Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise Vs. M.P. Steel Corporation - Court Judgment |
| Customs |
| Supreme Court of India |
| Mar-12-2003 |
| S.N. Variava and; B.P. Singh, JJ. |
| 2003(88)ECC11; 2003(154)ELT12(SC) |
| Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise |
| M.P. Steel Corporation |
| Appeal allowed |
.....of fixation of fair rent. thereafter, the matter came up before a single judge of the high court who applying the provisions of the' act to the facts of the-case, held that the act did not apply to the premises in question. the division bench reversed this decision, in the appeal by special leave the tenants mainly contended that a landlord has no right to apply for the fixation of a fair rent at a figure higher than the contractual rent, where there was a subsisting contract of tenancy. dismissing the appeal, held : (per majority and bhagwati, jj. contra) the present act which replaces the 1949 act adopts a completely new scheme of its own and provides for every contingency, i.e. in 'the relationship of landlord and tenant. the provisions of the act show that the madras legislature deliberately proceeded on, the basis that fair rent was to be fixed which was to be fair both to the landlords as 'well as to the tenants, and that only the poorer class of tenants needed protection. 'the assumption that the act like ill rent acts, is intended only for the to on of tenants is not warranted by the provisions of the act. it is clear therefore, that the fair rent under the present..........appeal is against a judgment dated 23-6-1998 passed by the customs, excise and gold (control) appellate tribunal, west regional bench at mumbai. 2. facts briefly stated are that the respondent filed a bill of entry in respect of ship m.v. olinda imported by them for purposes of breaking. the respondent showed the light displacement tonnage (ldt) as 7009 metric tons. this declaration was not accepted by the superintendent of customs and central excise. the respondent, thus, approached the assistant collector. the question was how ldt was to be calculated. it appears that between the assistant collector and the collector there was some internal correspondence on this aspect. the collector took a policy decision on how ldt was to be calculated. the collector conveyed this decision to the assistant collector by his letter dated 25-3-1992. pursuant thereto the superintendent of customs and central excise passed an order dated 2nd april, 1992 in respect ofvessel m.v. 'olinda'. of course the order dated 2nd april, 1992 is based on the decision of the collector. however, the order remains that of the superintendent of customs and central excise. 3. the respondent filed an appeal.....
ORDER
1. This appeal is against a judgment dated 23-6-1998 passed by the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, West Regional Bench at Mumbai.
2. Facts briefly stated are that the respondent filed a Bill of Entry in respect of ship M.V. Olinda imported by them for purposes of breaking. The respondent showed the light displacement tonnage (LDT) as 7009 metric tons. This declaration was not accepted by the Superintendent of Customs and Central Excise. The respondent, thus, approached the Assistant Collector. The question was how LDT was to be calculated. It appears that between the Assistant Collector and the Collector there was some internal correspondence on this aspect. The Collector took a policy decision on how LDT was to be calculated. The Collector conveyed this decision to the Assistant Collector by his letter dated 25-3-1992. Pursuant thereto the Superintendent of Customs and Central Excise passed an order dated 2nd April, 1992 in respect ofvessel M.V. 'Olinda'. Of course the order dated 2nd April, 1992 is based on the decision of the Collector. However, the order remains that of the Superintendent of Customs and Central Excise.
3. The respondent filed an appeal directly before CEGAT. CEGAT has disposed of this appeal by the impugned order. CEGAT negatived a contention that the appeal was not maintainable before them on the basis that the Superintendent's order is nothing more than a communication of the order passed by the Collector (Appeals). CEGAT held that the appeal was in fact against the Collector's order.
4. In our view, the reasoning of CEGAT cannot be sustained. The decision taken by the Collector was not taken in his capacity as Collector (Appeals). Also the order by which respondent is aggrieved is the order passed by the Superintendent. An appeal against that order has to be filed before the Commissioner (Appeals) under Section 128. By virtue of Section 129A, CEGAT has no jurisdiction to entertain such an appeal.
5. It is clear that the impugned order is passed without any jurisdiction. Therefore, it cannot be sustained. We, thus, set aside the order. The appeal is accordingly allowed. There will be no order as to costs.
6. We clarify that we have not gone into the merits of the matterand that it will be open to the respondent to adopt such remedy as they maybe advised, if in law they are entitled to do so.