ORDER
1. Mewa Singh, petitioner, was elected Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat, Chhatar. During his tenure as Sarpanch, Bali son of Tula respondent No. 4 allegedly lodged a false complaint against him before the Deputy Commissioner, Jind, who appointed the Additional General Assistant, Jind to hold enquiry into the allegations. The Enquiry Officer after recording the statements of Risala son of Phula, Ballu son of Haria and Ratia son of Sheola, submitted his report dated 3rd Jan., 1981 (copy Annexure P1) to the Deputy Commissioner, exonerating the petitioner, but the order passed by the latter on this report is not within the knowledge of the petitioner as the Copying Agency on his application had reported that the file had not been received from the concerned office by then. Under these circumstances, the petitioner alleges that he was exonerated of the charges. Thereafter, the petitioner was againcharge-sheeted by the Director, Panchayats, respondent No. 2 and appointed the General Assistant, Jind as an Enquiry Officer. It may be mentioned here that the relevant charges which ultimately survived were relating to the embezzlement of Rs. 13,900/- the sale proceeds of the Kikar trees belonging to the Panchayat and some bricks during the process of paving the village streets. The Enquiry Officer vide his report Annexure P-2 found the petitioner guilty of these two charges and the Director of Panchayats on the basis of this report, passed the order (copy Annexure P3) for removal of the petitioner from the Sarpanchship, besides disqualifying him for re-election for a period of five years. The proceedings under S. 105 of the Gram Panchayat Act, 1952 (hereinafter called the Act) were also ordered to be taken against the petitioner. The petitioner then went in appeal against the said order before the Deputy Commissioner, Jind, who dismissed the same on 15th Oct., 1985 (copy Annexure P4). Thereafter, the petitioner resorted to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution, mainly on the ground that he having been exonerated in the first enquiry regarding the charge of embezzlement of proceeds of the Kikar trees, no second enquiry could be held against him. It was further contended that the Enquiry Officer had failed to appreciate the evidence of the witnesses in the right context about the handing over of the sale-proceeds of the Kikar trees to the petitioner and that the pavement of the streets being done under the supervision of Bhag Singh Panch as per the resolution of the Panchayat, he was not responsible for the alleged embezzlement of some bricks. It was also maintained that the report of the Vigilance Enquiry could not be relied upon by the Deputy Commissioner while rejecting his appeal as neither a copy of the report was supplied to him nor such report was put to him during the enquiry by the Enquiry Officer.
2. In return filed by the respondents, it was admitted that in the previous enquiry held by the Additional General Assistant, Jind, the petitioner was exonerated, but the said report having not been accepted by thecompetent authority, i.e. the Deputy Commissioner, Jind, the second enquiry regarding the same allegations was not barred. It was further maintained that Shri Bhag Singh Panch was appointed to supervise the work of pavement of the village streets with pacca bricks, but all the same the overall supervision of this work being of the Sarpanch, he was rightly held liable for the same. The rest of the allegations of the petititoner were denied.
3. I have heard Mr. S.C. Kapoor,Advocate, assisted by Mr. Naresh Katiyal, Advocate, for the petitioner as well as Mr. S.S. Ahlawat, learned Deputy Advocate General, Haryana, for the respondents. There is no dispute regarding the legal position that under the provisions of S. 102(2) of the Act, only one enquiry is contemplated and no second enquiry could be ordered if the first report of the Enquiry Officer had been accepted by the authority competent to impose punishment or exonerate the defaulter. The single Bench decisions of this Court in Sultan Singh v. The Deputy Commissioner, Gurgaon, 1971 PLJ 456 and in Mehar Singh v. The Director of Panchayats, Punjab, 1972 PLJ 353 can be safely referred in this regard. In the case in hand, there is no dispute between the parties that the Additional General Assistant, Jind did exonerate the petitioner in the first enquiry, but strange enough despite the specific averment of the petitioner that the order passed by the Deputy Comissioner accepting or rejecting the enquiry is not being supplied to him, the respondents had not taken any step to place copy of that order on the file but felt contented by generally alleging that the competent authority was not bound to accept the report of the Enquiry Officer and second enquiry could be ordered. Under these circumstances, there is no option but to conclude that the order of the Deputy Commissioner on the first enquiry report had been withheld by the respondents because if produced it might have gone against their case. Thus an adverse presumption has to be drawn against the respondents to the effect that the Deputy Commissioner, Jind had accepted the first report of the Additional General Assistant, Jind. So the secondenquiry ordered by the Director of Pan-chayats regarding the charge of embezzlement of the proceeds of the Kikar trees by the petitioner being against the provisions of S. 102 of the Act is certainly liable to be quashed.
4. The matter does not rest here as under the second enquiry the charge framed against the petitioner regarding the embezzlement of sale proceeds of the Kikar trees growing on the Shamlat Deh land was that he himself had auctioned the same and embezzled this amount, but the evidence led against him was that certain villagers had sold the Kikar trees growing around the village pond as they used to do earlier, but the petitioner as Sarpanch allegedly collected this amount from those villagers on the stipulation that these trees were growing on the Shamlat Deh land, the ownership of which vesied in the Gram Panchayat. It is not acceptable that the villagers would part with this amount without getting any receipt from the Sarpanch or taking into confidence the higher Authorities like the Panchayat Officer etc. Thus, the conduct of the Enquiry Officer in not appraising the evidence of the witnesses in its right concept had resulted in miscarriage of justice.
5. Regarding the second charge pertaining to embezzlement of some bricks, it transpires that vide resolution dated 10th Dec., 1980, the village Sarpanch was authorised to supervise this work, but a week thereafter vide resolution dated 17th Dec., 1980 Bhag Singh Panch was deputed to supervise the work of pavement of village streets with pacca bricks. There is no indication from the impugned order of the concerned authority that actually any work was carried out between this spell of seven days, i.e. from 10th to 17th Dec., 1980. The Enquiry Officer as well as the Appellate Authority has held the petitioner guilty of embezzlement of these bricks by holding that since the overall responsibility was of the Sarpanch to supervise this work, he was liable for the same. Strange enough in the order Annexure P4, the Appellate Authority had relied upon the vigilance report dated 12th April, 1981 of the Vigilance Officer of the Development Department, Haryana, even though thisreport never figured before the Enquiry Officer, what to say of supplying its copy to the petitioner, or putting him during the enquiry proceedings for offering any explanation. Thus, the order, Annexure P4 regarding the charge of the Appellate Authority is certainly against the provisions of S. 102 of the Act, as held by a single Bench of this Court in Gurbaksh Singh v. The State of Punjab, 1970 PLJ 500, by relying upon the Full Bench decision of this Court in Ujagar Singh v. State of Punjab, ILR 1969(1) Punj & Har 59 : AIR 1970 Punj 193, wherein the bare minimums of an enquiry under S. 102 of the Act were listed as under :--
'(1) that dear and definite charge or charges must be given or stated to the delinquent;
(2) that the material forming the basis of the charge or charges must be made known to him; and
(3) that he must be given every opportunity to meet the charges and to defend himself.'
Thus, the second enquiry wherein the above referred bare minimums having not been complied with has to be regarded as void proceedings.
6. Moreover, a charge of embezzlement entails entrustment of property and its mis-appropriation. In the present case, the bricks having been entrusted to Shri Bhag Singh Panch vide resolution dated 17th Dec., 1980, of the Gram Panchayat, the Sarpanch could not be held to be liable for the embezzlement of bricks.
7. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned orders contained in Annexures P2, P3 and P4 respectively are hereby quashed by accepting this writ petition. There is, however, no order as to costs in view of the peculiar circumstances of the case.
8. Petition allowed.