ORDER
S.K. Dubey, J.
1. This second appeal has come up for hearing before us on a reference being made by C. K. Prasad, J. who was of the opinion that the substantial question of law required to be determined is a question of importance which reads thus:
'Whether the respondents were entitled to claim exemption from the provisions of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 on the basis of notification, issued on 7-9-1989, by the State Government, exempting the appellant from operation of the section subject to the conditions mentioned therein?'
2. Facts which are essential for determination of the question are thus : The respondent/plaintiff is a religious and charitable trust registered under M.P. Public Trusts Act, 1951 (for short 'the MPPT Act') which owns a Dharamshala, many houses and other properties. The houses are let out to the various tenants of the trust. The rental income derived from the houses and other buildings is exclusively used and applied for religious and charitable purposes and also for charitable institutions. The appellant is a tenant of a building on the monthly rent of Rs. 75/-, situated at Gujarati Bazar, Sagar in front of rice mill Batbatwali Atari No. 4. The appellant did not pay the rent since April 1988 and kept the premises closed. Therefore, the plaintiff served a notice Ex. P. 2 under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act terminating the tenancy and for payment of arrears of rent. The appellant sent the reply Ex. P. 3 to the notice. After determination of tenancy and length of notice the plaintiff instituted a suit on 11-6-1990 for eviction and for realisation of arrears of rent due and mesne profits. The appellant after the service of writ of summons, within one month deposited the arrears of rent and thereafter continued to deposit month by month by 15th of each succeeding month a sum equivalent to the rent during the pendency of the suit. The appellant contested the suit on various grounds. The trial Court held that the provisions of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (No. XLI of 1961) (for short 'the Act') do not apply to the accommodation of the charitable and religious trust in view of the notification No. F-24-(4)-83-XXXII-I, dated the 7th September, 1989 issued by the State Government in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, hence passed the decree of ejectment and for mesne profits.
3. The appellant aggrieved of the said judgment and decree preferred CA No. 26-A of 1994 which was dismissed vide judgment and decree dated the 31st August 1996 passed by IVth Additional District Judge, Sagar. Aggrieved of the said judgment and decree the appellant preferred this second appeal which was admitted by the learned Single Judge on 13-5-1997 on the substantial question of law referred to above.
4. Shri R. P. Agarwal, learned counsel for the appellant contended that Section 3(2) of the Act does not give to the State Government unfettered and uncanalised power to exempt from the operation of the Act belonging to any religious or charitable institution. The power can be exercised only in relation to accommodation owned by any educational religious charitable institution, or by any nursing or maternity home, the whole of the income derived from which is utilised for that institution or nursing or maternity home. It was submitted that the notification so issued by the State Government exempting the properties of the Wakf registered under the Wakf Act, 1954 or the Public Trusts registered under the MPPT Act does not satisfy conditions mentioned in Section 3(2), for the grant of exemption. A Division Bench of this Court considered the validity of notification granting exemption in relation to the accommodation owned by Wakf in case of Chintamani Chandramohan Agarwal and Ors. v. State of M.P. and Ors., 1994 MPLJ 597, and quashed the notification holding that there was nothing on record to consider whether basic conditions for granting exemption were satisfied. It was submitted that though the said decision was reversed by the Supreme Court in C.A. No. - of 1996 arising out of SLP (C) No. 4360/94 by order dated 19th October, 1995, but the decision would be applicable to the accommodation owned by Wakf. The constitutional validity of the notification upheld by Hon'ble Supreme Court would not apply in relation to the accommodations owned by the public trusts registered under the MPPT Act as that was not the question for consideration before the Hon'ble the Supreme Court. Therefore, it will not be a binding precedent as law declared under Article 141 of the Constitution inasmuch as the decision is not abstract and is not founded on reasons nor it proceeds on consideration of all issues. Therefore, it is per incuriam and sub-silentio which are exceptions to the rule of precedent, reliance was placed on a decision of Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd., and Anr., (1991) 4 SCC 139. Therefore, the decree of eviction could not have been passed by the Courts below as any one or more grounds for eviction as enumerated under Section 12(1) of the Act are non-existent.
5. Shri A. S. Usmani, learned Counsel for the respondent contended that once the validity of the notification has been upheld by Hon'ble the Supreme Court the appellant cannot be allowed to contend that the validity was considered only in relation to accommodation owned by Wakf registered under Wakf Act, 1954 and not in relation to public trust. The notification as a whole has been declared valid, therefore, it is law declared and would be binding on all whether in relation to accommodations owned by Wakf or owned by Public Trusts, as held by this Court in relation to the accommodations held by public trust, in M.P. No. 89/90 (J), decided on 19-8-1996, Baburam v. State of M.P., 1997 (1) MPWN 3.
6. To consider the question it would be appropriate to refer Section 3 of the Act, and notification issued by State Government in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act, which we quote :
'3. Act not to apply to certain accommodations. - (1) Nothing in this Act shall apply to -
(a) accommodation which is the property of the Government;
(b) accommodation which is the property of a local authority used exclusively for non-residential purposes.
(2) The Government, may by notification, exempt from all or any of the provisions of this Act any accommodation which is owned by any educational, religious or charitable institution or by any nursing or maternity home, the whole of the income derived from which is utilised for that institution or nursing home or maternity home.'
'Notification No. F-24(4)-83-XXXII-I, dated the 7th September, 1989. - In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (No. XLI of 1961), the State Government hereby exempts all the accommodation owned by -
(i) the Wakf, registered under the Wakf Act, 1954 (No. 29 of 1954), or
(ii) the public trust registered under the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951 (No. XXX of 1951), for an educational, religious or charitable purpose,
from all the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (No. XLI of 1961).
(Published in M.P. Rajpatra (Asadharan) dated 7-9-1989 page 2144).'
7. From a bare reading of sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act, it is evident that it gives power to State Government by issue of notification under sub-section (2) of Section 3 to exempt accommodation from all or any of the provisions of the Act which is owned by any educational, religious or charitable institution or by any nursing or maternity home; if the whole of the income derived from the accommodation is utilised for that institution or nursing home or maternity home.
8. The notification in question issued by the State Government in exercise of powers conferred under Section 3(2) of the Act is a general notification. The validity of which in relation to property belonging to Wakf was considered by this Court in case Chintamani supra, the Court observed that there was no material before the State Government to reach the satisfaction for issuance of the notification granting exemption under, Section 3(2) of the Act, hence, declared the notification constitutionally illegal and void being violative of Article 14, consequently held that the tenant of Wakf would be governed by the Act.
9. The State of M.P. challenged the said decision before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court upheld the notification constitutionally valid and observed thus :
'Learned counsel for the State of M.P. has invited our attention to the letter dated March 28, 1976 by the then Prime Minister of India addressed to the Chief Minister of the State of M.P. suggesting for the reasons given in the said letter to grant exemption of the provisions of the Act to the properties owned by the Wakf. Thereafter the State of M.P. made enquiries from various other States in this respect. On receipt of the replies, the matter was considered and thereafter the exemption notification was issued. We are satisfied that there was sufficient material before the State Government for issuing the impugned notification. We therefore set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court. We seek support from the judgment of this Court in S. Kanda Swami Cheltiar v. State of Tamil Nadu and Anr., 1985 (1) SCC 290.'
10. True, the validity of the notification was not considered in relation to the exemption to all the accommodations owned by Public Trust but when once the notification having come up for consideration before the Supreme Court of which validity has been upheld as a whole, in the opinion of this Court, its applicability on the accommodation in question owned by respondent Public Trust cannot be attacked, as constitutional validity of the notification on the accommodation owned by Public Trust is not under challenge in this appeal, as is evident from the substantial question of law framed. Even assuming for the sake of arguments that the constitutional validity of the notification is under challenge by which exemption from application granted to accommodations owned by Public Trusts, it may be noticed that this Court has already considered the question in case of Baburam supra wherein similar contention was raised, the Court upheld the validity of the notification in relation to accommodation owned by Public Trust registered under the MPPT Act and observed thus :
'In our opinion, the contention has no merit as it is well settled when the Supreme Court considers the vires of a statutory provision or of a notification and upholds the constitutional validity of the said notification as a whole then it cannot be contended that before the Supreme Court a part of the notification was not under consideration. Finality in litigation and public policy both require that a litigant should not be permitted to challenge validity of the provisions of the Act or notification at different times on different grounds. Once notification has been considered by the Supreme Court and the validity of the same was upheld it must be presumed that all grounds which could validly be raised were raised and considered by the Court and the decision would be binding under Article 141 of the Constitution. See -Anil Kumar Neotia and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1988 SC 1353 and Kesho Ram and Co. and Ors. etc. v. Union of India and Ors., (1989) 3 SCC 151.'
11. Besides, view taken by this Court it may also be stated that the law laid down by the Supreme Court is binding on all notwithstanding the fact that it is against or in favour of the party and it is binding on even those who were not parties before the Court. It is also well settled that once an authority of law is laid down it is no longer open to recanvass the same on new grounds or reasons that may be put forth in its support. Every new discovery or argumentative novelty cannot undo a binding precedent. It does not lose its authority merely because it was badly argued, inadequately considered and fallaciously reasoned. It is a law what has been declared by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution and is binding. It can only be substituted or clarified or reconsidered by the Supreme Court and not by this Court on the doctrine of per incuriam and sub-silentio which are in the nature of exceptions to the rule of precedent in relation to law declared under Article 141 of the Constitution. As the Supreme Court has declared the notification constitutionally valid now its validity cannot be challenged. To say so, besides the decisions relied in Baburam's case (supra), we rely on the decisions in Shenoy and Co. Bangalore and Ors. v. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle II, Bangalore and Ors., AIR 1985 SC 621 and D. K. Yadav v. J. M. A. Industries Ltd., (1993) 3 SCC 259.
12. As a result of aforesaid discussion we hold that the notification issued under Section 3(2) of the Act in question by the State Government exempting the applicability of the provisions to the accommodations owned by the public trust registered under MPPT Act, applies to the accommodation owned by the respondent public trust registered under MPPT Act of which the appellant is a tenant.
13. Accordingly, the reference is answered. Let the record of the case be placed before the Referring Judge for deciding the appeal in the light of our answer to the question referred.