Goli Veerraju S/O Ramanna Vs. the Commissioner and ors. - Court Judgment

Goda Raghuram, J.

1. Heard Sri K.V. Subrahmanya Narsu, learned Counsel appearing for Mr. S. Jagadish, the learned Counsel for the petitioner; the learned Government Pleader for Revenue for the respondents 2 to 3 and Mr. M.S.Ramachandra Rao, learned Counsel for the 4th respondent.

2. The 32 petitioners assail the order bearing reference No. VI/502/99 dated 16.10.2003 the impugned order passed by the 1st respondent - the Commissioner Appeals in the O/o the Chief Commissioner of Land Administration, AP, Hyderabad,. The revision was preferred to the 1st respondent by the 4th respondent under Section 14-A of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act 1956 (for short 'the Inams Abolition Act, 1956'), aggrieved by the appellate order of the 2nd respondent in Inam Appeal No. 1/89 conforming the order of the 3rd respondent dated 31.07.1989 in RC. No. C1/88. The revision was allowed.

3. The 4th respondent had filed a petition under Section 7 of the Inams Abolition Act, 1956 for grant of a Ryotwari Patta for Ac.410.57 cts in Pydipala Agraham (village), Tuni Taluk, East Godavari District. The petitioners herein objected to the 4th respondent's claim for a patta. The 3rd respondent by the order dated 31.07.1989 rejected the 4th respondent's petition. Aggrieved, the 4th respondent preferred Inams Appeal No. 1/89 under Section 7(2) of the Inam Abolition Act, 1956, to the 2nd respondent. By the order dated 30.09.1996 the 2nd respondent dismissed the appeal. The revision by the 4th respondent preferred under Section 14-A of the Inams Abolition Act, 1956 was allowed by the 1st respondent and hence the writ petition.

4. There is a protracted course of litigation preceding the impugned order. Reference to the several proceedings is relevant to the adjudication of the lis presented in this writ petition.

5. Chronology of relevant events and proceedings:

(A) In 1136-F (about 1726 AD) the Zamindar of Pydipala Agraharam granted an inam of an extent of Ac. 410.57 cts (the schedule lands), in favour of the Uttaradhi Mutt ('the Mutt'). In the year 1860 the inam was confirmed by the Inams Commissioner and a title deed No. 1905 was issued.

(B) An enquiry under Section 9(1)(3) of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 (for short 'the Estates Abolition Act, 1948') was held in 1949 by the Settlement Officer, Vijayawada in SR No. 1/49 and an order dated 31.05.1950 was passed concluding that the grant in favour of the Mutt was of an 'inam estate' as defined under Section 2(7) of the Estates Abolition Act, 1948.

(C) The Mutt preferred an appeal under Section 9(4) to the Estates Abolition Tribunal (EAT) Vizianagaram against the order of the Settlement Officer dated 31.05.1950, in AS No. 247/50. By the order dated 24.09.1952 the EAT allowed AS No. 247/50 and held that the grant in favour of the Mutt was not of a 'inam estate' as defined under Section 2(7) of the Estates Abolition Act 1948. This order was not challenged and has become final.

(D) In view of certain amendments including in 1956 to the provisions of Section 3(2) of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates Land Act 1908 (for short 'the Estates Land Act, 1908') (amending the definition of the expression 'estate') the State Government referred the mater to the Assistant Settlement Officer, Kakinada, under Section 9(3) of the Estates Abolition Act, 1948. By an order dated 31.05.1960 in S.R. No. 1/1959, the Assistant Settlement Officer, Kakinada held that the grant to the Mutt was not an 'inam estate', after duly considering the statutory amendments. Aggrieved thereby the Collector, E.G.District, preferred Tribunal Appeal No. 84/60 to the EAT (the District Judge), East Godavari at Rajahmundry. TA No. 84/60 was dismissed on merits by the order dated 11.09.1961 and has not been challenged. This order of the EAT dated 11.09.1961 has also thus become final.

(E) The Inams Deputy Tahsildar, Peddapuram initiated proceedings under the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act, 1956 and issued a notice under Section 3 of the said Act. One Goli Rudraiah (the father of petitioner No. 18 herein`) lodged objections to the proceedings by the Inam Deputy Tahsildar contending that the village is an 'inam estate' as defined under Section 2(7) of the Estates Abolition Act, 1948. By the order dated 29.06.1962 the Inams Deputy Tahsildar, Peddapuram rejected the objections in view of the earlier orders of the EAT dated 24.09.1952 in AS No. 247/50 and the subsequent order dated 11.09.1961 in TA No. 84/60 - holding the grant in favour of the Mutt as not constituting 'inam estate'.

(F) The Government in Gazette No. 1763 dated 12.07.1962 notified that the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates Land (Reduction of Rent) Act, 1947 (for short 'the Reduction of Rent Act, 1947'), would not apply to the schedule lands, in view of the order dated 31.05.1960 of the Assistant Settlement Officer, Kakinada as confirmed by the order of the EAT, Rajahmundry dated 11.09.1961 in TA No. 84/60.

(G) In April 1964 the 4th respondent petitioned to the Tahsildar, Tuni, E.G. District (under Section 7 of the Inam Abolition Act, 1956) for grant of a Ryotwari patta. Certain individuals (including Goli Rudrayya, the father of petitioner No. 18 herein) lodged objections to this petition, claiming that they were not aware of the order dated 29.06.1962 of the Inams Deputy Tahsildar, Peddapuram and are hence not bound by it. By the order dated 23.08.1973 in Proceedings B- 497/70 the Deputy Tahsildar, Tuni rejected the objections and granted ryotwari patta (No. 22 in proceedings dated 24.08.1973) to the Mutt for the entire extent of Ac.410.57 cts. The objectors thereupon filed an Inam Appeal No. 1/73 before the R.D.O., Peddapuram (R-2 herein). By the order dated 30.12.1974 the 2nd respondent dismissed the appeal. The objectors, aggrieved by the preliminary and appellate orders, filed W.P. No. 3474/75. By the judgment dated 13.07.1977 a learned single Judge of this Court allowed the writ petition on the ground that the earlier order dated 29.6.1962 (of the Inams Deputy Tahsildar, Peddapuram) was not binding on the writ petitioners (objectors to the claim of the 4th respondent for patta). This Court directed the Deputy Tahsildar, Peddapuram to enquire de novo under Section 3 (of the Inams Abolition Act, 1956) to decide the question of possession and claim of the writ petitioners under the provisions of the said Act and thereafter to consider the claim for ryotwari patta by the Mutt under Section 7 of the Act. The Mutt preferred W.A. No. 396/77. This appeal was dismissed on 12.12.1985. The learned Division Bench while dismissing the appeal directed the Deputy Tahsildar to dispose of the matter within six months from the date of the judgment.

(H) Pursuant the judgment of this Court in W.A. No. 396/77, the 3rd respondent took up the 4th respondent's petition for grant of a patta. By the order dated 31.07.1989 the 3rd respondent rejected the 4th respondent's petition. Thereagainst the 4th respondent preferred an appeal to the 2nd respondent under Section 7(2) of the Inams Abolition Act, 1956. The 2nd respondent by the order dated 30.09.1996 dismissed Inam Appeal No. 1/89. The 4th respondent thereupon preferred a revision to the 1st respondent, under Section 14-A of this Act. The 1st respondent by the impugned order set aside the primary order of the 3rd respondent and the appellate order of the 2nd respondent dated 31.07.1989 and 30.09.1996 respectively and granted ryotwari patta to the 4th respondent, under Section 7 of the Inams Abolition Act, 1956. The 1st respondent also granted liberty to the petitioners (respondents in the revision) to agitate for occupancy rights if so desired, before the appropriate authority under the Inams Abolition Act, 1956.

6. The case of the petitioners in brief:

1) They are residents of Pydipala Agraharam village which was originally a part of the Pithapuram estate, an estate under the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908. The lands in the village are inam lands and the Inams Commissioner notified the village as an inam village.

2) The judgment of the EAT in TA No. 84/60 was not filed by the 4th respondent in the proceedings before the 3rd respondent whereat the 4th respondent sought grant of a patta.

3) On a true and fair interpretation of the recitals of the Sanad (the original grant of inam by the Zamindar) and the Inam Fair Register the grant was of 'inam estate'. The 1st respondent acted without jurisdiction in reversing the well considered and legally sound conclusions of the primary and appellate authorities.

7. The defense by the 4th respondent to the impugned order:

(A) The initial and subsequent orders of the EAT (dated 24.9.1952 in AS No. 247/50 and 11.9.1961 in TA No. 84/60) declaring that the grant of the schedule lands is not an inam estate, have become final.

(B) The petitioners were aware of these orders of the EAT as early as in 1964 when objections were lodged to the 4th respondent's claim (for a patta in its favour) but they yet took no steps to assail these orders. The earlier orders of the EAT in AS No. 247/50 and TA No. 84/60 operate as res judicata against the petitioners.

(C) Section 9(6) of the Estates Abolition Act, 1948 enjoins: Every decision of the Tribunal and subject to such decision, every decision of the Settlement Officer under this Section shall be binding on all persons claiming an interest in any land in the village, or hamlet or Khandriga granted as inam notwithstanding that any such person has not preferred any application or filed any statement or adduced any evidence or appeared or participated in the proceedings before the Settlement Officer or the Tribunal as the case may be. In view of the provisions of Section 9(6), the finding (of the EAT dated 24.09.1952 in AS No. 247/50; of the Assistant Settlement Officer, Kakinada dated 31.05.1960; and of the EAT dated 11.09.1961 in TA No. 84/60) that the grant in favour of the 4th respondent is not an 'inam estate' is binding on all persons claiming any interest in any land in the village whether they preferred an application, filed any statement, adduced any evidence, appeared or participated in the proceedings before the Settlement Officer or the EAT (or not), as the case may be. The petitioners cannot therefore contend that the lands are 'inam estate' within the meaning of the said expression under the Estates Abolition Act, 1948.

(D) The order of the primary and appellate authorities (dated 31.07.1989 and 30.09.1996, are perverse. The 3rd respondent grossly misconstrued the recitals in the several columns of the Inams Fair Register extract and erroneously concluded that the grant was in favour of an individual and not in favour of the Mutt. The primary and appellate authorities also erred in observing that the non filing of the original grant by the 4th respondent invites the presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, that if it had been produced it would have shown that the grant is not in favour of the institution but an individual. This conclusion is at variance with the settled law on this aspect that in the absence of the record of an ancient grant, the Inams Fair Register extract is entitled to utmost importance and weight. The finding of the 2nd respondent appellate authority that the Mutt is entitled only to Melavaram rights and therefore not entitled for a patta, is also on the basis of a fundamental misconception. The appellate authority ignored the fact that the grant to the Mutt was recognized by the Government and title deed No. 1905 was issued as early as in 1860, conferring absolute rights to the Mutt.

(E) The petitioners did not raise the plea that they were tenants of the land in any earlier proceedings. Such plea was not raised either while filing objections to the 4th respondent Mutt's claim for a patta before the Inams Deputy Tahsildar, Peddapuram; before the R.D.O., Peddapuram in Inams Appeal No. 1/73; in W.P. No. 2494/75; before the 3rd respondent; or even before the 2nd respondent in Inam Appeal No. 1/89. There is also no evidence whatsoever on record that any of the petitioners were in possession of inam land as on 07.01.1948, the crucial date fixed under Inams Abolition Act, 1956 for grant of a patta, in their favour.

(F) Even if the petitioners are entitled to permanent occupancy rights under Section 10A they would continue to be tenants of the 4th respondent and liable to be evicted under Section 8(2) and 9 of Inams Abolition Act, 1956 and further the entitlement of the petitioners to permanent occupancy rights would not in any way affect the 4th respondent's claim or entitlement for grant of ryotwari patta under Section 7 of the Inams Abolition Act, 1956.

8. The primary order of the 3rd respondent dated 31.07.1989 in Proceedings Rc.C1/88:

By this order the 3rd respondent rejected the 4th respondent's petition (presented under Section 7 of the Inams Abolition Act, 1956) for issue of a ryotwari patta. The petitioners (as respondents) objected (to the 4th respondents claim) contending that the schedule lands constitute an estate within the meaning of Section 3(2) of the Estates Land Act, 1908; that they have rights of occupancy thereto; that the 4th respondent was not in possession of the land; that the earlier order of the Inams Deputy Tahsildar, Peddapuram dated 29.06.1962 was without notice to the objectors and therefore was not binding on them; and that they themselves are entitled for (ryotwari) pattas.

The order of the 3rd respondent states and records that the 4th respondent had filed a Photostat copy of the Inam Fair Register in the proceedings. In the written arguments submitted on behalf of the respondents (petitioners herein) it was urged -

(i) That Pydipala Agraharam is a part of the Pithapuram estate and the original Sanad (in favour of the 4th respondent) is not available on record;

(ii) That the grant is of land in Zamindari village, what was granted to the inamdar was a right to collect the rents and there was no delivery of possession to the inamdar;

(iii) The inamdar was stepping in the shoes of the estate holder; the village continued to be a zamindari village till its abolition and is not an inam village.

The 3rd respondent held:

(a) Since the Inams Commissioner confirmed the inam on 09.04.1860, the schedule lands are inam lands;

(b) The schedule lands though not in an Inam estate in view of the decisions (of the EAT) in T.A. No. 84/60 and A.S. No. 247/50, continued to be a part of Zamindari village as defined under the Estates Abolition Act, 1948, whereunder the Pithapuram estate was taken over. It is a part of the estate even though the Pithapuram estate holder had granted only a specific extent to the Mutt;

(c) As per the analysis of the Inam Fair Register, the grant is not in favour of an institution (i.e. the Mutt) but for the deity to be enjoyed by the priest till services are rendered.

(d) That the 4th respondent would not come within the purview of an institution as defined under Section 2(e), it cannot therefore claim grant of a ryotwari patta under Section 7; and the persons who are in occupation as tenants and their successors alone would be entitled to permanent occupancy rights under Section 10A, of the Inams Abolition Act, 1956.

The appellate order of the 2nd respondent dated 30.09.1996 in Inam Appeal No. 1/89:

The 2nd respondent 'the Revenue Court' dismissed the appeal preferred by the 4th respondent under Section 7(2) of the Inams Abolition Act, 1956 (against the 3rd respondent's order dt 31.7.1989).

The appellate authority having noticed and recorded that the schedule lands are in Pydipala Agraharam village framed the following points as arising for consideration in the appeal:

(i) Who is the grantee of the inam;

(ii) Is it an institution or an individual;

(iii) What was the grant;

(iv) And to whom the village is granted to call it an 'inam'. The 2nd respondent recorded that the original deed of grant was neither filed before the primary authority nor before it. The 2nd respondent referred to the extract of the Inam-B Register and proceeded to analyse its contents. According to the 2nd respondent, Col.2 of this Register records that the inam is a Devadayam inam; Col.8 records that the grant is for the daily offerings to the deity, Sri Rama Demudu in Uttaradhi Mutt for services performed; Col.10 records that the grant is for the duration the services are regularly performed; and Col. 13 records the name of the original grantee as Sri Matta Satya Prayatirdha Swamula Varu. The appellate authority also set out the notings in Col. 17 to 21 (of the Inam-B Register) as under:

The Agraharam can be confirmed permanently so long as the service entered in Col. 8 is rendered. The Manager or Priest has not yet sent his vakil. He seems not to be near remand.

The original sonad having been deposited in the Collectors Cutcherry at sometime unknown, was sent to me. In the sannad it is plainly stated that the Agraharam was given for the services of Ramademudu and it could have been given for no other purpose, because the priest in Col. 13 was a sanyasi worshipping the deity Ramademudu. The sannad is not for a specified extent of land but for the whole village. In the account of F. 1208, 16 putties are 0-0-0 entered as the area of the Agraharam exclusive of poramboke of Inams. In the account of F. 1230 in which the name of the priest appears for the last item, it is entered as 51 putties as a revenue of 1000 Rs. is mally lavied on the Agraharam. It is likely that the actual extent is not 16 putties as stated in there accounts of F. 1208 but very nearly 51 putties. The Karnam is the Tanedar on behalf of the priest of the title deed can be given to (iy wqstorn).

Sd/- xx xx xx

Dy. Collector 19-4-60

Approved

Sd/- xxxxx

Inam Commissioner,

T.D. No. 1905

9. The appellate order is very inelegantly drafted. It jumbles up the contentions of the parties, in particular the respondents (petitioners herein) and the conclusions of the appellate authority so inextricably that it is difficult to make out which are the contentions of the parties and which the appellate conclusions. After recording the contentions of the petitioners herein (respondents in the appeal - that they and their predecessors were enjoying the lands which devolved on them either by inheritance, sale, gifts or mortgages and that the 4th respondent never delivered the lands to the predecessors of these respondents nor changed the tenants nor did the 4th respondent ever have possession of the land), the appellate authority remarks that it is not the case of the appellant (R4 herein) that the tenants were not there for a long period both prior and subsequent to the coming into force of the Inams Abolition Act, 1956; it is not the case of the 4th respondent that it had inducted the tillers for the first time subsequent to the grant; to ascertain whether the inam is granted to an individual to perform certain duties or to a religious institution, the original grant should be filed and the non- filing of such document raises a presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act that if produced the document would disclose that the grant is not to an institution but to an individual.

10. The appellate authority rejected the appeal for certain additional reasons as well which are as irrelevant as its analysis of the entries in the Inam-B Register. These other reasons are best extracted in the language of the appellate authority itself:

According to law institution means a body or organisation or an association for the purposes of achieving some objects. Institution is n establishment organisation, association for the promotion of some object of public or general utility religious or charitable. Charitable institution means any establishment undertaking organisation or association etc., Religious institution means a Mutt, Temple or a specific endowment and includes brundavan or Samadhi or any other institution maintained for religious purpose. At any rate institution never means an individual or person. If the Inam is given to an institution it will have a permanent place where it is established. In the cause title of the appeal grounds the address of the appellant is given as Sri Sri Satya Pramoda Teerdha Swamuluvaru of Sri Rama Chandra Demullu and head of Uttaradi Mutt, that the Inam is given for the service of Ramademudu and at the same time that it is found that the priest is a 'Sanyasi' and it is claimed to be a whole village was given but in the accounts it was found for F. 1208 that only 16 putties of the land excluding porambokes and other Inams. But in F.1230 it is mentioned as 51 putties and that the revenue is being derived at that time by the Inamdar was Rs. 1000/- and it is mentioned therein that the land may not be 16 putties and all this is represented by the then Tanedar who was also village Karnam, which creates doubt that the extent was manipulated from 16 putties to 51 putties by the village Karnam. The appellant is not coming to the court with clean hands, there are other inams also in the same village.

At any rate Markapuram Venkatacharyulu has no right as Sri Satya Pramoda Teertha Swamulu did not coming the property to any person or institution or to this Markapuram Venkatacharyulu.

I see no reason to interfere in Lower Court order.

Notwithstanding the fact that the Deputy Collector concerned had recorded on 19- 04-1960 (in the Inam-B register) that: (a) the original Sanad (deed of grant) appears to have been deposited in the Collector's Cutcherry at some previous time and on perusal disclosed that it is not for a specific extent of land, but for a whole village; (b) In the account for F.1208, 16 putties is entered as the area of the Agraharam exculsive of poramboke, while in the account of F.1230, the extent is entered as 51 putties; (c) that normally a revenue of Rs. 1000-00 is levied on an Agraharam and therefore it is likely that the actual extent is not 16 putties as stated in the account of F.1208, but very nearly 51 putties as recorded for F.1230, the appellate authority without any basis or material whatsoever observed that the difference in extents (from 16 putties to 51 putties) creates doubt that the extent was manipulated from 16 putties to 51 putties by the village Karanam. This observation is a perverse observation based on no evidence. Further, the 2nd respondent - appellate authority recorded another perverse and gratituous finding that The appellant is not coming to the court with clean hands. Another irrelevant observation in the appellate order is that Markapuram Venkatacharyulu has no right as Sri Satya Pramotha Swamulu did not coming the property to any person or institution or to this Markapuram Venkatacharyulu. While the meaning of this sentence is not clear, the intent appears to be that there was no grant or personal interest or devolution of the schedule land in favour of Markapuram Venkatacharyulu. Even if this be the intent of the sentence, it is a wholly perverse inference. Markapuram Venkata Ramanacharyulu was the power of attorney agent of Sri Sri Sri Satyapramoda Teertha Swamula Varu, the trustee of the deity Sri Ramachandra Devulu and the Head of the Uttaradi Mutt. It is in his capacity as an agent that Markapuram Venkata Ramanacharyulu had represented the appellant (4th respondent herein).

The Revisional Order of the 1st respondent dated 16-10-2003 in ComMr. Appeals Proc. No. VI/502/99 (the impugned order).

11. During the pendency of the revisional proceedings, the Head of the Uttaradi Mutt Sri Sri Satya Pramoda Teertha Swamulu had expired and on an application, the successor Sri Satyathama Theertha Swamuluvaru became the head of the Mutt as well as the trustee of the deity Sri Ramachandra Devulu. The legal representative was brought on record and this fact is recorded in the impugned order.

12. The petitioners herein (as respondents in the revision proceedings) filed written arguments through their counsel, before the 1st respondent contending:

(a) that the Tahasildar under the Inams Abolition Act, 1956 could enquire into the jurisdictional fact whether the schedule lands is an estate as defined in Section 3(2)(d) of the Estates Land Act, 1908 and that only when it is decided that it is not an estate, could he proceed further and enquire as to who is entitled to a ryotwari patta; (b) that the order of the E.A.T. 24-09-1952 IN A.S. No. 247 of 1950 (concluding that the schedule lands is not an estate), is not binding as the respondents were not parties to those proceedings; (c) as the definition of 'Estate' was enlarged by the amendments by Act XXXV of 1956 (made to the Estates Land Act, 1908); the definition of 'Inam Estate' (in the Estates Abolition Act, 1948) was amended (Section 2(7)) was substituted by Act XVIII of 1957); no reliance can be placed on the decision in A.S. No. 247 of 1950; and (d) that as the grant is of the whole named village and Pydipala Agraharam is designated in the revenue records as an inam village, it is an inam estate as defined in Section 3(2)(d) of the Estates Land Act, 1908, the Inams Abolition Act, 1956 has no application and the revision petition must be dismissed.

13. The Mutt (as the revision petitioner) filed a reply. The Mutt asserted that the Tahasildar under the Inams Abolition Act, 1956 has no jurisdiction to determine whether the grant is of an estate as the EAT had earlier held that it is not an inam estate; that the judgment of the EAT dated 11-09-1961 in T.A. No. 84 of 1960 is on record; this judgment was passed on merits and the entire history of litigation till that date was referred in this judgment; that in view of the provisions of Section 9(6) of the Estates Abolition Act, 1948 every decision of the Settlement Officer and of the EAT would bind the respondents (the writ petitioners herein) whether or not that they had preferred an application, appeared or participated in the proceedings before the Settlement Officer or the Tribunal, as the case may be; that the judgment of the EAT in T.A. No. 84 of 1960 dated 11-09-1961 was passed after the definition of Inam Estate was amended and even after the amendment the Assistant Settlement Officer on 31-05-1960 had held that the grant is not of an estate and the appeal thereagainst was dismissed by the order of the EAT, dated 11-09-1961 in T.A. No. 84 of 1960.

14. Relevant observations and conclusions set out in the impugned Order:

(a) The order dated 11-09-1961 of the EAT, East Godavari in T.A. No. 84 of 1960 is on record. This order reveals that earlier the Settlement Officer had enquired with respect to Pydipala Agraharam and held (under Section 9(3) of the Estates Abolition Action, 1948 by the order dated 31-05-1950), that the Agraharam is an Inam Estate. The 4th respondent herein preferred an appeal to the EAT, Vijayanagaram in A.S. No. 247 of 1959. The EAT by the order dated 25-09-1952 allowed the appeal and declared that the Agraharam is not an Inam estate, following the decision of the Madras High Court in Somasundaram v. State of Madras 1952 (2) MLJ 202 wherein it was held that to constitute an 'estate' not only the grant must be of the whole of the named village but the confirmation must also be of the whole named village as required under Explanation-I of Section 3(2)(d) of the Estates Land Act, 1908; and further that if the grant is of a whole village and confirmation of only a part, it would not constitute an 'estate'. The decision of the EAT in A.S. No. 247 of 1950 has become final.

(b) In view of the amendment of the definition of 'estate' under Section 3(2)(d) of the Estates Land Act, 1908, the Government had referred the matter to the Assistant Settlement Officer, Kakinada for a fresh decision under Section 9(3) of the Estates Abolition Act, 1948. By the order dated 31-05-1960, the Assistant Settlement Officer, Kakinada held that Pydipala Agraharam is not a hamlet or khandriga in an Inam village and hence is not an 'inam estate' as defined under Section 2 (7) of the Estates Abolition Act, 1948. The District Collector, Rajahmundry preferred an appeal before the EAT, East Godavari in T.A. No. 84 of 1960. In this appeal, the Mutt and Goli Rudrayya (father of petitioner No. 18 herein), were respondent Nos. 1 and 2. The E.A.T, Rajahmundry by the order dated 11-09-1961 dismissed T.A. No. 84 of 1960.

(c) The proposal of the District Collector to file a writ petition against the order in T.A. No. 84 of 1960 was rejected by the Board of Revenue by an order dated 01-12-1961 and the Collector was informed that it is not a fit case to file a writ petition.

(d) In view of the decisions of the EAT, Vijayanagaram and East Godavari in A.S. No. 247 of 1950 and T.A. No. 84 of 1960 respectively and the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer, Kakinada dated 31-05-1960, the Tahasildar under the Inams Abolition Act, 1956 has no power to enquire whether Pydipala Agraharam is an 'estate'.

(e) The Government by a notification dated 27-06-1962 in G.O.Rt. No. 518 Revenue had cancelled the earlier notification dated 06-01-1949 in G.O.Rt. No. 41, under Section 3(2) of the Reduction of Rent Act, 1947 in respect of Pydipala Agraharam. Subsequently, assessment was fixed on the land covered by T.D. No. 1905 of Pydipala Agraharam village under Section 12 (3) of the Inams Abolition Act, 1956 and a final notification was also published in the District Gazette dated 16-06-1968.

(f) The Settlement Officer and the EAT have exclusive jurisdiction under the provisions of the Estates Abolition Act, 1948, to determine whether a particular land is an 'inam estate'. A determination was made by the authorities under this Act and therefore the Inams Deputy Tahasildar exercising powers under the Inams Abolition Act, 1956 has no jurisdiction to decide whether any 'inam village' is an 'inam estate'.

(g) Though the respondents had contended before the primary authority that the lands are 'inam lands' situated in a Zamindari village and under Section 10 of the Inams Abolition Act, persons in occupation as tenants and their successors are entitled for permanent occupancy rights, the respondents had produced no evidence whatsoever before the primary authority to show that the village is a 'zamindari village' and the zamindar was collecting rents from the Mutt or these respondents. In the absence of any evidence, no finding can be recorded. The Mandal Revenue Officer had also not verified the revenue records before holding that the scheduled lands are in a Zamindari village. Further, the Government had notified Pydipala village, under Section 3(2) of the Reduction of Rents Act, 1947 in G.O. 41 dated 06-01-1949. If it was a part of the Pithapuram Zamindari no separate notification was required to treat it as an 'inam estate' and the provisions of the Estates Abolition Act, 1948 were adequate to vest the village in the Government, as it would be a part of the Zamindari. The issuance of a separate notification (GO.Rt. No. 41) establishes that it was treated by the Government as not being a part of the Zamindari. The EAT in A.S. No. 247 of 1950 declared Pydipala Agraharam to be not an Inam Estate. Consequently, the Government issued G.O.Rt. No. 518 Revenue dated 27-06-1962 canceling the earlier notification issued in G.O.Rt. No. 41 dated 06- 01-1949. The revenue records in the office of the Mandal Revenue Officer show that this is an 'inam village'. Hence Pydipala Agraharam is situated in Inam village.

(h) On whether the Inam lands are held by an institution or an individual -- held that the Mutt had filed the extract of the Inam Fair Register before the Mandal Revenue Officer (3rd respondent herein); the analysis of the IFR reveals that the grant is Devadayam for daily offerings to the deity in Uttaradi Mutt; the grant is conditional for so long as service is regularly performed; in the permanent accounts prepared according to the Regulation 21 of 1802 the name of succeeding priests was entered in Column 13; the grant in F.1136 (1726 AD) was confirmed by the Inams Commissioner in T.D. No. 1905 of Pydipala Agraharam; in view of the decisions of the Division Bench reported in 1963 (2) An.W.R. 214 , in the absence of confirmation to a named individual with the added obligation as to performance of service, the grant could not be regarded as a personal one and hence the grant of the schedule lands covered by T.D. No. 1905 of Pydipala Agraharam village is in favour of the Uttaradi Mutt.

(i) On the aspect who is entitled for ryotwari patta in respect of the schedule lands, held -- if the land is held by any institution on the date of commencement, such institution would be entitled to ryotwari patta under Section 4 (2)(a) of the Inams Abolition Act, 1956. Even in case of an inam land in a ryotwari or a zamindari village, the institution holding such land as inamdar as on the date of commencement of the Act shall be entitled to ryotwari patta under Section 4 (1) of this Act; when the land is held by an institution, it is not material whether the inam land is situate in an inam village or zamindari village; in either case patta should be granted to the institution only; prior to the Amendment Act 20 of 1975 (Adding Section 10 (A)), permanent occupancy rights were given to tenants in inam lands held by an institution in inam villages under Section 8 of the Inams Abolition Act, 1956; by virtue of the amendment vide Section 10(A), the permanent occupancy rights were given to the tenants of inam lands in ryotwari and zamindari villages as well and in case such tenants do not pay any rents to the institution, they are liable to be evicted under Sections 8 (2) and 9 of the Act. In any event, the grant of permanent occupancy rights to the tenants would not disable the grant of ryotwari patta to the institution, under Section 7 of the Inams Abolition Act, 1956.

(j) As the lands covered by the grant and confirmed in T.D. No. 1905 of Pydipala Agraharam is of 'inam land' in an inam village and one held by the Mutt (4th respondent) it is entitled to ryotwari patta for the entire land covered by the grant, under Section 7 of the Inams Abolition Act, 1956. The principal contentions urged on behalf of the petitioners by Sri K.V. Subrahmanya Narsu, the learned Counsel for the petitioner are:

(a) that the schedule lands constitute an 'estate' and 'an inam estate' within the meaning of the said expressions as defined in Section 3(2)(d) and Section 2 (7) of the Estates Lands Act, 1908 and the Estates Abolition Act, 1948, respectively. Therefore the authorities under the Inams Abolition Act, 1956 have no jurisdiction to entertain the petition of the 4th respondent for grant of a ryotwari patta;

(b) since the power (under Section 3 of the Inams Abolition Act, 1956) of the Tahasildar to determine whether the schedule land in his jurisdiction is an Inam land must be consistent with the definition of 'inam land' in Section 2 (c) of this Act, in exercise of such exclusive jurisdiction, the Tahasildar has jurisdiction to determine that the land in question is an inam estate and therefore outside the purview of the Inams Abolition Act, 1956. The earlier determinations (by the Settlement Officer or the EAT) that the land is not an inam estate is neither conclusive nor binding on the Tahasildar, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 3 on an application by the 4th respondent under Section 7 of the Inams Abolition Act, 1956. The Inams authorities are required to determine the character of the land on the basis of the revenue entries eschewing any findings recorded in proceedings under the Estates Abolition Act, 1948;

(c) The judgment of the EAT dated 11-09-1961 in TA No. 84 of 1960 was not filed and therefore reliance in the impugned order on this decision of the EAT is perverse and violative of the principles of natural justice;

(d) The original grant (sanad) was not produced by the 4th respondent. Hence no valid determination, whether the grant was to an institution or to an individual, is possible;

(e) The 1st respondent erred in reversing the concurrent findings of the primary and appellate authorities that the grant was not to the Mutt, but was for the deity to be enjoyed by the priest till regular services are rendered (as held by the primary authority) and to the sanyasi (as held by the appellate authority). Rebutting the aforesaid contentions on behalf of the petitioners, Sri M.S. Ramachandra Rao, the learned Counsel for the 4th respondent contended:

(a) that it is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the authorities under the Estates Abolition Act, 1948 to determine whether the schedule land is an 'estate' and an 'inam estate' within the meaning of the said expressions under the provisions of the Estates Land Act, 1908 read with the provisions of the Estates Abolition Act, 1948. The Settlement Officer and the EAT had earlier determined that the schedule lands is not an estate. This determination had become final and were not ever questioned. It is therefore incompetent for the authorities under the Inams Abolition Act, 1956 to hold that the schedule land is an 'estate' falling within the regulatory provisions of the Estates Abolition Act, 1948;

(b) Section 9(4)(c) of the Estates Abolition Act, 1948 confers finality to the decision of the EAT and of the Settlement Officer, under Sub-section (4) of Section 9 and this decision is not liable to be questioned in any Court. Further, Section 9(6) of this Act enjoins binding efficacy to every decision of the Settlement Officer and the EAT under Section 9 including on any person whether or not such person had participated in the proceedings before the Settlement Officer or the Tribunal, as the case may be. The decisions of the Settlement Officer and the EAT are therefore binding on the petitioners, who claim an interest in the schedule land which had earlier been determined to be not an 'inam estate' by the authorities under the Estates Abolition Act, 1948. The petitioners are therefore disentitled and barred by application of the generic principles of res judicata to assert that the schedule land is an 'inam estate';

(c) The petitioner's contention that the order of the EAT dated 11-09-1961 in TA No. 84 of 1960 is not on record is wholly erroneous and misconceived and is clearly contrary to the record. The order of the primary authority (3rd respondent) dated 31-07-1989 in proceedings Rc.C1/88, clearly records: The advocate for the respondents (the petitioners herein) filed judgment in Tribunal Appeal No. 84 of 1960 between the State and the petitioner (the 4th respondent herein) i.e., an appeal filed by the Collector, East Godavari District, Kakinada against the order passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer, Kakinada on 31-05- 1960;

(d) It is a well settled principle, sanctified by binding precedential authority that in the absence of an ancient grant the entries in the Inam Fair Register constitute 'revenue entries' and can be looked into for determining the nature of a grant. Section 14-A of the Inams Abolition Act, 1956 consecrates a wide and wholesome spectrum of revisional jurisdiction on the 1st respondent --- to satisfy itself as to the regularity of such proceedings or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision made or orders passed therein; and if in any case, it appears that any such decision or order should be modified, annulled, reversed or remitted for reconsideration to pass an appropriate order. The impugned revisional order is therefore perfectly competent and the 1st respondent has jurisdiction to examine the entire record of the case to arrive at just and proper conclusion.

In the light of the respective pleadings and contentions, the following issues arise for consideration:

(a) Whether it is competent for the authorities under the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act, 1956 to hold and determine that the schedule lands (of an extent of Ac.410.57 cents in Pydipala Agraharam village covered by Title Deed No. 1905, confirmed by the Inams Commissioner in 1860), constitute an inam estate, contrary to the order of the EAT, Vizianagaram dated 31-05-1950 in A.S. No. 247 of 1950, the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer, Kakinada dated 31-05-1960 and the order of the EAT, Rajahmundry dated 11-09-1961 in T.A. No. 84 of 1960;

(b) Whether the impugned order (holding that the schedule lands covered by TD. No. 1905 are held by the 4th respondent-institution) is erroneous and liable to be interfered with under Article 226 of the Constitution of India;

(c) Whether the impugned order declaring entitlement of the 4th respondent for grant of a ryotwari patta for the schedule lands and granting a ryotwari patta under Section 7 of the Inams Abolition Act, 1956, is sustainable.

ANALYSIS:

15. Before proceeding to analyses of the aforesaid issues, one of the contentions on behalf of the petitioners', factual in nature, may be disposed of. In paragraph No. 7 of the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, the petitioner had pleaded that the judgment of the EAT in A.S. No. 84 of 1960 (T.A. No. 84 of 1960), was not filed. This contention is factually misconceived and contrary to the record of the case. The order of the 3rd respondent (the primary authority dated 31-07-1989 in Rc.C1/88, clearly records (at page Nos. 5 and 6 of the copy of the certified order) that the writ petitioners (respondents before the 3rd respondent) had filed the judgment of the EAT in TA. No. 84 of 1960 which was an order passed in appeal against the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer, Kakinada dated 31-05-1960. This contention has therefore no basis in fact and is rejected out of hand.

Issue No: (a):

16. Whether it is competent for the authorities under the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act, 1956 to hold and determine that the schedule lands (of an extent of Ac.410.57 cents in Pydipala Agraharam village covered by Title Deed No. 1905, confirmed by the Inams Commissioner in 1860), constitute an inam estate, contrary to the order of the EAT, Vizianagaram dated 31-05-1950 in A.S. No. 247 of 1950, the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer, Kakinada dated 31-05- 1960 and the order of the EAT, Rajahmundry dated 11-09-1961 in T.A. No. 84 of 1960.

17. Analysis of the relevant provisions of the Estates Land Act, 1908; the Estates Abolition Act, 1948 and the Inams Abolition Act, 1956 is warranted, for the resolution of this issue. The impugned order is passed under the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act, 1956.

18. Analysis of the relevant provisions of the Inams Abolition Act, 1956:

The jurisdiction of the Primary Authority (R-3) under the provisions of the Act may be noticed. UNDER Section 3 the Tahsildar may suo motu and shall on application enquire and determine (i) whether a particular land in his jurisdiction is an inam land; (ii) whether such land is in Ryotwari, Zamindari or Inam village; and (iii) whether such inam land is held by an institution. Section 3(4) provides an appeal to the Revenue Court (R-2) if any person or institution is aggrieved by the decision of the primary authority. Section 4 (dealing with the conversion of inam lands into ryotwari lands) provides inter alia, that in case of an inam land in a ryotwari or a zamindari village, the person or institution holding such land as inamdar on the date of commencement of the Act shall be entitled to ryotwari patta; if such land is held by an inamdar other than an institution on the date of commencement of the Act and is in his actual occupation on the said date; the tenant who is declared to be in occupation of that land on 07.01.1948 by the Revenue Court under Section 5(3) or the Collector under Section 5(5) as the case may be, shall be entitled to ryotwari patta for 2/3rd share of that land and the inamdar for a ryotwari patta for the remaining 1/3rd share; if such land is held by an inamdar other than an institution on the date of commencement of the Act, but is in occupation of a tenant on the said date, the tenant who is declared to be in occupation of that land on 07.01.1948 (by the Revenue Court or the Collector as the case may be), shall be entitled to a ryotwari patta for 2/3rd share and the inamdar for the remaining 1/3rd share; and if no tenant has filed an application before the Revenue Court under Section 5(3) of the Act within the period stipulated therein, then the tenant in occupation of the land on the date of commencement of the Act shall be entitled to a ryotwari patta for 2/3rd share and the inamdar for the remaining 1/3rd share. Sections 5 and 6 deal with reinstatement of tenants who were in occupation of inam lands in inam villages on 07.01.1948 but were evicted from such lands before commencement of the Act and with determination of 1/3rd share of the inam land in occupation of the tenant, respectively. Section 7 deals with grant of ryotwari pattas. Under Sub-section (1) the Tahsildar after due opportunity shall determine the persons or institutions entitled to ryotwari pattas in accordance with the provisions of Section 4 and grant them ryotwari patta. Under Section ub-Section (2), a person or institution aggrieved by grant of a ryotwari patta under Section ub-Section (1) may appeal to the Revenue Court.

Section 8 deals with grant of rights of permanent occupancy to tenants in inam lands held by institutions in inam villages. Sub-section (1) of Section 8 enacts that in case of inam lands held by an institution in an inam village, the tenant who is declared to be in occupation of the inam land on 07.01.1948 under Section 5 or if there is no such tenant, the tenant in occupation of the land on the date of commencement of the Act shall have a right of permanent occupancy of the lands, the said right being heritable and transferable by sale, gift or otherwise. Sub-section (2) enables the institutions holding inam lands where any tenant thereof has a right of permanent occupancy to seek eviction of such tenant in any of the circumstances set out in Clauses (i) and (ii) of Sub-section (2). Section 9 sets out the procedure for evicting a tenant having a right of permanent occupancy.

Section 10-A (inserted by Amending Act XX of 1975) enjoins (fortified by a non obstante provision) that where the Revenue Court is satisfied after an enquiry that a tenant of any inam land in a ryotwari or zamindari village has possessed the right of permanent occupancy in that land by virtue of any custom or usage having the force of law or any judgment, decree or order of a competent court, it may make a declaration to that effect and on such declaration the provisions of the Act shall apply to such inam land as if such inam land is in a inam village. Sub-section (2) of Section 10-A provides an appeal before the Collector to an aggrieved person or institution.

Section 14 enacts a bar of jurisdiction of the civil court qua any decision of the Tahsildar, the Revenue Court or the Collector under the Act except where such decision is obtained by misrepresentation, fraud or collusion of parties. Section 14-A enacts a revisional remedy before the Board of Revenue in relation to any proceedings by the Tahsildar, the Revenue Court or the Collector under the Act, for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the regularity of such proceedings or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision made or order passed therein, and if, in any case, it appears to the Board of Revenue that such decision or order should be modified, annulled, reversed or remitted for reconsideration, it may pass appropriate orders.

Section 2(c) defines 'inam land' to mean any land in respect of which the grant in inam has been made, confirmed or recognized by the Government but does not include an inam constituting an estate under the Madras Estate Lands Act 1908. Section 2(d) defines 'inam village' to mean a village designated as such in the Revenue Accounts of the Government and includes a village though designated immediately before it was notified and taken over by the Government under the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act 1948. Section 2(e) defines an 'institution' to mean a religious, charitable or an educational institution. Sections 2(h) and 2(k) define ryotwari village and zamindari village as meaning a village designated as such in the Revenue Accounts of the Government and including a village so designated immediately before it was notified and taken over by the Government under the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act 1948, respectively. Analysis of the relevant provisions of the Estates Land Act, 1908:

Before the Madras Amendment Act XVIII of 1936, the definition of 'estate' in Section 3(2) of the Estates Land Act, 1908 included within its ambit only those inam villages where the grant was to a person owning Kudivaram rights therein. By the 1936 amendment all inam villages were brought within the purview of the definition. The definition of 'estate' was further amended by Act XXXV of 1956 to include hamlets or khandrigas in an inam village, of which the grant as an inam has been made, confirmed or recognized by the Government, notwithstanding that subsequent to the grant the village, hamlet or khandriga has been partitioned among the grantees or their successors-in-title.

Explanation 1-A to Section 3(2)(d) of the Act (also inserted by Act XXXV of 1956) clarified that: An inam village, hamlet or khandriga in an inam village granted in inam, shall be deemed to be an estate, even though it was confirmed or recognized on different dates, or by different title deeds or in favour of different persons.

The Act was passed to declare and amend the law relating to the holdings of the land in estates in Andhra Area of the State of Andhra Pradesh. It requires to be mentioned in passing that the Act was originally passed by the composite State of Madras and after formation of Andhra State the Madras Acts were continued in the Andhra area and redesignated as Andhra Pradesh Acts. Analysis of the relevant provisions of the Estates Abolition Act, 1948:

This was enacted to provide for repeal of the permanent settlement, the acquisition of the rights of the landholders in permanently settled and certain other estates in the State of Andhra Pradesh and the introduction of Ryotwari settlement in the State. Section 1(3) enacts that this Act applies to all estates as defined in Section 3(2) of the Estates Land Act, 1908. In 1957, the definition of an 'inam estate' in Section 2(7) was amended taking in even those inam estates which were included in the definition of an 'estate' in Section 3(2)(d) of the Estates Land Act, 1908, as amended by the 1936 Madras Amendment Act.

Section 3 sets out the consequences of notification of an estate. Clause (b) of Section 3 enjoins that the entire estate included in the assets of the Zamindari estate [defined in Section 2(16)] at the permanent settlement of that estate; of communal lands and porambokes; other non ryoti lands; waste lands; pasture lands; lanka lands; forests, mines and minerals; quarries; etc shall stand transferred to the Government and vest therein free from all encumbrances. The proviso enacts that the Government shall not however dispossess any person of any land in the estate in respect of which they consider that he is prima facie entitled to a ryotwari patta.

Sections 4 and 5 set out the method of appointment and functions of the Director of Settlement and of the Settlement Officer, respectively. Section 6 empowers the Government to appoint one or more persons to manage the estates. Section 7 spells out the powers of control of the Board of Revenue. Section 8 deals with the constitution of Tribunals (EAT). Section 9 sets out the powers and procedure for determination of inam estate. Sub-section (1) enjoins that the Settlement Officer may suo motu and shall on application enquire and determine whether any inam village or hamlet or khandriga granted as inam (the words or hamlet or khandriga granted as inam were inserted by the Andhra Pradesh Second Amendment Act XVIII of 1957) in his jurisdiction is an inam estate or not. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 9 enjoin the Settlement Officer to cause publication in the village, hamlet or khandriga, of a notice requiring persons claiming an interest in the lands to file statements on the question whether the property is an inam estate or not and require the Settlement Officer to hear the parties duly affording a reasonable opportunity for adducing evidence. Section 9(4) was substituted by an amendment in 1957, a reference to which is not necessary for the purposes of this case. Sub-section (6) reads:

(6) Every decision of the Tribunal and subject to such decision, every decision of the Settlement Officer under this Section shall be binding on all persons claiming an interest in any land in the village, or hamlet or Khandriga granted as Inam notwithstanding that any such person has not preferred any application or filed any statement or adduced any evidence or appeared or participated in the proceedings before the Settlement Officer or the Tribunal as the case may be. Section 11 sets out provisions for grant of ryotwari pattas of land in which the ryot is entitled to a patta. Section 12 spells out the entitlement to a ryotwari patta of lands in Zamindari estate, in which the landholder is entitled to such a patta. Section 13 deals with lands in an inam estate in which the landholder is entitled to a ryotwari patta. Section 15 empowers the Settlement Officer to examine the nature and history of lands in respect of which the landlord claims a ryotwari patta under Section ections 12 to 14, as the case may be and to decide in respect of which land the claim should be allowed.

19. On the facts of this case, in an enquiry under Section 9(1)(3) of this Act the Settlement Officer in proceedings No. SR 1/49 by an order dated 31.05.1950 had held that the grant in favour of the 4th respondent-Mutt was of an inam estate. The EAT, Vizianagaram by the order dated 24.09.1962 allowed the appeal preferred by the Mutt in AS No. 247/50 and declared that the grant was not of an inam estate. This order has become final. Thereafter the State Government referred the issue again to the Assistant Settlement Officer, Kakinada under Section 9(3) of this Act (in view of the enlarged definition of the expression 'estate' by the 1956 amendment to the Estates Land Act, 1908). By the order dated 31.05.1960 in SR No. 1/59 the Assistant Settlement Officer, Kakinada held that the grant to the Mutt was not of an inam estate. Thereagainst the Collector, East Godavari preferred TA No. 84/60 and the EAT, Rajahmundry by the order dated 11.09.1961 dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer, Kakinada dated 31.05.1960. These orders were also not challenged and have become final. The authorities under the provisions of the Estates Abolition Act, 1948 had thus determined that the grant (covered by title deed No. 1905 confirmed by the Inams Commissioner in 1860) of the schedule land in Pydipala Agraharam village are not an inam estate within the meaning the expression as defined in this Act and these determinations were never challenged and have become final.

20. The crucial question therefore is whether the authorities under the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act, 1956 have jurisdiction to declare that the schedule lands are an inam estate, overriding/overruling the contrary determination by the authorities under the Estates Abolition Act, 1948.

21. Sri Subrahmanya Narsu, the learned Counsel for the petitioners strenuously contended that the impugned order is unsustainable. It is contended that while exercising jurisdiction under the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act, 1956 the Tahsildar is required to determine whether a particular land in his jurisdiction is an inam land. In exercising this jurisdiction the authority is not bound by any determination made by the authorities under the Estates Abolition Act, 1948 and the determination has to be independent and on an examination of the revenue records.

22. Reliance is placed for the above contention on the judgment of a learned single Judge in Kalamata Venkaiah and Ors. v. R.D.O. Parvathipuram and Ors. 1967 (2) AWR 1. In this case the Special Deputy Tahsildar, Inams in a suo motu enquiry under the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act, 1956 held (by the order dated 15.02.1962) that the land in question was not an inam village. For this conclusion he relied on the findings in the order dated 20.08.1953 of the Assistant Settlement Officer as confirmed by the EAT on 17.03.1954, made under the provisions of the Estates Abolition Act, 1948. The order dated 15.02.1962 of the Special Deputy Tahsildar, Inams was confirmed in appeal, by the RDO. Agreeing with the contentions by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the learned single Judge held that in view of the definition of 'inam village' the authority is required to decide whether it is an inam village as defined in Section 2(d) and by reference to the recitals in the Revenue Accounts of the Government including any other document like the Inam Fair Register. Though not clearly spelt out in Kalamata Venkaiah the decision appears to imply that the conclusion recorded by the authorities under the provisions of the Estates Abolition Act, 1948 (that a particular grant is not of an inam village), cannot be relied upon while exercising jurisdiction under the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act, 1956. Such a principle is too broadly stated. Also the impact of Section 9(6) of the Estates Abolition Act, 1948 was not considered in this judgment. Further the crucial issue is not with respect to the determination of a property as falling within an inam village. The determination by the authorities under the Estates Abolition Act, 1948 that the property is or is not an inam estate is an exclusive determination, which cannot be overridden by the authorities under the Inams Abolition Act, 1956.

23. In the case on hand, the initial decision dated 25.09.1952 of the EAT, Vizianagaram in AS No. 247/50 (allowing the appeal by the Mutt and holding that Pydipala Agraharam is not an inam estate) was on the basis of the decision of the judgment of the Madras High Court in Somasundaram v. State of Madras 1952 MLJ 202, whereat Krishna Swamy Naidu, J had observed: To constitute an 'Estate' not only the grant must be of the whole of the named village, but the confirmation must be similarly of the whole named village as required under Explanation-1 of Section 3(2)(d) of the Act (1/1908) and if there is a grant of whole village and confirmation only of the part, it cannot be a 'Estate' within the meaning of the Act. The decision in Somasundaram was over-ruled by a Full Bench in Bhavanarayana v. Venkatadu : 1954CriLJ1029 wherein the learned Madras Full Bench held that as per the definition 'Estate' under Section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act when once grant is made of a whole village or a named village as defined therein, it would be an 'Estate' provided the grant was confirmed or recognized by the British Government and it does not matter if portions of the original grant happened to be in the possession of different individuals and separate title deeds happened to be issued in favour of those individuals. By Act XXXV of 1956 Explanation 1-A was inserted in Section 3(2)(d) of the Estates Land Act, 1908 clarifying, (in conformity with the interpretation spelt out by the Bhavanarayana Full Bench), that an inam village ... shall be deemed to be an estate, even though it was confirmed or recognized on different dates, or by different title deeds or in favour of different persons. The decision of the EAT, Vizianagaram in AS No. 247/50 was however based on the principle spelt out in Somasundaram. But this decision has become final and had not ever been appealed against. After enlargement of the definition of 'estate' in Section 3(2)(d) of the Estates Land Act, 1908 by Act XXXV of 1956, the Government referred the matter for redetermination. The Assistant Settlement Officer, Kakinada by his decision dated 31.05.1960 held that Pydipala Agraharam is not a hamlet or Khandriga in an inam village and hence not an inam estate as defined in Section 2(7) of the Estates Abolition Act, 1948. The Collector's appeal thereagainst in TA No. 84/60 was dismissed by the EAT, Rajahmundry by the order dated 11.09.1961. This has also become final. Section 9(6) of the Estates Abolition Act, 1948 (as already noticed) confers finality to the decision of the EAT and subject to such decision to every decision of the Settlement Officer under Section 9 even though persons claiming interest in any land had not participated in proceedings before the Settlement Officer or EAT, as the case may be.

24. In Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Sri Anantha Padmanabha Swamy Varu of Padmanabham 1973 (1) AWR 322 a Division Bench of this Court (per Gopal Rao Ekbote, CJ) held that the principles of constructive res judicata can be invoked under Section 9(6) of the Estates Abolition Act, 1948. The relevant facts of this case may be noticed: By the order dated 31.01.1950 the Settlement Officer held that Mutcherla village of Visakhapatnam District, was an inam estate within the meaning of Section 2(7) of the Estates Abolition Act, 1948. The EAT however allowed AS No. 358/50 and by the order dated 11.04.1953 declared that it was not an 'estate'. The EAT came to the said conclusion on the ground that the confirmation was made by different grants. After incorporation of Explanation 1-A to Section 3(2)(d) of the Estates Land Act, 1908 by Act XXXV of 1956 (enlarging the definition of 'estate' by including hamlet and khandriga), the Government asked the Settlement Officer to decide whether the said village is an inam estate within the meaning of the amended Act. By the order dated 29.11.1962 the Assistant Settlement Officer held that Mutcherla village is neither a hamlet nor a khandriga and does not come within the purview of the amendment and consequently dropped the proceedings. The Government again requested the Assistant Settlement Officer to hold another enquiry under Section9 to decide the question on the basis of Explanation 1-A. By the order dated 24.11.1966 the Assistant Settlement Officer held that in view of Explanation 1-A Mutcherla village become an 'estate' even though the confirmation was by a different grant. By an order dated -04.11.1968 the EAT allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer dated 24.11.1966 and held that the earlier order of the Assistant Settlement Officer dated 29.11.1962 operate as res judicata and consequently the Assistant Settlement Officer could not have gone into the question whether Explanation 1-A applies to the facts of the case or not. The learned Division Bench concluded that by operation of the principle of constructive res judicata the Government is barred from seeking a fresh enquiry and it is not open to the Assistant Settlement Officer to try that question again in a fresh enquiry.

25. In Paladugu Venkaiah Chowdari and Ors. v. Kolasani Koti Veerabhadrachari and Ors. 1973 (2) AWR 52 the question involved was whether the decision of the EAT, Vizianagaram in AS No. 18/52 holding that the inam village Arepalli Agraharam is not an inam estate as defined under Section 2(7) of the Estates Abolition Act, 1948 (on the ground that though the grant was of the whole village it was not confirmed by the Government by one title deed but was by different title deeds on different dates), bars a fresh enquiry into the question whether the village would be an inam estate in view of the amendment to Section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 which added Explanation 1-A to the Act and consequently has become part of the definition of 'inam estate' as defined under Section 2(7) of the Estates Abolition Act, 1948. On facts, by the order dated 15.07.1950 the Settlement Officer in a suo motu enquiry had concluded that the village is not an estate, as the grant in question did not comprise the whole village but only a part of the village. Aggrieved by that decision the tenants of the lands preferred an appeal before the EAT, Vizianagaram. The EAT found that the grant was of the whole village but following the decision of the Madras High Court in Somasundaram (2 supra) agreed with the conclusion of the Settlement Officer that the village is not an estate as the grant was confirmed by the British Government on different dates. This judgment of the EAT became final as no steps were taken thereagainst. After the amending Act 1956 introducing Explanation 1-A to Section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, the Assistant Settlement Officer, Ongole again took up suo motu enquiry and by the order dated 09.03.1959 held that the village is an inam estate. Aggrieved thereby the matter was carried in appeal to the EAT, Guntur. The EAT dismissed the appeal. The Assistant Settlement Officer and the EAT found that the grant was of a whole village and though it was not a hamlet or khandriga and though was not confirmed by one title deed, it would be an 'estate' within the meaning of Explanation 1-A to Section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 as amended in 1956. The learned Division Bench allowed the appeal (against the decision of the learned single Judge dismissing the writ petition and confirming the orders of the Assistant Settlement Officer and the EAT, Guntur) and held that so far as grants of whole or named villages are concerned the 1956 amendment did not alter the previous law. It only reiterated it by making it more explicit; Explanation 1-A introduced by the 1956 amendment was only declaratory of the existing law and was intended to remove any doubts; even before Explanation 1-A was added the law had been (as decided in Bhavanarayana - 3 supra) that for an inam village to be an estate it is enough that if the grant was made by the Government or confirmed or recognized by it and it was not necessary even then that it should have been confirmed or recognized by the issue of a single title deed. Even before this amendment the grant could be confirmed by issue of more than one title deed in favour of more than one person and on different dates as now clarified by Explanation 1-A, observed this Court. The learned Bench also held that by introduction of Explanation 1-A, so far as whole inam villages are concerned, no inam village which was not an 'estate' previously was made an 'estate'. On this reasoning it was held that the 1956 amendment did not enable or legitimize a second enquiry into the issue whether the grant of a whole village, confirmed by different title deeds and in favour of different persons constitutes an 'estate', contrary to an earlier decision of the Settlement Officer as confirmed by the EAT that such grant was not an estate, in view of Section 9(6) of the Estates Abolition Act, 1948.

26. In the scheme of the Estates Abolition Act, 1948, in particular Section 9 thereof, the determination by the Settlement Officer and the EAT (in the context of the facts before us) comprises two distinct aspects: (A) Whether a particular grant is or is not an 'inam village' and (B) Whether such village is an 'inam estate' within the definition in Section 2(7). The first aspect i.e., whether the grant is of an inam village is a jurisdictional fact/an extrinsic fact which must be exist before the Settlement Officer can embark on the enquiry contemplated by Section 9(1). The second aspect i.e., whether such a village is an 'inam estate' is within the exclusive jurisdiction of enquiry by the Settlement Officer subject to appellate scrutiny by the EAT. This is clear from an interactive analysis of the provisions of Sections 9(1), 9(4)(C) and 9(6).

27. In Addanki Tirvenkata Thata Desika Charyulu v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. : AIR1964SC807 a constitution bench of Supreme Court had to consider whether the jurisdiction of the authorities under the Estates Abolition Act, 1948 as regards determination of whether an inam village is an inam estate, is exclusive and in regard thereto the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J speaking for the Court enunciated the position thus:

(26) Section 9(4) (c) in terms the jurisdiction of the Civil Court from questioning the correctness of the appellate decision. In such a situation there is an express bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to adjudicate upon the question whether 'any inam village'' 'is an inam estate or not''. The next question, and that is what was urged before us, is whether the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not barred when the Settlement officer has as a result of his enquiry determined that question and nothing more has happened. It was urged that there was no bar where the matter rested merely with the decision of a Settlement Officer and support was sought for this contention from the circumstance that Section 9(4) (c) in terms imparted finality solely to the orders of the Tribunal, and this could not be read so as to make the same provision applicable to the orders of the Settlement Officer. This argument entirely lacks substance. Clause (c) has to be read in conjunction with the positive provision in Sub-section (6) with which it is closely related and under this the decision of the Tribunal is declared to be binding on all persons interested, and a precisely similar effect is predicated as regards the decisions of the Settlement Officer where no appeal has been filed from his decision. The Act thus never meant to draw any distinction between orders of Settlement Officers which were affirmed by Tribunals and other orders which by reason of their not being appealed against within the time prescribed, attained finality. This apart, if the submission of the appellant were correct, it would mean that when a Settlement Officer rendered his decision on the matter set out in Section 9(1), the aggrieved party had a right either to appeal to the Tribunal within the time prescribed or challenge it by a suit in Civil Court within the period of limitation which might be applicable to such suits under the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act. If this were so, as there might conceivably be more than one party having a similar interest and raising a similar contention who might all feel aggrieved by the decision of a Settlement Officer, it would mean that one party might file a suit, while another resorted to the Tribunal by way of appeal. This result would be sufficient to demonstrate the impossibility of accepting the construction for which the appellant contends. The very provision setting up an hierarchy of judicial tribunals for the determination of the question on which the applicability of the Act depends, is sufficient in most cases for inferring that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to try the same matter is barred. In addition we have the provision in Section 9(4) (c) read with Section 9(6) to which we have adverted. In these circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that to the extent of the question stated in Section 9(1), the jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer and of the Tribunal are exclusive and that the Civil Courts are barred from trying or retrying the same question. We should, however, hasten to add that this exclusion of jurisdiction would be subject to two limitations. First is the reservation made by the Lord Thankerton in Secretary of State v. Mask and Co. 67 Ind App 222 where, after holding that the provisions of the Sea Customs Act setting up a special machinery for the adjudication of the correct duty leviable under the Act barred recourse to the Civil Courts to question the correctness of the decisions of the Authorities acting under that enactment added:

It is also well settled that even if jurisdiction is excluded, the civil courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with, or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.The scope of the exception here made was the subject of examination by this Court in the case of Firm of Illuri Subbayya Chetty v. State of Andhra Pradesh : [1963]50ITR93(SC) where Gajendragadkar, J. speaking for the Court said:

Non-compliance with the provisions of the statute to which reference is made by the Privy Council must, we think, be non-compliance with such fundamental provisions of the statute as would make the entire proceedings before the appropriate authority illegal and without jurisdiction. Similarly, if an appropriate authority has acted in violation of the fundamental principles or judicial procedure, that may also tend to make the proceedings illegal and void and this infirmity may affect the validity of the order passed by the authority in question. It is cases of this character where the defect or the infirmity in the order goes to the root of the order and makes it in law invalid and void that these observations may perhaps be invoked in support of the plea that the civil court can exercise its jurisdiction notwithstanding a provision to the contrary contained in the relevant statute.It is only necessary to add that no question envisaged by Lord Thankerton or referred to by Gajendragadkar, J. is raised in the appeal before us and it is therefore unnecessary for us to examine, in the present appeal either, the precise limits of this exception.

(27) The second is as regards the exact extent to which the powers of statutory tribunals are exclusive, Lord Esher formulated the point thus in The Queen v. The Commissioner for Special purposes of the Income Tax (1888) 21 QBD 313 at Public Prosecutor. 319-320:

When an inferior court or tribunal or body, which has to exercise the power of deciding facts, is first established by Act of Parliament, the legislature has to consider what powers it will give that tribunal or body. It may in effect say that, if a certain state of facts exists and is shown to such tribunal or body before it proceeds to do certain things, it shall have jurisdiction to do such things, but not otherwise. There it is not for them conclusively to decide whether that state of facts exists, and, if they exercise the jurisdiction without its existence, what they do may be questioned, and it will be held that they have acted without jurisdiction. But there is another state of things which may exist. The legislature may intrust the tribunal or body with a jurisdiction, which includes the jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary state of facts exists as well as the jurisdiction, on finding that it does exist, to proceed further or do something more. When the legislature are establishing such a tribunal or body with limited jurisdiction, they also have to consider, whatever jurisdiction they give them, whether there shall be any appeal from their decision, for otherwise there will be none. In the second of the two cases I have mentioned it is an erroneous application of the formula to say that the tribunal cannot give themselves jurisdiction by wrongly deciding certain facts to exist, because the legislature gave them jurisdiction to determine all the facts, including the existence of the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of their jurisdiction depends, and if they were given jurisdiction so to decide, without any appeal being given, there is no appeal from such exercise of their jurisdiction.It is manifest that the answer to the question as to whether any particular case falls under the first or the second of the above categories would depend on the purpose of the statute and its general scheme, taken in conjunction with the scope of the enquiry entrusted to the tribunal set up and other relevant factors. In the present case, this is determined by the terms of Section 9(1) which prescribes and delimits the functions of the Settlement Officer and thus in effect, of the appellate forum. This Sub-section enjoins on or empowers the Settlement Officer to determine whether 'any inam village' is 'an inam estate or not' and the object of the Act is to 'abolish' only 'inam estates'. This determination involves two distinct matters in view of the circumstances that every 'inam village' is not necessarily 'and inam estate' viz. , (1) whether a particular property is or is not an 'inam village' and (2) whether such a village is 'an inam estate' within the definition in Section 2 (7 ). The first of these questions whether the grant is of an 'inam village' is referred to in Section 9(1) itself as some extrinsic fact which must pre-exist before the Settlement Officer can embark on the enquiry contemplated by that provision and the Abolition Act as it stood at the date relevant to this appeal, makes no provision for this being the subject of enquiry by the Settlement Officer. (28) Where therefore persons appearing in opposition to the proceedings initiated before the Settlement Officer under Section 9 question the character of the property as not falling within the description of an 'inam village', he has of necessity to decide the issue, for until he holds that this condition is satisfied, he cannot enter on the further enquiry which is the one which by Section 9(1) of the Act he is directed to conduct. On the terms of Section 9(1) the property in question being an 'inam village' is assumed as a fact on the existence of which the competency of the Settlement Officer to determine the matter within his jurisdiction rests and as there are no words in the statute empowering him to decide finally the former, he cannot confer jurisdiction on himself by a wrong decision on this preliminary condition to his jurisdiction. Any determination by him of this question, therefore, is (subject to the result of an appeal to the Tribunal) binding on the parties only for the purposes of the proceedings under the Act, but no further. The correctness of that finding may be questioned in any subsequent legal proceeding in the ordinary courts of the land where the question might arise for decision. The determination by him of the second question whether the 'inam village' is an inam estate is, however, within his exclusive jurisdiction and in regard to it the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is clearly barred. In this connection we might refer to the decision of the Madras High Court: in Venkatanarasayya v. State of Madras ILR (1952) Mad 681 at p. 681: (AIR 1953 Mad 60 at p. 61) where Rajamannar, C.J. said:

If the grant is less than a village then obviously Madras Act XXVI of 1948 can have no application whatever. Section 9 of that Act provides for the determination after inquiry of the question whether any inam village is an inam estate or not. Presumably, when the contention is that the grant does not comprise a village, the proceedings under Section 9 would not be strictly open to the aggrieved party. . . . . . The aggrieved party will have a right of suit as he would have a good cause of action when proceedings are taken under colour of an Act which does not apply to the facts of the case.This correctly expresses the distinction between the two related questions and the effect of the decision on the preliminary condition.

28. The above principle has been quoted with approval and reiterated in K.C.Dora and Ors. v. G.Annammanaidu (1974) 1 SCC 567 and followed by a Division Bench of this Court in Konduru Ramana Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr 1973 (1) APLJ 388.

29. Since it is the settled legal position that it is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer and the EAT (under the provisions of the Estates Abolition Act, 1948) to determine whether a particular property constitutes an 'inam estate' and even the jurisdiction of the civil court (generic as it is under Section 9 CPC) is excluded on the issue whether the property is an 'estate' or otherwise, except where the authority under this Act has wrongly assumed jurisdiction by erroneously determining the jurisdictional fact regarding the aspect as to the grant being of an 'inam village', the earlier determinations, by the EAT, Vizianagaram dated 24.09.1952 in AS No. 247/50; of the Assistant Settlement Officer, Kakinada dated 31.05.1960 in SR No. 1/59 and of the EAT, Rajahmundry dated 11.09.1961 in TA No. 84/60 (that the schedule lands covered by title deed No. 1905 confirmed by the Inams Commissioner in 1860, do not constitute an 'inam estate') bars and excludes the jurisdiction of the authorities under the Inams Abolition Act, 1956 to enter upon adjudication of the issues determined under the Estates Abolition Act, 1948. Section 9(6) of the Estates Abolition Act, 1948 enjoins binding efficacy to every decision of the EAT and subject to such decision, to every decision of the Settlement Officer under Section 9, on all persons claiming any interest in any land in the village, hamlet or Khandriga granted as inam, irrespective of whether such person has preferred an application, filed any statement, adduced any evidence or appeared or participated in the proceedings before the Settlement Officer or the EAT, as the case may be. It also requires to be noticed that Goli Rudraiah - the father of the 18th petitioner herein, was the 2nd respondent in TA No. 84/60. It is therefore not open to the petitioners to contend (in opposition to the 4th respondent's petition presented to the 3rd respondent for grant of a ryotwari patta in respect of the schedule lands), that the schedule lands and the grant thereof constitute an 'estate' or an 'inam estate' falling within the province of the provisions of the Estates Abolition Act, 1948 and are therefore excluded from the jurisdiction of the authorities under the Inams Abolition Act, 1956, in view of the definition of 'inam land' in Section 2(7) of the later Act.

30. It is not the case of the petitioners that the earlier determination by the authorities under the Estates Abolition Act, 1948 was vitiated on account of substantive transgression of the procedural prescriptions of that Act or that those determinations were vitiated by misrepresentation or fraud. If the petitioners were aggrieved by the declarations of the Assistant Settlement Officer, Kakinada or of the EAT, Vizianagaram or Rajahmundry as the case may be, on the ground that these statutory authorities had arrived at a wrong conclusion that the schedule lands are not an 'inam estate' on the basis of an erroneous conclusion as to the preliminary and jurisdictional fact as to the lands falling within an inam village, it was perhaps open to them to canvass this position before a civil court of competent jurisdiction. Even if the petitioners were aggrieved by the earlier decisions of the statutory authorities ( that the schedule lands are not an 'inam estate') and though the jurisdiction of the civil court on such finding was barred, the petitioners could perhaps canvass the correctness of this finding in a proceedings under Art 226 of the Constitution. No such process or remedies were pursued by the petitioners. The petitioners were aware of the earlier proceedings and determination by the authorities under the Estates Abolition Act, 1948, at least since 1961 when the father of the 18th petitioner herein filed an objection before the EAT, Rajahmundry in T.A. No. 84/60 contending that Pydipala Agraharam is an 'inam estate' as defined under Section 2(7) of the Estates Abolition Act, 1948. In any view of the mater on settled principles of law, the binding precedents referred to supra and in the context of the provisions of Section 9(6) of the Estates Abolition Act, 1948, the petitioners were precluded from contending that the schedule lands constitute an 'inam estate' within the meaning of the said expression under Section 2(7) of the Estates Abolition Act, 1948.

31. On issue (A) it is accordingly held that it is not competent to the authorities under the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act, 1956 to determine that the schedule lands constitute an 'inam estate' and therefore the 4th respondent's petition could not be considered by the authorities under the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act, 1956. Issue (B):

32. Whether the impugned order (holding that the schedule lands covered by TD. No. 1905 are held by the 4th respondent-institution) is erroneous and liable to be interfered with under Article 226 of the Constitution of India;

33. In Arunachellam Chetty v. Venkatachalapathy Guru Swamigal AIR 1919 PC 62, the Judicial Committee while dealing with the Inam Fair Register for the year 1864 which had been produced for inspection observed:

34. It is true that the making of this Register was for the ultimate purpose of determining whether or not the lands were tax free. But it must not be forgotten that the preparation of this Register was a great act of State, and its preparation and contents were the subject of much consideration under elaborately detailed reports and minutes. It is to be remembered that the Inam Commissioner through their officials made enquiry on the spot, heard evidence and examined documents, and with regard to each individual property, the Government was put in possession not only of the conclusion come to as whether the land was tax-free, but of a statement of the history and tenure of the property itself. While their Lordships do not doubt that such a report would not displace actual and authentic evidence in individual cases; yet the Board, when such is not available, cannot fail to attach the utmost importance, as part of the history of the property, to the information set forth in the Inam Register.

35. In Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Balajiwale v. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi and Ors. : [1960]1SCR773 the Supreme Court quoted with approval the above observations of the Judicial Committee in Arunachallam Chetty (9 supra).

36. In Palacharla Hymavathamma v. RDO, Parvathipuram : AIR1971AP103 Parthasarathi,J speaking for the Division Bench observed:

12. It is therefore apparent that from the very ancient times accounts and registers were maintained by the village establishment and the maintenance of such accounts, was accorded a statutory basis since 1802. As indicated earlier, both expressions 'accounts' and 'registers' were used in the relevant statutes. In the Inams Abolition Act and also in the Madras Estates Land Act, the expression 'revenue accounts' alone is used. Though there is no reference to the registers or other books that were prescribed to be kept, it appears to us that in using the expression 'revenue accounts', in the Madras Estates Land Act and in the Inam Abolition Act, the Legislature never intended to exclude registers kept by the village establishments from the purview of 'Revenue accounts'. It is not unreasonable to infer that 'revenue accounts' has been used to the Inams Abolition Act and in the Madras Estates Land Act in comprehensive sense so as to include accounts and also registers that were prescribed to be maintained by the Board of Revenue or other authorities pursuant to the Karnams Regulation and the subsequent enactments. It is necessary to bear in mind that it is open to the authorities concerned including the Board of Revenue, to add from time to time to the list of accounts or registers that are to be kept by the village establishments. The expression 'revenue accounts' therefore cannot be said to refer to any permanent or unalterable list. The relevant statutes clearly provided for the addition to the list of village accounts and registers.

37. The learned Division Bench noticed and quoted with approval the observations of a learned single Judge in W.P. No. 23/62 wherein it was observed that accounts maintained for the revenue administration at the village and taluk levels were relevant but the scope of the enquiry would extend to a consideration of all categories of the revenue accounts from the origin of the grant. That was a case in which the extract from the Inams Fair Register formed part of the record.

38. In Konduru Ramana Reddy (8 supra) a Division Bench of this Court observed that: If the deed by which, the grant was made is not available, then the entries in the Inam Fair Register will form the important source of material from which those maters could be gathered.

39. In the case on hand the grant is of the year 1726 [1136-F]. On the basis of the said grant the Inams Commissioner confirmed the Title Deed No. 1905 in 1860. The proceedings of the Inams Commissioner granting confirmation to title deed No. 1905 set out the recommendations of the concerned Deputy Collector, dated 19.04.1860 which records that: The original Sanad having been deposited in the Collector's Cuttchery at sometime unknown, was sent to me. These proceedings also set out the relevant extracts from the Inam Fair Register. The above proceedings were extracted and referred to in the appellate order of the 2nd respondent dated 30.09.1996.

40. In the aforesaid circumstances the observation of the appellate authority (2nd respondent) that the non-production of the original grant by the 4th respondent warrants an adverse presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, is perverse and has rightly been rejected by the 1st respondent - Revisional authority.

41. The 1st respondent-Revisional Authority specifically framed the point Whether the inam lands are held by the institution or not, for consideration. This point was discussed in Para-18 of the impugned order. The 1st respondent noticed that the 4th respondent had filed the extract of the Inam Fair Register before the 3rd respondent primary authority. The entries in the Inam Fair Register were incisively extracted, referred to and considered by the revisional authority. Col.2 of the Inam Fair Register noted that the inam is a devadayam inam; Col.8 that the purpose of the grant was for the daily offerings to the deity Sri Rama Devudu in Uttaradhi Mutt for services performed; Col.10 relating to whether the grant is hereditary noted that it is for so long as the service is regularly performed; Col.13 relating to the name of the original grantee noted 'Sri Matta Satyanarayana Praatiruthda Swamulavaru'; Col.14 relating to the name entered in the register prepared according to Regulation XXI of 1802 for the permanent account and relationship of the person so entered to the original grantee mentioned 'priest after priest' in Col.13; Col.17 to 21 of the Inam Fair Register relating to the recommendations and confirmation of the grant noted that the Agraharam can be confirmed permanently so long as the service entered in Col.8 are rendered.

42. On an analysis of the above entries in the Inam Fair Register, the revisional authority relying on the decision of the Division Bench in Boppudi Punnaiah and Ors. v. Sri Lakshmi Narasimha Swamy Varu 1963 (2) AWR 214, held that the grant of the schedule land is not a personal grant but is added with an obligation of performance service to the deity Sri Rama Devudu in Uttaradhi Mutt and therefore the grant covered by TD No. 1905 is held by the 4th respondent-Mutt.

43. In Boppudi Punnaiah (12 supra) Chandra Reddy CJ, writing the opinion for the Division Bench of this Court classified 'devadayam inams' into three categories: (i) grants to the institution; (ii) grants to an office to serve as emoluments annexed to that office; and 9iii) grants to named individuals burdened with service. Analyzing the 3rd category of grants the learned Chief Justice observed that where the entry in Col.10 of the Inam Fair Register reads 'so long as service is performed' without mentioning that it is hereditary and where in Col. 21 relating to recommendations and confirmation of the grant it is mentioned that 'it should be confirmed so long as service was performed', the grant must be treated not as a personal grant. Relying on the observations of the Supreme Court in Lakshminarasimhachari v. Agastheeswaraswami Varu : [1960]2SCR768 the learned Division Bench observed that there is a distinction between the words 'to be confirmed so long as the service is performed' and 'to be confirmed to the party so long as he continues the performance of the service'. Where the later expressions are found in the grant they are to be treated as personal grant and in the former case not so. The learned Division Bench further observed that in the absence of confirmation to a named individual with the added obligation of performance of service, the grant could not be regarded as a personal one.

44. In the light of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Boppudi Punnaiah (12 supra), the conclusion of the revisional authority that the grant of the schedule lands covered by TD No. 1905 is to the 4th respondent institution, is impeccable and is not liable to be interfered with. Issue (B) is accordingly answered against the petitioners and in favour of the 4th respondent. The grant of the schedule lands is rightly held by the impugned order to be in favour of the 4th respondent-Mutt, a religious institution. Issue (C):

Whether the impugned order declaring entitlement of the 4th respondent for grant of a ryotwari patta for the schedule lands and granting a ryotwari patta under Section 7 of the Inams Abolition Act, 1956, is sustainable.

45. In the light of the conclusions herein above on the issues (a) and (b) the impugned order declaring entitlement of the 4th respondent for grant of ryotwari patta for the schedule land and granting ryotwari patta to the 4th respondent under Section 7 of the Inams Abolition Act, 1956 suffers from no infirmity warranting interference. Section 4(1) confers entitlement to a ryotwari patta to a person or institution holding such land as inamdar on the date of commencement of the Inams Abolition Act, 1956 in the case of inam land in a ryotwari or a zamindari village. Section 4(2)(a) enacts that in the case of an inam land in an inam village if such land is held by any institution [the 4th respondent is an institution as defined in Section 2(e)] on the date of commencement of the Act, such institution shall be entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of that land. The relevant facts that the grant is in favour of the 4th respondent institution, that it is an inam land in an inam village, that it is not an 'inam estate' within the meaning of the said expression as defined in Section 2(7) of the Estates Abolition Act, 1948 have all been rightly held in the impugned order, in favour of the 4th respondent. The impugned order is therefore not liable to be interfered with.

46. By the impugned order the 1st respondent preserved liberty to the writ petitioners (respondents in the revision) to agitate for occupancy rights before the appropriate authority under the Inams Abolition Act, 1956 by producing relevant documents. It requires to be noticed that under Section8 of this Act right of permanent occupancy to tenants in inam lands held by an institution in an inam village could be granted in favour of the tenant who is declared to be in occupation of the inam land on 07.01.1948 under Section e. 5 or if there is no such tenant, the tenant in occupation of the land on the date of commencement of the Inams Abolition Act, 1956. The petitioners are therefore required to establish before the appropriate authority by cogent and credible evidence that they are entitled to permanent occupancy rights, in terms of the eligibility specified in Section 8 of the Inams Abolition Act, 1956.

47. On the analysis, for the reasons and with the observations set out herein, the writ petition is dismissed, but in the circumstances without costs.