very rare. In the circumstances, we do not find any reason to reconsider the decision in Elizabeth's case (AIR 1992 Kerala 108) (supra). On the contrary, we would in fact respectfully agree with and adopt all the reasons given by the Division Bench in the above case in support of the view which we have taken in this case.
13. In this view, having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, we would allow the plaintiff a very short extension of time for payment of the requisite Court-fee, namely ten days from today. If the requisite Court-fee is paid within the time granted above, the Court below will restore the plant and proceed to dispose of it in accordance with law.
C.R.P. is thus allowed. No costs.