D.K. Jam, J.
(1) This appeal by the claimants under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short the 'Act') is directed against the award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (for short the 'Tribunal') dated 26 July19.88 in Suit No. 186/81.
(2) On 30/07/1977 at about 2 P.M. Surinder Kumar, son of theappellants, aged about 13 years, along with one Ved Prakash, both on a cycle left from their residence at Prithviraj Road from the service road. They saw a truck bearing registration No. Dll 8003, emerging from Tughlak Road side on the Tughlak Lane, driven by respondent No. 1, at a high speed. The truck took a sharp turn on the right hand side towards service road and it dashed against the cycle. Surinder Kumar and Ved Prakash fell down from their cycle. Surinder Kumar died on the spot and Ved Prakash received injuries on his right' leg and other parts of his body. It is the case of the claimants that after the accident respondent No. 1 tried to run away from the spot but was apprehended by some persons, who appeared as witnesses before theTribunal. Before the Tribunal, the claimants claimed that the deceased was a student of 8th Class and belonged to a family which had the history of longevity of life. Accordingly, the claimers made a claim of Rs. 1 lakh against the respondents. Respondents 1 & 2, the driver and the owner of the . truckrespectively, did not contest the .petition. It was contested only by respondent No. 3, the Insurance Company, on diverse pleas.
(3) The learned Tribunal framed the issues on the pleadings of theparties. The parties led their evidence before the Tribunal. The Tribunal held that respondent No. 1 was driving the truck rashly and negligently causing the accident as a result of which deceased Surinder Kumar died; that deceased was 12 years and three months old at the time of the accident and would have started earning after about ten years or so and thus would have started providing help to his parents. The Tribunal found that the deceased being only 12 years old, the parents would have been more than 45years of age by the time the deceased would have started earning. Taking into account all these factors, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that 16 was years was an appropriate multiplier to be adopted in the case of the appellants. As regards the dependency of the appellants, the Tribunal opined that the deceased, after completion of his studies would have started earning Rs. 1000.00to Rs. 1,500.00 per month or so and would have contributed Rs. 250.00 per month to the family. Thus, the yearly dependency was determined Rs. 3,000.00.Accordingly, the Tribunal computed the compensation payable to the appellants at Rs. 48,000.00 by applying the multiplier of 16. Interest claimed on the compensation amount, however, was not allowed.
(4) Claimants have filed this appeal for. grant of higher compensation and interest. There is no cross-appeal by any of the respondents. The fact of the accident and the liability of the truck for causing accident on 30/07/1977, thereforee, stand admitted. The only question for consideration, thus, is of the quantum of compensation and liability to pay interest thereon.
(5) Mr. H.S. Dhir, learned Counsel for the appellant, has assailed the order of the Tribunal on two grounds, namely, (i) compensation awarded by the Tribunal is neither just nor is its mode of computation correct and; (ii) the reasons given by the Tribunal while declining to grant interest are factually and legally incorrect. On the other hand, Mr. Manmohan Sarin, learned Counsel for respondent No. 3 i.e.the Insurance Company, while supporting the award,has submitted that in fact the award is more than liberal in fixing the multiplier of 16 on the facts of the present case. On the question of interest, he submits that Interest acts as compensation for the period during which the dependents are deprived of the earnings of the deceased. His contention is that it is in the nature of restitution and the concept of restitution does not apply in a case where the deceased was not an earning member.
(6) The first question which arises for consideration is the amount payable to the claimants/appellants on account of the death of the deceased.The principles governing the assessment of compensation payable to dependents of the deceased in such cases have been reiterated in a catena of cases. Following its earlier judgment in Gobald Motor Services Ltd. & Am. v. R.M.K.Veluswamy & Ors. 41962 SC1,the Supreme Court in C.K. Subramania Iyer and Ors. v. T. Kunhi Kuttan Nair and Ors. (1970) Acj 110, deciding a case under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, in which a boy of 8 years was killed by abus, reiterated the principles on the question of assessment of damages inthe following words:
'COMPULSORY damages under Section I A of the Act for wrongful death must be limited strictly to the pecuniary loss to the beneficiaries and that under Section 2, the measure of damages is the economic loss sustained by the estate. There can be no exact uniform rule for measuring the value of the human life and the measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculations but the amount recoverable depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. The life expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiaries whichever is shorter is an important factor. Since the elements which go to make up the value of the life of the deceased to the designated beneficiaries are necessarily personal to each case,in the very nature of things, there can be no exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of human life. In assessing damages, the Court must exclude all considerations of matter which rest in speculation or fancy though conjecture to some extent is inevitable.As a general rule parents are entitled to recover the present cash value of the prospective service of the deceased minor child. In addition they may receive compensation for loss of pecuniary benefits reasonably to be expected after the child attains majority.'
Thus, there is no exact formula or a set standard to determine the quantum of compensation payable in such cases. The compensation to be assessed is the pecuniary loss caused to the dependents by the death of the deceased. For the purpose of calculating the just compensation, the annual dependency of the dependents should be determined in terms of the annual loss accruing to them due to the abrupt termination of life. For this purpose broadly speaking,annual earnings of the deceased at the time of the accident and/ or later and amount out of the same which he was spending or could spend for the maintenance of the dependents will be an important determining factor. The basic figure will then be multiplied by a suitable multiplier. On the question asto what is the law and practice of multiplier, this Court in the case of Sushila Devi ami Ors. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (1985) Acj 255, observed asunder:
'THE multiplier was devised because of the uncertainties of thefuture. Future prospects may be bright or dull. Life may be full of rewards and promotions. Or one may have unemployment and ill-health in store. Who know? In determining the multiplier, however,the Court will not simply adopt the number of years from trial to retirement age or the age of death, for that would be to make no allowance for the 'general vicissitudes of life' nor for the accelerated receipt of what might otherwise have been spread over forty years.A reduction of the multiplier will thereforee be made to effect a discount in respect of those factors. In practice, there is maximum,of about 18 as the multiplier, but there is no automatic relationship between the multiplier and the plaintiffs age: thus a multiplier of15 or 16 would be the norm whether the plaintiff was aged 18 or 35,though it would be a steady decline after the age.'
In the instant case the deceased was a young boy of about 12 years. For enhancement, it is contended that the boy was very good at studies and had bright chances of becoming an Engineer; that the boy was helping his father in fields and thus was rendering financial help to the family to the extent of Rs. 250.00 permonth. Although in the statement of the father of the deceased (P.W.5), there is a bald statement to the effect that the deceased was rendering financial help to the extent of Rs.,200.00 per month, but there is no evidence on the record that the parents of the deceased , possess some agriculture land. In fact, thereis nothing on the record to show that his parents were engaged in agriculture.As regards his chances of bright career as an Engineer, these are unpredictableuncertainities of life which one cannot foresee. He could be unemployed anda burden, on the family as well. Having regard .to it all, I am of the considered view that the Tribunal has in the light of all these factors, applied the correct principles on the issue and found that 16 is an appropriate multiplier to be adopted on the yearly dependency of Rs. 3,000.00.
(7) Taking an overall view of the matter the amount of Rs. 48,000.00awarded by the Tribunal appears to be just and proper and in accordance with the principles, noted above, as also the present trend of decisions, which I have been relied upon by the learned Counsel for the parties, It is well settled that in the matter of ascertainment of damages, the appellate Court should be slow in disturbing the findings reached by the Courts below, if they have taken all the relevant facts into consideration. These findings should be disturbed only when there are compelling reasons. .1 do not find any infirmity in the order of the Tribunal and as such no interference is called for on the question of quantum of compensation.
(8) The second question is about the grant of interest. No doubt Section 110 Cc of the Act empowers the Tribunal to allow interest in its discretion, which has to be a judicial discretion, and if the Tribunal disallows interest for no cogent reasons, the mistake can be rectified. In the instant case the Tribunal has disallowed interest on two grounds : (i) the claimants/appellants have themselves delayed the case throughout; and (ii) the deceased was only a child at the time of accident and would have started earning after about10/12 years. I do not agree with the learned Tribunal on this issue.
(9) I have perused the record of the Tribunal and it seems difficult to conclude that it was the claimants/appellants alone who had been seeking adjournments or were responsible for delaying the proceedings before it. As a matter of fact from 15/02/1984 to 7 February, 1985, there wre was no Presiding Officer, from 7/02/1985 to 25 February, 1986 the case was being adjourned for effecting service on the respondents and then there was lawyers'strike. I also find that some adjournments were sought for and granted on the request of the respondents. The appellants cannot, thereforee, be dubbed with delay or penalised for a longer .span of proceedings before the Tribunal.
(10) Mr. Dhir has made reference to a number of decisions, the latest being G. Padmanabhan Nair & Ors. v. G.M. Kerala State Road Trans. Corpn. &Another; 1989 Acj 873, wherein a young boy of 13 years, like the deceased,was involved in a fatal accident. The rate of interest awarded in this case is12% per annum. This Court in Hara Singh & Ors. v. Mew a Ram Singh & Ors.1987 Acj 979 has also awarded interest @ 12%.
(11) I am, thus, of the considered view that the petitioner should have been granted interest. Having regard to the rate of interest on the Government securities like National Savings Certificates and long term fixed deposits inbanks, I feel, an interest at the rate of 12% per annum will be reasonable inthe instant case.
(12) In the result, the appeal partly succeeds. The impugned award is modified to the extent that the appellants will be entitled to interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal from the date of filing of the claim petition till the date of paymen(s) to theappellants. The additional amount, now payable as interest, shall be paid to the appellants through Counsel, by the Insurance Company, respondent No. 3,within two months from today, failing which, on this amount also, the appellants will be entitled to future interest at the rate of 12% per annum in terms ofthe impugned award.
(13) In the circumstances, however, the parties will bear their own costs.