1. Unfortunately, the order of reference does not contain the questions to he considered by this Full Bench. We, therefore, formulate the questions as follows : (i) Whether Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, (in short, "CSIR"). or its unit the Central Drug Research Institute, (in short, "CDRI"), is an "industry" within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; or "industrial establishment" under Section 2(c) of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 read with Section 2(ii)(f) of the Payment of Wages Act (ii) If so, whether Bye Law No. 12 of the CSIR and its Units could not be enforced against their employees for want of its certification under Section 3 of the Standing Orders Act? (iii) Whether the right to contest an election under the Representation of People's Act could not be taken away or restricted by the Bye Laws of a society having no statutory force? (iv) Whether the CSIR was not a "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and, therefore, the rules framed for the Government servants could not be applied to the employees of the CSIR and its units? (v) Whether Bye Law No. 12 as a term in the service contract was against law and, therefore, void under Section 23 of the Contract Act? 2. Briefly stated, while employed as a Senior Laboratory Assistant with the CDRI, a unit of the CSIR, the applicant filed his nomination papers on 4.4.1990 and contested the election to the U.P. Legislative Council from the Lucknow Region Graduate Constituency as an independent candidate. He was declared unsuccessful at the election results of which were declared in May, 1990. He was, thereafter, charge-sheeted under the provisions of Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, (in short, "CCS (CCA) Rules") on the ground hat he contested the said U.P. Legislative Council election in violation of Rule 5(4) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, (in short, "CCS (C) Rules") which were made applicable to the employees of the CSIR and its units by Bye Law No. 12 of the CSIR. After receipt of the charge-sheet, the applicant filed O.A. No. 188/1990 (L) before this Tribunal for quashing the charges against him on various grounds. The O.A. was dismissed on 2.7.1991 by this Tribunal. Being aggrieved, the applicant filed Special Leave Petition No. 16660 of 1991 before the Supreme Court, which was dismissed on 4.2.1992 after recording the following order sheet: "In the facts and circumstances of the case we decline to interfere.
It will, however be open to the petitioner to take up the question of law raised in the special leave petition in this Court if any order of punishment is imposed against him and is challenged in this Court. The special leave petition is dismissed." The applicant was, thereafter, found guilty of the alleged misconduct against him in the departmental enquiry and accordingly he was awarded the punishment of compulsory retirement by the disciplinary authority vide its impugned order dated 5.6.1992, which is the subject matter of challenge in this O.A. The O.A. is resisted by the respondents. The Division Bench referred the case to the Full Bench in view of the fact that on the basis of the order dated 4.2.1992 of the Supreme Court in SLP No. 16660 of 1991, the applicant is trying to reagitate most of the points in this O.A. which were urged by him in his earlier O.A. No.188/1990 (L) but rejected. The aforesaid question of law are, thus, before this Full Bench for consideration.
3. Though the question whether CSIR, or its unit the CDRI was an industry was already decided by this Tribunal in applicant's earlier O.A. No. 188/1990 (L) on 2.7.1991, the question is reagitated before us on the basis of what the Supreme Court said while dismissing his SLP No. 16660 of 1991 on 4.2.1992. We are of the view that the finding recorded by this Tribunal in O.A. No. 188/1990 (L) that CSIR or its unit CDRI was not an industry was not set aside by the Supreme Court and, therefore, it would operate as res judicata against the parties to the earlier O.A. No. 188/1990 (L). The order sheet recorded on 4.2.1992 in Special Leave Petition No. 16660 of 1991 also does not indicate that any right was reserved to the applicant to reagitate the point before this Tribunal. It only says that if any order of punishment was imposed on him and was ultimately challenged before the Supreme Court, he would be at liberty to reagitate the question of law raised in the said Special Leave Petition. For this reason it does not appear necessary to mention or discuss at length various authorities cited by the learned Counsel for the parties on the question whether CSIR or CDRI was an industry within the meaning of Section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Accordingly our answer to the first question is that the CSIR or its unit the CDRI is not an industry within the meaning of Section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; or industrial establishment under Section 2(e) of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 read with Section 2 (ii) (f) of the Payment of Wages Act.
4. In view of our answer to the first question, the second question of law does nol arise in the case and it is, therefore, not necessary to answer the same.
5. The other questions of law were either taken or could betaken by the applicant in his previous O.A. No. 188/1990 (L) and, therefore, they would also be hit by the principle of res judicata and need no consideration.
6. As a result of our discussions aforesaid, our answers to the aforesaid questions are as follows: (i) The CSIR or its unit the CDRI is not an industry within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; or industrial establishment under Section 2(e) of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Aet, 1946 read with Section 2(ii) (f) of the Payment of Wages Act.
7. As no other question survives in this O.A., we propose to dispose it of finally instead of sending it back to the D.B. for further hearing and disposal in accordance with law.
8. In the result this O.A; fails and it is hereby dismissed but without any order as to costs.