Hemant Gupta, J.
1. The defendant is in second appeal aggrieved against the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below whereby the suit filed by the plaintiffs for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 10.07.1995 was decreed holding that the plaintiffs were willing and ready to perform their part of the contract.
2. The sole argument raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is that the suit has been filed after one year and eight months of the date fixed for execution of the sale deed and, therefore, the plaintiffs are not entitled to the decree for specific performance of the agreement. He has relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court reported as K.S. Vidyanadam and Ors. v. Viaravan. : AIR1997SC1751 , and Pushparani S. Sundaram and Ors. v. Pauline Manomani James (deceased) and Ors. : (2002)9SCC532 .
3. The judgment of Hon'bie Supreme Court in K.S. Vidyanadam's case (supra) has come up for consideration in V. Pechimuthu v. Gowrammal : AIR2001SC2446 , Veerayee Ammal v. Seeni Ammal : AIR2001SC2920 and Swarnam Ramachandran (Smt) and Anr. v. Aravacode Chakungal Juyupalan : (2004)8SCC689 .
4. In Chand Rani v. Kamal Rani : AIR1993SC1742 , it has been held that in case of sale of immovable property there is no presumption as to time being the essence of the contract. Even if it is not of the essence of the contract, the Court may infer that is to be performed in a reasonable time if the conditions evident: (i) from the express terms of the contract; (ii) from the nature of the property; and (iii) from the surrounding circumstances, for example, the object of making the contract. For the purpose of granting relief, the reasonable time has to be ascertained from all the facts and circumstances of the case. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Veerayee Ammal's case (supra), while considering the aforesaid judgment of Constitution Bench and judgment in the case of K.S. Vidyanadam (supra), has held that it may be unreasonable to give an exact definition of the word 'reasonable'. The dictionary meaning of 'reasonable time' is to be so much time as is necessary, under the circumstances, to do conveniently what the contract or duty requires should be done in a particular case. In V. Peechimuthu's case (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court found that rise in price of land agreed to be conveyed may be a relevant factor in denying relief of specific performance but such argument may be relevant factor when decree for specific performance is being considered by the Court for the first time. The said view was reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Swarnam Ramchandran's case (supra), wherein it was held that rise in price of land is not a relevant factor before the Supreme Court where all the Courts below have granted the decree for specific performance of agreement of sale.
5. In the facts of the present case, the agreement of sale was executed on 10.07.1995. The sale deed was agreed to be executed and registered on 10.12.1995. Since 10.12.1995 was Sunday, the plaintiff are proved to have appeared before the Sub Registrar on 11.12.1995 along with balance sale consideration and expenses for getting the sale deed executed. Before the plaintiffs filed suit, the defendant has sought partition of land which was allowed by the order of Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Fazilka, on 28.04.1997 (Exhibit D-7). The plaintiffs filed appeal on 11.08.1997 which was accepted and the case was remanded back for fresh decision on 1.4.1999 (Exhibit P-10). The learned trial Court found that the defendant has taken contradictory stand. On the one hand, it is the stand of the defendant that she went to the office of the Sub Registrar and got her presence marked. On the other hand, stand is taken that the price mentioned in the agreement of sale is low. After considering all the arguments raised by the parties, learned trial Court granted decree for specific performance of the agreement to sell which finding has been affirmed by the learned first Appellate Court.
6. Under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the Court may exercise discretion not to decree specific performance where the purpose of the contract would involve some hardship on the defendant which the defendant did not foresee, where its non-performance would involve no such hardship on the plaintiff. The defendant has neither pleaded nor proved any hardship which would have been relevant to decline specific performance of the agreement in exercise of the discretion conferred on the Court. The conduct of the respondent is not such by which time was reflected to be the essence of the contract. Therefore, mere fact that the suit has been filed after 18 months of the performance of the agreement would not be a ground to decline decree for specific performance when both the Courts below have granted such decree in favour of the plaintiffs.
7. The other judgment referred to by learned Counsel for the appellant in Pushparani S. Siindaram's case (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the present case. In the said case, the plaintiff has not proved his readiness and willingness to perform the contract except the plea being raised in the pleadings but that is not the fact in the present case.
8. Therefore, I do not find any patent illegality or material irregularity in the findings recorded by the Courts below which may warrant interference by this Court in second appeal. No substantial question of law arises for consideration by this Court in the present appeal.
Consequently, the present appeal is dismissed.