Malik, J.
(1) The appellants have filed this appeal against the award passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal on 31st of January 1981 allowing a compensation of Rs. 54,600 in favor of the legal representatives of the deceased P. C. Gupta who died as a result of motor accident which took place on 29th of December 1977. The liability of the insurance company was held to be the statutory limit of Rs. 50,000 only. The Tribunal concluded that the accident took place as a result of contributory negligence by the deceased and apportioned the responsibility of' the accident to the extent of 50 per cent attributed to the deceased and. 50 per cent to the respondents in the claim petition. I shall be adverting to the other details in the subsequent paras of the judgment.
(2) Adverting to the facts, the deceased P. C. Gupta was driving his scooter Dhe 7115 on 29th of December 1977 at about 1.52 P. M. It is alleged that soon after he crossed the railway crossing at Shakti Nagar and was negotiating a turn towards Bharat Nagar road, the offending truck No. Dhg 5463 which was being driven rashly and negligently overtook the deceased without giving any warning and in the process the rear mudguard of the truck struck the deceased as a result of which the scooter fell on the left side whereas the decea
(3) It was further alleged that the deceased was born on 15th April, 1933 and was 44 years and 6 months old on the date of the accident. The deceased held a second division in M.A. (Mathematics) from Delhi University and was supposed to have a very brilliant academic career. The deceased was employed as arraigned Post Graduate Teacher in the Department of Education, Delhi Administration, for about 20 years prior to his death. It was also alleged in the claim petition that the deceased was a talented person resulting in promotion within very short time and on the date of death he was a confirmed Post Graduate Teacher. It was further alleged that his promotion as Principal in the higher grade of Rs. 1100-1600 was likely to happen and that he enjoyed good health and hailed from a family having the tradition of longevity of life.
(4) It was also urged that the deceased was earning about Rs. 2000 per month which included his salary of Rs. 1411.50 The remaining earnings, according to the claimants, were being. received by the deceased as a result of taking private tuition. According to the claimants, the deceased was spending more than Rs. 1200 for the maintenance of his family and the claimants demanded the compensation for the loss of earnings up to the age of 58 years.
(5) The defense set up by respondents I to 3 in their joint written statement was the denial of the averments made in the petition. The allegation attributing rashness and negligence to the driver of the offending vehicle was controverter and a counter version of the accident was given in para 10 of the written statement which is as under :-
'It is stated that the offending vehicle was being driven at a slow motion at the turning of the road and the deceased came from behind driving the sector rashly and negligently and tried to overtake the offending vehicle from wrong side. It was also stated that the driver had warned the deceased by hand signal and by a horn not to overtake at the turning but the deceased did not desist and tried to overtake the offending vehicle from the wrong side at high speed as a result of which the .scooter lost the balance. It is further stated that it was in this manner that the deceased lost control on the scooter as a result of which he struck against the rear wheel of the. truck resulting in this accident. It is also pleaded that it was in this manner that the scooter fell on one side and the deceased was enveloped in between the wheel of the 'cooler and* the wheel of the truck. The respondents No. I to 3 further denied the fact that the deceased was overrun by the truck. It was pleaded further that the arriver of the vehicle immediately stopped the offend- ing vehicle but since the distance between the deceased and the rear wheel was very short the deceased was caught in between the two vehicles. The respondents further pleaded that the deceased was safely to be blamed for the accident and had he not obstinately tried to overtake the vehicle on the wrong side the accident could have been saved.'
(6) The insurance company respondent No. 4 filed' a separate written statement. On merits, the counter version in respect of the details of the accident advanced by respondents No. I to 3 were adopted by the insurance company while the remaining averments made were denied.
(7) The Tribunal framed as many a- six issues but during the course of arguments before this court, both the parties confined to the issues No. 1, 3 and 6 which relate to the cause of accident, the negligence of the deceased and the quantum of compensation and also to the fact a- to from whom the compensation is recoverable.
(8) As already indicated) the Tribunal has held that die accident was a result of contributory negligence of the deceased. This conclusion was arrived at on the basis of- the circumstantial evidence such as the mechanical examination of the scooter and the offending vehicle and the site plan, and after holding that the testimony of two eye-witnesses is gross exaggeration. In this case one Dewan Chand (P.W.5) and Madan Lal (P.W.6) were examined as the persons who had seen the accident.
(9) According to Dewan Chand on the date and time of the accident he along with Madan Lal was going to village Sadura Kalan on foot. He saw the deceased coming on scooter from the side of Shakti Nagar and was proceeding towards Wazirpur. The offending truck Dhg 5463 followed the Scooters at a speed of 50 to 60 kilometres per hour and the front left side of the truck hit the right side of the scooter as a result of which the scooter was thrown on the left side and the Scooters fell on the right side between the front wheels. He has also deposed that an alarm was- raised by the people and the driver of the vehicle stopped the truck within 2 to 3 paces. According to him, the truck driver ran away. He, however, admits that the deceased was removed to Bara Hindu Rao hospital by him Along with Madan Lal and the driver of the offending vehicle Amrik Singh and Mahinder Singh. He has further stated that at the time of the accident he and Madan Lal were about 8 or 9 paces away from the scene of the incident. Public Witness 6 Madan Lal has given almost a similar version of the incident. According to him, the deceased was dragged Along with tile rear wheel of the offending vehicle but was not over-run. He states that the deceased was known to him and at the time of the accident the front left wheel of the truck was hardly 1-112 feet away from the left edge of the road. He has clearly stated that at the time of the accident the scooter was ahead of the truck and the offending vehicle came from behind. It may be pointed out that the testimony of these two eye. witnesses was also recorded by A.S.I. Khushi Ram (P.W.8) who was deputed to investigate this case. These eye-witnesses had met him in the hospital. To rebut this evidence, the driver of the offending vehicle Amrik Singh appeared in the witness box and he deposed on the lines of the written statement filed by respondents No. 1 to 3.
(10) The fact that the deceased was involved in this accident and died as a result of it is not in dispute, The main question that arises for consideration is as to whether this accident was caused mainly due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle by Amrik Singh and whether the deceased can be held liable for contributory negligence. The mechanical inspections of both the offending vehicle as also the scooter have been proved by Public Witness 7 S. L. Chhabra S. 1. and have been marked as Ext. Public Witness 711 and Ex. Public Witness 712, respectively. Accordingly to S.I. S. L. Chhabra he found no fresh damage on the body of the truck. While examining the scooter he found head-lights cover dented from left side, left shade and right shade dented and pushed backward and engine cover dented. He also noticed damage on the handle of the scooter. The site plan prepared by the investigating officer and marked Ex. Pw 811 was also proved and this was admitted to be correct by Amrik Singh, driver of the offending vehicle. Since the truck came to a stop within six feet from the point of impact, I agree with the finding of the Tribunal that the truck was not being driven at a fast speed and the testimony of P. Ws 5 and 6 Dewan Chand and Madan Lal, both eye-witnesses to this extent is a gross exaggeration. The. Tribunal also did not believe the eye-witness in their assertion that the front left bumper of the truck had hit he scooter as according to it the mechanical inspection report of the truck marked Ex. Public Witness 7/1 did not support it as there was not even a scratch on the left bumper of the truck. The Tribunal also held that the witnesses Dewan Chand (P.W.5) was not correct in asserting .that Amrit Singh, driver, had run away. It, thereforee, held that the truck was not being driven rashly.
(11) I do not find myself in agreement with the finding of the Tribunal that this accident took place as a result of contributory negligence by the deceased. It seems to me that the Tribunal disbelieved the eye-witnesses simply because they had said that the offending truck was being driven at a speed of 50 to 60 kilometres per hour and one of them Dewan Chand (P.W.5) had stated that Amrik Singh truck driver ran away. Further, one has to clearly understand that negligence, also lies in not taking proper precautions while driving a vehicle. In the present case, the eye-witnesses of the incident were the persons whose presence at the spot could not be disputed In fact, they were the persons who together with Amrik Single truck driver, took the deceased to the hospital. Amrik Singh was arrested in the hospital itself and the witnesses met the investigating officer in the hospital and it was soon thereafter that he recorded their statements. It, cannot, thereforee, be said that everything they stated was an exaggeration. It may be that while deposing about the speed at which the truck was being driven they have resorted to exaggeration but that is a statement which has been made according to their own perception. The broad facts which they have brought to the 'notice are that they saw the Scooters going ahead of the offending vehicle and the offending vehicle followed it. It will be seen that this accident took place on the turning. The site plan marked Ex. Public Witness 8/1. which has been admitted to be correct by Amrik Singh, offending truck driver, shows that the impact took place at the turning which has been marked as 'A' in the site plan and the Scooters and the scooter fell on the left side of the road at point 'C' which is at some distance from the point 'A' where the impact took place. It will further be seen that the truck came to stop within about 6 feet from point 'C', the place where the Scooters had fallen. It is also in the statement of Madan Lal (P.W.6) that the front left wheel of the truck after it came to stop was only 1-1/2 feet away from the left edge of the road. Thee facts clearly go to show that the truck driver had taken an acute turn without taking proper precautions to save the Scooters even though he was going ahead of him. Whether the scooter was hit by the front portion or by the hind portion of the truck is not material and the witnesses could not be expected to observe these things minutely. The crux of the matter is that the position of the offending vehicle after the accident was found to be such that it in all probability took an acute turn at the point of impact leaving no room for the Scooters to save himself. It will he seen from the mechanical examination of the scooter that the engine cover was dented. The engine of the scooter is located on the back wheel of the scooter and this dent on the cover of the engine could not be there if the scooter was not hit from behind. The damage on the front side of the scooter could be the result of the fall of the scooter after the accident and it cannot be said that it was caused due *o the hitting of the scooter with the truck from behind. The site plan Ex. Public Witness 811 proved in this case clearly support? this view. The evidence of Public Witness 5 Dewan Chand could not be discredited simply for the reasons given by the Tribunal. He had' also admitted in his statement that Amrik Singh, driver of the offending vehicle. also accompanied them to the hospital. The site plan and the position of the offending vehicle after the. accident clearly go to show that the accident was caused as a result of negligent driving by the driver of the offending vehicle and it is clear that while taking the turn the driver of the offending vehicle had left no space for the deceased to save himself. In this view also derive support from the descriptions given In the site plan. If the counter version that the Scooters was trying to overtake and in the process struck against the vehicle were correct then the position described in the site plan could not be obtained. In that event the Scooters would have fallen on the point of impact described as point 'A' in the site plan and not at point 'C' which is at a considerable distance from the point of impact. The finding of the Tribunal as such on this issue is unsustainable. The same is set aside and it Is held that this accident as a result of which the deceased died was caused mainly due to the negligent driving by Amrik Singh, the driver of the offending truck.
(12) While determining the compensation awardable in this case, the Tribunal calculated it at the rate of Rs. 1400 per month, multiplied it by 12 and then applied a multiplier of 13 on the ground that the deceased would retire after the age of 58. The Tribunal thereafter deducted half of it as the personal expenses of the deceased taking into consideration the fact that he was maintaining a scooter and thereafter it divided the remaining half further on the ground that only 50 per cent responsibility for negligence could be imputed to the driver of the offending vehicle. In my view, the approach of the Tribunal is not correct. In practical terms only one-half of the income of the deceased was taken to be the dependency of his legal representatives.
(13) The established position is that the deceased was 44 years and 6 months of age at the time of his death. This fact is affirmed by Public Witness 3 Sube Singh on the basis of the date of birth recorded in the department where the deceased was employed. The Tribunal, thereforee, held that for the purpose of determining the compensation the age of the deceased at: the time of death could be taken as 45 years. On the basis of pay certificate Ex. Public Witness 3/1 which again was proved by Public Witness 3 Sube Singh, the monthly emoluments of the deceased at the time of the death were Rs. 1411.50. The Tribunal also held that there was no evidence to support the fact that the deceased was going for private constitution and supplementing his income. This the Tribunal did inspire of the testimony of Public Witness 4 Roshan Lal Bansal who had deposed that the deceased was privately teaching his daughter for three months and was paid Rs. 200 per month by him. The Tribunal also felt that since Public Witness 3 Sube Singh had not stated as to what deductions were made from the salary of the deceased there was no evidence regarding the. net salary that the deceased used to get per month.. During the pendency' of this appeal, the learned counsel for the appellants filed an application C.M. No. 2033187 in which he has worked out the details of the salaries which the deceased would have drawn in different years. According to it. the deceased would' have drawn a salary of Rs. 3600 per month from 1st of January 1986 to 1st April 1993, the date when the deceased was due to retire. This was worked out on the basis of an alleged communication of the Principal of the School in which the deceased was working pursuant to a letter by Mr. O. P. Goyal, counsel for the appellants, in which he had asked some questions. The Principal of the School was not examined at any stage nor is there any affidavit of the Principal on record. It is, thereforee, difficult to rely upon this document. The fact of the matter. however, is that consequent to the revision of pay scales and D.A. and A.D.A., house-rent and city compensatory allowance. there would have been manifold increase in the pay scale of the deceased till the time of his retirement. The' income in normal course would have also increased due to the earning of increments. This fact has- to be taken into consideration as that alone would help in determining to loss in terms of money to the dependents. Taking into consideration the totality of the facts and circumstances of this case, I would, thereforee. hold that the dependency can safely be placed at Rs. 1200 per month as stated by the petitioners in the claim petition. In this way the total annual dependency can be computed at Rs. 14,400 and after applying a multiplier of 13 the claimants would be entitled to a sum of Rs. 1,87,200. This the claimants, in my view, are entitled to receive from the respondents.
(14) The learned counsel for the respondents has urged that since the widow has admitted that she is getting a pension of Rs. 378 per month this amount should be deducted from the dependency. He further contends that there is bound to be increased in the pension and the court should take judicial notice of it while computing the dependency. I do not agree as the settled law now is that the pensionary benefits are not deductible. A Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Bhagat Singh Sohan Singh vs. Om Sharma and others 1983 A.C.J. 203(1) has held that financial benefits like insurance. provident fund, family pension or gratuity are in essence the deferred earnings of the victims of the accident or the result of his savings, his thrift or foresight, and all these benefits must be excluded from consideration in the award of the compensation to the heirs under section 110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act. The reliance by the learned counsel for the respondents on Ish Kumar and others v. Bhagwanti Devi and others 1982 A.C.J. 183(2) is misconceived as it is no more a good law. I would, thereforee, reverse the finding of the Tribunal on the point of quantum and hold that the appellants/'claimants are entitled to a sum of Rs. 1,87,200 as compensation and I accordingly award it in their favor.
(15) The last point which was rather vehemently contested before me is in regard to the liability of the insurance company. The Tribunal held that the liability of the insurance company is limited to Rs. 50,000 and this the Tribunal held on the basis of the cover note marked Ex. Rw 211. Mr. 0 P. Goyal, learned counsel for the appellants, has assailed this finding on the ground that the insurance policy is comprehensive in nature and it should be as such presumed that the liability of the insurance company is unlimited.. He has further submitted that the insurance company has failed to prove the insurance policy as no permission was taken from the court for leading secondary evidence and the simple fact that the insurance policy has been exhibited does not ipso facto establish the contents of the insurance policy.
(16) Before I advert to the contentions and counter-contentions in this regard, it must be clearly understood that unlike the suits for damages the claims as a result of motor accidents are not filed before the civil courts and the legislature in its wisdom has created a totally independent forum for determining the compensation. Section 110-C of the Motor Vehicles Act clearly enjoins that in holding an enquiry under section 110-A the Claims Tribunal may, subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. In New India Assurance Company Ltd. and another v. Punjab Roadways, and others Air 1964 P&H235;(3) it has been held and I quote :-
'The Tribunal is at liberty to follow any procedure that it may choose to evolve for itself so long as the said procedure is orderly and consistent with the rules of natural justice and does not contravene the positive provisions of the law.'
(17) The Supreme Court had also an occasion to go into this matter in Union of India vs. T. R. Verma, : (1958)IILLJ259SC . This was a constitution bench and in respect of the application of the Evidence Act to the Tribunals, the following observations were made :
'The Evidence Act has no application to enquiries conducted by the Tribunals, ev;n though they may be judicial in character. The law requires that such Tribunals should observe rules of natural justice in the conduct. of the enquiry and if they do so. their decision is not liable to be impeached on the ground that the procedure followed was not in accordance with that, which obtains in a court of law. Stating it broadly and without intending it to be exhaustive it may be observed that rules of natural justice require that a party should have the opportunity of adducing all relevant evidence on which he relies, that the evidence of the opponent should be taken in his presence, and that he should be given the opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses examined by that party, and that no materials should be relied on against him without his being given an ' opportunity of explaining them. If these rules are satisfied, the enquiry is not open to attack on the ground that the procedure laid down in the Evidence Act for taking evidence was not strictly followed.'
(18) It is thus clear that in dealing with these claim petitions the Tribunal is not bound to strictly adhere to the provisions of the Evidence Act. This is particularly so in view of the provisions of section 21C-C which entitles the Tribunal to follow any summary procedure it thinks fit. The contention of Mr. Goyal, learned counsel for the appellants, I assume, is being advanced on the assumption that the Tribunal is required to strictly adhere to the provisions of the Evidence Act and since the respondents in this case have not sought the permission of the court to lead secondary evidence the mere marking of the cover note is not sufficient to entitle the Tribunal to read if in evidence.
(19) Mr. Goyal has relied on Sail Tarajee Khimchand and others vs. Yelamarti Satyam and others, : AIR1971SC1865 and is. asserting that mere marking of a document as an exhibit does not dispense with its proof. This is a clearly distinguishable judgment and is not applicable to the facts of the present case. In the case supra the plaintiff wanted to rely on Exts. A-12 and A-13, the day book and the ledger respectively. The plaintiffs did not prove these books not was there any reference to these books in the judgment. It was in these circumstances that the Supreme Court held that the mere marking of an exhibit does not dispense with the proof of documents. In that case the proof of the bocks of accounts was thought to be important because the plaintiffs' accounts were impeached and falsified by the defense case of larger payments than those admitted by the plaintiffs and the Supreme Court felt that this is bound to result in an irresistible inference that the plaintiffs' books would not have supported the plaintiffs.
(20) Mr. Goyal further relied upon the judgment of this court delivered by a learned single Judge and reproduced in Mahinder Singh v. Manju Sawhney and others 1986 A. C. J. 446(6) in which the learned single Judge held that since the certified copy of the policy regarding the limited liability was not proved by the person who certified the policy and since the policy register was found smudged and contained over-writing and no attempt was made to produce the original policy it was not possible to hold that the policy has been proved. It would be seen that this judgment was delivered on the peculiar facts of that case. In that case a certified copy of the policy was produced without there being an attempt to prove the same by the person who had attested it to be the true copy not was the original policy produced in the court. It was under those circumstances that the policy was held as not proved.
(21) This case, thereforee, is also distinguishable from the facts of the case with which I am dealing.
(22) Mr. O. P. Goyal also relied on Chandro Devi and others vs. Jit Singh and others 1989 A.C.J. 41(7). Here also the teamed single Judge of this court held that since the person who attested the copy of the cover note was not produced and since the carbon copy of the policy was not placed on record the policy was held as not proved.
(23) The facts of the case with which I am dealing are totally different. In the present case, the true copy was produced and it was proved by R.W. 2 Prasad Chandra Assistant Administrative Officer of the New Indian Assurance Company. The testimony given by him is as under :
'I have brought the copy of the policy of vehicle Dhg 5463. The certified copy of the policy is R.W. 211. No extra premium was paid. The liability under the Act is Rs. 50,000.'
(24) It would thus be seen that in this case the true copy was proved by R.W. 2 a responsible officer of the insurance company and this 'he did by reference to,.the carbon copy of the original which he had brought before the Tribunal. The document was thus exhibited as k was found a copy of the original. The record shows that lull opportunity was provided to the other side to cross-examine but it did not avail of the opportunity. It would thus be seen that at the time when this document was exhibited it was found to be an exact copy of the original which in the form of a carbon copy was in the possession of the insurance company. The basic cover note was in the possession of the insured and lie failed to produce the same. In my view, there- fore, since the principles of natural justice were strictly adhered to. the document cannot be impeached for failure of the Tribunal to strictly comply with the rules of evidence. The insured can only show the kind and quality of its liability by reference lo the records in its possession. The appellants in the present case could, not, thereforee, impeach the credibility of the insurance cover Ex. Rw 2/1 in appeal.
(25) Mr. Goyal submits that the facts of the present case are similar to the facts of the case decided by a learned single Judge of this court appearing in 1986 A.C.J. 446. I have already stated that the facts of that case arc distinguishable as in that case the certified copy of the cover note was not proved by reference to the contents of the carbon copy retained by the insurer nor was the person who certified it to be true copy produced before the Tribunal. Mr. O. P. Goyal has further submitted that this policy pertains to the year 1977 and the cover note Ex. Rw 2/1 which has been proved before the court shows that the form on which this is reproduced was itself printed in 1978 and, thereforee, it should be taken to be not a true copy of the original. I fail to understand as to what benefit the appellants can derive from this. It is apparent that this policy was proved before the Tribunal in the year 1980 and when it was copied the forms printed in 1977 were possibly not available and it was in those circumstances that the certified copy was typed on the form which was printed in 1978. The cover note Ex. Rw 211 in the present case clearly shows that the liability of the insurance company is limited to Rs. 50,000. On the facts and circumstances of this case, thereforee, I am not in agreement with Mr. Goyal that the insurance company has failed to prove the cover note and, thereforee, its liability must be held to be unlimited.
(26) Next Mr. Goyal urged that since the cover note proved in this case would show that the insured had paid a premium for higher than was required under regulation Iv of the Indian Motor Tariff the policy shall be construed to be comprehensive and the liability of the insurance company shall be deemed to be unlimited. According to Mr. Goyal under regulation Iv of the Indian Motor Tariff the insured for the minimum statutory liability was to pay only Rs. 84 as premium on the 'Act only' policy. He, thereforee, contends and vehemently so that the insurance company has taken upon itself to reimburse the insured to the unlimited extent. I do not think the learned counsel for the appellants is right in this assertion. There is no doubt that the insured can go for the covering of the risks beyond the statutory limits but for that he has to pay additional premium and it must be clearly specified in the policy. The Supreme Court in National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Jugal Kishore and others, 1988 Act 270(8) had the occasion to go into the fact as to what constitutes a comprehensive policy. The insurance policy in that case was somewhat similar to the present one and it was specifically mentioned in that policy that the policy is comprehensive. The argument before the Supreme Court was that on the basis of the expression 'comprehensive' appearing in the policy and on the basis that the premium paid was higher than the premium of an 'Act only' policy it was urged that the liability of the insurance company was unlimited and not confined to the statutory limits- The Supreme Court while negativing the contention held that even though it is not permissible to use a vehicle unless it is covered at least under an 'Act only' policy, it is not obligatory for the owner of a vehicle to get it comprehensively insured. The Supreme Court further held that in cases, however, it is got comprehensively insured a higher premium than for an 'Act only' policy is possible depending upon the estimated value of the vehicle and such insurance entitles the owner to claim reimbursement of the entire amount of loss or damage suffered up to the estimated value of the vehicle calculated according to the rules and regulations framed in this behalf. The Supreme Court further held that comprehensive insurance of the vehicle and payment of higher premium on this score, however, do not mean that the limit of the liability with regard to third party risk becomes unlimited or higher than the statutory liability fixed under sub-section (2) of Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Supreme Court further held that if the risk in excess of statutory liability is sought to be covered it has to be clearly specified in the policy and separate premium paid thereof. In short, the Supreme Court in somewhat similar circumstances has held that the policy qua the insured is unlimited but qua third party it is limited to the statutory limits. In the present case, the insurance policy is somewhat similar to the one that fell for the examination of the Supreme Court in the case Jugal Kishore supra and. thereforee, it cannot be said that the policy covers the third party risks to an unlimited extent. This is particularly so when it is clearly spelt out in the column regarding the limits of the liability that the liability of the insurance company as per the Motor Vehicles Act is Rs. 50,000.
(27) The last leg of the argument advanced by Mr. Goyal is that the defenses that the insurer is entitled to advance arc limited to the defenses provided in sub-section (2) of section 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act. It is in that context that he stresses the fact that the insurance company is not entitled to press into since its defense that its liability is limited to Rs. 50.000 only. In the judgment supra somewhat similar argument was advanced before the Supreme Court and in paragraph 8 of the judgment the Supreme Court dealt with the argument and held that the restrictions placed with regard lo defenses available to the insurer under sub-section (2) of section 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act are applicable to a case where the insurer wants to avoid his liability and where the insurer does not want to avoid its liability but wants a determination of the extent of its liability in the absence of any special contract to the contrary the insurer is well within his rights to raise M-ieh :' defense. In the present case also, the insurer did not want to avoid its liability but has only asked for the determination of the extent of its liability in accordance with the statutory provisions. In the present case also, the insurer did not undertake in the policy any liability beyond the statutory limits. hence the award against the insurer can only be in accordance with the statutory limits. In that view of the matter. I find no merit in the contention of Mr. O. P. Goyal and it is held that the liability of the insurance company is limited to Rs. 50,000 only.
(28) Having dealt with all the contentions of the learned counsel for the parties I allow this appeal and enhance the amount of compensation awardable to the appellants to Rs. 1,87,200. Out of the amount the insurer's liability is fixed at Rs. 50,000. The remaining amount of compensation shall be recoverable by the claimants from the other respondents. It is directed that the respondents other than insurer shall deposit this amount with the Registrar of this court within a period of two months failing which the claimants shall be entitled to interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum on the unpaid amount from the date of this order till the date of its final realisation. The appeal to the extent stated above is allowed.