ORDER
S.P. Khare, J.
1. This is a revision by the tenant under Section 23-E of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Act') against the order of his eviction passed by the Rent Controlling Authority on the application of Smt. Nirmal Mitra, a widow, under Section 23-A of the Act.
2. It is not in dispute that non-applicant T.D. Agarwal is tenant of applicant Nirmal Mitra on the ground floor of house No. 1, Ridge Road, Idgah Hills, Bhopal at a monthly rent of Rs. 3,200/-. The accommodation is being used for residential purpose by the non-applicant and his family. The accommodation is fully described in the map annexed to the application. It consists of three 'bed rooms', a kitchen, store, 'drawing-cum-dining room', etc. The tenancy commenced from August, 1985. The applicant is a widow and comes in the category of landlord given in Section 23-J of the Act. She is at present living in the 'basement' of this house. She has no other house at Bhopal. The non-applicant wrote the letter dated 12-5-1993 (Ex. P-8) addressed to the applicant stating therein: 'we understand that you need the house for yourself. It is hereby assured that we will vacate the house by the end of May, 1994 definitely. We my do it earlier also'.
3. The applicant's case is that the accommodation was let out for residential purpose. She requires it bona fide for her own residence and she has no other accommodation of her own for this purpose. She is living in the basement of this house with her husband's brother H.S. Mitra and that portion is owned by him. She is patient of hyper-tension, ischemic heart disease, bronchitis and T.B. in left lung. She has difficulty in breathing. She is required to climb 12-13 steps on the stair-case to reach the ground floor and therefore she wants to shift to the 'ground floor' which is in occupation of the non-applicant. She has been advised by her doctor not to climb the stairs. She was 65 years of age when the application under Section 23-A of the Act was submitted by her on 28-4-1996.
4. The case of the non-applicant is that the accommodation was let out to him both for 'residential and non-residential purpose'. According to him the major part of the accommodation is being used for 'office' and the rest of the portion is being used as residence. The alleged need of the applicant is a mere pretence to get the accommodation vacated. She has taken back a 'servant quarter' by making false representation and the rent has been increased by her from time to time from Rs. 2,200/- to Rs. 3,200/-. The non-applicant refused to increase the rent and therefore she has filed the application for eviction with a malafide intention. She herself and her husband's brother are joint owners of the basement portion of the house and that is reasonably suitable for her residence. In fact she wants to sell this house after getting it vacated. The non-applicant wrote the letter dated 12-5-1993 (Ex. P-8) because the applicant had threatened to evict him.
5. The Rent Controlling Authority after appreciation of the documentary and oral evidence adduced by both the parties has held that the accommodation was let out to the non-applicant for residential purpose only; it is bona fide required by her for her own residence and she has not other reasonably suitable accommodation of her own for this purpose; the basement portion is owned by the applicant's husband's brother and she does not want to increase the rent. On these findings the order of eviction has been passed.
6. During the course of hearing of this revision the learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued that-- (a) the dominant purpose of the lease was non-residential and, therefore, the applicant cannot get it vacated for her alleged residential need, (b) the said requirement is not bona fide, (c) the applicant wants to sell the house, (d) she is comfortably living in the basement and if she wants to shift to the ground floor she should give the basement to the non-applicant, and (e) the children of the applicant are living abroad and she also wants to go there and live with them after selling the house. These are the points which arise for determination in this revision.
7. Before dealing with the points mentioned above it must be clearly stated that the scope of interference by this Court in the findings of fact recorded by the R.C.A. is limited. It has been held recently by this Court in M.P. Dongre v. Kusumlata, 2002 (1) MPLJ 40, following the earlier decisions that the revisional power conferred by Section 23-E of the Act is larger than the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115, CPC but lesser than the appellate power. The indication is that an attempt should be made to keep as nearly as possible to the limits of power of revision under Section 115, CPC exceeding the same only to the extent necessary for preventing miscarriage of justice. The finding of fact arrived at by the R.C.A. regarding the bona fide requirement of the landlord can be disturbed in revision if it is perverse and not simply on the ground that another view is possible non re-appreciation of the evidence. The question is whether the findings of fact arrived at by the R.C.A. in the present case are perverse or wholly unreasonable.
8. Point (a):
The applicant's case is that non-applicant T.D. Agarwal is her tenant in the suit accommodation. That is stated in para 3 (b) of the application. That has been unequivocally admitted by the non-applicant in reply to para 3 (b). Therefore, it cannot be said that 'Bhopal Paper and Board Limited' was the tenant. In the agreement dated 7-5-1986 (Ex. D-1) this company has been shown to be tenant. So is the case in the agreement dated 15-8-1988 (Ex. D-2). But in the later agreements dated 23-10-1989 (Ex. D-3) and dated 19-11-1990 (Ex. D-4) 'T.D. Agarwal' has been described to be the tenant. In view of the subsequent agreements and clear admission of non-applicant T.D. Agarwal there is no escape from the conclusion that the said company was not the tenant. In these four agreements it is nowhere mentioned that the house was let out for non-residential purpose or for office purpose. The accommodation which was let out mainly consisted of 'three bed-rooms with attached bathrooms' and one 'drawing-cum-dining room'. It is well known that the bedrooms and drawing-cum-dining room constitute residential accommodation. In the agreement Ex. D-1 one room has been shown as 'office room'. Therefore, the argument that the main or dominant purpose of letting was non-residential is untenable. The non-applicant was the Managing Director of a company and must be using one room as his office. Therefore, the real dominant purpose was residential. It is admitted by the non-applicant that he is residing in this accommodation with his family members. Therefore, the real and primary purpose for which the accommodation was let out to the non-applicant was 'residential'. It was not non-residential. The finding of the R.C.A. on this point cannot be said to be either perverse or unreasonable. It has been held by a Division Bench of this Court in Jagjit Kumar v. Jagdeesh Chandra, AIR 1982 MP 144, that in case of composite tenancy (as alleged by the non-applicant in the present case), if it is established that the landlord requires the non-residential part of the accommodation or residential part of the accommodation, a decree for eviction of the tenant from the entire premises can be passed. Therefore, even assuming that the accommodation was let out for composite purpose, as the non-applicant contends, he can be evicted on proof of the residential requirement of the applicant. There can be no splitting up of the tenancy. The decision of the Supreme Court in Pujamal v. Sakhi Gopal, AIR 1977 SC 2077, cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner has been referred in this Division Bench judgment and that has been distinguished keeping in view the later judgment of the Supreme Court in Smt. Naibahu v. Lala Ramnarayan, AIR 1978 SC 22.
9. Points (b) to (e):
All these points centre round the pivotal issue whether the applicant 'bona fide requires' the suit accommodation for her residence. She is a widow. She was aged about 65 years when she filed the application under Section 23-A of the Act in the year 1996 and by now she has become 71 years of age. What is wrong in her choice if she wants to shift from basement to the ground floor Smt. Nirmal Mitra (P.W. 1) has deposed that she is suffering from hyper-tension (high-blood pressure), ischemic heart disease, bronchitis and T.B. Her testimony is corroborated by Dr. Ved Prakash Suri (P.W. 2). She has difficulty in breathing. She cannot climb stairs. Therefore, it is clear that her need for the ground floor is genuine. If an old lady of 71 years of age having so many ailments wants to live on the ground floor which is more suitable for her compared to the basement it cannot be denied to her. Law is sympathetic to such a landlord and as provided in Section 23-D (3) of the Act it is presumed that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide. Apart from this statutory presumption the applicant has proved by her documentary and oral evidence that her need for the suit accommodation is of pressing character. In S.S. Gupta v. M. C. Gupta, AIR 1999 SC 2507, it has been observed by the Supreme Court that the concept of bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by the realities of life. An approach either too liberal or too conservative or pedantic must be guarded against. If the landlord wishes to live with comfort in a house of his own, the law does not command or compel him to squeeze himself tightly into lesser premises to protect the tenant's occupancy. More recently it has been observed by a three-Judge Bench in Siddalingamma v. Mamta Shenoy, (2001) 8 SCC 561, that 'Rent Control legislation generally leans in favour of the tenant; it is only the provision for seeking eviction of the tenant on the ground of 'bona fide requirement' of the landlord for his own occupation or use of the tenanted accommodation which treats the landlord with some sympathy'. In Raghunath v. Chaganlal, (1999) 8 SCC 1, also it has been observed that the requirement must be something more than a mere desire but need not certainly be a compelling or absolute or dire necessity. It should be honest and not tainted with oblique motive.
10. It is argued on behalf of the petitioner that the applicant has sold out her other properties and her children are in Canada and Washington and therefore she is making efforts to sell this house also and she has contacted many prospective buyers for this purpose. These pleas are not of much substance. Even if she has sold out her other properties she can retain the present house for her residence. She goes abroad to meet her children but that does not render her need as malafide. Her husband was living in this house and she must be having some emotional attachment with this house. Her husband's brother is living in basement which belongs to him. The declaratory decree and the pleadings in the suit between her and her devar (Ex. P-6 and P-7) clearly go to prove that her husband's brother is owner of the basement. It is difficult to comprehend how the non-applicant who is a stranger to the family can challenge the decree passed in the year 1986 when the present suit has been filed in the year 1996. So far as the increase in the rent is concerned, it is found that the rent has been increased from Rs. 2,200/- to Rs. 3,200/- during a period of ten years. In view of rising cost of living in every field this increase in the rent by the Managing Director of a company keeping in view the realities of life cannot be said to be unreasonable and is not indicative of the applicant's intention to secure higher rent. A reasonable increase in the rent after some interval is understandable and does not always smack of the malafides of the landlord. Similarly the return of the servant quarter was with the consent of both the parties.
11. An attempt has been made to show that the applicant wants to sell the suit house also. That may be out of disgust. Law does not prohibit sale of the house by its owner. There is some restriction on transfer of the house by the landlord after he gets possession of the house on the ground of his bona fide requirement and that is provided in Section 17 of the Act. If the defendant is not vacating the house what is the option with the owner She could sell it to have another suitable accommodation for her residence. It has been observed in M.P. Dongre v. Kusumlata, 2002 (1) MPLJ 40, that even with aid of statutory provisions for eviction of tenant on ground of bona fide requirement of certain specified categories of landlords in Chapter III-A of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, it is seen, that it takes years and years to establish 'bona fide need' and if in such a situation the landlord out of disgust entertains a concurrent idea to sell the accommodation and arrange an alternative shelter speedily that does not necessarily negate his bona fide requirement. In the present case the finding of the R.C.A. is that the applicant does not intend to sell the suit house and that is factually correct.
12. In view of the above factual and legal position the view taken by the R.C.A. is quite reasonable. It cannot be said to be perverse or unreasonable and therefore, it cannot be disturbed in revision. The revision is dismissed.