ORDER
Srinivasa Reddy, J.
1. In this revision under Section 115 C P C the petitioner challenges the order passed by the Court-below dated 9th July, 2002 disposing of the revision petitions as having abated at the revisional level and directing the tenants to hand over vacant possession of the premises to the landlord.
2. Before the Court-below the petitioners-tenants preferred revision petitions against the common orders passed by the Prl. Civil Judge (Jr Dn) Udupi in H R C Nos 7 and 4/90. The tenants in both these petitions are practicing. Advocates and the premises involved in each of these petitions measures less than 14 sq metres and the Karnataka Rent Act 1999 is made applicable to Udupi City. The Court-below disposed of the revision petitions not on their comparative merits of the respective case of the landlord and the tenant but purely on the question of abatement of the revision petition.
3. The learned Counsel on both sides confined their arguments to the question whether the Court-below was right in holding that the revision petitions abate Mr. Vijaya Kumar, learned Counsel appearing for the tenants, contended that the Court-below erred in reaching the said conclusion as in respect of all premises other than those excluded under Clause (a) and (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 70 of the Act the provisions of the Act would apply and since the revision proceedings before the Court-below squarely falls under the class of cases and proceedings enumerated in Clause (b) of sub ILR Shridhar M. Kalmady & Anr. vs H. Baburaya Nayak 2923 section (2) of Section 70, the Court-below should have tried and disposed of the same on merits.
4. Learned Counsel Mr. Baliga put forth the submission that under clause (g) of sub sec (3) of Section 2 if the premises are used for non-residential purpose, the Act does not apply irrespective of the extent. Mr.Baliga contends that the exclusion under Clause (g) is limited to those premises which are used for commercial premises and not to premises used for purpose other than commercial. His specific contention is that since the petition premises are not used for commercial purpose, the provisions of the Act would not apply as the premises involved are used for non-residential purposes.
5. In the light of the rival contention urged on both sides, the question that arises for my consideration in this revision petition is whether the exception to the non-applicability Clause contained in Section 2(3)(g) of the Act exempting the premises which are exclusively used for commercial purpose and whose plinth area does not exceed fourteen square metres is not attracted to a premises used for practice of legal profession. To put it more simply, the contention of Mr. Baliga is that the Lawyers' Officer is not put to any Commercial use and therefore it is exempt from the provisions of the Act. Section 2(3)(g) of the Act which has given rise to this dispute reads
'2 Application of the Act-
(2)
(3) Nothing contained in this Act shall apply-
(g) to any premises used for non-residential purpose but excluding premises having a plinth area of not exceeding fourteen square metres used for commercial purpose.'
(Underlining is mine)
Mr. Baliga firstly submits that a non-residential premises need not necessarily be used for commercial purpose. No one can dispute this proposition. But, what he next contends on the basis of this proposition is what requires a closer examination. According to him user of a premises by practicing lawyers would not amount to putting the premises to a commercial use and once it is so held then, he submits, the exclusion to the non-application of the Act provided for in the latter portion of clause (g) would cease to operate and the premises used by practicing lawyers would invite the non-applicability provision and therefore the matter cannot be resolved under the provisions of present Act. The Court-below having held the same view, the impugned order, according to him, does not call for any interference under Section 115 CPC.
6. In the entire Act premises have been broadly classified into only two classes viz, (i) residential and non-residential without there being any reference to the different types of non-residential premises. The term 'non-residential' has not been defined by the Act and nor is the term 'commercial purpose' defined. The premises involved herein being used exclusively as lawyers' chambers, it can safely be said that the premises are being used for a non-residential purpose. But because they measure less than fourteen square metres the question to be sorted out is whether with reference to their specific usages the premises could be termed as commercial in order to exclude them from the non-applicability clause contained in clause (g) of sub sec (3) of Sec 2 of the Act or whether they should be treated as non-residential premises simpliciter not attracting the latter exclusion.
7. The premises in the present case is being used by petitioners who are practicing Advocates for running their practice. In MOHAN LAL vs KONDIAH, (1979) 2 S C C 616 which arose under the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction)Control Act, 1960 the Apex Court was required to decide the very question arising for consideration herein. The question that arose for consideration therein was whether eviction from a business premises could be sought by the landlord who is a legal professional on the ground that he requires the same for practicing his profession. Referring to the absence of the definition of the expression 'business' in Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 which was under consideration of the Apex Court in the said case, the Apex Court unravelled the meaning of the expression, 'business' as under.
'The expression, 'business' has not been defined in the Andhra Pradesh Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960. It is a common expression which is sometimes used by itself and sometimes in a collocation of words as in 'business, trade or profession'. It is a word of large and wide import, capable of a variety of meanings. It is needless to refer to the meanings given to that term in the various dictionaries except to say that everyone of them notices a large number of meanings of the word. In a broad sense it is taken to mean 'everything that occupies the time, attention and labour of men for the purpose of livelihood or profit'. In a narrow sense it is confined to commercial activity. It is obvious that the meaning of the word must be gleaned from the context in which it is used Reference to the provisions of the Constitution or other statutes where the expression is used cannot be of any assistance in determining its meaning in Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960'
The Apex Court fully conscious of the well-known principle of construction that meaning of words and expressions used in an Act must take their colour from the context in which they appear, proceeded to expound the scheme of the Act in the following words, in order to determine whether the term 'business' should be applied to the case in its broader sense or a narrower sense.
'The scheme of the Act is to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants by landlords and to provide for eviction on a specified grounds. The Act is of general application and its protection not confined to any classes of tenants nor is the right to evict under the Act limited to any class of landlords. There is no reason why a landlord who is member of the legal or medical profession and who requires the premises for carrying on the practice of his profession should be wholly debarred from obtaining possession of the premises. It is impossible to discover any reason for so making a discrimination against the liberal professions. But, that would be result if the expression 'business' is given a narrow meaning which the appellant wants us to give to that expression. It would indeed be anomalous to held that all the provisions of the Act including Section 4 which provides for the determination of fair rent and Section 10(1) which bars the eviction of the tenants apply to non-residential buildings owned by an Advocate but not Section 10(3)(a)(iii) only. In our view the expression 'business' 2926 INDIAN LAW REPORTS 2003 KARNATAKA SERIES occurring in Section 10(3)(a)(iii) is used in a wide sense so as to include the practice of the profession of an Advocate'.
The scheme of the present Act is no different from the scheme of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings Control Act, 1960. The protection under the present Act is too is not confined to any class of tenants nor is the right to evict under the Act limited to any class of landlords. If the term 'business' is held under the scheme of the Act to include in its ambit the legal profession also, then the reverse i.e. that the legal profession also amounts to a business should be held to be equally true. No brain raking is needed to conclude that business as a natural corollary would also include in its ambit every commercial activity and therefore if the legal profession has to be construed as a commercial activity or business, then the premises in which the activity is carried on is to be held as one used for commercial purpose. The principle enunciated in the above decision, therefore, nails the submission made by Mr.Baliga to the ground because the Apex Court has clearly held that the expression 'business' lands itself to two interpretations. In the broader sense it is held to mean 'everything that occupies the time, attention and labour of men for the purpose of livelihood or profit' and in the narrower sense it is confined to 'commercial activity'. Now, the entire argument of Mr. Baliga is based on the ground that the legal profession cannot be called a commercial activity. If it is to be termed as a commercial activity he would be estopped from contending that the Act does not apply to the premises given their size. The position that obtains in the present case, therefore, is a hopeless one for the respondents because even if I were to give the benefit of doubt to them and be guided entirely by the narrower sense of the term ' business' in order to determine the question in issue, I have to perforce hold that the legal profession is a commercial activity. But what aptly applies to the legal profession is the broader definition of the term 'business' which means 'everything that occupies the time, attention and labour of men for the purpose of livelihood or profit'. Now there can be no disputing the fact that the profession of a lawyer occupies the time, attention and labour and all this is spent on earning profit or eking out a livelihood.
Thus, there is no escape from the conclusion that the Act does apply to the premises in question as it is fully covered by the ILR Shridhar M. Kalmady & Anr. vs H. Baburaya Nayak 2927 exclusion carved out in the latter portion of clause (g). The application of the principle enunciated in Mohan Lal's case supra to the present case can never be doubted because the said principle was laid in the context of an eviction proceedings just as in the present case.
8. Learned Counsel Mr. Baliga drew my attention to the decision in V. SASIDHARAN vs PETER & KARUNAKAR AND OTHERS, : (1984)IILLJ385SC wherein their Lordships of the Apex Court were seized of an appeal preferred from an order passed by the Appellate Authority under the Shops and Establishments Act 1960 refusing to entertain the appeal preferred to it under the said Act by an employee of the firm of lawyers against his dismissal on the ground that the firm of lawyers is not a commercial establishment which is covered under the Act. Dismissing the appeal, their Lordships observed:
'The argument, that a lawyer 's office is a commercial establishment because, persons who are employed in that office are mainly engaged in office work, cannot be sustained. This argument overlooks that (i) under the second clause of the definition in section 2(4), 'commercial establishment' means 'an establishment or administrative service in which the persons employed are mainly engaged in office work' and thus the same question arises again as to whether a lawyer's office is an 'establishment' within the meaning of the Act, and (ii) that a lawyer's office is not an 'administrative service' and it will be doing violence to the language of the second clause of sec 2(4) to hold that a lawyer's office is an 'administrative service' . The proposition is well established that words which occur in the same context must take their colour from each other. It is unrealistic to dissect the definition clause in Section 2(4) and to catch a word here or there in order to bring a lawyer's office within the four corners of the definition of 'commercial establishment'. The various clauses of that definition would show that establishments, far apart from professional offices were within the contemplation of the legislature'
The decision so arrived at by the Apex Court in the above case depended entirely upon the definition of the expression 'commercial establishment' and the definition of cognate expressions contained in the Act. The Apex Court took up consideration only one of the various meanings assigned to the term 'commercial establishment' in Section 2(4) of the said Act which the appellant claimed would cover a lawyer's office. The said definition defined a 'commercial establishment' as 'an establishment or administrative service' in which the persons employed are mainly engaged in office work. It is in the context of the said definition contained in Section 2(4) of the said Act that the Apex Court held that the lawyer's office can neither be termed as 'an establishment' nor 'an administrative service' where the persons employed are mainly engaged in office work. The Apex Court was construing the meaning of the term 'commercial establishment' for purpose of determining the applicability of the said Act to the lawyer's office in order to decide the entitlement of a dismissed employee, who was working in the lawyer's office, to reinstatement in the light of the provisions of the said Act which did provide for such a relief against wrongful dismissal. It was in that context that the Apex Court held that the lawyers office would neither be an 'establishment' nor 'an administrative service' to enable the dismissed employee to seek such a relief. The principle so laid down by the Apex Court on the interpretation of the definition of the term as contained in the said Act cannot be made use of for purpose of interpreting the very term when it occurs sans any definition in a different statute and in a different context. The interpretation of any term must be in conformity with the contemplation of the legislature and not be alien to the context of the statute concerned. In the absence of any definition of the term 'commercial purpose' in the present Act it would be improper to import to it the limited meaning that was assigned to it under the Shops and Establishment Act, 1960 which was under consideration of the Apex Court in the case of V. Sasidharan, supra. The legislature resorts to a restrictive definition of a particular term in certain statutes with the idea of restricting its applicability to certain areas and to certain entities only by excluding vast areas that would be otherwise covered by a general definition of the particular term. Wherever such a restrictive definition is given in the statute, the Courts would be compelled to interpret or comprehend the terms within the outer limits placed on them by such restrictive definition. Because the ratio of the decision in V. Sasidharan, supra, was bound by such restrictive definition, particularly in the light of the fact that the appellant therein was content to rest his case on only one of the several definitions contained in the statute of the term 'commercial establishment', the ratio so laid down in the said case with reference to that particular definition and in the context of reinstatement of a dismissed employee, cannot be construed as laying down a general principle which could be applied to the present case for deciding the question whether the premises used by a lawyer for practicing his legal profession could be termed as one used for 'commercial purpose', in the context of an eviction petition filed under the present Act. In the absence of any definition of the term 'commercial purpose' in the statute it would be injudicious to subject the said expression to a narrow interpretation when the statute itself does not place any restriction on the power of the Court to import and to apply to it the variety of meanings that the term is capable of being construed as. From the scheme of the Act it is quite clear that the omission to define the term is deliberate and intentional on the part of the legislature and it would do violence to the provisions of the Act to interpret or to describe the term in a narrow sense. In the ultimate analysis of the provision and the case laws, it is my considered opinion that a premises used for the practice of legal profession has to be construed and comprehended as one coming within the meaning of 'commercial purpose' as found in Section 2(3)(g) of the present Act and therefore the conclusion reached by the Court-below based on the popular conception of the nature of profession of a lawyer cannot be sustained and needs to be interfered with in this revision under Section 115 as the said finding is perverse.
8. In the result, for the reasons stated above, the Revision Petitions allowed and the order passed by the Court-below is set aside. The matter is remanded to the Court-below for fresh disposal on merits by applying the provisions of the present Act and by treating the premises as one used for commercial purpose.