ORDER
V.V.S. Rao, J.
1. There are 192 petitioners in this writ petition. They filed the writ petition seeking a writ of mandamus declaring the action of the Sub-Collector, Vijayawada (first respondent), Mandal Revenue Officer (MRO), Vijayawada (second respondent) and Village Administrative Officer, Bhavanipuram, Vijayawada, in seeking to dispossess them from their lands admeasuring Acs.8.92 cents in R.S.No. 17/5, 24/4, 26/2, 34/1, 35/1, 36/1, 37/1, 38/1 and 39/1 of Bhavanipuram village, Vijayawada, hereafter called the petition schedule land, contrary to the observations made by this Court that the petitioners are not bound by the judgment in LG.O.P. No. 335 of 1983, as illegal and contrary to law. They also seek further orders as the Court deems fit.
2. In the affidavit filed by the first petitioner on behalf of other petitioners, it is stated as follows. Respondents 4 to 11 herein filed LG.O.P.No. 335 of 1983 against third parties praying the Special Tribunal constituted under the A. P. Land Grabbing (Protection) Act, 1982 (hereafter called 'the Act') seeking eviction of those persons from the petition schedule land on the ground that they are land grabbers. The Special Tribunal passed an order in favour of respondents 4 to 11. The same was sought to be executed by evicting the petitioners. They approached this Court by filing W.P.No. 3486 of 2000 questioning the judgment and decree in LG.O.P.No. 335 of 1983. While dismissing the writ petition, this Court observed that the judgment in LGOP will not bind the petitioners. They were given liberty to approach the civil Court. The petitioners filed a civil suit as in forma pauperis. They allege that the suit is pending registration before the Court of the II Additional District Judge, Vijayawada, On 22-1-2003, it is alleged, respondents 1 to 3 came to the site along with bulldozers so as to forcibly dispossess the petitioners in execution of the decree passed by the learned Tribunal in the LGOP. The petitioners contend that the action of respondents 1 to 3 in evicting them pursuant to such decree is illegal and contrary to the observations made by this Court and that it violates fundamental right of the petitioners to live in a dignified manner as guaranteed under the Constitution of India besides violating Articles 14 and 300A of the Constitution of India. Therefore, they filed the writ petition.
3. Respondents 1 to 3 as well as respondents 4 and 8 to 11 have filed separate counter affidavits. In the counter-affidavit filed by the MRO on behalf of respondents 1 to 3, it is stated that Haji Abdul Rehman Saheb and eight others filed LGOP No. 335 of 1983 against New Joji Labour Society, Bhavanipuram, Vijayawada, represented by its President, The said society and its members, it is alleged in the said O.P., grabbed land in Sy.Nos.17/5. 24/4, 26/2, 34/ 1, 35/1, 36/1, 37/1, 38/1 and 39/1 admeasuring Acs.8.92 cts. situated at Bhavanipuram village. The Court of the I Additional District Judge, Vijayawada passed a decree on 27-10-1986 declaring that the petitioners in the LGOP are the owners of petition schedule lands and that New Joji Labour Society and its members are land grabbers. The said Tribunal also ordered eviction of the members of the petitioner society, immediately and directed to restore petition schedule lands to the claimants in the LGOP. The society filed appeal against the judgment and decree in L.G.O.P.No. 335 of 1983 with a petition to condone delay on the file of the Special Court at Hyderabad. The condone delay petition was dismissed on 28-1-1994 and one Chimata Adinarayana Venkata Reddy and others filed a writ petition being W.P.No. 1685 of 1995 seeking a direction to the officials to deliver possession of the land. This Court dismissed the writ petition directing the petitioners to approach appropriate forum. In the meanwhile, Haji Mohammed Kareemulla filed W.P.No. 25614 of 1999 seeking a direction to the Revenue officials to implement the judgment and decree in L.G.O.P.No. 335 of 1983. A Division Bench of this Court disposed of the writ petition on 18-7-2000 directing the Revenue officials to deliver actual, physical and vacant possession of the petition schedule property in the LGOP subject to the claimants providing necessary paraphernalia and also depositing an amount of Rs. 25,000/- with the Revenue officials. The petitioners' herein (192 persons) filed W.P. No. 3486 of 2000 questioning the judgment and decree in LGOP No. 335 of 1983. By an order dated 16-12-2000, this Court dismissed the writ petition giving liberty to the petitioners to work out their remedies in a civil Court. This Court also observed that the judgment in LGOP will not bind the petitioners. The petitioners filed O.S.No. 15 of 2001 on the file of the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Vijayawada for perpetual injunction. The said Court granted interim order in the suit. One Chaitanya Samkshema Sangham filed a writ petition being W.P.No. 8724 of 2001 seeking a writ of mandamus to declare the proceedings dated 9-3-2001 issued in From No. 5 by the Sub-Collector, Vijayawada authorising the MRO (second respondent) to take possession of the land and deliver the same to the claimants in LGOP. The members of the petitioner Sangham did not press the writ petition and the same was dismissed as withdrawn at the admission stage on 27-4-2001. However, the said Sangham again filed W.P. No. 10362 of 2001 seeking a declaration that the provisions of the Act are void and illegal and a further direction that the proceedings dated 9-3-2001 in Form No.5 are illegal. The writ petition was dismissed by this Court on 7-10-2002.
4. In the counter-affidavit of respondents 1 to 3, it is further stated that one Vakam Parvathi and others filed W.P.No. 1412 of 2003 seeking a declaration that the action of the Revenue officials in dispossessing them from the houses in their occupation is illegal. The writ petition was also dismissed on 18-2-2003. In view of these proceedings, this writ petition is not maintainable. Respondents are taking steps for evicting the petitioners from the petition schedule land as per law and, therefore, the writ petition does not merit any consideration.
5. Respondents 4 and 8 to 11 also filed a lengthy counter affidavit narrating the history of the litigation. A brief reference is only necessary to the same. It is their case that one Mahboob Ali Baig Saheb of Vijayawada is the owner of the land admeasuring Acs.8.92 cents in D.Nos.35/1, 36/1, 37/1, 38/1 and 391 situated at Bhavanipuram, Vijaywada. He had purchased the land from Chinta Purnachandra Rao under a registered sale deed dated 7-11-1940 Mahboob Ali Baig Saheb sold property to the grand father of the fourth respondent under a registered sale deed dated 11-1-1943 and since then till his death in 1962, Abdul Kareem (grand father of fourth respondent) was in possession. The family partition took place on 21-9-1968. An extent of Acs.2.50 cents was allotted to Haji Abdul Rehman saheb, He also obtained a Ryotwari passbook from the Revenue Department. Under a gift deed, Haji Abdul Rehman gave the property to respondents 8 to 11 and they were in possession of the property. The members of New Joji Labour Society, New Joji Nagar trespassed into the lands and put up huts. Proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 were initiated in M.C. No. 61 of 1981 by the Taluk Magistrate, Vijayawada. As per the orders of the said Magistrate, dated 25-6-1981, the huts put up by the members of the society were removed on 2-6-1981. In spite of the same on 15-8-1981, Burra Mariamma and Srisetty Arjun Rao calling themselves as President and Secretary of the society respectively along with other members of the society trespassed into the remaining land and erected huts thereon. Again, a criminal case being C.C. No. 282 of 1981 was filed before the Court of the IV Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Vijayawada which ended in acquittal. Again, Burra Maraiamma and Srisetty Arjun Rao trespassed on to the land on 4-3-1983. The respondents, therefore, filed a case being C.C. No. 60 of 1983 before the learned Magistrate.
6. Respondents 4 and 8 to 11, after coming to know that no purpose would be served by evicting the hut dwellers, along with their father filed LG.O.P. No. 335 of 1983 before the Special Tribunal which passed a judgment on 27-10-1986 in favour of the respondents. When the LGOP was initially filed before the I Additional District Judge, Machilipatnam, and was subsequently transferred to the I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Machiliptanam, the society represented by its President, B. Hariprasad, and Secretary, Arjun Rao, filed a revision petition being C.R.P. No. 115 of 1981 under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, before this Court, contending that the District Judge is designated as Special Tribunal is persona designata and, therefore, the Additional District Judge has no jurisdiction to dispose of the LGOP. The contention was rejected and CRP was dismissed on 17-12-1991. It was also observed that all the persons who were in occupation of a portion of the respondents' land are bound by the judgment and decree in LGOP though they are not parties to the same. After obtaining the judgment and decree before the Special Tribunal, respondents 4 and 8 to 11 moved the Revenue officials for delivering possession of the land by removing the alleged constructions. As no action was taken, the respondents filed W.P. No. 25674 of 1999 seeking a direction to the Revenue officials to deliver possession of the land. The same was disposed of on 18-7-2000 giving appropriate directions. The respondents were directed to deposit an amount of Rs. 25,000/- with the Sub-Collector, Vijayawada and also provide necessary equipment. The respondents complied with the directions issued by this Court.
7. In the counter affidavit, respondents 4 and 8 to 11 further stated that when the MRO initiated steps to deliver possession of the land to the respondents by removing the alleged constructions. One Mullapudi Satyam and 191 others filed W.P. No. 3486 of 2000. The writ petition was disposed of by the Division Bench on 6-12-2000 giving liberty to the petitioners to approach the civil Court by way of suit for declaration, injunction or damages. Again, Chaitanya Samkshema Sangham filed W.P. No. 8724 of 2001 challenging the proceedings of the Sub-Collector dated 9-3-2001 authorising MRO to take possession of the land and deliver the same to them. However, the writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn on 27-4-2001.
8. The writ petitioners filed O.S. No. 15 of 2001 on the file of the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Vijaywada, for grant of permanent injunction. The said suit was dismissed on 3-6-2002 for default and non-prosecution. Again, Chaitanya Samkshema Sangham filed W.P.No. 10362 of 2001 challenging the proceedings of the Special Tribunal. The Sangham also filed WPMP No. 12938 of 2001 seeking interim direction to the Revenue officials for taking possession of the land from the petitioner society. Though an interim injunction was issued in favour of the members of the petitioner society, the Division Bench dismissed the writ petition on 7-10-2002 placing reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sarguja Transport Service v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, M.P., Gwalior, : [1987]1SCR200 . Ettella Durga Rao, who filed the said writ petition representing Chaitanya Samkshema Sangham as himself a member of the New Joji Labour Society. Further, all the members of New Joji Labour Society were shown as encroachers in the list filed in LGOP No. 335 of 1983 filed by the first respondent therein, which was marked as Ex.C4. The son and wife of the said Durga Rao are petitioners 79 and 143 in this writ petition. The first petitioner, Mullapudi Satyam, who is shown as a coolie was in fact working as an employee of Krishna District Milk Producers Co-operative Union Ltd. The petitioners suppressed several facts before the Division Bench which disposed of W.P.No. 3486 of 2000. The order passed in the earlier proceedings before this Court operate as resjudicata against the petitioners. Some of the petitioners representing as members of New Joji Labour Society were respondents in LGOP. They did not oppose the LGOP and they also abandoned the suit in O.S.No. 15 of 2001 which was filed pursuant to the observations made by this Court in W.P.No. 3486 of 2000. The writ petition is not bona fide and it is mainly intended to protract illegal occupation of the land belonging to respondents 4 and 8 to 11.
9. It is also revealed in the counter affidavit of respondents 4 and 8 to 11 that after the dismissal of the suit being O.S. No. 15 of 2001 on the file of the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Vijayawada for default, the petitioners filed an O.P. on the file of the n Additional District Judge, Vijayawada seeking leave of the Court to sue as in forma pauperis. The said Court by order dated 20-1-2003 rejected O.P. GL.No. 734 of 2002. The petitioners deliberately suppressed this fact and filed the writ petition on 23-1-2003. The petitioners did not file any revision or appeal against the order of the learned I Additional District Judge rejecting the O.P. Therefore, there is no prohibition for respondents 1 to 3 to take possession of the land from the petitioners and deliver it to respondents 4 and 8 to 11. The petitioners exhausted all the remedies and also filed various cases by the name of the benami society. They deliberately filed the writ petition suppressing various facts.
10. The petitioners have not filed reply affidavit denying the allegations. In view of the unrebutted averments made in the counter affidavit of respondents 1 to 3 on one hand and counter affidavit filed by respondents 4 and 8 to 11 on the other hand, this Court can draw inference that there is no dispute as to the. Facts of the case. Further, as the chronology of events revealed in the counter affidavit is well supported by various documents, the petitioners could not have denied the same. Be that as it is, learned Counsel for the petitioners, Sri A. Ramanarayana only submits that in view of the observations made by the Division Bench in the order in W.P.No. 3486 of 2000 to the effect that the judgment and decree in LGOP does not bind the petitioners, pursuant to the same, the petitioners cannot be evicted from the land/huts.
11. Placing reliance on various facts and circumstances, learned Government Pleader for Revenue and learned Counsel for respondents 4 and 8 to 11 refute these contentions and submit that the judgment and decree in LGOP is binding on the petitioners and that the judgment of this Court in W.P. No. 3486 of 2000 does not in any manner prevent respondents 1 to 3 from evicting the petitioners and handing over possession of the land to respondents 4 and 8 to 11.
12. The admitted facts and submissions made by the learned Counsel for the petitioners and the learned Counsel for respondents will give rise to two questions for consideration. The first question is whether the judgment and decree passed by the Special Tribunal under the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 is binding on the petitioners? The second question would be whether the judgment and order of this Court in W.P.No. 3486 of 2000 is a bar for respondents 1 to 3 to enforce and execute the judgment and decree passed by the Special Tribunal in LG.O.P.No. 335 of 1983?
First Question
13. The A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 is mainly intended to prohibit the activity of land grabbing in the State of Andhra Pradesh which is adversely affecting the public order by reason of some unlawful activities of land grabbers. Section 2(e) defines-'land grabbing' as to mean every activity and grabbing of any land whether belonging to the Government, local authority or religious institution, wakf or any other private person by a person or group of persons without any lawful entitlement and with a view to illegally entering into possession of the land or entering into or create illegal tenancy or lease and licence in respect of such land. The expression 'land grabbing' {as defined in Section 2(e)} shall have to be construed as including every activity of land grabbing, selling, leasing or granting licence in respect of the land which was grabbed or inducting others in possession in respect of the grabbed land.
14. Section 2(d) defines the term 'land grabber' as a person or group of persons who commit land grabbing and a person who finances such land grabbing are land grabbers. The successors in interest, abettors and all persons claiming through a land grabber are also land grabbers. The intention of the legislation in defining Section 2(d) and Section 2(e) in a broadest language possible is again reflected in Sub-section (4) of Section 7-A as well as, Sub-section (6) of Section 8 of the Act. The said sub-section reads as under:
7-A(4) Every finding of the Special Tribunal with regard to any alleged act of land grabbing shall be conclusive proof of the fact of land grabbing, and of the persons who committed such land grabbing and every judgment of the Special Tribunal with regard to the determination of the title and ownership to, or lawful possession of, any land grabbed shall be binding on all persons having interest in such land.
15. A plain reading of the above sub-section would show that a finding of the Special Tribunal with regard to any act of land grabbing shall be conclusive proof of the fact of land grabbing. Such finding shall be binding on the persons who committed such land grabbing and every judgment of the Special Tribunal with regard to determination of the title and ownership or lawful possession of any land grabbed shall be binding on all the persons having interest in such land.
16. Learned Counsel for the petitioners, Sri A. Ramnarayana, brought to the notice of this Court Sub-section (6) of Section 8 of the ULC Act (which is in pari materia with Sub-section (4) of Section 7A) in support of the submission that the provision must be given a restricted meaning. He would submit that before it was amended by the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Amendment Act, 1987, it contained the words ' whether or not such persons are parties before the civil Court', but by Amendment Act No. 16 of 1987 those words/phrases were omitted from Sub-section (6) of Section 8 and therefore, the learned Counsel would urge that the judgment and decree in L.G.O.P. No. 335 of 1983 is not binding on the petitioners. Sub-section (6) of Section 8 of the ULC Act before it was amended by Act No. 16 of 1987 reads as under :
8(6) Every finding of the Special Court with regard to any alleged act of land grabbing shall be conclusive proof of the fact of land grabbing and of the persons who commit such land grabbing, and every judgment of the Special Court with regard to determination of title and ownership to, or lawful possession of, any land grabbed shall be binding on all the persons having interest in such land whether or not such persons are parties before the civil Court.
17. By Act No. 16 of 1987 certain words which are shown in italics as above were omitted in Sub-section (6) of Section 8. After amendment it reads as under.
8(6) Every finding of the Special Court with regard to any alleged act of land grabbing shall be conclusive proof of the fact of ' land grabbing and of the persons who commit such land grabbing, and every judgment of the Special Court with regard to determination of title and ownership to, or lawful possession of, any land grabbed shall be binding on all the persons having interest in such land.
18. As seen, Sub-section (4) of Section 7A does not contain the words 'whether or not such persons are parties before the civil Court (Special Tribunal)'. This could be one reason for the Legislature to omit those words from Sub-section (6) of Section 8 to avoid any contusion. The procedure prescribed under Section 8 is equally applicable to the Special Tribunal. However, Section 7A was inserted by Act No. 16 of 1997. While so doing, in Sub-section (4) of Section 7 A, the words 'whether or not such persons are parties before the Special Court' were not made part of Sub-section (4) of Section 7A. For this reason, the same words were omitted from Sub-section (6) of Section 8 by Act No. 16 of 1987. In any view of the matter, the omission of those words does not make any difference in the plain meaning of Sub-section (6) of Section 8.
19. It is settled rule of interpretation that when the plain meaning is clear, whatever be the hardship caused, the Court should give literal interpretation unless it results in absurdity. In this connection, a reference may be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kanai Lal v. Paramnidhi, : [1958]1SCR360 . In the said judgment, the submission before the Supreme Court was that the provisions of a welfare legislation should receive a beneficent construction from the Courts. Dealing with the said submission, the Supreme Court observed as under:..................it must always be borne in mind that the first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the Legislature must be found in the words used by the Legislature itself. If the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the Courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act......... ..........The words used in the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can legitimately arise. When the material words are capable of two constructions, one of which is likely to defeat or impair the policy of the Act whilst the other construction is likely to assist the achievement of the said policy, then the Courts would prefer to adopt the latter construction.
As already noticed. Section 7A(4) and Section 8(6) of the ULC Act only mean that whether persons are parties before the Special Court or Special Tribunal. When once the Special Tribunal or Special Court determines the title or ownership of the land grabbed, the same is binding on all the persons claiming interest in such land. In pith and substance, the enactment is to protect the government land as well as private land from being grabbed and give relief to real owners. When once the land is declared as grabbed by the non-owners, all the persons claiming through such non-owners are bound by the determination given by the Special Tribunal/Special Court. As noticed hereinabove, New Joji Labour Society filed CRP No. 15 of 1997 challenging the judgment and decree of the Court of the n Additional District Judge in LGOP No. 35 of 1983, The case was decided by the Division Bench and was reported as New Joji Labour Society v. Haji Abdul Rahaman Saheb, : 1992(1)ALT112 (DB). The Division Bench inter alia considered the question whether the order passed by the learned District Judge is valid as all encroachers are not parties to the proceedings. Answering the question, the Division Bench laid down as under:.............From the aims and objects of the Act it is evident that the activity of land grabbing which is sought to be prohibited by the Act is not only by the individual, but also by the societies whether incorporated or not. The individuals who encroach and remain on the land are not constant but variables. They change from time to time. So, it is very difficult for any person or authority to implead them eo nominee. It is for this reason Sub-section (6) of Section 8 of the Act provides that finding of the Special Court with regard to any alleged act of land grabbing shall be conclusive proof of the fact of land grabbing and of the persons who committed such land grabbing and every judgment of the Special Court with regard to the determination of title and ownership to, or lawful possession of, any land grabbed shall be binding on all persons having interest in such land, whether or not, such persons are parties before the Special Court. From the judgment under revision it is clear that the President and Secretary of the society have been instrumental in grabbing the lands in question and those who are in possession of the land grabbed by the society and its members. Therefore, the judgment is binding on all those who have occupied the land grabbed. In view of this position, the contention that the judgment under revision is not executable against those who are in possession of the land grabbed, is untenable.
Therefore, the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the judgment and decree in the LGOP are not binding on the petitioners cannot be countenanced.
20. In view of the clear intention of the legislation in Sub-section (4) of Section 7A, it must be held that the petitioners who have admittedly raised huts and who are in occupation of the petition schedule land are bound by the determination of the Special Tribunal and there would not be any hurdle for respondents 1 to 3 from evicting the petitioners from the land. As per Rule 15 of the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Rules, 1988, when once the Special Tribunal communicates its final decision or order to the affected party and the Revenue Divisional Officer (Sub-Collector), the latter has to give effect to the decision of the Tribunal in accordance with the said Rule. If the relief is granted to the petitioners as prayed, the same would amount to issuing a mandamus contrary to law. It will also amount to issuing a mandamus to the respondents to ignore law. If any authority is required, a reference may be made to the judgments of the Supreme Court in Brij Mohan Parihar v. M.P.S.R.T.C., : [1987]1SCR369 , and LIC of India v. Asha Ramachandra Ambedkar, : (1994)IILLJ173SC .
21. Therefore, point No. 1 is answered against the petitioners and in favour of the respondents.
Second Question
22. Learned Counsel for the petitioners placed strong reliance on the observations made by this Court in W.P. No. 3486 of 2000 in support of the contention that the judgment and decree in L.G.O.P. No. 335 of 1983 is not binding on the petitioners and, therefore, the same cannot be executed. This is refuted by the learned Counsel for the respondents who contend that the petitioners have abandoned their challenge to the judgment in LGOP and the same having become final by reason of Sub-section (4) of Section 7A, the decree of the Special Tribunal is binding on them. They also placed reliance on the observations made by the Division Bench in the order in W.P. No. 10362 of 2001, dated 7-10-2002 in support of the said contention.
23. The petitioners herein filed W.P. No. 3486 of 2000 challenging Sub-section (6) of Section 8 of the Act as amended by Act No. 16 of 1987 as arbitrary and unconstitutional being violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. As a consequential direction they also sought the relief to set aside the judgment in LGOP No. 335 of 1983. This Court dismissed the writ petition. While dismissing the writ petition, the Division Bench observed as under:............The claim of the petitioners as set out in the present writ petition is that they are entitled to be in possession of the subject property covered by the judgment. We decline to entertain this writ petition and take up adjudication of the claim put forth by the petitioners touching upon the title to the property. Suffice it to state that since the petitioners are not parties to the judgment in LG.O.P. No. 335 of 1983 dated 27-10-1986, it will not bind the petitioners, and if the petitioners are entitled to the property covered by the judgment and be in possession of the same, the petitioners can work out the legal remedies by way of private law review and seek declaration, injunction or damages as the case may be to suit their grievances. It is trite to state that in order to grant the relief to the petitioners, the Court should necessarily go into the realm of facts and factum of possession. In that view of the matter, we decline to entertain the writ petition.
24. In W.P. No. 10362 of 2001 filed by Chaitanya Samkshema Sangham, it was prayed to declare the provisions of the Act as void and illegal and to declare the proceedings of the Sub-Collector, Vijayawada in directing the MRO to take possession of the land as void and non-est, The Division Bench referred to the prayer made in W.P. No. 3486 of 2000 and the prayer in W.P. No. 8724 of 2001 and referring to the orders passed therein, came to the conclusion that the challenge to the provisions of the Act as well as the validity of the judgment and decree in LGOP No. 335 of 1985 were abandoned. The relevant observations are as under;..............It is pertinent to notice that in W.P. No. 3486 of 2000, the members of the petitioner-Sangham questioned validity of the judgment and decree made in LG.O.P.No. 335 of 1983 dated 27-10-1986, whereas in W.P. No. 8724 of 2001, the petitioners have not questioned validity of the judgment and decree passed in the above L.G.O.P., but they only questioned the validity of the proceedings of the Sub-Collector, Vijayawada dated 9-3-2001 directing the Mandal Revenue Officer, Vijayawada to take possession of the subject land from the members of the petitioner-Sangham and deliver the same to the owners. It is quite apparent from the order made by this Court on 6-12-2000 in W.P. No. 3486 of 2000 that the constitutionality of Section 8(6) of the Act was abandoned by the petitioners. Be that as it may, the order made by this Court in the above writ petition is allowed to become final. Similarly, the challenge to the judgment and decree in LG.O.P. No. 335 of 1983 dated 27-10-1986 was abandoned and that order of the Court was also allowed to become final. Further, in W.P. No. 8724 of 2001, though the petitioner assailed the validity of the proceedings of the Sub-Collector, Vijayawada dated 9-3-2001, that challenge was abandoned and the writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn. The resultant position is that the challenge to the validity of the judgment and decree in LG.O.P. No. 335 of 1983 dated 27-10-1986 in W.P. No. 3486 of 2000 and the challenge to the validity of the order of the Sub-Collector, Vijayawada dated 9-3-2001 in W.P. No. 8724 of 2001 were abandoned without reserving liberty to institute fresh writ petition on the same cause of action....................
25. In view of the observations made by the Division Bench in W.P. No. 10362 of 2001, it must be held that the observations made in W.P. No. 3486 of 2000 are not of any assistance to the petitioners. As held by the Division Bench of this Court on two occasions, the judgment and decree in LGOP is unassailable as challenge to the same was abandoned. Further, after giving anxious consideration, I am not able to agree with the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the judgment of the Special Tribunal cannot be executed against the petitioners. The reasons are as follows.
26. Sub-section (4) of Section 7A is in two parts. Every finding of the Special Tribunal with regard to the act of land grabbing shall be conclusive proof of the, fact of land grabbing. It is also conclusive proof as to the persons who committed such land grabbing. The second part is that every judgment of the Special Tribunal regarding title and ownership of any land grabbed shall be binding on all persons having interest in such land. Therefore, when this Court made observations to the effect that the judgment in LGOP will not bind the petitioners, it only means that the finding with regard to the act of land grabbing which would attract penal consequences as per the provisions of the said Act is left open giving liberty to the petitioners to seek legal remedies by way of private law remedy seeking declaration and damages. By reason of the second part of Sub-section (4) of Section 7A of the Act, the determination by the Special Tribunal as to title and ownership is binding on all the persons having interest in such land. The petitioners claim interest in the land and, therefore, that is binding on the petitioners as well.
27. Under Rule 15 of the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Rules, when a direction is issued by the RDO in Form No. 5 to any Revenue officer not lesser than the rank of Revenue Inspector, possession of the land grabbed has to be taken and delivered to the person to whom it is to be given as per the orders of the Special Tribunal. In case, the persons in possession of the grabbed land failed to deliver possession voluntarily to the Revenue officer or to the official deputed by the RDO, it will be open to the officer to take possession on behalf of the RDO after removing any obstruction or unauthorized occupants by taking police assistance. It only means that every person in occupation of the land grabbed in law is liable to deliver possession. When this Court dismissed W.P. No. 3486 of 2000, the petitioners were only given liberty to seek appropriate declaration from the civil Court which means that the provisions of Sub-section (4) of Section 7-A of the Act were not even brought to the notice of this Court. In any event, by reason of the observations made by the Division Bench in W.P. No. 10362 of 2001, the petitioners cannot get any enforceable right.
28. Before parting with this case, I may also observe that the petitioners herein are admittedly members of New Joji Labour Society and have been trying to continue in possession of the land grabbed by filing case after case. Their challenge to the provisions of the Act was rejected. Their attempts to question the judgment and decree of the Special Tribunal in LGOP was unsuccessful. This Court gave them liberty to approach the civil Court. They approached the civil Court and abandoned their suit claim in O.S. No. 15 of 1981 on the file of the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Vijayawada. Again they filed O.P.GLR No. 123 of 2002 under Order 32, Rules 1 and 2 before the Court of the Additional District Judge, Vijayawada. The same was rejected on 21-1-2003. Suppressing the fact, the writ petition was filed on 23-1-2003 and interim order was obtained. The affidavit accompanying the writ petition also suppressed the various facts and events in the litigation though they were aware of all this. The petitioners are encroachers of the land which is declared to be grabbed land and the title and ownership of respondents 4 and 8 to 11 was upheld, The petitioners have no manner of right that can be enforced in these proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Further, the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution is a discretionary remedy. It is well settled that when a person approaches this Court suppressing the facts or attempts to mislead the Court, such person would not be entitled to any relief in exercise of discretion by this Court. These principles are applicable to this case that the petitioners are not entitled for any relief.
29. In the result, for the above reasons, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. The interim order stands vacated and respondents 1 to 3 shall forthwith evict the petitioners and deliver possession to respondents 4 and 8 to 11 and others who are entitled for the benefit under the judgment and decree in LG.O.P. No. 335 of 1983 dated 27-104986. Though this Court desires to impose exemplary costs, having regard to the fact that most of the petitioners are poor persons living in huts in the encroached land, this Court refrains from imposing any exemplary costs.