ORDER
S.R. Nayak, J.
1. This writ petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order of the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal at Bangalore (for short, the Tribunal) dated 20th December, 2002 passed in Application Nos. 6631 to 6643 of 2001.
2. The background facts leading to the filing the Applications before the Tribunal, in brief, are as follows:
The petitioners herein were initially appointed as Reserve Police Constables in the establishment of the Karnataka State Reserve Police (KSRP). According to the petitioners, before their appointment, they were subjected to practical training in the Central Jail printing press and on successful completion of the training they were posted to serve in the printing press as Police Constables (Printing). It is common case of the petitioners, the official respondents and the private respondents that till the year 1981 the cadre strength of various cadres of the printing press was not fixed. For the first time, the Government issued order bearing No. HD 34 PEM 81, Bangalore, dated 11-11-1981 fixing the strength of the personnel in various cadres, twelve in number. Though cadre-strength was fixed in the above order in the year 1981, it is also admitted position that till date Cadre and Recruitment Rules are not framed by the Government of Karnataka governing recruitment and promotion of the personnel in the printing press. It is stated that the draft rules were framed in 1987 by the Director General and Inspector General of Police and they have been forwarded to the Government and the Government has not yet approved the draft rules and, consequently, even as on today, there are no C and R Rules.
3. After the Government issued Order dated 11-11-1981, the office of the Director General and Inspector General of Police, Karnataka, issued a Memo dated 26th November, 1982 transferring/ posting the petitioners and certain others to the police printing press on deputation basis for a period of two years in the interest of public service and they were directed to report for duty to the Chief Officer of the Police printing press. Subsequently, the Director General and Inspector General of Police, Karnataka, issued Memo No. 181/SGP/ 4/82-83, dated 15-7-1983 in modification of the earlier Memo dated 26-11-1982 and posted the petitioners to work in the Police printing press against the posts indicated against each of them. The memo dated 15-7-1983 reads as follows:
'Sub: Representation of Police Printing Press Officials Regarding change of trade.
Ref: This Office Memo of Even No. dated 26-11-1982.
In modification of this office memo of even No. dated 26-11-1982, the following PCs/L.Ns. are posted against the posts indicated each in the Police Press with immediate effect:_________________________________________________________________Sl.No. Name Section_________________________________________________________________Sriyuths:1. T. Chinnappa, L.N. 49 Composing Section2. S.K.Achaiah,L.N. 58 - do -3. Mariswamy Gowda, PC 14 - do -4. Sathyanarayana PC 544 - do -5. Peter Pereira PC 1439 Machine Binding Section6. Ghouse Peer PC, 543 - do -7. K.G. Murthy, PC 547 Binding Section8. B. Venkoji Rao, PC 5422 - do -9. Raju, PC 542 - do -10. H.V. Srinivasa, PC, 289 - do -_________________________________________________________________To:The Assistant Directorof Printing Press, Staff.Sd/-Director General and Inspector Generalof Police'.
The above memo would go to show that the modified order was issued by the Director General and Inspector General of Police in pursuance of the representation of the petitioners for change of cadre, though wrongly it is stated as 'change of trade'.
4. When the matter stood thus, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Planning, Research and Special Units, office of the Director General and Inspector General of Police, Karnataka, issued O.M. dated 3-3-1986 promoting the petitioners temporarily as Senior Compositors, Senior Machine Minders and Senior Binders in the scale of Rs. 675-1320 noted against each of them, in the then existing vacancies on the basis of seniority-cum-merit subject to their passing kannada language examination during the officiation period of one year from the date of promotion. Further, vide Memo dated 13-3-1986 issued by the Deputy Inspector General of Police (Headquarters), the pay of the petitioners in the cadre of Senior Compositors, Senior Machine Minders and Senior Binders was fixed in the pay scale of Rs. 675-1320 in terms of Rule 41 of the Karnataka Civil Service Rules, 1958. In this memo, the petitioners are referred to as 'technical personnel'.
5. When the petitioners were serving as such in the printing press, in the year 1986, the contesting private respondents and certain others (in all fifteen in number) were recruited to the posts of Junior Compositors, Junior Machine Minders and Junior Binders to serve in the police printing press vide Memo dated 25-8-1996. Thereafter, the Director General and Inspector General of Police, passed an order on 30-12-2000 repatriating the petitioners to their parent department-KSRP and in pursuance of that order of the Director General and Inspector General of Police, the petitioners were relieved from the Printing press on 1 -1 -2001 with a direction to report for duty at KSRP.
6. Being aggrieved by the above action, petitioners filed Application Nos. 71 to 76 of 2001 before the Tribunal. The Tribunal having admitted those applications, granted an interim order on 22nd May, 2001 directing continuation of the services of the petitioners in the printing press till 8-6-2001 and, we are told that the interim order was subsequently extended. In the meanwhile, the petitioners made a representation to the Director General and Inspector General of Police requesting to retain their services in the printing press. The Director General and Inspector General of Police having appreciated the grievance of the petitioners issued an order dated 6-6-2001 marked as Annexure-A. 14 cancelling the earlier order dated 30-12-2000 and continuing the services of the petitioners in the printing press.
7. At this stage, the contesting private respondents being aggrieved by Annexure-A. 14 dated 6-6-2001 filed Application Nos. 6631 to 6643 of 2001 before the Tribunal praying for the following reliefs:
'(i) To issue writ of mandamus, order of direction to respondent No. 2 to enforce the orders contained in Standing Order No. 956 dated 22-8-2000 of respondent No. 2 at Annexure-A 10 and repatriate respondents 3 to 9 to their parent unit of KSRP forthwith by quashing Memo No. PRAKASI (2) 143/2000-01, Dated 6-6-2001 at Annexure-A 14;
(ii) To issue a writ of certiorari, order or direction to set aside the memos No. STF. 2/333/85-86, dated 3-3-1986 and STF-2/141/86-87 dated 19-12-1986 at Annexures-A3 and A4 respectively in which respondent Nos. 3 to 8 were promoted to higher technical grades in the press;
(iii) To issue a writ of mandamus, order of direction to respondent No. 1 to take prompt and expeditious action for finalising, approving and notifying the C and R Rules for the employees of the press;
(iv) To issue writ of mandamus, order or direction to respondents 1 and 2 to consider the applicants for promotion to the higher grades, which promotion they are legitimately entitled to on a proper consideration of the facts and circumstances as well as their qualifications and experience in the light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, and
(v) to grant such other relief/s as this Hon'ble Tribunal deems fit in the facts and circumstances of the case including the costs of this application.'
8. In the Applications filed before the Tribunal, it was contended by the contesting private respondents that the petitioners are not technically trained personnel to take up the job in the printing press; they are not qualified or experienced to occupy the promotional posts in the printing press; their deployment to the printing press is contrary to the provisions of the Karnataka Police Manual-Volume II; their deployment in the printing press is not in public interest and the promotional avenues of the contesting private respondents were blocked due to illegal promotions of the petitioners.
9. Applications were opposed by the respondents-authorities as well as the petitioners herein by filing reply statements/statement of objections. In the reply statement filed by the State authorities, the deployment of the writ petitioners to the printing press was justified by contending that the said action was in the interest of the administration to run the press to sub-serve public interest; services of the petitioners have been utilized in the printing press ever since its inception in the year 1976 and the petitioners have given their willingness to work in the printing press permanently; the petitioners had given an undertaking that they would not claim their right of promotion in the KSRP Unit and therefore, the repatriation order dated 30-12-2000 was withdrawn. It was also contended by the State authorities that the case of the contesting private respondents for promotion would be considered as soon as the Government accords approval to the draft C and R Rules submitted to it vide letter dated 11-12-1989 of the Director General and Inspector General of Police.
10. In the reply statement/statement of objections filed by the petitioners herein, it was contended that the next promotional post of the contesting private respondents in their respective cadres are Compositors, Machine Minders and Binders, whereas the petitioners were working as Senior Compositors, Senior Machine Minders and Senior Binders having been promoted to those posts during the year 1986 itself; the petitioners are not occupying the promotional posts of the contesting private respondents and therefore the contesting private respondents cannot be regarded as aggrieved persons due to the absorption and promotions of the petitioners in the printing press.
11. The Tribunal having appreciated the pleadings of the parties and the material documents placed before it and having formed an opinion that the transfer and absorption of the KSRP personnel in the printing press could be done only in terms of Rule 16-a of the Karnataka Civil Services (General) Recruitment Rules, 1977 and since the deployment of the petitioners to the service of the printing press was not in accordance with the said rule and taking exception to the promotion of the petitioners to higher cadres in the printing press, but, denying similar promotion to the contesting private respondents on the ground that the C and R Rules are not framed, disposed of the applications. The operative portion of the order reads as follows:
'In view of the above, the promotions given to Respondents 3 to 8 while Annexure-A3 bearing No. STF/ 2/333/85-86, dated 3-3-1986 and Annexure-A4 bearing No. STF 2/141/86-87, dated 19-12-1986 are set aside prospectively from today. The respondents 1 and 2 are directed to finalise and publish the C and R Rules for the Printing Press and take further action to examine and consider the cases of the Applicants for promotion in accordance with the C and R rules'.
12. It is also appropriate to notice what the Tribunal has observed in paragraph 7 of the order. It reads:
'Regarding the Relief sought for by the applicants to direct the second respondent to repatriate respondents 3 to 9 to their parent unit of KSRP in accordance with the Circular Standing Order No. 956, dated 22-8-2000 and quash Memo No. Prakasi (2) 143 : 2000-2001, dated 6-6-2001 at Annexure-A14, though it is an administrative decision to be taken by the first and second respondents as to how to use the service of its employees, it is not permissible to deviate from Standing Order No. 956 as long as the order is in force. The first and second respondents may look into this aspect and take appropriate decision expeditiously'.
13. We have heard Sri K. Subba Rao, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, Sri. S. Prakash Shetty, learned Government Advocate for Respondents-1 and 2 and Sri. Dinakar, learned Counsel for Respondents-3 to 15.
14. Sri K. Subba Rao, at the threshold, would contend that Respondents-3 to 15 cannot be regarded as 'aggrieved persons' and, therefore, the Application Nos. 6631 to 6643 of 2001 filed by them before the Tribunal are not maintainable. Elaborating the above contention, Sri Subba Rao would point out that Respondents-3 to 15 were appointed on 25-8-1986, whereas, the petitioners were working in the Printing Press from the year 1975; the petitioners were not only serving in the Printing Press from the year 1975 but in course of time they were also promoted to higher cadres after the Government fixed the cadre-strength as per Order-Annexure-A1 dated 11-11-1981. Sri Subba Rao would contend that the transfer and absorption of the services of the petitioners in the Printing Press and the subsequent promotions granted to them, in no way, would impair or violate any of the legal rights of Respondents-3 to 15, because, the transfer and absorption of the petitioners in the Printing Press and their subsequent promotions took place well before 25-8-1986. Sri. Subba Rao would next contend that the Applications filed by Respondents-3 to 15 before the Tribunal are liable to be dismissed in limine without going into the merits of the matter solely on the ground of delay and laches. Sri. Subba Rao would highlight that in the Applications, Respondents-3 to 15 sought for quashing of Annexure-A3 dated 3-3-1986 and Annexure-A4 dated 19-12-1986, whereby and whereunder the petitioners were granted promotions, after a lapse of 15 years and there is absolutely no satisfactory explanation why Respondents-3 to 15 could not challenge the validity of Annexure-A3 and Annexure-A4 earlier. Sri Subba Rao would also contend that the petitioners have already put in about 30 years of service in the Printing Press and they are in the verge of attaining the age of superannuation within two or three years from now, and even assuming that their initial appointment and absorption of their services in the Printing Press are irregular and not in strict conformity with law requirements, even then, this is not a case where the Tribunal on the Court would be justified in upsetting the settled matter. Sri. Subba Rao would highlight that the State action in recalling the repatriation order is based on a policy decision and in the public interest, because, in the pleading of the State Authorities, it is stated that the petitioners have acquired job and technical experience having worked in the Printing Press ever since the year 1975. Sri. S. Prakash Shetty, learned Government Advocate while supporting the State action impugned before the Tribunal, would adopt and supplement the arguments of Sri. Subba Rao.
15. Sri. Dinakar, learned Counsel for Respondents-3 to 15, per contra, would reiterate and highlight the same contentions urged before the Tribunal on behalf of his clients to which a reference is made by us supra. In addition, Sri. Dinakar would contend that the State Authorities are guilty of practicing invidious discrimination in the matter of granting promotions to the petitioners and Respondents-3 to 15. Sri Dinakar would contend that even in the absence of C and R Rules governing Recruitment of Personnel in the Printing Press, the respondents-authorities, admittedly, have promoted the petitioners after the Government issued the Order-Annexure-Al dated 11-11-1981, but, none of the Respondents-3 to 15 has been granted any promotion though by this time they have put-in more than 19 years of service in the Printing Press and this differential treatment meted out to Respondents-3 to 15 is nothing but a blatant violation of Article 14 postulates. Sri. Dinakar, while drawing our attention to certain provisions of Chapter-XLII of the Karnataka Police Manual-Volume-11, would highlight that the job requirement of Reserve Police and the job requirement in the Printing Press is altogether different, since the petitioners were appointed as Reserve Police, they are totally ill-equipped to carry out the job required of them in the Printing Press, whereas, his clients Respondents-3 to 15 are exclusively recruited to serve only in the Printing Press.
16. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, the question that arises for our decision is whether any ground is made out for us to interfere with the order of the Tribunal impugned in this writ petition
17. We find considerable force in the first two contentions raised by Sri. K. Subba Rao. The relevant facts are not in dispute. Though the petitioners contended that they were exclusively appointed as Police Constables (Technical) to serve only in the Printing Press, there is no satisfactory evidence for us to accept that contention. In the year 1975-76, the Government did not sanction Police Printing Press nor the Government did grant cadre-strength of the Police Printing Press; there were not even any administrative instructions issued by the Government to create the Police Printing Press. Therefore, we hold that the petitioners were actually appointed as Reserve Police Constables, but, their services were deployed in the Printing Press to meet the exigency of the services. It might be that before the petitioners were deployed to serve in the Printing Press they were given some training in the Central Prison but, only on that basis, it could not be said that the petitioners were exclusively recruited and appointed as Police Constables (Technical) to serve in the Printing Press. Having said it, the Court cannot lose sight of the fact that admittedly, in the year 1975 itself, immediately after their appointment, the petitioners were directed to serve in the Police Printing Press and from that day onwards, till date, all of them except who left the job or who died, have been continuously serving as personnel in the Printing Press.
18. When the matter stood thus, after issuance of Order-Annexure :A1 dated 11-11-1981, the Office of the Director of General and Inspector General of Police, Karnataka State, issued an order dated 26-11-1982, whereby and whereunder the petitioners were transferred and posted to the Police Printing Press for a period of two years on deputation basis in the interest of public service. The above order was followed by another order issued by the Director General and Inspector General of Police dated 15-7-1983 whereby and whereunder, the Director General of Police and Inspector General of Police in modification of the earlier order dated 26-11-1982, posted the petitioners against the posts sanctioned by the Karnataka Government under Annexure-A1 dated 11-11-1981. The contention of Sri. Dinakar that the order dated 26-11-1982 and further order dated 15-7-1983 of the Director General of Police and Inspector General of Police would not lend any support to the case of the petitioners that they became employees of the Printing Press and therefore, their repatriation to the Police Department could not be faulted, is not acceptable to us. Similarly, the alternative argument of Sri Dinakar that the petitioners' services could not be absorbed in the Printing Press in the absence of C and R Rules, is also not acceptable to us. As seen above, the petitioners have been working in the Printing Press even in the absence of C and R Rules from the year 1975. But, after the Karnataka Government issued Order-Annexure -A1 sanctioning cadre strength, there was absolutely no legal or constitutional impediment for the Director General of Police and Inspector General of Police to fit the petitioners against the sanctioned posts. The power of the Government of the power of the Director General of Police and Inspector General of Police to transfer the personnel from one department to another department, in the public interest, could not be questioned and in fact it was not questioned. What was questioned is that the services of the petitioners could not have been transferred from Karnataka Reserve Police to Printing Press in the absence of the C and R Rules. It is not the requirement of law that if certain posts are created by the lawful authorities in the public interest, the competent authority to which power of appointment is entrusted/delegated shall not make appointments to such sanctioned posts in the absence of C and R Rules, unless the law directs otherwise. In this regard, what the Apex Court has observed in para 3 of the Judgment in the case of The Mysore State Road Transport Corporation v. Gopinath Gundachar, : (1968)IILLJ144SC is quite apt to be noticed. It reads:
'In Dundee Harbour Trustees v. D. and J. Nicol 1915 AC 550 at P.556 Viscount Haldane L.C. said: 'The answer to the question whether a corporation created by a statute has a particular power depends exclusively on whether that power has been expressly given to it by the statute regulating it, or can be implied from the language used. The question is simply one of the construction of language and not of presumption.' Bearing in mind this statement of law, let us consider whether the appellant had the power to appoint officers and servants and to lay down their conditions of service in the absence of regulations framed under Section 45(2) of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950. The appellant is an autonomous Corporation incorporated under the Act for the purpose of operating road transport services in the State and extended areas. For the proper discharge of its functions, it is necessary for the Corporation to appoint officers and servants. Section 14(2) expressly confers upon the Corporation the incidental power to appoint such officers and servants as it considers necessary for the efficient performance of its functions. Section 19(1)(c) empowers it to provide for its employees suitable conditions of service. Section 14(3) provides that the conditions of appointment and service and the scales of pay of its officers and servants shall be such as may, subject to the provisions of Section 34, be determined by regulations made under the Act. Section 45(2)(c) empowers the Corporation to frame regulations with the previous sanction of the State Government prescribing the conditions of appointment, service and scales of pay of the officers and servants. If the State Government issues any directions under Section 34 relating to the recruitment and conditions of service of the employees, the Corporation must obey those directions. The conjoint effect of Sections 14(3)(b), 34 and 45(2)(c) is that the appointment of officers and servants and their conditions of service must conforms to the directions, if any, given by the State Government under Section 34 and the regulations, if any, framed under Section 45(2)(c). But until such regulations are framed or directions are given, the Corporation may appoint such officers or servants as may be necessary for the efficient performance of its duties on such terms and conditions as it thinks fit. There is necessarily a time-lag between the formation of the Corporation and the framing of regulations under Section 45(2)(c). During the intervening period, the Corporation must carry on the administration of its affairs with the help of officers and servants. In the absence of clear words, it is difficult to impute to the legislature the intention that the Corporation would have no power to appoint officers and servants and fix the conditions of service unless the regulations under Section 45(2)(c) are framed.
19. Sri. Dinakar was not in a position to point out any provision of law which prohibited the Director General of Police and Inspector General of Police from making appointment to the posts sanctioned by the Government of Karnataka under Order: Annexure-A1. After issuance of Order: Annexure-Al not only the Director General of Police and Inspector General of Police transferred and absorbed the services of the petitioners in the Printing Press vide order dated 26-11 -1982 and 15-7-1983 as noticed above, but also granted promotions to the petitioners vide order dated 3-3-1986 and 19-12-1986. All the three events, viz., transfer, absorption and promotion of the petitioners in the Printing Press took place well before Respondents-3 to 15 were appointed as Junior Compositors, Junior Machine Minders and Junior Binders. We are at a loss to understand how the transfer and absorption of the services of the petitioners which were made in the year 1982-83 and further promotions which were granted to them as per Annexure-A3 and Annexure- A4 during the year 1986, would in any way impair or violate any of the legal rights of Respondents-3 to 15. However, it is the contention of Sri. Dinakar that since the petitioners were granted promotions as per Annexure-A3 dated 3-3-1986 and Annexure-A4 dated 19-12-1986 to the higher sanctioned posts, the avenues of promotions which are otherwise available to Respondents-3 to 15 are blocked. Sri. Dinakar would not stop at that but would highlight that the respondents having illegally granted promotions to the petitioners under Annexure-A3 and Annexure-A4 even in the absence of C and R Rules as reflected in the pleadings of the respondents-authorities, they say that, they would consider the claims of Respondents-3 to 15 for promotion only after the C and R Rules receive approval of the State Government. Sri Dinakar would point out that though the draft C and R Rules were framed in the year 1987 and forwarded to the State Government for approval, admittedly, the State Government has not yet accorded approval. Sri Dinakar basing his arguments on the case law laid down by the Apex Court, would contend that an employee in his/her official career cannot be stagnated at the stage at which he/she is initially recruited and there should be an opportunity for them to earn one or two promotions. There is nothing before us to show that all the sanctioned posts in various cadres as sanctioned by the State Government under Annexure-A1, have been filled and therefore, there is no scope for the State Authorities to consider the case of the Respondents-3 to 15 for promotion to the higher cadres. It is true that, in the absence of C and R Rules but before Respondents-3 to 15 were appointed to the service, the petitioners were promoted. It is also true that the pleading filed by the State Authorities, as pointed out by the Tribunal in its order, would show the stand of the State Authorities that the case of the Respondents-3 to 15 would be considered for promotion only after C and R Rules receive approval of the State Government. Looking from that angle, there seems to be some inconsistency in the stand of the State. But, only on that count the Tribunal cannot step-in and set-at-naught the promotions which were granted to the petitioners well before Respondents 3 to 15 joined the service. There is no impediment for Respondents 3 to 15 to work-out their legal remedies against their non-promotions to the higher cadres. Respondents-3 to 15 might have sought for a mandamus to consider their case also for promotions to the higher cadres. It is neither said nor shown that all the sanctioned posts in all cadres under Annexure-A1 have been filled. It also needs to be noticed that as on today, none of the petitioners are holding the post to which respondents 3 to 15 could seek promotion. Looking from that angle also, Respondents-3 to 15 cannot have any grievance against the promotions earned by the petitioners. Cumulatively, it is quite clear that the transfer and absorption of the services of the petitioners and their subsequent promotions to the higher cadre has not impaired or violated any of the legal rights of Respondents-3 to 15.
20. The Supreme Court in the case of Gopabandhu Biswal v. Krishna Chandra Mohanty and Ors., 1998 SCC (L&S;) 1147 in Paras-12 and 13 of Judgment, had to deal with the meaning of 'aggrieved person'. It reads:
'12. Undoubtedly when the Tribunal interprets service rules and regulations: the interpretation so given may affect other members of that service-past, present or future. One can understand a wider meaning in this context being given to the phrase 'person aggrieved', thus enlarging the right of persons to intervene either at the hearing before the Tribunal, of in appeal, or for filing a review petition. Nevertheless, this right must be exercised at the appropriate time and in accordance with law. The review petition must be within the scope of Section 22(3)(f) of the Administrative Tribunals Act read with Order 47 Rule 1 and must comply with the Rules framed under the Administrative Tribunals Act. The present review applications are not within the principles laid down in Order 47 Rule 1. They also do not comply with the relevant Rules. Rule 17 of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987 prescribes, interalia, that no application for review shall be entertained unless it is filed within thirty days from the date of the receipt of a copy of the order sought to be reviewed. In the present case the review petitions were filed one and a half years after the main judgment was delivered and one year after the special leave petition was dismissed. We do not find any explanation for this delay.
13. It is difficult to include the applicants in the review applications in the category of 'persons aggrieved'. The main applicant, i.e., the present appellant Biswal had joined as party respondent all those persons who had superseded him for selection to the Indian Police Service since they would be persons affected in case he succeeded in this application. The Tribunal has directed that Biswal be considered for promotion between 1977 and 1980 and not thereafter. During this period, the two applicants in Review Application No. 16 of 1993 were nowhere within the zone of consideration for promotion to IPS. One of the applicants joined the police service only 1974 and was not eligible for further promotion till in 1982. The other applicant, though eligible for promotion, was on account of his rank in the seniority list, not within the zone of consideration at any time prior to 5-11 -1980. As a matter of fact the two applicants in Review Application No. 16 of 1993 were selected for promotion to IPS only in 1993 when they were included in the select list of 1993. Therefore, they would not have been made parties in TA No. 1 of 1989. At that point of time, these applicants had only a chance of promotion in future. This does not confer any legal right on these applicants and they cannot be considered as parties aggrieved by the impugned judgment. However leniently one may construe the term 'party aggrieved', a person not directly affected cannot be so considered. Otherwise for years to come, every person who becomes eligible for promotion will be considered a 'partly aggrieved' when the Tribunal interprets any service rule such as in the present case. Only persons who are directly and immediately affected by the impugned order can be considered as 'parties aggrieved' under Section 22(3)(f) read with Order 47 Rule 1'.
21. Further, the Supreme Court in the case of Bar Council Of Maharashtra v. M. V. Dabholkar Etc., : [1976]1SCR306 observed thus:
'Where a right of appeal to Courts against an administrative or judicial decision is created by statute, the right is invariably confined to a person aggrieved or a person who claims to be aggrieved. The meaning of the words 'a person aggrieved' may vary according to the context of the statute. One of the meanings is that a person will be held to be aggrieved by a decision if that decision is materially adverse to him. Normally, one is required to establish that one has been denied or deprived of something to which one is legally entitled in order to make one 'a person aggrieved'. Again a person is aggrieved if a legal burden is imposed on him. The meaning of the words 'a person aggrieved' is sometimes given a restricted meaning in certain statutes which provide remedies for the protection of private legal rights. The restricted meaning requires denial or deprivation of legal rights. A more liberal approach is required in the background of statutes which do not deal with property rights but deal with professional conduct and morality. The role of the Bar Council under Advocates Act is comparable to the role of a guardian in professional ethics. The words 'persons aggrieved' in Sections 37 and 38 of the Act are of wide import and should not be subjected to a restricted interpretation of possession or denial of legal rights or burdens or financial interests. The test is whether the words 'person aggrieved' include 'a person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been made which prejudicially affects his interests.' It has, therefore, to be found out whether the Bar Council has a grievance in respect of an order or decision affecting the professional conduct and etiquette.'
22. We also find force in the contention of Sri Subba Rao that the relief sought for by Respondents-3 to 15 should have been denied by the Tribunal only on the ground of delay and laches. It is quite often reiterated that the law helps the diligent and not the indolent. As pointed out supra, the transfer and absorption of services of the petitioners in the Printing Press and their promotions under Annexure-A3 and Annexure-A4 took place well before 25-8-1986, when Respondents-3 to 15 joined the service. As could be seen from the records placed before us, only in the year 2000, the contesting respondents seem to have made a grievance. For a long period of 14 years, they did not arise any objection either to the transfer and absorption of services of the petitioners in the Printing Press or promotions granted to them under Annexure-A3 dated 3-3-1986 and under Annexure-A4 dated 19-12-1986. Though Sri. Dinakar would meekly contend before us that even before 2002 his clients were making representations with regard to their grievances, there is absolutely no evidence to support that Shakuntala Bai and Anr. v. Sailatha Anandlea. Be that as it may, even assuming that Respondents-3 to 15 had made certain representations to the Director General and Inspector general of Police or to the State Government, that circumstance would not come to the aid of Respondents-3 to 15 to contend that there was no delay and laches on their part. In this regard, the following observations of the Apex Court in para 2 of the Judgment in the case of P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State Of Tamil Nadu, : [1975]2SCR356 can profitably be noticed:
'The main grievance of the appellant is that the 2nd respondent who was junior to him as Assistant Engineer was promoted as Divisional Engineer in 1957 by relaxing the relevant rules regarding the length of service necessary for promotion as Divisional Engineer and that his claim for a similar relaxation was not considered at that time. The learned Judge of the Madras High Court who heard the writ petition was of the view that the relaxation of the rules in favour of the 2nd respondent without considering the appellant's case was arbitrary. In view of the statement on behalf of the Government that such relaxation was given only in the case of overseas scholars, which statement was not controverted, it is not possible to agree with the view of the learned Judge. Be that as it may, if the appellant was aggrieved by it he should have approached the Court in the year 1957 after the two representations made by him had failed to produce any result. One cannot sleep over the matter and come to the Court questioning that relaxation in the year 1971. There is the further fact that even after Respondents-3 and 4 were promoted as Divisional Engineers over the head of the appellant he did not come to the Court questioning it. There was a third opportunity for him to have come to the Court when respondents 2 to 4 were again promoted as Superintending Engineers over the head of the appellant. After fourteen long years because of the tempting prospect of the Chief Engineer ship he has come to the Court. In effect he wants to unscramble a scrambled egg. It is very difficult for the Government to consider whether any relaxation of the rules should have been made in favour of the appellant in the year 1957. The conditions that were prevalent in 1957 cannot be reproduced now. In any case as the Government had decided as a matter of policy, as they were entitled to do, not to relax the rules in favour of any except overseas scholars it will be wholly pointless to direct them to consider the appellant's case as if nothing had happened after 1957. Not only respondent 2 but also respondents 3 and 4 who were the appellant's juniors became Divisional Engineers in 1957 apparently on the ground that their merits deserved their promotion over the head of the appellant. He did not question it. Nor did he question the promotion of his juniors as Superintending Engineers over his head, he could have come to the Court on every one of these three occasions. A person aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior over his head should approach the Court at least within six months or at the most a year of such promotion. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle matters. The petitioner's petition should, therefore, have been dismissed in limine. Entertaining such petitions is a waste of time of the Court. It clogs the work of the Court and impedes the work of the Court in considering legitimate grievances as also its normal work. We consider that the High Court was right in dismissing the appellant's petition as well as the appeal.'
23 Alternatively, it needs to be noticed that it is well settled by the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of T. Shantharam v. State Of Karnataka And Ors. 1995 SCC(L&S;)537 that when an employee works in a post for a long time, it should be deemed that his services have been absorbed. In that case the appellant was appointed in the Revenue Department as Second Division Clerk in Mangalore on 8-10-1963. He was sent on deputation to the Food and Civil Supplies Department which was then part of Revenue Department as Assistant Civil supplies Inspector on 26-12-1967 and was promoted to the post of Second Grade Civil Supplies Inspector on 11 -9-1968 which post is stated to be equivalent to the post of Sheristedar. The 5th Respondent, Mr. R.K. Vasudev was appointed as a Second Division Clerk on 22-1-1965 in Food Wing of the Revenue Department. Thereafter, he was regularised as Second Division Clerk on 30-9-1971 and was promoted as a Sheristedar on 17-6-1982. The Supreme Court in such fact-situation having noticed that in all levels of appointments and promotions, the appellant was senior to the 5th respondent, held that it would be highly unjust to send the appellant back to his Parent Department and that the Tribunal ought not to have interfered with the action of the department in absorbing the services of the appellant in the Food and Civil Supplies Department.
24. The law declared in the above case squarely applies to the facts of this case also. All the petitioners have already put-in-more than 30 years of service in the Printing Press and they have gained experience and expertise in the Printing Press and all of them are on the verge of reaching the age of superannuation within two or three years. At this distance of time, if they are repatriated to the K.S.R.P, it would neither serve any public purpose nor serve the interest of the petitioners or for that matter, even the interests of Respondents-3 to 15.
25. In conclusion we cannot sustain the order of the Tribunal impugned in this writ petition. Accordingly, we allow the writ petition and set aside the impugned order of the Tribunal dated 20-12-2002 and dismiss Application Nos. 6631 and 6643 of 2001 filed by Respondents-3 to 15 herein. However, we make it clear that this order shall not come in the way of Respondents-3 to 15 working out their legal remedies in accordance with law for promotions in an independent legal action without disturbing the transfer and absorption of the services of the petitioners in the Printing Press or the promotions which were already granted to the petitioners before 25-8-1986. No order as to costs.