ORDER
Dubagunta Subrahmanyam, J.
1. CRP 2437 of 1997 is filed by the defendants against the judgment and decree dated 24th April 1997 in O.S. No. 159 of 1992 on the file of the Junior Civil Judge, Nirmal. C.R.P. 2232 of 1999 is filed by the defendants against the order dated 30th April 1999, in T.A. 247 of 1999 in O.S. No. 11 of 1998 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Nirmal.
2. As the parties and the property involved in both the C.R.Ps. are common,these two civil revision petitions are being disposed of by a common order. The necessary facts for the disposal of these two revision petitions are as follows:
3. The suit in OS 159 of 1992 was filed under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. Under the letter Ex.A1 dated 7-1-1992, the defendants in the suit requested the plaintiffs to permit them to hold 'Yagna' in the plaint schedule premises and the plaintiffs passed a resolution Ex.A-2 dated 20-1-1992 permitting the defendants to conduct Yagna in the plaint schedule premises. The plaintiffs delivered possession of plaint schedule property to the defendants on 3-2-1992. As per the agreement, the defendants have to handover possession of plaint schedule premises to the plaintiffs by 17-2-1992. A school was being run in the plaint schedule premises. Alleging that the defendants failed to handover possession to the plaintiffs by 17-2-1992 and also alleging that the defendants have high-handedly closed the gate of the premises and locked it, thus preventing the plaintiffs from entering into the plaint schedule property, the plaintiffs filed the suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act seeking recovery of the plaint schedule property from the defendants. In addition to the recovery of possession, the plaintiffs sought for two other reliefs, namely, (i) mandatory injunction to direct the defendants to break open the locks of the gate of the plaint schedule property and (ii) permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property by the plaintiffs. The defendants contested the suit on various allegations. According to the defendants, the plaintiffs are licensees of the defendants and they asserted that they revoked the licence to the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs agreed for the same, kept all their belongings in one room of the school building agreeing to remove the same within a couple of days and subsequently they did not remove theirbelongings. It is their contention that as the plaintiffs did not remove their belongings, the defendants locked the gate of the suit premises where they kept the property. They also claimed that the plaintiffs are running a school in another premises without any hardship.
4. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned Junior Civil Judge framed appropriate issues in the suit. Plaintiffs examined PWs.1 to 3 and marked Exs.A1 to A4 on their behalf. Defendants examined DWs.1 to 3 and marked Exs.B-1 to B-5 on their behalf. On a consideration of oral and documentary evidence adduced by both the parties, the learned Junior Civil Judge answered all the issues in favour of the plaintiffs and decreed the suit as prayed for. Aggrieved by that judgment and decree of the trial Court, CRP No. 2437 of 1997 is filed by the defendants in the suit.
5. After the judgment and decree in O.S. 159 of 1992 and during the period of pendency of CRP 2437 of 1997 on the file of this Court, the defendants in OS 159 of 1992 filed a civil suit in OS 11 of 1998 seeking the main relief of declaration of their title to the suit property. During the pendency of (that suit, they filed a petition in I.A. 247 of 1999 under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure requesting the Court to restrain the 1st defendant in the suit from executing the decree in OS 159 of 1992. The said petition was resisted by the defendants in the said suit. On a consideration of evidence placed by both the parties, by order dated 30th April 1999 the learned Senior Civil Judge allowed the said petition. It is also necessary to point out that the plaintiffs in O.S. 159 of 1992 meanwhile executed the decree and had taken delivery of possession of the said suit property through the process of Court. Another development also took place during the pendency of the interim injunction application before the Senior CivilJudge. CRP 2437 of 1997 dismissed for default by this Court. Subsequently, the dismissal order was set aside and the said civil revision petition was restored to file for final hearing. In view of that development dismissing the CRP 2437 of 1997 for default by this Court, in IA 247 of 1999 the Senior Civil Judge directed the defendants in the said suit to restore the possession to plaintiffs petitioners. Aggrieved by that order, CRP 2232 of 1999 was filed by the defendants in O.S. No. 11 of 1998 on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Nirmal.
6. The respondents in CRP 2437 of 1997 seriously contended mat no revision petition lies against a judgment and decree passed by any Court under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. They have also relied upon some decisions in support of their contentions. The Supreme Court of India in Vanitha M. Khanolkar v. Pragna M. Pai, AIR 1998 SC 424, considered the question whether the provision of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act would bar an appeal under Clause (15) of Letters Patent. In that case, the decree under Section 6 of the said Act was passed by a learned single Judge of the High Court. An appeal was filed against that judgment and decree under Letters Patent before a Division Bench of Bombay High Court. The Supreme Court held that Clause (15) of the Letters Patent, which is a charter under which the High Court of Bombay functions, would not have been whittled down by the statutory provisions of Section 6(2) of the Specific Relief Act. Incidentally, the Supreme Court observed that the provisions of Section 6(3) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 bar any appeal or revision against any order passed by the Court under Section 6 of the Act. The question whether revision can be filed under Section 115 CPC in a High Court against a judgment and decree passed by any subordinate Court under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 did not actually fall for consideration before the Supreme Court.
7. Another decision relied upon in this regard is the judgment of Orissa High Court in Sobhavati v. Lakshmi Chand, : AIR1984Ori171 . The Orissa High Court held that a High Court will not interfere in its discretionary revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of CPC when a suit for recovery of possession under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 was dismissed.
8. The learned Counsel for the revision petitioners invited the attention of this Court to a judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court in R. Dheemudu v. P. Deemudamma, : 1998(3)ALD225 . In that case, this Court entertained a revision petition against a judgment and decree passed under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and ultimately allowed the said revision petition. In that decision, the contention that in view of the provision in Section 6(3) of the said Act a revision cannot be entertained was not raised and considered by this Court.
9. In my considered opinion, it is not necessary to consider in this revision petition whether a revision can be entertained in the present case on hand. The reason is very simple. In the suit in OS 159 of 1992 three reliefs are asked for by the plaintiffs. Only one relief, namely, the relief relating to recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property to the plaintiffs is alone covered by the provisions of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. The other two reliefs, namely, mandatory injunction and perpetual injunction asked for by the plaintiffs do not fall within the ambit of Section 6 of the said Act. In view of the fact that reliefs not covered by Section 6 of the Act are asked for by the plaintiffs in the said suit, I am of the opinion that this Court can entertain the revision petition and dispose it of on merits.
10. Under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, a person forcibly dispossessedfrom the suit property without his consent alone can invoke the provision in Section 6 of the Act and seek the relief of possession in a summary enquiry. In the present suit, as per the averments in the plaint itself, the plaintiffs had voluntarily handed over the possession of the suit property to the defendants. According to the plaintiffs themselves, the defendants agreed to vacate the plaint schedule property and re-deliver possession to the plaintiffs by 17.2.1992. Subsequent breach of the alleged contract by the defendants cannot be treated as forcible dispossession of the plaintiffs from the suit property. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the suit filed under Section 6 of the Act is not maintainable. For that reason alone, the said suit is liable to be dismissed. The other reliefs relating to mandatory injunction and perpetual injunction granted by the trial Court are consequential reliefs granted by it in view of its finding that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover the possession of plaint schedule property from the defendants invoking the provision in Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act.
11. Regarding the other revision petition, it is to be stated that the plaintiffs sought for interim injunction in their favour restraining the defendants from executing the decree in OS No. 159 of 1992 to take delivery of the suit property. They did not seek relief of interim mandatory injunction to restore possession to them. When the trial Court noticed that the defendants in the said suit had taken possession of the said suit property through process of Court while executing another decree passed in another civil suit, the trial Court should have dismissed the said petition. The trial Court has no jurisdiction in that petition to direct the defendants in that suit to restore the possession of the suit property to the plaintiffs in OS No. 11 of 1998 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Nirmal. The fact that the decree in OS 159 of 1992 is being set aside by this Court, does not make any difference in the order to be passed inCRP No. 2232 of 1997. The only remedy of the defendants is to file a petition for restitution under Section 144 CPC before the Junior Civil Judge, Nirmal and seek restoration of possession of the said suit property to them. They are not entitled to recover possession through the petition filed by them in IA 247 of 1999. Thus, the order passed by the Senior Civil Judge in IA-247 of 1999 is liable to be set aside.
12. In the result, I allow both therevision petitions. The judgment and decreedated 24th April 1997 in OS 159 of 1992are set aside. The said suit is dismissed andin the circumstances without costs. The orderdated 30th April, 1999 in IA 247 of 1999 inOS 11 of 1998 on the file of the SeniorCivil Judge, Nirmal is set aside. The saidpetition is dismissed without costs. Bothparties shall bear their own costs in thesetwo revision petitions.