M.H.S. Ansari, J.
1. The above Letters Patent Appeal has been filed-by the defendants, aggrieved against the judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court, in A.S.No. 1567 of 1985 dated 14-8-1995, reversing the judgment and decree dated 31-12-1984 in O.S. No. 67 of 1974 on the file of the Sub-Judge at Tanuku and decreeing the suit for specific performance filed by the Respondent No. 1 herein - Plaintiff.
2. Respondent No. 1 herein filed the suit for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 1-5-1974 (Ex.A-1). The said agreement (Ex. A-l) is executed by defendant No. 1 who is the kartha of the joint family consisting of himself and his sons - defendants 2 to 8; Defendant No. 2 was the only major son and has executed Ex.A-1 along with his father. The property to be conveyed by the said agreement is an agricultural land of an extent of Ac. 2.27 cts (9156 Sq. metres) situated in Khandavali village, Tanuku Taluk, West Godavari District. The total sale consideration stipulated under Ex.A-1 is Rs. 20,500/- and an amount of Rs. 2,000/- was paid immediately at the time of the agreement by way of earnest money. It was stipulated that a further amount of Rs. 8,000/- is to be paid by the purchaser on or before 15-6-1974 and the remaining balance of Rs. 10,500/- was to be paid by 15-7-1974 on which day the sale deed was to be executed and registered in favour of the plaintiff - purchaser and at her expense. The purchaser-plaintiff paid Rs. 14,000/- to the defendants, firstly Rs. 2,000/-and thereafter Rs. 4,000/- each on three occasions i.e., on 20-6-1974,17-7-1974 and 18-7-1974 as is evidenced by Ex. A-1 and the endorsements made thereon vide Exs. A-3, A-4 and A-5. The agreement Ex. A-1 recites that the debts were incurred for family necessity by defendant No. 1 and the payments sought for under the agreement were for discharging the debts of the family. Defendant No. 9 (Respondent No. 2 herein) was the tenant of the suit schedule property and as per directions of defendants 1 and 2, he handed over the property to the plaintiff in view of the agreement to sell Ex.A-1 and executed one year Kadapa (lease) in favour of the purchaser - plaintiff under Ex.A-2 and thereby agreed to give 32 bags of paddy by way of rent to the purchaser-plaintiff. The plaintiff thus claimed to have been put in possession of the suit schedule property by attornment of tenancy. The defendants 1 and 2 tried to dispose of the property to some other persons and a notice was issued by the plaintiff on 29-8-1974 (Ex.B-1) calling upon the defendants to execute a registered sale deed by accepting remaining consideration. Reply notice was issued by the defendants and thereafter the suit was filed. The trial Court dismissed the suit holding that the signatures of D-l and D-2 were obtained upon blank papers by PW-3, by misrepresentation and that the plaintiff is not entitled for grant of the relief of specific performance but decreed the suit against D-l and D-2 for refund of the sum of Rs. 14,000/- paid pursuant to Ex.A-1 with interest at 12% per annum
3. Aggrieved against the said judgment and decree, the unsuccessful plaintiff preferred an appeal which was disposed of by a learned Single Judge of this Court setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court and decreeing the suit of the plaintiff for specific performance of the agreement. It is against this judgment that the defendants 1 to 8 have filed the above Letters Patent Appeal.
4. Sri Ramakrishna Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants, assailing the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge, contended that the suit agreement Ex.A-1 is vitiated by fraud and that there was no legal necessity to sell the joint family property for discharging the debts and that the plaintiff is not entitled for a decree for specific performance of the agreement as the interest of the minor coparceners are affected and that the proposed sale under Ex.A-1 is for inadequate consideration, and therefore does not bind the appellants (defendants 1 to 8 ) in general and minor coparceners, appellants- defendants 3 to 8 in particular.
5. It was the specific case set up by the appellants - defendants 1 and 2 that the suit agreement has been brought into existance, with the connivance and collusion of the husband of the plaintiff and one Venkata Raju-P.W.3. It is stated in the written statement of defendant No. 1 that to enable the said Venkata Raju (FW3) to sell the property, the defendants signed on blank paper. It is further stated that the said Venkata Raju-PW3 who is the brother-in-law of the 1st defendant represented that he would sell the property at not less than Rs. 15,000/- per acre, the defendant No. 1 on the faith of representation signed on blank stamp papers. The defendant came to know that the sale is effected at Rs. 9,000/- per acre when the agreement was brought by Venkata Raju for taking the signature of the defendant No. 1 for part payments made.
6. In his deposition defendant No. 1 (DW-1) stated that his signatures were obtained on blank papers. In cross-examination, however, it was admitted by defendant No. 1 (DW-1) as under :
'...When I signed in Ex. A-1 I know that it was written for Rs. 9,000/- per acre. Ex.A-1 was read over to me and D.2. Then I asked P.W.3 why it was written as Rs. 9,000/- when he promised me to sell at Rs. 15,000/-. And at that time nobody was present. Ex.A-1 was read over to me at my house and my wife was present and my mother also present but she cannot see and hear. P.W.3 said that he will pay the balance at the time of registration, and it was written so to avoid stamp duty.'
7. It was further deposed by defendant No. 1 in cross-examination as under:
'...The dispute is with regard to the quantum of payment and not to the genuineness of the agreement Ex.A-1.'
The learned single Judge, in the light of the above evidence held that the contention of defendants 1 and 2 that the document (Ex.A-1) was obtained by fraud or by misrepresentation was not established and that the learned Trial Judge committed patent error in holding otherwise.
8. We have no reason to differ with the said conclusion arrived at by the learned Single Judge.
9. Next, it was contended that there was no legal necessity to sell the property for discharging the alleged debts and that the debts were small in amount and that in any event the agreement cannot be enforced against the minor coparceners-appellants-defendants 3 to 8.
10. The suit property was the self acquired property of the father of defendant No. 1 as per deposition of D.W.1 himself and that after his death the property devolved on defendant No. 1 and his mother who died during the pendency of the suit in equal shares. Insofar as the defendants 2 to 8 are concerned, they have a share in half the property inherited by defendant No. 1 - their father which could he termed as joint family property vis-a-vis, the entire suit property. The mother of defendant No. 1 had become the owner of the other half by succession and on her death, the said half share devolved upon defendant No. 1 alone. Ex.A-1, it must be remembered, has been executed by defendant No. 1 and his major son defendant No. 2. The agreement Ex.A-1 recites the debts and in his evidence, defendant No. 1 (D.W.1) admitted that there were debts prior to Ex.A-1. Defendant No. 1 sold properties covered under the original of Exs.A-15 and A-16 respectively dated 16-6-1978 and 25-9-1978. A debt of Rs. 40,000/- is mentioned in Exs.A-15 and A-16. More significantly, it has been deposed by Defendant No. 1 as follows :
'In case the Court decrees for the return of amount received by me under Ex.A-1, I have to sell away the property of the family and pay it off. There is no other way for me. I sold the property under Ex.A-1 only to discharge the debts'.
From the above, it is evident that the family was indebted and in fact certain properties under Exs.A-15 and A-16 which are subsequent to Ex.A-1 were sold by defendant No. 1. In the instant case, the requirement as to the existence of debt and necessity for sale of the property for the benefit of the family has been established. The only adult member-defendant No. 2 was not only consulted, but is also a signatory to the said agreement. As already noticed, the share of minor coparceners - defendants 3 to 8 is about 84 cts. out of the total Ae. 2,27 cts. The legal necessity was such that even for return of the earnest money received by Defendant No. 1, he would have to sell away the property of the family as there was no other way for him, as deposed by him. We therefore find no reason to interfere with the findings of the learned single Judge that the transaction was for legal necessity and for the benefit of the family, and therefore, the minor defendants are bound by the said agreement as well.
11. Sri Ramakrishna Rao, learned Counsel, contended that even if the agreement is for the benefit of the family and is one supported by legal necessity still it would not bind the minors unless it is found that it was for adequate consideration.
12. No doubt it is the duty of the father or Manager of the joint family to act as a prudent guardian and he should, therefore, while dealing with the joint family properties involving the interest of minors act in a prudent manner. If the property is sold for inadequate consideration, it is liable to be set aside at the instance of other coparceners who are not parties to the said transaction.
13. The question, however, for consideration in the instant case, is whether the property in question was agreed to be sold for inadequate consideration.
14. In this connection, it is relevant to look at the plea taken by the minor coparceners - defendants 3 to 8 who filed the joint written statement represented by their mother in the above suit. The plea as to inadequacy of the sale consideration is not one of the pleas set up by defendants 3 to 8 in their written statement. Also, no issue has been framed by the Trial Court with regard to the inadequacy of the sale consideration specified in Ex.A-1. The evidence of D.W.1 with regard to the sale price mentioned in Ex.A-1 was in relation to the plea of misrepresentation and fraud. The trial Court also considered the market value of the property while considering the aspect relating to misrepresentation pleaded by defendant No. 1 and 2. The trial Court has in so many words stated that the inadequacy of sale consideration is discussed only as a circumstance that the defendants would not have sold the lands for a low price of Rs. 9,000/- per acre when the lands were having a price of Rs. 15,000/- per acre and that was one of the circumstances found by the trial Court to hold that the agreement Ex.A-1 was a suspicious one. The learned Single judge in the first appeal observed that there is no convincing evidence to show that the price of Rs. 9,000/- per acre was really low. The reliance of defendant No. 1 on a small piece of 1 and said to have been purchased by one Reddy Surya Rao at the rate of Rs. 15,000/- per acre/was some time in the year 1976 and that the said land was by the side of irrigation facilities. An agreement said to have been executed for the suit land at the rate of Rs. 14,000/- per acre under Ex.X-1 from defendant No. 1 was disbelieved by the learned single Judge on the testimony of defendant No. 1 himself who admitted that the said Ranga Rao (purchaser) was attending to his affairs. No independent evidence in the form of sale deeds have been placed before Court on behalf of the defendants on this aspect of inadequacy of sale consideration. D.W.7, Assistant, working in the Registrar's office merely deposed about the value of the property entered in the basic value register maintained by the Registrar was more than Rs. 16,000/- in the year 1975. Except his oral testimony as to the value entered in the basic value register, no documentary evidence was placed by D.W.7 to substantiate the same. Neither an extract of the basic value register is produced. Needless to state that the oral testimony of DW-7 unsupported by any other evidence in that behalf coupled with the fact that the basic value register itself is not a statutory register, it has to be held that in the absence of specific pleading as to inadequacy of sale consideration and necessary evidence to substantiate the same, it cannot be said that Ex.A-1 suffers from the vice of inadequacy.
15. It was further contended on behalf of the appellants that the discretionary relief of specific performance should not be granted in the instant case. The genuineness of the agreement Ex.A-1 has been established, payment of substantial sale consideration stands proved and the un-substantiated plea of inadequacy of consideration would not be a ground to refuse the relief of specific performance or for granting the alternate relief of damages. We accordingly reject the said contention.
16. It was contended that defendant No. 1 at the time of execution of the agreement Ex.A-1 had only a half share in the property and therefore specific performance for the whole agreement cannot be granted for want of title in Defendant No. 1. As already noticed, Defendant No. 1 became the owner of the other half share of the property on the death of his mother during the pendency of the suit. In a suit for specific performance filed by the purchaser, the vendor cannot put forward the plea that he had no title or defective title, but if the suit is by the vendor, the purchaser can plead that the vendor had no title or had defective title as a defence. The present suit is one filed by the purchaser and the plea now put forth by the appellant No. 1 as to the defect in his title is unavailable to the appellants and specific performance cannot on that ground be denied.
17. An attempt was also made by the learned Counsel for the appellants that Ex.A-2-Lease (Kadapa) was not valid, and was obtained by misrepresentation. The learned Single Judge rejected the said contention in view of the specific admission of defendant No. 9, (D.W.6) that he (D.W.6) signed Ex.A-2 after knowing the contents of Ex. A-2. The defendant No. 9 was in occupation of the suit land purportedly as a tenant and the attornment of tenancy in favour of the plaintiff or otherwise would not alter the position in law with regard to enforceability of the agreement Ex,A-l.
18. Defendant No. 9-tenant through his Counsel Sri Parabrahma Sastry sought to advance a plea that by an amendment to the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act, 1956, Section 15 confers a right on the tenant to purchase the property. It was pleaded that decree for specific performance if granted would have the effect of defeating the rights of defendant No. 9 - tenant and would be in violation of the statutory provisions contained in Section 15.
19. The aforesaid contention is untenable besides being misconceived. It should be remembered that the amendment to Section 15 by substitution was effected by Andhra Pradesh Amendment Act 39 of 1974 and the said Section itself was brought into operation from 1-7-1980. This particular right of the tenant to purchase the land leased to him was not in existence when the suit agreement Ex.A-1 was executed on 1-5-1974. Even Section 15 does not declare the agreements in contravention of the said provision to be void. The said Section is neither retrospective nor does it stipulate that the existing agreements are covered thereby. Where third party to a contract such as defendant No. 9 is tenant of the land, the utmost he is entitled to ask is for continuation of his rights as lessee. He cannot claim title to the land. Mere possibility of injury to third party's interests would not and cannot disentitle the plaintiff from getting the relief of specific performance. Neither during the pendency of the suit nor after the coming into effect of Section 15 when the defendant No. 9 deposed in Court any plea was advanced as to the option available under Section 15 nor during the pendency of the 1st Appeal. At a belated stage when the above Letters Patent Appeal was taken up for hearing, a petition is filed seeking permission to amend the written statement seeking to avail of the pre-emptive right under Section 15 of the Tenancy Act. In the view that we have taken, as above, the belated attempt on the part of the defendant No. 9 for amending the written statement is not tenable and we accordingly reject the prayer seeking amendment of the written statement and dismiss the C.M.P.No. 2264 of 1997.
20. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has brought to the notice of this Court that during the pendency of the suit an application I.A.No. 1290 of 1974 was filed for appointment of a Receiver and aggrieved against the said order, the defendant No. 9 filed Civil Misc. Appeal No. 312 of 1975 on the file of this Court which was disposed of by orders dated 10-2-1976 setting aside the order of appointment of Receiver with a direction to the 9th defendant to deposit the rents into the lower Court before the end of January of each year commencing from the year 1977. It was further directed that the rents so deposited in the lower Court during the pendency of the suit will be paid ultimately to the successful party. Sri T. Veerabhadraiah, learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 1 submitted that consequent to. the dismissal of the suit by trial Court, the defendant No. 9 stopped depositing the rents into Court. Learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 1 - plaintiff further brought to our notice an order in C.M.P. No. 1300 of 1996 in the above L.P.A. whereby this Court granted interim stay of execution of the decree after the appeal in favour of the plaintiff was allowed by the learned Single Judge, subject to the condition that the defendant No. 9 (Respondent No. 2 in the above LPA) deposits the yearly rents for 1996 and subsequently to the credit of O.S.No. 67 of 1974. It was further observed in the said order that the amounts for the period from 1974 to 1984 lying to the credit of the suit, the plaintiff is entitled to withdraw the same on furnishing the security. The question as to the period between 31-12-1984 (date of dismissal of the suit) and 14-8-1995 when the 1st appeal was allowed, it was observed that, suitable orders would be passed at the time of disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal. Learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 1 seeks appropriate directions with regard to the said amounts.
21. After having considered the rival contentions on this aspect of the matter, we are of the view that it would meet the ends of justice if the amounts lying to the credit of the suit for the period from 1974 to 1984 are directed to be paid to the plaintiff in O.S.No. 67 of 1974 and likewise for the period from 1996 till the sale deed is executed in favour of the plaintiff by the Court below. The above shall be the direction with regard to the rents payable by defendant No. 9. For the period between 31-12-1984 i.e., dismissal of the suit and 14-8-1995, the amounts have been realised by the appellant and as there are no orders passed either by the first appellate Court or in the above Letters Patent Appeal, we see no reason to issue any directions for payment thereof by the appellants to Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff).
22. In the result, the above Letters Patent appeal is dismissed but in the circumstances without costs. The Judgment passed in Appeal Suit No. 1567 of 1985 decreeing the suit for specific performance is hereby affirmed.
23. Accordingly, it is ordered that the defendants shall execute the sale deed in terms of agreement Ex.A-1 within one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment by the trial Court. If the defendants fail to execute the sale deed, the plaintiff is entitled to get executed the same through Court as per law. The defendants 1 to 8 shall be entitled to withdraw the balance sale consideration lying to the credit of the suit. The plaintiff shall be entitled to withdraw the rents lying in deposit to the credit of the suit, as directed above. The plaintiff, however, shall be entitled to symbolic possession of the property and defendant No. 9 shall be directed to attorn the tenancy and accept the plaintiff as owner of the suit property and to pay the rents at the agreed rent as per Ex.A-2.