S. P. Srivastava, J.
1. Heard the learned counsel for the owner appellant.
2. The appellant has filed the present appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, feeling aggrieved by the award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Meerut, determining an amount of Rs. 8,92,700 as just compensation to which the dependants of the deceased Subodh Kumar Sharma were found entitled to on account of his untimely death having been caused in an accident involving the offending motor vehicle-the bus which was owned and being run by the present appellant.
3. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, after careful consideration of the evidence and materials brought on record, had come to the conclusion that Subodh Kumar Sharma had died in an accident involving the offending motor vehicle on 27.4.1996. The deceased was aged about 39 years at the time of death and was employed as a Senior Teacher in Kendriya Vidyalaya, Air Force, Station Hindon, Ghaziabad.
4. It may be noticed that the death had occurred in the accident caused by the explosion of bomb in the Bus. The Tribunal drew ample support for its conclusion from the observations made in the case of Samir Chand v. M. D., Assam State Transport Corporation, 1998 (3) AWC 2385 (SC) : 1998 (2) TAC 643 (SC).
5. Taking into consideration the age factor and the number of the dependants left by the deceased, the Tribunal had utilised the multiplier of 16 for calculating the amount of compensation. Although the deceased was receiving a salary of an amount of Rs. 7,450 per month, yet taking into consideration the assertions of the claimants that the substantive pay of the deceased was Rs. 6,900 per month, the amount of compensation was calculated taking the lesser figure of Rs. 6,900 per month and not taking into account the figure of Rs. 7,450. Excluding 1/3rd of the amount from the monthly salary which the deceased might be spending upon himself, the extent of annual dependency was calculated at a figure of Rs. 55,200.
6. The learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously urged that the award is not at all sustainable in law as the application for compensation had been specifically filed claiming it to be an application under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act. The contention is that since the claimants themselves had so specified, their claim had to be considered as contemplated under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act and, therefore, the annual income of the deceased could not be held to be over and above the maximum which has been prescribed in the Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act which Is Rs. 40,000 p.a. only.
7. So far as the above aspect is concerned, it may be noticed that Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act as well as Second Schedule referable to that section was deleted vide the Amending Act No. 30 of 2001 which came Into force on September 3, 2001. The accident had taken place on 27.4.1996. The claim petition, however, had been filed in the year 2000. During the pendency of the claim petition, the amendment became effective and Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act itself was deleted. The effect was that by the date of the judgment/award, the only provision under which the claim petition could be continued, was the provision under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. In the absence of Section 163A of the Act and the Schedule II, which contains only the guidelines, the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal proceeded with the claim petition treating the same to be a claim petition under Section 166 of the Act and determined the amount of compensation applying the principles attracted to a claim filed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
8. It may be noticed that Section 163B of the Motor Vehicles Act provides that where a person is entitled to claim compensation under Section 140 and Section 163A, he shall file the claim under either of the said sections and not under both but there is no provision which may prohibit the continuance of the claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. In fact, it is always open to a claimant to convert the claim under Section 163A of the New Act to be a claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. There is no prohibition for converting the claim filed under Section 163A to a claim under Section 166 of the Act.
9. Further, it is not obligatory for a claimant to mention specific provision under which a claim has been filed. The Tribunal can take Into consideration the facts and circumstances mentioned in the application seeking the granting of award and award compensation tracing its authority to the relevant provisions under the Motor Vehicles Act.
10. It may further be noticed that as pointed out by Apex Court in Its decision in the case of Lakshmi Narayan Guin and Ors. v. Niranjan Madak, AIR 1985 SC 111, a change in the taw during the pendency of the appeal has to be taken into account and has to govern all the rights of the parties. That being so, it is apparent that the change in the law during the pendency of the original proceedings has to be taken into account and has to govern the rights of the parties.
11. In the present case, it cannot be said that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal was bound to reject the claim as the provisions under Section 163A of the Act had been deleted. He could still proceed with the case and determine the compensation tracing its jurisdiction to the relevant provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act which was available as envisaged under Section 166 of the aforesaid Act.
12. The learned counsel for the appellant has tried to draw support from the decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala and Ors., 2001 (2) AWC 1447 (SC) : 2001 (2) TAC 312 and in the case of Guruanna Wadi and Anr. v. General Manager, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation and Anr., 2001 (3) TAC 329. The ratio of the aforesaid decisions cannot come to the rescue of the applicant as in these cases, there was no occasion to consider the effect of the deletion of the provisions contained in Section 163A and the Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act vide the Amending Act No. 30 of 2001.
13. The learned counsel for the appellant had next urged that the Tribunal has erred in applying the multiplier of 16 as the amount of annual dependency in the present case even on the own finding of the Tribunal could not exceed Rs. 55,200 and that amount could be safely secured by Investing the amount of Rs. 6,00,000 in any interest bearing account.
14. The submission Is totally misconceived. The deceased at the time of the death was only 39 years of age. It is not possible to presume that the rate of interest would remain static, it could go down or there might be upward revision. It all depends on various factors. Further, the choice of multiplier is not dependent solely on the consideration of the Interest income which may be available by investing the amount.
15. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, as noticed hereinabove, in essence is that while awarding the compensation, the Tribunal ought to have adopted the 'Interest Yield Method'. This method adopts the principle of interest where annual loss to the dependants by the death of the deceased is determined and compensation which would fetch that amount of interest annually is awarded. The sum to be awarded should be equal to the cost of purchasing an annuity of the relevant amount for the relevant period. If the amount awarded is deposited In any bank, it would be possible for the dependants to earn as much money by way of interest as the deceased had been contributing to the dependants.
16. The aforesaid method, has, however, been held to be most unworkable and inapplicable to the prevailing conditions in India. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana in its decision In the case of Lachhman Singh and Ors. v. Gurmit Kaur and Ors., AIR 1979 P&H; 50 and the Bombay High Court in its decision in the case of Padmadevi Bhankarrao Jadhav and Ors. v. Kabalsing Gormilsing Sardarji and Ors., 1985 ACJ 382 (Bom), did not approve this method. We are not inclined to take a different view.
17. In the present case, the deceased had left behind besides his wife aged about 35 years, five minor children whose ages ranged between 10 to 17 years.
18. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the Tribunal has erred in selecting the multiplier of 16 for determining the compensation.
19. We have given our anxious consideration to this submission.
20. So far as the use of multiplier is concerned, it may be noticed that for the purpose of calculating the just compensation, the annual dependency of the dependants has to be determined in terms of the annual loss due to the abrupt termination of life. The suitable multiplier has to be determined by taking into consideration the number of years of the dependency of various dependants as well as the number of years by which the life of the deceased was cut short and the various imponderable factors, such as the early natural death or the deceased becoming incapable of supporting the dependants due to illness or other natural handicap or calamities, the age of the dependants and their developing, their independent sources of income, etc., excluding, however, the amount of insurance policies of the deceased to which the dependants may become entitled on account of its maturity on account of the death. It must further be emphasised, however, that the method of multiplying the amount of annual loss to the dependants with the number of years by which the life has been cut short without anything else cannot be sustained.
21. The choice of multiplier has, however, to be made by the Court using its own experience and having due regard to the peculiar facts of each case because the ultimate goal is not to adhere to any rigid formula but to award a compensation which is Just. The age of the deceased person cannot be taken to be either a conclusive or a paramount factor in the determination of the compensation, except in those cases where the remaining years of the life expectancy are less than the multiplier which is sought to be applied.
22. Taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances, the amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal cannot be held to be unjust.
23. This appeal being devoid of merits deserves to be and is hereby dismissed.
24. As prayed, the amount of Rs. 25,000 deposited in this Court under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act be remitted to the concerned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal so that it may be adjusted against the amount to be paid to the claimants.