R.P. Sethi, C.J.
1. Aggrieved by the Notification No. LAQ (1) SR. 16 : 85-86, dated 7-4-1986 issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, ('the Act' for short) Annexure-A and the Notification No. RD. 53.AOB.87, dated 12-6-1987 issued under Section 6 of the Act, Annexure-E, respondent 1 herein, filed W.P. No. 15912 of 1987 with prayer for setting aside the same alleging it to be against the provisions of law and the result of extraneous consideration. It was further submitted that no enquiry within the meaning of Section 5-A of the Act was held and no reasonable opportunity was provided of being heard before passing the final notification. The learned Single Judge found that there was no substance in the submission of the respondent 1 herein insofar as he complained of non-holding of enquiry under Section 5-A or made grievance regarding not providing adequate opportunity. However the writ petition was allowed on the ground of action of the respondent-authorities being the consequence of extraneous considerations. It was found that along with the land belonging to the writ petitioner bearing Survey No. 83 another piece of land bearing Survey No. 86 had been earlier acquired but proceedings with respect to Survey No. 86 were dropped without assigning any reason.
2. It was submitted by the petitioner that he and the other members of his joint family were cultivating 14.30 acres of land in Survey Nos. 57, 58, 69 and 83 of Byrasandra Village. Survey No. 83 measures 7.14 acres. In the year 1942 Survey No. 69 was acquired leaving the petitioner and his family with only Survey Nos. 57, 58 and 83. In the year 1968 land measuring 1.20 acres was acquired out of Survey No. 83. In the year 1973 vide notification dated 23-6-1973 issued under Section 6 of the Act, Survey Nos. 57 and 58 comprising an area of 2.16 acres was again acquired for the purposes of the appellant. In the aforesaid notificationan area of 4.20 acres of Survey No. 83 had also been notified for acquisition. .However on the representation of the petitioner the acquisition proceedings were dropped under Section 48 of the Act. After the Karnataka Land Reforms Act came into force an application was filed before the Tribunal, Bangalore, claiming occupancy rights in respect of remaining area in Survey No. 83. On this application the Land Tribunal registered the writ petitioner as an occupant of 4.24 acres in Survey No. 83 in LRF Nos. 2074 and 2049 of 1974-75. The petitioner claimed that his family consisted of three brothers having a family strength of 20 persons. It was claimed that a dairy farm had been established in Survey No. 83. Second respondent, vide the notification impugned in the writ petition, again initiated action for acquisition of the land comprising Survey No. 83. In response to the notice issued under Section 4 of the Act, the writ petitioner preferred objection statement on 18-7-1986 vide Annexure-C. But the third respondent, allegedly without giving any opportunity of being heard, adjourned the case from time to time and ultimately sent the report under Section 5-A of the Act. In pursuance of the report submitted by the third respondent the final notification was issued with respect to Survey No. 83. It is submitted that along with the petitioner's land in Survey No. 83 proposal was made for acquisition of Survey No. 86. The proposal for acquisition of Survey No. 86 was also made in the preliminary notification. The owner of the Survey No. 86 made submissions that he has no objection for the acquisition of the land provided he was paid a compensation of Rs. 3 lakhs per acre, as is evident from Annexure-F. The objections filed by the writ petitioner are stated to have been overruled before issuance of the final declaration Annexure-E. It was submitted that the respondents had initiated and concluded the action of acquisition in a casual manner, no reason was assigned for dropping the proceedings with respect to Survey No. 86 and acquiring the land comprising Survey No. 83 though both the survey numbers were sought to be acquired vide Annexure-A. It was further submitted that the order sheet maintained by the 3rd respondent clearly showed that the writ petitioner was not afforded reasonable opportunity of being heard before the submission of the report under Section 5-A of the Act. It was contended that non-compliance of the amended provisions vitiated the acquisition proceedings. The third respondent was alleged to have failed to communicate the writ petitioner the submission of the report to the Government, as was the mandate of law. It was contended that the respondents had declined to drop the acquisition proceedings in respect of Survey No. 83 on the ground that it came in the middle of the project which was stated to be incorrect. The petitioner presumed that the action of the respondent was for extraneous reasons and discriminatory. It was further submitted that as impugned notifications were issued after Act 68 of 1984 came into force, the same were without jurisdiction as the expression, 'public purpose', excluded acquisition of the land for the company as the appellant is. It was pleaded that the respondents should have followed the procedure prescribed under Chapter VII of the Act which govern the procedure for the acquisition of the land for the Company. It was further contended that the impugnednotifications were not published either in any newspaper or in Byrasandra Village or in surrounding villages of Byrasandra. The acquisition of the land was apprehended to deprive the writ petitioner of his right of livelihood as he had claimed to have established a dairy farm in the land, the subject-matter of the litigation.
3. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record.
4. The learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has vehemently argued that the learned Single Judge was not justified in allowing the writ petition on the alleged grounds of mala fides as according to him the respondent 1 had nowhere pleaded that the action of the Acquiring Authorities was actuated by extraneous considerations. In support of his contention he has relied upon the judgment reported in Gulam Mustafa and Others v State of Maharashtra, wherein it has been held that charge of mala fides against the authorities are usually more easily made than made out. It was the last refuge of a losing litigant. It is submitted that allegations of mala fides are required to be pleaded and proved like a criminal charge and cannot be decided on vague and ambiguous allegations made by applying the test of probabilities. It is contended that the respondent had only submitted that the acquisition of Survey No. 86 was dropped for extraneous reasons, without giving details of such extraneous considerations. It is further contended that mere dropping of proceedings with respect to Survey No. 86, did not mean that the action with respect to Survey No. 83 was the result of mala fides or actuated by extraneous considerations. In support of his contention the learned Counsel for the appellant has referred to a judgment reported in Chandra Bansi Singh and Others v State of Bihar and Others, wherein it is held that under such circumstances direction could be issued for acquisition of the land regarding which the proceedings were dropped but on that ground alone the acquisition with respect to the other land could not be set aside or quashed.
5. While supporting the judgment, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents has vehemently submitted that as the impugned notification was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, the same was rightly quashed by the learned Single Judge. It is submitted that action initiated was a mala fide exercise of power which required to be quashed. There was no justification for the authorities to drop the proceedings so far as Sy. No. 86 was concerned and acquire the land comprising Sy. No. 83. It is contended that with the acquisition of Sy. No. 83, the respondent herein would be rendered homeless as no other land would be left with him.
6. The mere fact of releasing one survey number from the ambit of acquisition proceedings cannot be made a basis for quashing the acquisition with respect to Sy. No. 83 allegedly on the ground of violation of Article 14. The Supreme Court in Chandra Bansi Singh's case, supra,dealing with such a situation held that the release being a separate and subsequent act of the Collector, could not invalidate the entire notification and would also not amount to infringement of Article 14 of the Constitution. The reliance of the learned Counsel for the respondents on Sengara Singh and Others v State of Punjab and Others is misplaced. In that case the Court was concerned with the service conditions of the police personnel who were admittedly similarly situated but were differently treated in the matter of reinstatement. The reinstatement of the dismissed employees cannot be equated with the dropping of the acquisition proceedings under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. Acquisition of the land does not completely deprive the person of his right over the property inasmuch as he in duly compensated under the Act, whereas the dismissal of the civil servant results in the forfeiture of his service career. Article 14 has to be made applicable in a realistic manner and not in hypothetical, academic, imaginary or artificial manner.
7. The respondents have also shown us the record which necessitated the dropping of the proceedings so far as Sy. No. 86 was concerned. In their letter dated 20-7-1974 the appellant-company had intimated the Divisional Commissioner, Bangalore Division, that on account of severe financial restraints imposed by the Government of India they had decided to restrict the acquisition proceedings to a specified limit for which the approval of the Government of India had already been received. They prayed for the dropping of the acquisition of various numbers detailed therein which include Sy. No. 86. On receipt of the letter the Government considered the matter and dropped the acquisition proceedings with respect of various survey numbers including Sy. No. 86. No fault, therefore, be found in the action of the acquiring authority which dropped the acquisition proceedings with respect to various lands including Sy. No. 86. The learned Single Judge was, therefore, not right in concluding that the action of acquisition with respect to the land of the appellant was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
8. Similarly we do not find any force in the submission of the writ petitioners that the acquisition of the land comprising Sy. No. 83 was actuated by extraneous consideration and was the result of mala fides. A perusal of the pleadings falsifies the contention of the petitioners inasmuch as no circumstances were brought to the notice of the Court to hold that the action of acquisition of the land belonging to the writ petitioners was the result of mala fides. In similar circumstances this Court in Bangalore Development Authority v Dr. H.S. Hanumanthappa, held:
'11. The reliance placed by the Counsel for the Authority on the two decisions of the Supreme Court in this connection is very appropriate. In the decision reported in Chandra Bansi Singh, supra, a large tract of land belonging to several persons was sought to be acquired for the purpose of construction of houses andallotment to the people belonging to the low and middle income groups by issuing notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. Six years thereafter, the land belonging to a particular family was released by the Government by way of a pure and simple favouritism. The Supreme Court held that the release would be bad and non est, and the notification issued under Section 4 initially would be deemed to be valid and the land released to the family would form part of the acquisition. The Supreme Court also held that the release being a separate and subsequent act, could not invalidate the entire notification, but would only invalidate the portion released with the result that the original notification would be restored to its position. The Supreme Court observed that sometimes while taking a pragmatic and progressive action under a statute in the general public interest, the Government succumbs to internal or external pressures by a citizen or group of citizens, so as to show special favour to them which destroys the laudable object of the nature of the action. It was pointed out that such a course adopted by the Government to help a few chosen friends at the cost of the people in general, frustrates the very object of the meaningful State action. In paragraph 11 of the judgment, the Supreme Court examined the contention that the entire acquisition of lands should be declared as unconstitutional, even though a very small fraction of it was hit by the mischief of Article 14. The Supreme Court held that the entire acquisition cannot be disturbed even though the release of certain lands in favour of a particular family was opposed to the public interest. The second decision in Chandigarh Administration v Jagjit Singh, reflects how the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge is unsustainable. The Chandigarh Administration held an auction and the highest bidder secured the leasehold rights for 99 years in respect of a plot of land. The highest bidder deposited certain amount and committed default in respect of payment of balance. The proceedings were taken for cancellation of the bid and the lease was cancelled forfeiting the amount already paid. The bidder secured the refund of the amount and thereafter filed a review petition for reconsideration of the order of cancellation. The review petition was dismissed, but, a second review petition succeeded and the Chief Commissioner had directed that the plot should be restored to the highest bidder provided the entire payment as per the bid was deposited. The payment along with interest as directed, was not made and the bidder then approached the High Court seeking the relief or directing the Administration to accept the amount with interest and pass appropriate order. The bidder failed in his attempt and then again moved the State Officer to settle the case in the alleged policy of the Administration to restore the plot to defaulters. TheAdministration did not grant the relief, but the High Court in exercise of Writ Jurisdiction, granted the relief sought by the bidder. The Administration carried the matter to the Supreme Court. It would be appropriate to set out the relevant portion in paragraph 8 of the judgment delivered by Mr. Justice Jeevan Reddy:
'Generally speaking, the mere fact that the respondent-authority has passed a particular order in the case of another person similarly situated can never be the ground for issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner on the plea of discrimination. The order in favour of the other person might be legal and valid or it might not be. That has to be investigated first before it can be directed to be followed in the case of the petitioner. If the order in favour of the other person is found to be contrary to law or not warranted in the facts and circumstances of his case, it is obvious that such illegal or unwarranted order cannot be made the basis of issuing a writ compelling the respondent-authority to repeat the illegality or to pass another unwarranted order. The extraordinary and discretionary power of the High Court cannot be exercised for such a purpose. Merely because the respondent-authority has passed one illegal/unwarranted order, it does not entitle the High Court to compel the authority to repeat that illegality over again and again. The illegal/unwarranted action must be corrected, if it can be done according to law indeed, wherever it is possible, the Court should direct the Appropriate Authority to correct such wrong orders in accordance with law, but even if it cannot be corrected, it cannot be made a basis for its repetition. But refusing to direct the respondent-authority to repeat the illegality, the Court is not condoning the earlier illegal act/order nor can such illegal order constitute the basis for a legitimate complaint of discrimination. Giving effect to such plea would be prejudicial to the interests of law and will do incalculable mischief to public interest. It will be a negation of law and rule of law. Of course, if in case the order in favour of the other person is found to be lawful and justified one, it can be followed and a similar relief can be given to the petitioner if it is found that the petitioner's case is similar to the other person's case. But then why examine another person's case in his absence rather than examining the case of the petitioner who is present before the Court and seeking the reliefs. Is it not more appropriate and convenient to examine the entitlement of the petitioner before the Court to the relief asked for in the facts and circumstances of his case than to enquire into the correctness of the order made or action taken in another person's case, which other person is not before the Court nor is his case. Such a course barring exceptional situations would neither be advisable nor desirable. In other words the HighCourt cannot ignore the law and the well-accepted norms governing the writ jurisdiction and say that because in one case a particular order has been passed or a particular action has been taken, the same must be repeated irrespective of the fact whether such an order or action is contrary to law or otherwise'.The observations of the Supreme Court is a clear answer to the contentions raised by respondent 1 by approaching this Court in writ jurisdiction. In our judgment, the impugned judgment is entirely unsustainable and is required to be quashed'.
In this regard the Supreme Court in Gulam Mustafa's case, supra, held:
'2. Striking down any act for mala fide exercise of power is a judicial reserve power exercised lethally, but rarely. The charge of mala fides against public bodies and authorities is more easily made in than made out. It is the last refuge of a losing litigant. Even so, we will examine the merits of the contention here from the point of view of the serious factors placed for our consideration'.
9. In this view of the matter, the order of the learned Single Judge cannot be upheld. The allegations of mala fides were neither pleaded nor established. Submissions made at the time of argument were far-fetched which could not be made a basis for quashing the notification.
10. Under the circumstances, the appeal is allowed by setting aside the order of the learned Single Judge. Rule issued is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.