ORDER
N.N. Sharma, J.
1. This revision is directed against order dated 25.3.1980 in Case No. 15/11 of 1979 under Section 145 of Cr.P.C. recorded by Sri K.R. Shilpkar, learned City Magistrate, Muzaffarnagar by which he declared possession of Nisar first party on the plots in dispute who was held to have been in possession over this holding two months prior to the arising of the dispute; his possession was to be maintained till he was evicted in due course of law; revisionist was restrained from interfering with his possession till then; S.O. Kotwali was to be informed accordingly.
2. The proceedings were initiated on the report of S.O. Kotwali dated 12.2.1976 who submitted his report about the triangular claims put forward about possession over the plots in dispute, viz., 2730, 2705 and 2704 by Nisar Ahmad son of Lala, Buddhu son of Rahim Bux and Dal Chand stm of Jaharia Singh. Revisionist traced his claim through Budhu, alleged Mukhtaream of Serajuddin and alleged that he cultivated this holding Barseem crop was standing at the time of arising of dispute to have been sown and cultivated by him; police report further disclosed that the disputed holding was in cultivatory possession of Mohd. Umar and Nisar while Nisar claimed exclusive possession over this holding and alleged to have sown the Barseem crop himself Dal Chand put forward his claim through custodian as Sarajuddin, own brother of Nisar son of Lala migrated to Pakistan even during the life time of Lala. There was apprehension of breach of peace about the harvest of Barseen crop. So learned Magistrate felt satisfied under Section 145 of Cr.P.C. that, there was a dispute relating to immovable property giving rise to the apprehension of breach of peace and attached the Barseem crop which was eventually harvested by first party Nisar who deposited its auction price in court under the orders of court pending these proceedings.
3. Contention of Nisar was that after migration of Serajuddin to Pakistan in 1960 and on the death of his father, Lala, he was in exclusive possession over the entire property of Serajuddin. In 1965, his brother came from Pakistan and appointed Abdul Qadir his Mukhtaream and filed proceedings for division of holding under Sections 229-B/176 of Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act; subsequently, Abdul Qadir was appointed Mukhtare-am by his brother Seraj alias Buddhu but still the possession of first party Nisar continued over the land in dispute.
4. In support of his assertion Nisar examined himself, Abdul Qadir, the alleged Mukhtare-am of his brother, Mohd. Bashir who supported the claim of Nisar, it was conceded even by Abdul Qadir, alleged Mukhtare-am of Seraj that despite the litigation and compromise decree in revenue proceedings about the division of holding, Nisar was never dispossessed nor he signed the Dakhalnama nor was evicted but his possession remained intact. They further testified that the disputed crop had been sown by Nisar Ahmad who was in exclusive possession thereof.
5. Second party Buddhu filed an agreement dated 26.11.1975 executed by him on behalf of Serajuddin in favour of Ram Prasad, Noor Ahmad etc. and in pursuance of that agreement he asserted his possession over this holding but faltered in cross-examination and could not give even the boundary of the holding. He even could not tell the name of the person who had sown the disputed Barseem crop. Prabhu, examined on behalf of Buddhu, conceded that after the death of Lala, his entire holding remained continuously in possession of Nisar who carried the cultivation through his servant. Ram Prasad revisionist, who is dead now, and whose heirs are on record, conceded in his statement that up to the date of execution of general power of attorney, Seraj was in possession of the disputed land; Sher Singh alleged possession of Buddhu over the disputed holding.
6. Learned Magistrate found the evidence of first party cogent and recorded the impugned order giving rise to this revision.
7. No revision has been filed by Dal Chand. So he is out of picture now.
8. On behalf of Ram Prasad revisionist, it was alleged that the compromise decree arrived at amongst the parties in proceedings under Sections 229-B, 176 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act was binding on Nisar and learned Magistrate cried in nullifying that decree by the impugned order. In support of this contention, he relied open Mahadeo v. Gaon Sabha Saraibhogi reported in 1968 ACC 133 which posited:-
Where the rights of the parties have been recently determined by a competent court - be it a revenue court - the dispute comes to an end, and it is the duty of the Magistrate in proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. to maintain the rights of the successful party and not to allow the, defeated party to invoke an aid of the Magistrate and the police to neutralize the effect of the decree' of that court.
9. It appears that in that case after local inspection, learned S.D.M. assessed the evidence of the parties and upheld the possession of Gaon Sabha within two months next prior to the passing of the preliminary order and released that property in its favour. It was pointed out in revision that there was already a decision of a competent court on the question of possession over the plots in dispute in favour of revisionist and learned S.D.M. could not override the same.
10. In this connection, learned Advocate for revisionist further relied upon Masih Uddin v. The State reported in : AIR1953All383 where it was observed:
It is the duty of the Magistrate holding proceedings under Section 145 to maintain the rights of the parties when such rights have been declared by a competent Court within a time not remote from taking proceedings under the section.
It appears that in that case, the applicant, on 26.11.1949, made an application under Section 145 Cr.P.C. as the Mukhtar-am of the Mutwallis of a waqf. It was alleged by the applicant that the opposite party, namely, Bhura and others, were interfering with the possession pf the Mutwallis trustees over a large number of plots of land in village Kalolijar in the district of Namirpur. It was alleged that there was consequently an apprehension of a breach of the peace.
11. Notice was issued to the opposite party and proceedings under Section 145, Cr.P.C. were carried on in the court of the Magistrate. The applicant, in support of his case, filed the Dakhalnama which showed that, in pursuance of a decree for ejectment passed by the revenue Court in a case under Section 180 U.P. (sic) enance Act, against Bhura along with some others, proceedings in execution had been carried out by a Vakil Commissioner appointed by the Court and possession delivered to the decree-holder. Along with this piece of documentary evidence some witnesses were also produced by the applicant to support his case.
12. The opposite party denied that the trustees of the waqf had obtained actual possession by means of execution proceedings in the revenue Court. Some witnesses were also produced to support the case of the opposite party.
13. The learned Magistrate, on a consideration of the materials before him, recorded the opinion that in spite of the formal ejectment of Bhura under the decree passed in the suit in 1948, he i.e. Bhura, continued in possession of the plots in dispute, in other words, it was held that the second party was not actually dispossessed from the land in dispute in spite of the delivery of possession which according to the learned Magistrate, was only formal.
14. It was on these facts when the -aforesaid order was recorded by this Court.
15. In Farzand Ali v. Shaukat Ali reported in 1970 ACC 225 : 1971 Cri LJ 29 a reference in proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. was made to the Civil Court under Section 146(1) and that finding of Civil Court was held as binding on the Magistrate also who was bound to act in conformity with that finding.
16. The next authority relied upon has been reported in Munna v. Jhingu 1969 ACC 303 at page 304 where it was observed:
Once the applicant had obtained Dakhal as a result of a decree passed by a competent Civil Court proceedings under Section 145, Cr.P.C. were not maintainable till the order passed by the Civil Court had been vacated. The judgment of the Civil Court in favour of the applicant could not be nullified by the Criminal Court.
17. It appears that in that case, the revisionist has obtained Dakhai as a result of a decree passed by a competent Civil Court some time prior to the initiation of proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. and it was held that such proceedings were not maintainable.
18. The next authority relied upon on behalf of revisionist has been reported in Karamchand Ganga Pershad v. Union of India : 1971CriLJ1072 which posited:
Criminal Procedure Code (1898) Section 367 - Decisions of Civil Courts are binding on criminal Courts - Converse not true - Export of maize by dealers from one State to another - Forfeiture of goods by Government on ground that export is banned by order issued under Essential Commodities Act. Criminal Prosecution of dealers also - Writ challenging forfeiture on ground that ban was lifted at time of Export - High Court dismissing petition in view of pendency of criminal proceedings - Dismissal is illegal.
It appears that there was dispute relating to the consignments of maize transported from the State of Haryana to Howrah in West Bengal during the month of Oct., 1967. The case of the State was that the movements of Maize had been controlled by the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 read with Northern Inter-Zonal Maize (Movement Control) Order, 1967. But the restrictions on export imposed by that order were removed by the State of Haryana in October, 1967. The contention of Union was that the State of Haryana had not lifted the ban on export and further it had no power to lift the ban hence the export was illegal and as such the railway authorities were competent to withhold the delivery of goods. That contention was repelled with the observation that Civil Court had already found that the petitioner's claim had been established by the decision of Civil Court and criminal courts were bound by it and the converse was not true.
19. On behalf of opposite party, reliance was placed upon Kalap Din v. State reported in 1970 All LJ 873 where it was observed:
Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, Section 145 action Under Section 145 - Pendency of Civil suit relating to same property and between same parties in court of competent jurisdiction - Magistrate can take action Under Section 145 if he is satisfied that a dispute relating to immovable property giving rise to apprehension of breach of peace exists.
20. I have carefully considered all these contentions and find that the order of learned Magistrate is unassailable for the following reasons:
(1) It is significant to note that no copy of Dakhalnama is on record to show that first party Nisar had actually signed the Dakhalnama in the compromise decree. Even Abdul Qadir, Mukhtare-am to Seraj, conceded that he was the marginal witness of that Dakhalnama which did not operate and possession in Nisar remained intact and he was not evicted from that holding. Any entry in favour of Serajuddin would not endure to the benefit of Ram Prasad for the simple reason that there is no sale deed on record executed by Serajuddin by which he actually transferred his Qura in this holding in favour of Ram Prasad or Buddhu. Even the agreement to sell is not on record although it was pointed out by the learned Advocate for the revisionist that at the time of deposition of Ram Prasad, the document was there and its certified copy is on record. Had it been a registered document, its certified copy could have been easily procurable. Learned Advocate for the revisionist himself pointed out that in the teeth of Sections 91 and 92 of Indian Evidence Act, it is not possible to act on the oral evidence in the absence of that document. Under Section 61 of the Indian Evidence Act, contents of document have to be proved by primary evidence unless secondary evidence is admissible. So no explanation was offered for the absence of primary evidence in this case.
(2) It is correct that there are some collusive entries in favour of Serajuddin made by Lekhpal in the copy of Khasra of 1383 Fasli but name of Ram Prasad does not occur anywhere either in the Khasra or in the irrigation slips which were prepared long ago. The compromise decree is dated 6.8.1975 while these proceedings were initiated many years after. Under such circumstances, when there was apprehension of breach of peace at the time of initiation of these proceedings, learned Magistrate had full jurisdiction to record the preliminary as well as the final order under Section 145 of Code of Criminal Procedure.
(3) There is on record a complaint dated 24.7.1979 filed in the court of Special Judicial Magistrate, Muzaffarnagar by Seraj against Ram Prasad and Baru complaining forgery etc. under Sections 420/468 /471/120B of Indian Penal Code. A perusal of that complaint is revealing and shows that Mukhtarnama procured by Buddhu on 2.12.1975 was a forged document and he was not held fast by any dealings by that Mukhtarnama or agreement to sell.
21. There is not a single document showing possession of revisionist Ram Prasad in any year over the property in dispute and the oral evidence adduced on behalf of his plea was simply bogus it is highly improbable that when possession of Nisar remained intact throughout, his brother, who had migrated to Pakistan long ago could have cultivated this land continuously, as a Pakistani national through such The visits to India after such big time gaps specially through revisionist whom he accused to be a forger. It is not open to the Court to highly disturb such finding of fact recorded by learned Magistrate about possession in favour of Nisar.
22. So the revision is devoid of force and is dismissed herewith.