T.N. Singh, J.
1. Two private transporters' operating in Chambal Division are locked in a legal battle to settle old scores. Indeed, it is a specific grievance of the petitioner that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter, STAT or Tribunal) is applying different standards in dealing with cases of the two operators in different proceedings in the same matter of 'extension' of a route in the existing permits, under Section 57(8) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, for short, the Act.
2. Even at this stage, we may at once say that the Tribunal cannot be faulted if it has taken a different view on a subsequent date on the interpretation of the statutory provision and on that ground alone, the impugned order is not liable to be set aside. No mala fide can be attributed to the Tribunal on that score. Parties are entitled to invite us to interpret any statutory provision for determination of any dispute and our interpretation will be binding not only on the parties, but also on the subordinate courts and tribunals under our supervisory jurisdiction, as cpntemplated under Article 227 of the Constitution.
3. We propose to state first few admitted facts necessary for resolving the legal controversy. Both operators, the petitioner and the first respondent, have regular permits for different routes, but those relevant to the present controversy are - Manpur-Khuhanjapur route via Sheopur and Baroda, operated by the petitioner and Baroda-Khatoli via Sheopur, operated by first respondent. Between Baroda and Sheopur, there is evidently an overlapping of services provided by the two operators and what has given rise to the grievance in this case is purported 'extension' granted in revision by STAT to the first respondent in respect of a portion of the route between Baroda and Sheopur.
4. Be it' mentioned further in this connection that the first respondent had filed an application before the Regional Transport Authority, Chambal (hereinafter, R.T.A.) styling it as a application for extension of his route by way of one return trip extra on the portion Baroda-Sheopur which was published in the Gazette on 30-1-1986 inviting objections thereto. Several operators including the petitioner filed objections and in his objection, the petitioner stated that Baroda-Sheopur was a totally new regional route and the permission applied for the extra trip in the existing permit on the said route was nothing but an application for a fresh permit which was not permissible under Section 57(8) as that tantamounted to circumventing provisions of Section 47(3) of the Act. He also contended further that the applicant (herein first respondent) was already having 9 permits in that sector and granting his prayer would be encouraging monopoly. The legal objection of the petitioner was upheld and the application of the first respondent was rejected. The objection is Annexure 2 and the order of the R.T.A. is Annexure 3 to the petition.
5. The impugned order is Annexure 4 which was rendered on 5-2-1988 in the revision filed by the first respondent On two grounds, the Tribunal allowed the revision and also the application of the first respondent purportedly made under Section 57(8). It was held that on the strength of temporary permit granted the applicant had been operating the service on Baroda-Sheopur sector of the route and the 'extension' applied for was recommended by the Additional Collector and others, such as M.L.A. of Sheopur constituency and Chairman of the Janpad. It was also held that the word 'extension' has not to be read in Section 48(3) and/or Section 57 of the Act and the term referred in the Act was not 'extension', but 'variation' which covered fully petitioner's case. The Tribunal took the view that a variation within 24 kilometres was permissible under the proviso to Clause (xxi) of Section 48(3) of the Act and that it would serve public interest if the 'extension by variation' was allowed and first respondent's permit No. 939/Stage/70 on Baroda-Khatoli via Sheopur route was modified as prayed
6. Stage is now well set to quote the crucial provisions, in relevant parts having a bearing on the controversy. Let it, however, be noted that Section 45 contains what have been termed 'general provisions as to applications for permits' while Section 46 deals specifically with 'applications for stage carriage permits' only. Section 57 has an ambiguous marginal note reading, 'Procedure in applying for and granting permits'.
'47. Procedure of Regional Transport Authority in considering application for stage carriage permit- (1) A Regional Transport Authority shall, in considering an application for a stage carriage permit, have regard to the following matters namely :
(a) the interest of the public generally;
(b) the advantages to the public of the service to be provided, including the saving of time likely to be effected thereby and any convenience arising from journeys not being broken;
(c) the adequacy of other passenger transport services operating or likely to operate in the near future, whether by road or other means, between the places to be served;
*** *** *** (e) the operation by the applicant of other transport services, including those in respect of which applications from him for permits are pending;
48. Grant of stage carriage permits.- (1) Subject to the provisions of Section 47, a Regional Transport Authority may, on an application made to it under Section 46, grant a stage carriage permit in accordance with the application or with such modifications as it deems fit or refuse to grant such a permit:
Provided that no such permit shall be granted in respect of any route or area not specified in the application. *** *** *** (3) The Regional Transport Authority, if it decides to grant a stage carriage permit, may grant the permit for a service of stage carriage of a specified description or for one or more particular stage carriages and may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, attach to the permit any one or more of the following conditions, namely : -
(i) that the vehicle or vehicles beused only in a specified area, or on a specified route or routes;
*** *** *** (xxi) that the Regional Transport Authority may, after giving notice of not less than one month, -
(a) vary the conditions of the permit;
(b) attach to the permit further conditions :
Provided that the conditions specified in pursuance of Clause (i) shall not be varied so as to alter the distance covered by the original route by more than 24 kilometres, and any variation within such limits shall be made only after the Regional Transport Authority is satisfied that such variation will serve the public convenience and that it is not expedient to grant a separate permit in respect of the original route as so varied or any part thereof. 57(8). An application to vary theconditions of any permit, other than a temporary permit, by the inclusion of a new route or routes or a new area or, in, the case of a stage carriage permit, by increasing the number of trips above the specified maximum or by altering the route covered by it or in the case of a contract carriage permit or a public carrier's permit, by increasing the number of vehicles covered by the permit shall be treated as an application for the grant of a new permit: Provided that it shall not be necessary so to treat an application made by the holder of a stage carriage permit who provides the only service on any route or in any area to increase the frequency of the service so provided, without any increase in the number of vehicles.'
7. The provision of primal significance to the controversy has, however, been totally overlooked by the Tribunal to which we must refer. It is the definition of the term 'route' to be read in Sub-section (28-A) of Section 2 which was inserted in the Act in 1970. A 'route' is defined to mean 'a line of travel which specifies the highway which may be traversed by a motor vehicle between one terminus and another'.
Another provision having a bearing on the interpretation of Section 57(8) is the Explanation, added also in 1970, to Clause (c) of Section 46 which prescribes the particulars which an application for a stage carriage permit must contain. Clause (a) of Section 46 speaks of 'the route or routes or the area or areas' and Clause (c) speaks of 'the minimum and maximum number of daily trips proposed to be provided in relation to each route and the area and the time table of the normal trips'. According to the Explanation, for the purpose of Sections 46, 48 and 57, 'a trip means a single journey from one point to another, and every return journey shall be deemed to be a separate trip.'
8. Counsel on both sides, relied on the same decision of the Apex Court in the case of Shiv Chand Amolak Chand, AIR 1984 SC 9 and we are also of the view that although the decision is no direct authority as can be said to support contention pressed by either side, it still provides a clue to the resolution of the controversy which we are called upon to resolve in the instant case. The appeal against this Court's decision was allowed holding that the legal fiction introduced in Section 57(8) should be limited to its context and setting and as such, when a case was covered by the provisions of Section 57(8), there was no scope for refusing the prayer made thereunder by referring to Section 47(3) as the requirement thereof was not contemplated under Section 57(8). However, what was further observed in that case by their Lordships bears extraction :
'It may be possible to say that where a totally new route is sought to be included by an application to vary the conditions of a permit or the alteration of the route sought by such an application is of such a drastic character that it becomes substantially a new route, the application, though in form an application to vary the conditions of the permit, would in effect and substance, be an application for grant of a new permit and in such a case, a view may conceivably be taken with some degree of plausibility that the number of stage carriages for which permits may be granted on such new route should first be determined under Section 47, sub-section (3) before the application to vary the conditions of the permit can be entertained. An applicantfor a permit on a route which is not merely technically, but in truth and reality a different route, distinct from the original route, may not be permitted to defeat the provisions enacted in Section 47, Sub-section (3) by labelling his application as one for varying the conditions of the permit and in such a case, the procedure set out in Section 47, Sub-section (3) may have to be complied with before the R.T.A. can consider and grant the application.'
9. Their Lordships' aforequoted observations are illuminating though obiter, in the context of the controversy which they were called upon to resolve. In that case, 'extension' of the route under existing permit for a distance of 20 kilometres from Satanwara to Shivpuri was held permissible under Section 57(8) taking the view that the application for extension was 'in effect and substance an application for varying the condition of permit by extending the route'. Indeed, in that case the prayer was for shifting the terminus ad quem to Shivpuri, at a distance of 27 Kilometres from Satanwara, which was originally the terminus ad quem under the existing permit. The matter was remitted to the Regional Transport Authority for disposing of the application on merits after setting aside this Court's judgment that the application was not maintainable because it contravened Section 47(3).
10. We, therefore, find much substance in the contention of the petitioner's counsel Shri Gupta that authorities concerned (RTA/STAT) have a duty to look at the substance of the matter and determine the character of the application; they are not bound by the label attached to the application. This duty indeed follows from the statutory mandate inscribed in Section 47(3) inasmuch as the said provision has been 'regarded mandatory in Mohd. Ibrahim's case AIR 1970 SC 1542, to which their Lordships referred in Shiv Chand Amolak Chand, (AIR l984 SC 9) (supra) in accepting the view expressed therein. The scope of the legal fiction was considered by the Apex Court also in a later decision in K.S.R.T. Corporation v. B. A. Jayaram, AIR 1964 SC 790 and in both cases the position which is self-evident was recognised that Section 57 is a procedural provision.
Indeed, the contention which prevailed in both cases with their Lordships was that Section 47(3) would not prevail against Section 57(8) as the latter dealt with the specific case of a 'variation' of a condition of an existing permit, as made clear in the later decision. It is indisputable that in both cases the focus was on the inter-relation only on Sections 47(3) and 57(8) and the impact of neither Section 2(28-A) nor of any other provision on Section 57(8) came up in specific terms for their Lordships' consideration.
11. However, in our opinion, recourseto the provisos to Section 48(1) and Clause (xxi) of Section 48(3) as also to the provisions of Section 46 would be permissible to interpret further the scope and ambit of Section 57 for the purpose of identifying the nature and character of the application made under Section 57(8). In other words, for determining the scope of 'altering the route'' in the existing permit contemplated under Section 57(8) vis-a-vis grant of a new or a separate permit under Section 48, on an application made under Section 46, what appears to us indisputable is that if the regional route is 'altered' under Section 57(8) in an existing permit, that may be done only by ensuring that such alteration does not offend Section 2(28-A) and for that matter, also the two provisos aforequoted of Sub-sections (1) and (3) respectively of Section 48. The alteration can be effected in respect of the two terminii of the existing route, but the altered route must still have not more than two terminii. The alteration may take the shape of an 'extension' lengthwise of the existing route, as held in Shiv Chand Amolak Chand (supra) but such an extension may also result in alteration in the line of travel from one point to another on the same highway or partly also on another highway except that the line of travel in respect of which the alteration is made must be specified and that can only be clearly and categorically indicated with reference to two terminii. Needless to say that the word 'highway' used in Section 2(28-A) is related to the 'line of travel' which need not necessarily be a straight line. The term obviously is not related to the name or number that is ascribed to a 'highway' in official records, the emphasis being on the 'line of travel'. Section 57(8) clearly circumscribes the scope of variation in the condition of an existing permit in relation toits route indicating that such a variation may be made only in respect of the number of trips or alteration of the route in the case of a stage carriage permit. It clearly does not apply to a case when the alteration would result in more than one route being covered in the same or existing permit.
12. Looking into the provisions of Subsections (3) to (6) of Section 57 which are applicable to an application made under Sub-section (8), it appears clear to us that even when the condition of an existing permit is varied under Sub-section (8) in respect of the route specified therein, care is taken to ensure that other operators in the area or region are not adversely affected Indeed, it is for this reason that even an application under Section 58(7) has to be advertised and objection thereto disposed of giving a hearing to the other operators. Their Lordships have held in their decisions aforenoted, that the provisions of Subsections (3) to (6) apply to an application under Sub-section (8) of Section 57. And, Sub section (6) categorically envisages; consideration of the question as to whether permits already grantee) in any region or area are 'sufficient for or in excess of the needs of the region or of such area'. This position is made further clear by the Proviso to Subsection (8) which dispenses with the procedure envisaged under Sub-sections (3) to (6) in the cases contemplated therein, namely, when 'the holder of a stage carriage permit who provides the only service on any route or in any area' and when the prayer is only 'to increase the frequency of the service so provided'. Because, in that case, only number of trips may be increased on the existing route as would not affect other operators.
13. We must also read the aforequoted Proviso to Clause (xxi) of Section 48(3) in the context of the proviso to sub-section (1) thereof. When an 'extension' is made under Section 57(8) in an existing permit, it is not only alteration in 'distance covered by the original route' which must determine the nature and character of the application made thereunder, but it would be necessary to see if it was 'not expedient to grant a separate permit in respect of the original route as so varied' because the extended route, in- respect of which thealteration is sought in the existing permit must be mentioned in terms of Section 2(28-A), according to the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 48. This requirement follows also from what is to be read in Cl (a) of Section 46 which is the basic provision for all types of applications concerning a stage carriage permit. That no permit or variation can be granted without the route being specified under Section 46(a) or 57(8) is well-established, but it also follows therefrom that if a 'separate route' is contemplated in an application made under Section 57(8), then the provisions of Sections 47 and 48 must be borne in mind.
14. In our opinion, whenever the alteration sought in the original route is of such a nature that it is not possible to allow the alteration because for such a route, a separate permit is required to be granted by Section 2(28-A), then the case will not be covered by Section 57(8) as the route, asheldin Shiv Chand Amolak Chand, (AIR 1984 SC 9) (supra) would be 'in truth and reality a different route, distinct from the original route', If in such a case the provision of Section 47(3) cannot be allowed to be defeated, it would be more so, in the case of Section 2(28-A). If 'public convenience' and 'interest of the public generally' must be kept in mind, as required by Sections 47 and 48, there are other things also which are to be borne in mind to fulfil the other requirements of Section 47 to exclude unhealthy competition between operators and creation of monopoly in favour of any particular operator. This is clearly spelt out in Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 47. If an application under Section 57(8) is so devised that it breaches any provision of Sections 2(28-A), 46, 47 and 48 in a manner as would affect substantive right of other operators, then, it cannot be treated as an application for alteration of the original route envisaged under the existing permit because 'interest of the public generally' and 'public convenience' can even be taken care of by a 'separate permit' following the procedure envisaged under Sections 46, 47 and 48.
15. We have already observed that an alteration in the original route must conform to the requirements of Section 2(28-A) and the alteration can be made in only such manner that in no case the number of terminii of thealtered route would be more than two. Indeed, when the altered route envisages more than two terminii, then it would no longer remain a single route and when it becomes the case of more than one route, then, it would be expedient rather to consider the question of grant of a separate permit in respect of the route that is contemplated under the alteration. On the scope of alteration, our attention is drawn by Shri Gupta to a Bench decision in the case of Akal Transport Company, AIR 1973 Punj and Har 338 wherein it was held that Section 57(8) applied only when one of two terminii of the route is to be changed and Clause (xxi) of Section 48(3) applied when diversion of a route between two terminii fixed for the original route was intended.
15A. But more than that we read in recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of Adarsh Travels Bus Service, AIR 1986 SC 319 which throws much light on the ambit and scope of the newly inserted definition clause, Sub-section (28-A) in Section 2. It was observed that the amendment was meant to take care of the confusion that existed earlier making a distinction between the terms 'route' and 'highway' on account of the Privy Council decision in Kelani Valley Motor Transport Company's case, AIR 1946 PC 137. Their Lordships have held that the highway traversed between two terminii envisaged under Section 2(28-A) as a whole comprises a 'route' and as such, any part of that highway would also be 'route' within the meaning of the terms defined in Section 2(28-A). This supports the view we have taken that in the original route covered by two terminii, there may be more 'routes' if more terminii are contemplated in relation to any particular portion of the same highway or original line of travel In such a case, it would be difficult to say that the application is not for a fresh permit for a separate or new route, but for an alteration of the same route with only two terminii. At para 7 of the report in Adarsh Transport Bus Service (supra), it was categorically held that the 'route AB covers and includes every part of particular highway from A to B traversed by the motor vehicle along that route'. Their Lordships further observed that it was impossible to accept theargument that only the particular terminii had to be looked at and 'the rest of the highway ignored in order to discover a route for the purpose of the Motor Vehicles Act.'
16. In the instant case, what is very clear is that by the alteration proposed, which has been allowed, on the same highway or line of travel, the service operates now between four terminii. Originally, it operated between Baroda and Khatoli, but two more terminii came into existence as a result of the alteration as the first respondent is allowed to operate the service by an additional trip and a return trip between Baroda-Sheopur. While under the existing permit, he was operating one trip from Baroda to Khatoli and back, in virtue of the alteration he is now allowed to operate another trip between Baroda to Sheopur and return trip (termed as 'partial return trip') from Sheopur to Baroda. These 'alterations' indeed distinguished the new, separate or independent route from the original route as the return trip under the original trip started from Khatoli and not from Sheopur, the midway station, at which the line of travel took a turn to proceed to Khatoli. This conclusion is inevitable if the holding in Adarsh Transport (supra) has to prevail.
16A. We have no doubt that the 'extra trip' and 'partial return trip' contemplated under the alteration, in 'effect and substance' constituted a separate route though it was a part of the same highway, or line of travel between Baroda and Khatoli via Sheopur under the original route. For the view we have taken, we read support also in the afore-quoted Explanation of Section 46(c) which defines the term 'trip' to mean a single journey between two terminii. The 'extra' trip and the 'partial return' trip between the two terminii, Baroda and Sheopur, allowed under the impugned alteration of the original route, in our opinion, could only be in respect of a separate route connecting the terminii Baroda and Sheopur and such an alteration was beyond the purview of Section 57(8). Had it been a case of increaseof 'trips' of the service which operated under the existing permit between the original two terminii Baroda and Khatoli, the matter would have been different as that would have been otherwise covered byS. 57(8). The instant case is not one of increase in number of trips on the original 'route' but of alteration of 'route', in other words of two routes being provided for in the same permit in contravention not only of Section 47(3) but also of Section 46(a) and 48(1) of the Act. It is not, and it cannot be, disputed that when respondent No. 1 had applied for stage carriage permit for the original route Baroda-Khatoli via Sheopur, the route contemplated under the alteration, namely, Baroda-Sheopur was not mentioned and permit in that regard was not granted The proviso to Section 48(1) prohibits grant of permit 'in respect of any route or area not specified in the application' and Section 46(a) mandates 'route or routes' to be mentioned specifically in the application.
17. Shri Nigudkar, appearin for the first respondent, besides relying on Shiv Chand Amolak Chand, (AIR 1984 SC 9) (supra) has also cited a D.B. decision of this Court in the case of M.P.S.R.T.C. v. S.T.A.A., (1974 MPLJ 133), but relevance thereof to the instant controversy is very little. True, in that case, a cast-iron pattern is woven around Sections 45, 48(3) and 57(8) and Shri Gupta has submitted that the law laid down therein has ceased to be good law in view of what is observed by their Lordships in Shiv Chand Amolak Chand (supra). But, we do not consider necessary to examine that contention and feel satisfied observing only that we are constitutionally mandated to attach supreme primacy to the views of their Lordships of the Apex Court that the character of the application made under Section 57(8) is justiciable and the label is not conclusive of its character. What appears to us is that this Court was not required to pronounce in that case on the impact and effect of insertion of Sub-section (28-A) in Section 2 on Section 57(8) and other provisions of the Act while we have rested our decision mainly on that consideration. Suffice it to add further that Section 57(8) is not armed with a non obstante clause and is not, therefore, in derogation of other provisions of the Act. If due consideration is not paid to Section 2(28-A) and other provisions then an anamolous result will follow encouraging monopoly in favour of a particular operator and unhealthycompetition between operators providing service on the same highway or line of travel as would defeat the salutary provisions of Sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section 47. Indeed, under the garb of 'alteration', the operator providing service on a particular highway between two terminii will be able to create for himself multiple routes in respect of different portions of the same highway on which he is operating under an existing permit to serve only his convenience and interest; and not that of public generally.
18. For the reasons aforesaid, we hold that the interpretation of Section 57(8) by the Tribunal is not tenable in law. The Tribunal has erred in law in holding the application of the first respondent to be one made under Section 57(8) and has passed the impugned order without jurisdiction in that view of the matter. We are also of the view that while considering the prayer for 'altering the route' or for 'increasing the number of trips' on che route covered by the existing permit, the fact that in regard thereto the applicant had a temporary permit on the Baroda-Sheopur sector was irrelevant and the impugned order having taken into consideration that fact, it is, on that score too, vitiated in law. On the other hand, on our interpretation of Section 57(8), we have no hesitation to hold that the decision of the. R.T.A. that the application was not covered by Section 57(8) as Baroda-Sheopur portion of the original route under the existing permit was an 'independent route' and in regard thereof, provisions of Section 47(3) were required to be complied with, is legal and valid. In our view, no interference in revision with the order of the R.T.A. was called for and the impugned order is, therefore, quashed.
19. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed, The impugned order Annexure 4 passed by the SectionT.A,T. is quashed and the order rendered as per Annexure 3 by the R.T.A. is restored There will be noorder as to costs. Outstanding amount of security be refunded to the petitioner.