S. Ananda Reddy, J.
1. This Tax Revision Case is filed by the dealer, aggrieved by the order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal in TA No.576 of 1993, dated 14.7.1994 for the assessment year 1986-87. The dispute in this tax revision case is 'Whether the Xerox machine is to be considered as duplicating machine, falling under Entry-12 of the First Schedule or to be treated as one falling under 'all kinds of machinery' specified under Entry-83 of the First Schedule?'.
2. The Petitioner - M/s. Replica Agencies, is a dealer in Xerox machines andtheir parts. During the assessment year 1986-87 the assessing authority subjected the disputed turnover of Rs.6,73,604/- to tax treating the Xerox machines and their parts as 'machinery parts' failing under Entry 83 of the First Schedule to the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The Deputy Commissioner, however, revised the said order and treated the Xerox machines as duplicating machines, falling under Entry 12 of the First Schedule and subjected to higher rate of tax. Aggrieved by the same, the dealer carried the matter in appeal to the Sales Tax. Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal after considering the contentions of the dealer as well as the Department affirmed the order of the Deputy Commissioner (CT). Therefore, the present tax revision case by the dealer.
3. The learned counsel for the dealer contended that the Xerox machines, with which the Petitioner was dealing, cannot be considered as duplicating machines as they are not simple duplicators, but is equipped with the capacity to enlarge as well as contract the size of the documents that are required to be copied. According to the learned counsel, the Xerox machine is being operated with electricity and therefore it should be treated as one falling under Entry 83 as part of all kinds of machinery propelled or operated by electricity, diesel etc. The learned counsel also contended that the term duplicating machine was there under Entry-12 from the beginning of the Act, though the Xerox machines were not available at that time when the said Entry was introduced. Though the Xerox machines are being traded in the market for the last so many years, the legislature did not thought it fit to incorporate as an item in Entry-12 and therefore it would be proper to treat it as a machinery specified under Entry-83 of the First Schedule. The learned counsel also tried to distinguish the Xerox machines from the duplicating machines, which areconfined only to take replica of whatsoever put into the said machines. In view of the variations in the copies that are being obtained in the Xerox machines, the Xerox machines could not be considered as duplicating machines. Therefore, the Tribunal as well as Deputy Commissioner are in error in treating the Xerox machines as one falling under Entry-12 of the First Schedule. The learned counsel also contended that assuming that the Xerox machines falls under both Entry-12 as well as Entry-83 of the First Schedule, then in such case it should be considered under the Entry where a lesser tax is being provided. If so considered the Xerox machine has to be taxed under Entry-83 instead of Entry 12.The learned counsel also advanced another argument that even assuming that there is any ambiguity with reference to the Xerox machine, whether it fall under Entry-12 or Entry 83, then the benefit of doubt should be given to the dealer. Therefore, the learned counsel contended that in any case the Xerox machines are to be treated as failing under Entry 83 and not Entry 12 of the First Schedule. The teamed counsel also relied upon Slate of A.P. v. Karnatakatn Govindayya Setty & Sons, 55 STC 160; Indo National Ltd vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, 64 STC 382, in support of his contentions. The learned counsel also distinguished a judgment of the Gujarat High Court in Bhuji Products v. State of Gujarat, 84 STC 328, which was referred to and relied upon by the Tribunal.
4. The learned Special Government Pleader for the Department, on the other hand, supported the order of the Tribunal. The learned counsel contended that as per the objections filed by the Dealer before the Deputy Commissioner, in Xerox machine photo camera takes photos and prints the said photos on paper; whereas in duplicatingmachine, no such process was there to print on papers. Therefore, Xerox machines cannot be treated as duplicating machines. The learned counsel also contended that merely because there was some subsequent advancement of technology so as to get enlarged as well as contracted copies of the originals while taking Copses, the dealer has advanced an argument that such a provision is not there in the duplicating machine. The learned counsel also contended that even assuming that the Xerox machines could be considered as falling under both the entries, even then Entry-83 is a general entry; whereas Entry 12 is of specific entry, dealing with a special type of items. Under such circumstances a special entry prevails over the general entry and therefore the Xerox machines are to be treated as falling under Entry 12, instead of Entry 83 of the First Schedule. The learned counsel relied upon the following judgments in support of his contention Good Year India Ltd. vs. State of A.P., 19 APSTJ 247, State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Serval Industries, 23 APSTJ 63. The learned counsel also contended that there is no ambiguity with reference to the item in question whether it would fall under Entry 12 or Entry 83. When there is no ambiguity, there is no scope for giving any benefit of levying lower tax by treating it as one falling under Entry 83 of the First Schedule. Therefore, it is contended that there is absolutely no justification for the dealer to contend that it should be treated as one falling under Entry 83. In support of his contention the learned counsel also relied upon the decisions in Kothari Products Limited vs. Government of A.P., 25 APSTJ 192 and State of A.P. vs. A.P. Electrical Equipment Corpn., 104 STC 415.
5. Before considering the merits of the rival contentions, it would be proper to refer to the relevant Entries i.e., 83 and 12, as they stood during the relevant previous year and prior thereto.
Act No. Notification No.& dateEffective DateDescription of goodsRate of tax
ITEM 83Act 5 of 19741-3-1974Machinery, spare parts and accessories, Item No.83-First Schedule First sale
4 paise in the rupeeAct 49 of 19761-9-1976Substituted as under All kinds of machinery propelled or operated by (i) electricity, (ii)diesel. (iii) petrol, (iv) furnace oil (v) kerosene, (vi) coal. including charcoal or Many other fuel or power including spare parts and accessories of such machinery (other than those specifically mentioned elsewhere)
4 paise in the rupee
ITEM 12Added by Act III of 19581-4-1958 Typewriters, tabulating machines, calculating machines and duplicating parts machines and thereof.
Item 43 - Schedule II - First sals.
Act 16 of 19631-8-1963Item 12 First Schedule - First sale10 paise in the rupeeAct 49 of 19761-9-1976 Subs, as under Typewriters, tabulating machines, calculating machines, teleprinters and teleprinting machines and duplicating machines and parts and accessories thereof, including typewriter ribbons.1 2paise in the rupee 1
6. According to the learned counsel, the duplicating machines mentioned in Entry-12 of the First Schedule can be referable only to stencil rollers by which cyclo-styled copies can be obtained and the same cannotbe referred to Xerox machines by which photocopies of the originals alone are obtained. The learned counsel also contended that in duplicating machines there cannot be any provision either for enlargement or for contracting the size of the originals in the copies; whereas in the Xerox machines, such a facility is available. It was also the contention of the learned counsel with reference to the objections filed by the dealer before the Deputy Commissioner that in Xerox machines photo cameras take the photo and prints the photo on paper, whereas in duplicating machines there is no such process of printing. Therefore, the Xerox machine has to be considered as machine operated electrically. The learned counsel also referred to and relied upon the meaning of term Xerox, xerography, photo copier and duplicating as given in the Webster Dictionary, which are as follows :
'Xerography' - Dry printing process in which a black mineral powder is deposited on, and adheres permanently to, those parts of a paper surface which are rendered sensitive by a photo electric beam, xerox adj.
Xerox n. the copy - Xerox v. to copy by xerography - Xerox trademark of the copiers of the Xerox Corporation.
Photocopier - photocopies n. a photographic reproduction of a document, illustration, etc. 2.v.t.pres.part. photocopying past and past part. Photocopied to make a photocopy of. Duplicate - 1.v.t.pres.part. duplicating past and past part. Duplicated to do or cause to be done twice over; to make in duplicate; to be a copy of; to make several copies of; 2.adj. Double, twofold; exactly like another or several others; (cards) of a game in which identical hands are dealt at two or more tables to allow comparison of play and scores. 3. n. a thing that is exactly like another or others; a second copy of a form or document; (cards) duplicate bridge, whist etc., In duplicate In two copies duplication.n. a duplicating or being duplicated; a duplicate duplicative. adj. Duplicator n. a machine which quickly makes many copies of a document [fr.L.duplicare (duplicatus), to double].
7. By referring to the above, the learned counsel contended that the Xerox machines should be treated as machines and not as duplicating machines. But the said contention was rejected by the Tribunal referring to and relying upon a judgment of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Bhuj Products v. State of Gujarat (supra). In that case the Gujarat High Court considered with reference to the Xerox machines whether the same would fall under duplicating, machines or photographic camera or other cameras. The Gujarat High Court considered the claim of the dealer with reference to the Entry 75 and 79 of Schedule-11, Part-A of the Gujarat Sales Tax, Act, 1969, which reads as under: -
'75. Photographic and other cameras and enlargers, lenses, paper, films and plates required for use therewith and spare parts and accessories thereof,'
'79. Duplicating machines and teleprinters and tape-recorders including tape for use in connection therewith and spare parts and accessories thereof.'
Though the dealer, in fact claimed that the said Xerox machine, which was described in the sale invoice, as photo copying machine or photocopier and claimed that the said item should have been classified as falling under Entry-16 of the II Schedule or in the alternative in the residuary Entry-23 of Schedule -III to the Act. The Court also noticed the amendment to Entry-79 by insertion of the photocopier with effect from April, 1983. But the said entry was held merely clarificatory in nature and photocopiers were taxable under the said Entry even before the said amendment. TheCourt further held that - the principal and sole function of a Xerox machine is to make copies. Whether copies are made by any mechanical process or by some other chemical or electronic process is immaterial. In a copying machine some mechanical principle may be applied along with some use of chemistry, and products of such a machine would be products of a duplicating machine. Where, on the basis of principles of photography and surface electrification an instrument is devised to obtain copies, such a machine or instrument would also be a duplicating machine because the essential function of the machine is to make copies. It does not create any original material. The product is known not by the application of the basic principle by which it is manufactured. It is known by its function. Simply because one additional function of the Xerox machine is to contract or enlarge the original writing, it, cannot be said that a Xerox machine, is a photographic or other type of camera.Therefore, Xerox machines or photocopiers are taxable as duplicating machines under entry 79 of Part A of Schedule II to the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969 and not under the other entry.The said decision clearly shows that the Court proceeded on the purpose, for which the machine is being used and not the method or the way it was being used for the purpose of obtaining copies. Therefore, the Tribunal is right in holding that the Xerox machine has to be treated as a duplicating, machine.
8. However, the learned counsel for the Dealer contended that seven assuming that the, said Xerox machine would fall under both the entries, then the benefit of lower tax has to be given to the assesses by treating the same as falling in an entry where the to lower tax is payable. The learned counsel also contended that if any ambiguity is there, while determining anitem, whether it falls under one entry or the other, even in such case also the benefit should be given to the dealer and the item has to be computed under an entry which has a lesser liability on the dealer.
9. The learned counsel relied upon on the decision of this Court in the case of State of A.P. v. Karnatakam Govindayya Setty & Sons (supra). In that case the Court was considering the issue whether the Vermicelli, which is popularly known as Shevaya, is 'maida' and therefore falls within entry 60 of the First Schedule to the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957. The Court while accepting the contention of the dealer that vermicelli is to be treated as maida falling under entry 60, or alternatively, it was held that even in the case of any doubt or ambiguity in the question 'whether vermicelli is maida?' it was held that it should be answered in favour of the' 'assessee for the reason that it in turn goes to make the goods available at a lesser price to the common man.
10. Similarly, the learned counsel also relied upon the decision in the case of Indo National Lid vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (supra). In this case a Division Bench this Court was considering 'whether the dry cells meant for use in transistor- radios, multipurpose cells would be treated as accumulators, as per entry 152 of the First Schedule or they should be treated under entries 3, 38 or 137 of the First Schedule. The Court while deciding the issue held -'We are of the further opinion that, even if by some reasoning it can be held that dry-cells 'accumulators' and therefore constitute 'electrical storage batteries' falling under entry 137, even then the result would be the same. This would be a case where same goods would be falling simultaneously under three entries viz., entries 3, 38 and 137. In such a case too, the tax has to be levied at the lower rate, which would be again entry 38.'
Therefore, basing on the above two judgments, the learned counsel contended that the benefit of doubt should be given to the dealer so as to reduce the liability.
11. The learned Special Government Pleader, on the other hand, referred to the entries and contended that entry 83 is a general entry regarding to all machines other than those specifically mentioned elsewhere. Entry 12 is a specific and special entry, where duplicate machines are specifically mentioned. According to the learned counsel if an item falls under both the general entry as well as special entry, then the special entry prevails over the general entry and the item has to be treated as falling under the special entry and not under the general entry. In support of his contention the learned counsel relied upon the decision of this Court in Good Year India Ltd. vs. State of A.P (Supra). In that case the Court was considering the issue 'Whether the 'Transmission Beltings' are cotton fabrics or not?'. The Court while deciding the issue held that 'it is settled law (vide State of Gujarat vs. Patel Ramjibhai Danabhais, : [1979]3SCR788 ) that when there is a conflict between special provision and general provision the special provision prevails.' Similarly, a Division bench of this Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Serval Industries (supra) while considering whether the 'polythene bags' fall under entry 113 or entry 19 of the First Schedule to the APGST Act held - 'it is well settled that specific entry prevails over general entry. In this view of the matter, we do not find any illegality in the order of the Tribunal' and held that the plastic polythene bags would fall under entry 113 dealing with plastic sheets and articles excluding those allied goods failing under any other item, in preference to entry-19 dealing with containers other than gunnies and bottles.
12. The learned counsel also referred and relied upon a judgment of this Court inthe case of State of A.P. vs. A.P. Electrical Equipment Corpn., (supra) where this Court considered 'Whether electric meters would fall under entry 38 or under entry 83?' This Court held that prior to the amendment of Entry-38, though the electric meters could be considered as falling under entry 83, subsequent to the amendment electric meters would fall under the entry-38 and not under entry-83 as entry-3S being a special entry while entry-83 is a general entry.
13. With reference to the above legal positions referred to and relied upon by both sides, there is absolutely no quarrel as we are in agreement with the said propositions laid down in the above decisions. But the issue here is whether there is any ambiguity and whether the item 'Xerox machine' could be considered as falling under both entry 83 as well as entry-12. It is not in dispute that by nature of the items specified under entry-83, the said item can be considered as a general entry regarding to all kinds of machinery propelled or operated by electricity etc., other than those specifically mentioned elsewhere. Insofar as item 12 is concerned it is a special entry, specifying special kinds of articles or machinery. One of it is a duplicating machine.
14. The Apex Court in the case of Guntdevdatta VKSSS Maty Adit v. State of Mahrashtra, : [2001]2SCR654 , while interpreting the provisions of statute held in the following terms:
'It is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statute that the words of a statute must be understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless such construction leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context or in the object of the statute to suggest to the contrary. . The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. It isyet another rule of construction that when the words of the statute are clear, plan and unambiguous, then the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of the consequences. It is said that the words themselves best declare the intention of the lawgiver.'
If we give the natural, ordinary and popular meaning as io the term Xerox machine and the purpose for which it is being used, the said item unmistakably falls under entry-12 as a duplicating machine and not under the term 'machinery' mentioned in the entry-83 of the First Schedule.
15. As observed earlier, we are in agreement with the finding of the Tribunal that the Xerox machine is nothing but a duplicating machine, where it is being used for obtaining copies of the original. There is no ambiguity and the Xerox machine would be considered as a duplicating machine only, falling under entry-12 of the First Schedule. Even assuming that the same would fall under entry-83 also treating it as a machine, still entry-12 being a special entry, it prevails over the general entry i.e., entry-83. Therefore, in any view of the matter, we do not find that there is any merit in the contention advanced by the counsel for the dealer.
16. Under the above circumstances, we hold that the Xerox machine is to be treated as a duplicating machine falling under entry-12 of the First Schedule to the APGST Act. We, therefore, uphold the order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal.
17. The tax revision case is accordingly dismissed. No costs.