S.N. Kapoor, J.
1. By this petition u/Sec. 482, Cr.PC the petitioner seeks quashing of the proceedings arising out of FIR No. 332/93 Under Sections 498-A/406/34, IPC at PS Jahangir Puri, Delhi.
2. The relevant facts giving rise to the petition are as under:
Praveen Kaur filed a complaint on 14.11.1993 at P.S. Jahangir Puri. She alleged in the complaint that she was married on 7th May, 1989 to late Shri Bhupinder Singh at Chattiwind, Amritsar. Dowry was given according to status of her parents. But her in-laws were not satisfied and they demanded cash, jewellery and colour TV. These demands could not be met. Thereupon, her father-in-law Pritam Singh and brothers-in-law Ravinder Singh and Karamjeet Singh started abusing, beating and torturing her. She and her husband used to tolerate it helplessly. On 7th May, 1990, a child Paramveer Singh @ Honey was born. Thereafter her father-in-law and brothers-in-law started demanding more dowry and used to harass her. On 15th October, 1990, her husband expired. One month after the death of her husband, she came to her parents' house at Jahangir Puri, Delhi. After about 15 days, she went along with her mother to her matrimonial house but her father-in-law and brothers-in-law did not allow her to enter the house and threatened to kill her. Since then she was residing in Jahangir Puri, Delhi. She does not want to go to Patiala. She sent a complaint by post on 14th November, 1993 to the above effect. She was called to the police station and her statement was recorded. The petitioners were admitted to anticipatory bail on 7th December, 1993.
3. It is contended on the basis of the above-said facts that according to the statement of Praveen Kaur, the marriage took place at Patiala in Punjab; all the alleged atrocities and cruelties, demands of dowry, harassments etc. committed by the petitioners were caused at Patiala, Punjab. thereforee, the proceedings could have been initiated against the petitioners only at Patiala (Punjab) and within the jurisdiction of Patiala Courts and not in Delhi. Delhi Courts have no jurisdiction to try the petition. Besides as the marriage also took place on 7th May, 1989 in Punjab and also the alleged atrocities as well as the last incident of harassment and beatings occurred three years ago in Punjab, the complaint was barred by limitation. Moreover, there is no allegation of specific entrustment of any article to any of the petitioners. Consequently, no case has been made out against the petitioners Under Section 406, IPC and whatever Istridhan was lying, that was taken away 24th November, 1993. The present proceedings arising out of FIR No. 332/93 under Sections 498A and 406 read with Section 34, IPC amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. Hence the prayer for quashing it.
4. In reply, the respondent No. 2, Praveen Kaur admits marriage and atrocities etc. taking place at Patiala Punjab by saying as under:
'Contents of para Nos. 3 and 4 is true to the extent that all the cruelty, harassment and beating given and demand of dowry by the petitioners were made at Patiala. But the petitioners were asked for and were required to return and account for the dowry and the Istridhan at Delhi where the respondent has taken up her residence after she was thrown out of her house in Patiala by the petitioners and as such it is the Delhi Courts which has the jurisdiction and not the Punjab Courts.'
5. The complaint made about entrustment and atrocities etc. is specific and not vague. Since the petitioners are required to return and account for the articles of dowry and 'Islridhan' at Delhi, where respondent No. 2 has started living, Delhi Courts have jurisdiction to try the case. It is alleged that the offences being continuing ' offences, the complaint was made within time and it is not barred by lirnitation. Moreover she was turned out of her matrimonial house on 10.11.1991 and not on 15.10.1990.
6. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties. The main point in issue which is required to be decided relates to territorial jurisdiction of Delhi Courts in the light of the undisputed facts about marriage, harassment and entrustment of dowry etc. at Patiala.
7.1. In so far as territorial jurisdiction is concerned, Section 177, CrPC provides that every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Courts within whose jurisdiction it was committed. Sections 178 to 184 carve out certain exceptions to the 'general rule. A special provision has to obviously get precedence over the general rule.
7.2. Learned Counsel for the petitioner relies upon Rajinder Singh v. State and Anr. : 75(1998)DLT192 , Rohit Arora and Ors. v. The State and Anr. 1996 JCC 555 and Yashpal Luthra v. Smt. Meera Ltithra 1996 (2) All India Cri.LR 264, in support of his contention.
7.3. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the State relies upon Bhim Singh v. State of Punjab (1990 (2) PLR 187 and Sardar Harpal Singh and Anr. v. Balbinder Pal Kaur and Anr. (1992) 3 CCR 2598.
7.4. In Rajinder Singh's case (Supra), after referring to Section 181(4), learned Single Judge observed that an offence of criminal breach of trust could be enquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed or any part of the property which was the subject matter of the offence was received or retained or was required to be returned or accounted for by the accused person.
8. The learned Single Judge further observed in paras 12 and 13 as under:
'12. ...There would thus be no controversy with regard to the question of jurisdiction of the Court in the first three situations, namely, (a) where the offence is committed; (b) where any part of the property was received; and (c) where such property was retained. In all the three situations, the territorial jurisdiction will undoubtedly be with the Patiala Courts. The fourth situation envisaged in the section is the place where the items, in regard to which criminal breach of trust is alleged, were required to be returned or accounted for.'
13. There is no gain-saying that the words 'was required to be returned or accounted for' have no nexus with the parental home of the wife. The relevant factor would be either a stipulation to that effect between the parties either before or after the marriage and in the absence of such a stipulation, the place where the items in question were kept in trust and a breach in respect thereof was committed.'
9. Ultimately on the basis of these observations, the learned Single Judge took the view that the matter could be decided only at Patiala.
10. In Rohit Arora and Ors. v. The State and Anr, (supra) the marriage took place at Calcutta; the parties lived as husband and wife at Calcutta and dowry articles were also given at Calcutta. The wife on account of the discord returned to her parents house in Delhi. It was held that Delhi Courts had no territorial jurisdiction on return of the wife to her parental house at Delhi after breaking of the marriage. It was also observed that the husband was not bound to return her Istridhan at her parental house. The Court took the view that the FIR did not prima facie disclose the commission of cognizable offence within the territorial jurisdiction of Delhi Courts. It was also observed that Section 181, IPC did not refer to the residence of the wife after breaking down of the marriage with regard to the jurisdiction tp try the offence of criminal breach of trust relating to dowry articles. The Court also observed that the residence of the wife after the breaking down of the marriage cannot confer territorial jurisdiction on the Court to try the offences of criminal breach of trust relating to dowry articles.
11. It appears from the judgment in Yashpal Luthra v. Smt. Meera Luthra (supra) that in the similar circumstances, Satpal, J. of Punjab and Haryana High Court took the following view:
'7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by thelearned Counsel for the parties and have perused the record. Admittedly, therespondent-wife at the time of filing the complaint was residing at Bathinda.From the facts stated herein above, it is also evident that she along with herdaughter had no option but to reside at Bathinda where her brother is residingas she is alleged to have been pushed out of the matrimonial house by the.petitioner-husband. In terms of the provisions of Sub-section (4) of Section 181 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court where any property was received or retained orwas required to be returned or accounted for by the accused person has the jurisdictionto try the offences of criminal misappropriation or criminal breach of trust. In thepresent case, the articles if any of dowry or Istridhan are required to be returned by theaccused persons to the respondent-wife at Bathinda. In view of these facts, lam of theopinion that Bathinda Court has jurisdiction to entertain the complaint filed by therespondent.'
12. In Bhim Singh v. State of Punjab (supra), in similar circumstances after referring to the Dowry (Prohibition) Act, the following view was taken:
'6. After hearing learned Counsel for both the parties I am of the view that theCourt at Patiala has jurisdiction though I would like to base my conclusion ondifferent reasons. Section 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure makes ageneral provision that every offence shall ordinarily be enquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. Section 181(4) makes a specific provision with regard to an offence of criminal misappropriation or criminal breach of trust. It lays down that the said offence may be tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed or any part of the property which is subject to the offence was received or retained or was required to be returned or accounted for by the accused person. At this stage reference may be made to provisions of Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, which supplements the law with regard to offence under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code insofar as dowry articles are concerned. Section 6 lays down that where any dowry article is received by any person, that person shall transfer it to the woman in connection with whose marriage that article has been received and pending such transfer shall hold it in trust for the benefit of the woman. In other words, the person receiving the dowry articles is under a legal obligation to transfer the same to the woman for whom he holds the dowry in trust. In PTS Saibaba and Anr. v. P. Mangatayaru and Anr., following a Full Bench decision in E.S.L Corporation v. Md. Ismail Sahib, it washeld by a learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court that the person can transferthe dowry at the place where the woman is residing. If he fails to do so, the womangets a cause of action for filing a complaint at the place where it should havebeen transferred to her. It was, thereforee, laid down that the complaint can be filed by the woman where she is residing. I am in respectful agreement with theabove view and, thereforee, the present F.I.R. cannot be quashed for want ofterritorial jurisdiction.
13. In this case, whatever was given from the bride's side would be covered by the term 'dowry'. Section 6(1) of the Dowry (Prohibition) Act provides that any person who is holding any article of dowry other than the woman in connection with whose marriage it is given, that person shall transfer it to the woman within three months after the date of marriage or after the date of its receipt or when the woman is minor within one year after she has attained the age of 18 years and pending such transfer, he shall hold its interest for the benefit of the woman. Sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Dowry (Prohibition) Act provides that if any person fails to transfer any property as required by Sub-section (1) within the time-limit specified therefore, he shall be punishable for imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend up to two years or with fine.
14. If we look it from that point of view, it appears that the marriage took place on 7th May, 1989. thereforee, the offences could possibly have been committed for the first time on 7th May, 1989.
15. One has to keep in mind that there is some distinction between 'dowry' and 'Istridhan'. Istridhan means and includes dowry as well as the presents given to the bride by her in-laws. What is covered by Section 6 of the Dowry (Prohibition) Act is only dowry and not the other part of Istridhan meaning thereby the presents given by in-laws of the bride.
16. The Patna High Court in Sardar Harpal Singh and Anr. v. Balbinder Pal Kaur and Anr. (supra) has taken the view as under:
'6. thereforee from the facts stated above, it can be prima facie safely concluded at this stage that different types of tortures and ill-treatments were meted out to opposite party No. 1 at Rourkella as a consequences of which she had to leave her matrimonial home at Rourkella and shift to her father's house Jamshedpur. She could not have left her matrimonial house, if she would not have been subjected to ill-treatment and torture. According to the allegations, thereforee, the offence was undoubtedly, committed in Rourkella but its consequences had caused at Jamshedpur where opposite party No. 1 is residing at present at her father's house. She is not expected to leave her in law's house if she would not have been entered in that fashion.
7. The whole scheme of the Act is to provide relief to the weaker section and it is never expected that she is required to file a case at the place where in-laws are residing from where she is alleged to have been driven out which will frustrate the nature of the relief which she is likely to get in the event of her success in the case. thereforee, leaving of the place at Rourkella and residing at Jamshedpur can be taken to include within even the word 'consequences' which resulted in parting company from her wedded life and residing at Jamshedpur in her father's house.'
17. The Patna High Court has reached to the above conclusion and in all probability acted on two provisions Sees. 180 and 182(2) of the Cr.P.C. but specifically referred to Section 182 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
18. Before proceedings further, it is desirable to refer to Sections 180, 181(4) and Section 182, Cr.P.C. :
Place of trial where act is offence by reason of relation to other offence.
180. When an act is an offence by reason of its relation to any other act which is also an offence or which would be an offence if the doer were capable of committing an offence, the first-mentioned offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction either act was done.
Place of trial in case of certain offences.
181(1) xxx
(2) xxx
(3) xxx
(4) Any offence of criminal misappropriation or of criminal breach of trust may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed or any part of the property which is the subject of the offence was received or retained, or was required to be returned or accounted for, by the accused person.'
182(1) Any offence which includes cheating may, if the deception is practiced by means of letters or telecommunication messages, be inquired into or tried by any Court-within whose local jurisdiction such letters or messages were sent or were received; and any offence of cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the property was delivered by the person deceived or was received by the accused person.
(2) Any offence punishable under Section 494 or Section 495 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed or the offender last resided with his or her spouse by the first marriage (or the wife by the first marriage has taken up permanent residence after the commission of the offence.
19. Seeing the observations of Patna High Court in para 6 it appears that theCourt acted upon the provisions of Section 180, Cr.P.C Offence under Section 498Arelates to subjecting a woman to cruelty. In this case the relative of the husband ofthe complainant subjected the complainant to cruelty not only by causing physicalassaults but also by depriving her of her 'Istridhan'; by turning her out from hermatrimonial home and by not protecting and maintaining her and her child. Bydoing so they are continuously harassing the complainant with a view to coercingher to meet their unlawful demand in respect of the property left by her husband andnot to claim the articles of dowry and presents given to her at the time of her marriage.This amounts to cruelty within the meaning of Clause (b) of Explanationn to Section498(A), IPC. The cruelty was committed not only in ousting her but also creating suchconditions by which she has been forced to live at Delhi. Consequential cruelty is alsobeing committed at Delhi. This may amount to such willful conduct which is likelyto be drive 'her to commit suicide Or to cause grave injury or danger to her life or limbor health. At least it amounts to causing mental torture falling within Clause (a) ofthe Explanationn to Section 498-A, IPC . Consequently, the harassment which she ispresently suffering, as a consequence of turning her out is also an offence underSection 498-A, IPC . In such type of offences causing mental torture etc, physicalpresence of the accused in Delhi is not necessary. If the matter is considered from this,point of view then it squarely falls within the provisions of Section 180 of the CriminalProcedure Code. In the aforesaid circumstances the atrocities committed at Patialaspecially turning her out of the house and the consequential further commission ofoffences under Section 498A in Delhi and Section 406 may be inquired into and triedby Delhi Courts within whose local jurisdiction the consequential offence of 498A isbeing committed.
20. There cannot be any doubt that Sub-section (2) of Section 182 has specifically provided that any offence punishable under Section 494 and Section 495 of the Indian Penal Code may be inquired or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed or the offender last resided with her or her spouse or the wife of the first marriage has taken up permanent marriage of the commission. But this Sub-section (2) is confined to offence punishable under Section 494 and 495, though it indicates a specific legislative intention to provide a Forum at the place where the aggrieved wife has taken a permanent residence after the commission of the offence. In order to provide real protection and to avoid any ambiguity, it may be desirable that Section 498A as well as offence under Section 406 relating to matrimonial matters should also be included in Sub-section (2) of Section 182, Cr.P.C. But in any case Section 180 clearly provides for the continuing offences under Section 498A in the cases like the present one, the aggrieved wife could file case before the Court in whose jurisdiction she is residing.
21. Seeing the allegations in her complaint filed along with the reply, it could not be said that the allegations are vague and not specific. It is not only a case of torture caused to the complainant but to her husband also. Unfortunately in this case the husband of the complainant had expired. When she went along with her uncle, two sisters of her mother Basant Kaur and Kirpal Kaur, her father-in-law and her brother-in-law threatened her that if she was seen at Patiala she herself and her son would be finished. Consequently all further efforts to settle the matter failed. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances narrated in the complaint filed before the DCP(Crime) against Woman Cell it does not appears that the allegations are vague.
22. Prima facie it appears that she was so much tortured and ill-treated in Patiala that she feels insecure to stay at Patiala specially on account of threats given to finish the complainant and her son in case she was seen in Patiala. As a consequence thereof, she had to leave her matrimonial home at Patiala and had to live here in Delhi at her father's house. She could not have left her matrimonial home, if she would not have been subjected to ill-treatment and torture. Consequences of physical atrocities and mental torture caused at Patiala are still flowing at Delhi also as mentioned herein above where she is residing presently at her father's house. Consequently, in view of the provisions of Section 180 it could not be said that the Delhi Courts have no jurisdiction. Accordingly I feel that there is virtually no substance in the submission that the Delhi Courts have no jurisdiction
23. So far as the limitation is concerned both the offences being continuing offences it is not possible to accept the plea of limitation.
24. For the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any force in this matter and dismiss the petition. However, since it is a family matter it may cause inconvenience if all the petitioners are required to attend the Court on every day. The learned Trial Court, thereforee, may consider the question of exempting at least two petitioners at a time from personal attendance to avoid any unnecessary hardship.